Topic: Energy and Environment

Rain on EPA’s Parade

No, the “waters of the United States” subject to Clean Water Act regulation do not include things like dry land over which water occasionally flows. That’s the conclusion of a federal judge who just put on hold the Environmental Protection Agency’s latest power grab.

The Clean Water Act empowers EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to regulate the use of private property that affects “navigable waters,” which the Act defines as “the waters of the United States.” In late June, EPA and the Corps finalized a rule defining that term. This was, they said, a boon to those potentially subject to CWA regulation, because “the rule will clarify and simplify implementation of the CWA consistent with its purposes through clearer definitions and increased use of bright-line boundaries…and limit the need for case- specific analysis.”

In reality, it was yet another step in what the Supreme Court called “the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act.” The rule extends federal regulation—and prohibitions on land use—to “tributaries,” which it defines as anything that directly or indirectly “contributes flow” to an actually navigable body of water or wetland and “is characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark.” The point of that legalese is to reach things like “perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral streams”—in other words, areas that aren’t really “waters” at all. The broader the definition, the more land that is subject to CWA permitting requirements and, ultimately, EPA control.

The problem for the federal government is that the Supreme Court rejected basically the same expansive approach in a 2006 case, Rapanos v. United States. In a separate opinion that some believe to be controlling, Justice Kennedy explained that, to be within the reach of the Act, a water must, at the least, “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”

Judge Ralph Erickson recognized that the new rule “suffers from the same fatal defect.” It “allows EPA regulation of waters that do not bear any effect on the ‘chemical, physical, and biological integrity’ or any navigable-in-fact water.” That includes “vast numbers of waters that are unlikely to have a nexus to navigable waters within any reasonable understanding of the term.” In other words, EPA is overreaching once again.

Federal Nuclear Clean Up: $150 Billion

Cleaning up the government’s nuclear weapons sites has become a vast sinkhole for taxpayer dollars. The Department of Energy (DOE) spends about $6 billion a year on environmental clean up of federal nuclear sites. These sites were despoiled in the decades following World War II with little notice taken by Congress. Then during the 1980s, a series of reports lambasted DOE for its lax safety and environmental standards, and federal polices began to change.

Since 1990, federal taxpayers have paid more than $150 billion to clean up the mess from the government’s nuclear sites, based on my calculations. Unfortunately, many more billions will be likely needed in coming years, partly because DOE management continues to be so poor.

A 2003 GAO report (GAO-03-593) found that “DOE’s past efforts to treat and dispose of high-level waste have been plagued with false starts and failures.” And a 2008 GAO report (GAO-08-1081) found that 9 out of 10 major clean up projects “experienced cost increases and schedule delays in their life cycle baseline, ranging from $139 million for one project to more than $9 billion for another.”

The largest of the nuclear clean up sites is Hanford in Washington State. One facility at the site has ballooned in cost from $4.3 billion in 2000 to $13.4 billion today (GAO-13-38). Overall, $19 billion has been spent cleaning up the Hanford site since 1989, and the effort continues to face huge problems (GAO-15-354).

The Washington Post reported yesterday:

A nearly completed government facility intended to treat the radioactive byproducts of nuclear weapons production is riddled with design flaws that could put the entire operation at risk of failure, according to a leaked internal report.

A technical review of the treatment plant on the grounds of the former Hanford nuclear site identified hundreds of “design vulnerabilities” and other weaknesses, some serious enough to lead to spills of radioactive material.

The draft report is the latest in a series of blows to the clean-up effort at Hanford, the once-secret government reservation in eastern Washington state where much of the nation’s plutonium stockpile originated. Engineers have struggled for years to come up with a safe method for disposing of Hanford’s millions of gallons of high-level radioactive waste, much of which is stored in leaky underground tanks.

Obviously this is a complex task, but a former Clinton administration DOE official told the newspaper that DOE:

“has proven to be incapable of managing a project of this magnitude and importance,” Alvarez said. “The agency has shown a long-standing intolerance for whistleblowers while conducting faith-based management of its contractors regardless of poor performance. This has bred a culture in which no safety misdeed goes unrewarded.”

Solyndra: A Case Study in Green Energy, Cronyism, and the Failure of Central Planning

Back in 2011 I wrote several times about the failure of Solyndra, the solar panel company that was well connected to the Obama administration. Then, as with so many stories, the topic passed out of the headlines and I lost touch with it. Today, the Washington Post and other papers bring news of a newly released federal investigative report:

Top leaders of a troubled solar panel company that cost taxpayers a half-billion dollars repeatedly misled federal officials and omitted information about the firm’s financial prospects as they sought to win a major government loan, according to a newly-released federal investigative report.

Solyndra’s leaders engaged in a “pattern of false and misleading assertions” that drew a rosy picture of their company enjoying robust sales while they lobbied to win the first clean energy loan the new administration awarded in 2009, a lengthy investigation uncovered. The Silicon Valley start-up’s dramatic rise and then collapse into bankruptcy two years later became a rallying cry for critics of President Obama’s signature program to create jobs by injecting billions of dollars into clean energy firms.

And why would it become such a rallying cry for critics? Well, consider the hyperlink the Post inserted at that point in the article: “[Past coverage: Solyndra: Politics infused Obama energy programs]” And what did that article report?

Hurricane Katrina: Remembering the Federal Failures

Ten years ago this week, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast and generated a huge disaster. The storm flooded New Orleans, killed more than 1,800 people, and caused $100 billion in property damage. The storm’s damage was greatly exacerbated by the failures of Congress, the Bush administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Army Corps of Engineers.

Weather forecasters warned government officials about Katrina’s approach, so they should have been ready for it. But they were not, and Katrina exposed major failures in America’s disaster preparedness and response systems.

Here are some of the federal failures:

  • Confusion. Key federal officials were not proactive, they gave faulty information to the public, and they were not adequately trained. The 2006 bipartisan House report on the disaster, A Failure of Initiative, said, “federal agencies … had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System.” The report found that there was “general confusion over mission assignments, deployments, and command structure.” One reason was that FEMA’s executive suites were full of political appointees with little disaster experience.
  • Failure to Learn. The government was unprepared for Katrina even though it was widely known that such a hurricane was probable, and weather forecasters had accurately predicted the advance of Katrina before landfall. A year prior to Katrina, government agencies had performed a simulation exercise—“Hurricane Pam”—for a hurricane of similar strength hitting New Orleans, but governments “failed to learn important lessons” from the exercise.
  • Communications Breakdown. The House report found that there was “a complete breakdown in communications that paralyzed command and control and made situational awareness murky at best.” Agencies could not communicate with each other due to equipment failures and a lack of system interoperability. These problems occurred despite the fact that FEMA and predecessor agencies have been giving grants to state and local governments for emergency communication systems since the beginning of the Cold War.
  • Supply Failures. Some emergency supplies were prepositioned before the storm, but there was nowhere near enough. In places that desperately needed help, such as the New Orleans Superdome, it took days to deliver medical supplies. FEMA also wasted huge amounts of supplies. It delivered millions of pounds of ice to holding centers in cities far away from the Gulf Coast. FEMA sent truckers carrying ice on wild goose chases across the country. Two years after the storm, the agency ended up throwing out $100 million of unused ice. FEMA also paid for 25,000 mobile homes costing $900 million, but they went virtually unused because of FEMA’s own regulations that such homes cannot be used on flood plains, which is where most Katrina victims lived.
  • Indecision. Indecision plagued government leaders in the deployment of supplies, in medical personnel decisions, and in other areas. Even the grisly task of body recovery after Katrina was slow and confused. Bodies went uncollected for days “as state and federal officials remained indecisive on a body recovery plan.” FEMA waited for Louisiana to make decisions about bodies, but the governor of Louisiana blamed FEMA’s tardiness in making a deal with a contractor. Similar problems of too many bureaucratic cooks in the kitchen hampered decisionmaking in areas, such as organizing evacuations and providing law enforcement resources to Louisiana.

Warming-Assisted Rapid Evolution of a Parasitic Host

In 1980, heated water from a nuclear power plant in Forsmark, Sweden (60.42°N, 18.17°E) began to be discharged into Biotest Lake, an artificial semi-enclosed lake in the Baltic Sea created in 1977 that is adjacent to the power plant and covers an area of 0.9 km2 with a mean depth of 2.5 m. The heated water has raised the temperature of the lake by 6-10°C compared to the surrounding Baltic Sea, but aside from this temperature difference, the physical conditions between the lake and the sea are very similar.

A few years after the power plant began operation, scientists conducted a study to determine the effect of the lake’s increased temperatures on the host-parasite dynamics between a fish parasite, the eyefluke (Diplostomum baeri), and its intermediate host, European perch (Perca fluviatilis). That analysis, performed in 1986 and 1987, revealed that perch in Biotest Lake experienced a higher degree of parasite infection compared to perch living in the cooler confines of the surrounding Baltic Sea (Höglund and Thulin, 1990), which finding is consistent with climate alarmist concerns that rising temperatures may lead to an increase in infectious diseases.

Fast forward to the present, however, and a much different ending to the story is observed.

Nearly three decades later, Mateos-Gonzales et al. (2015) returned to Biotest Lake and reexamined the very same host-parasite dynamic to learn what, if anything, had changed in the intervening time period. According to the team of researchers, Biotest Lake “provides an excellent opportunity to study the effect of a drastically changed environmental factor, water temperature, on the evolution of host-parasite interactions, in a single population recently split into two.” Specifically, it was their aim “to examine if the altered conditions have produced a change in prevalence and/or intensity of infection, and if these potential variations in infection have led to (or might have been caused by) a difference in parasite resistance.”

Spin Cycle: EPA Deflates Climate Impacts, Inflates Significance

The Spin Cycle is a reoccurring feature based upon just how much the latest weather or climate story, policy pronouncement, or simply poo-bah blather spins the truth. Statements are given a rating between 1-5 spin cycles, with less cycles meaning less spin. For a more in-depth description, visit the inaugural edition.

Well, well, well. The EPA has finally gone and done it. They have actually calculated the climate change impacts projected to result of one of their climate change regulations—in this case, the proposed rules for the efficiency standards for medium and heavy duty vehicles.

What they found was hardly surprising—the climate impacts from the proposed regulations will be vanishingly small.

The EPA calculates that the amount of global temperature rise averted by the end of the 21st century from the proposed regulations to be… wait, this is too good to paraphrase. From the EPA:

The results of the analysis demonstrate that relative to the reference case, by 2100 projected atmospheric CO2 concentrations are estimated to be reduced by 1.1 to 1.2 part per million by volume (ppmv), global mean temperature is estimated to be reduced by 0.0026 to 0.0065 °C, and sea-level rise is projected to be reduced by approximately 0.023 to 0.057 cm.

Did you catch that? According to the EPA’s own calculations, their regulation mandating the fuel economy of medium and light duty trucks avoids somewhere between twenty-six ten-thousandths and sixty-five ten-housandths of a degree of future global warming. In other words, it is a useless measure when it comes to influencing the future course of global temperature. If the EPA wants to regulate the fuel efficiency of trucks, it needs to justify it for reasons that don’t relate to climate change.

Overshoot Day Underestimates Human Ingenuity

Media outlets ranging from Newsweek and Time, to National Geographic and even the Weather Channel, all recently ran articles on the so-called “Overshoot Day,” which is defined by its official website as the day of the year

when humanity’s annual demand for the goods and services that our land and seas can provide—fruits and vegetables, meat, fish, wood, cotton for clothing, andcarbon dioxide absorption—exceeds what Earth’s ecosystems can renew in a year.

This year, the world allegedly reached the Overshoot Day on August 13th. Overshoot Day’s proponents claim that, having used up our ecological “budget” for the year and entered into “deficit spending,” all consumption after August 13th is unsustainable. Let’s look at the data concerning resources that, according to Overshoot Day’s definition, we are consuming unsustainably. (We’ll leave aside carbon dioxide absorption—as that issue is more complex—and focus on all the other resources).

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