Tag: Zimbabwe

Iran’s Inflation Statistics: Lies, Lies and Mehr Lies

The Mehr News Agency is now reporting that Iran’s annual inflation rate has reached 31.5%. According to the Central Bank’s official line, Iran’s annual inflation rate has bumped up only 1.3 percentage points from February to March.

Never mind that this official inflation statistic is well below all serious estimates of Iran’s inflation. And yes, Iran’s official inflation statistics are also contradicted by the overwhelming body of anecdotal reports in the financial press.

Since September 2012, I have been estimating Iran’s inflation rate – which briefly reached hyperinflation levels in October 2012 – using a standard, widely-accepted methodology. By measuring changes in the rial’s black-market (read: free-market) U.S. dollar exchange rate, it is possible to calculate an implied inflation rate for Iran.

When we do so, a much different picture of Iran’s inflation emerges. Indeed, Iran’s annual inflation rate is actually 82.5% – a rate more than double the official rate of 31.5% (see the accompanying chart).

As I have documented, regimes in countries undergoing severe inflation have a long history of hiding the true extent of their inflationary woes. In many cases, the regimes resort to underreporting or simply fabricating statistics to hide their economic problems. And, in some cases, such as Zimbabwe and North Korea, the government simply stops reporting economic data altogether.

Iran has followed a familiar path, failing to report inflation data in a timely and replicable manner. Those data that are reported by Iran’s Central Bank tend to possess what I’ve described as an “Alice in Wonderland” quality and should be taken with a grain of salt.

Where’s Iran’s Money?

Since I first estimated Iran’s hyperinflation last month , I have received inquiries as to why I have never so much as mentioned Iran’s money supply. That’s a good question, which comes as no surprise. After all, inflations of significant degree and duration always involve a monetary expansion.

But when it comes to Iran, there is not too much one can say about its money supply, as it relates to Iran’s recent bout of hyperinflation. Iran’s money supply data are inconsistent and dated. In short, the available money supply data don’t shed much light on the current state of Iran’s inflation.

Iran mysteriously stopped publishing any sort of data on its money supply after March 2011. Additionally, Iranian officials decided to change their definition of broad money in March 2010. This resulted in a sudden drop in the reported all-important bank money  portion of the total money supply, and, as a result, in the total. In consequence, a quick glance at the total money supply chart would have given off a false signal, suggesting a slump and significant deflationary pressures, as early as 2010

While very dated, at least Iran’s state money, or money produced by the central bank (monetary base, M0), is a uniform time series. The state money picture, though dated, is consistent with a “high” inflation story. Indeed, the monetary base was growing at an exponential rate in the years leading up to the end of the reported annual series.  No annual data are available after 2010 (see the chart below).

Iran is following in Zimbabwe’s well-worn footsteps, trying to throw a shroud of secrecy over the country’s monetary statistics, and ultimately its inflation problems. Fortunately for us, the availability of black-market exchange-rate data has allowed for a reliable estimate  of Iran’s inflation—casting light on its death spiral .

Zimbabwe’s Four-Year Anniversary—From Hyperinflation to Growth

In mid-November 2008, Zimbabwe recorded the world’s second-highest hyperinflation. Today, it can boast strong growth and single-digit inflation rates. In 2008, Zimbabwe’s annual real GDP growth rate was a miserable -17.6 percent and its annual inflation rate was 89.7 sextillion percent—that’s roughly 9 followed by 22 zeros.

So how did Zimbabwe go from economic ruin to an annual GDP growth rate of 9.32 percent in 2011, with estimates of relatively strong growth rates through 2013?  As I predicted in early 2008, the answer is simple: spontaneous dollarization brought an end to the horrors of hyperinflation.

In late 2008, the people of Zimbabwe spontaneously dollarized the economy. Thiers’ Law prevailed: good money drove out bad, and the government’s hands were tied. Indeed, the government was forced to officially dollarize in 2009. Since then, Zimbabwe has enjoyed positive GDP growth rates, a feat not accomplished since 2001 (see accompanying chart).

 

While these achievements are cause for celebration, there are still problems in paradise: Robert Mugabe continues to hold the reins of power; Zimbabwe’s “Ease of Doing Business” ranking is a dismal 172nd out of 185; and “change” is, in short, hard to come by. In addition, the government’s external debt is now close to $12.5 billion and lending rates between Zimbabwe’s embattled banks are as high as 25 percent. To top it off, the Zimbabwean government is attempting to force banks to buy its treasury bills at significantly discounted rates, after its debt auction flopped in early October. Talk about ruling with an iron fist.

If this isn’t bad enough, Zimbabwe’s official statistics have produced a very low signal-to-noise ratio—one that, quite frankly, leaves one listening to static. Both the quantity and quality of official data, ranging from migration statistics to trade figures, are in short supply, particularly data from the period of Zimbabwe’s 2007-08 hyperinflation.

None of this comes to a surprise to me. After all, as far as Zimbabwean officials are concerned, the country’s hyperinflation peaked in July 2008, with a monthly inflation rate of 2,600 percent. After this point, Zimbabwe stopped collecting and reporting data on price changes, throwing a shroud of secrecy over the country’s hyperinflation disaster. In reality, hyperinflation continued after July 2008, growing at an exponential rate until mid-November 2008.

Alex Kwok and I lifted the shroud on this hyperinflation in our 2009 Cato Journal article. We determined that Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation actually peaked in mid-November 2008, with a monthly rate over 30 million times higher than the final inflation rate reported by the government. In an attempt to correct the government’s lying statistics, I have contacted high officials in Zimbabwe via telephone and email. But, I have been stonewalled, given a bureaucratic runaround.

The last thing the Mugabe government seems to be interested in is an accurate account of the world’s second-highest hyperinflation. Lying statistics remain the order of the day.