Tag: weapons programs

New Paper Argues for Immediate, Practical Cuts in Military Spending

A new report published today by the Project on Defense Alternatives  argues for $17-$20 billion in immediate savings to the Fiscal Year 2013 defense budget. I co-authored the report along with Benjamin Friedman of Cato, and PDA’s Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Ethan Rosenkranz. Those savings come from 18 line items—personnel, weapons systems, and programs—that could be implemented quickly. Adjustments to U.S. national security strategy are not a prerequisite for these options, which are relatively low-hanging fruit.

The 2013 defense authorization bill will move to the House floor this week. Many members are expected to offer amendments, some allowing savings in the defense budget. During the debates that are about to ensue„ it is important to keep in mind just how large the defense budget has become. As our paper notes, the national defense base budget constitutes 52 percent of discretionary spending, separate from the war account. Since 2000, it has risen by 90 percent in nominal terms and 42 percent in real terms. If Washington is serious about addressing the nation’s massive fiscal challenge, many programs will have to be cut or reformed. The Pentagon should not be expected to bear all of the costs; other departments and agencies will also have to contribute. But there has not yet been a significant decline in the Pentagon’s base budget, contrary to what some have claimed.

The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 places an initial discretionary spending cap on National Defense for 2013 at $546 billion. Both President Obama’s request, and the House Republican’s budget exceed the BCA caps. In addition, the BCA requires $110 billion in spending cuts in January 2013 via sequestration, half of which need to come from DoD. Neither the White House nor Congress plans for that to occur; both sides hope to amend the law and achieve equal deficit reductions by other means. As it currently stands, though they disagree on how. Republicans want to cut other spending, Democrats to raise taxes. The options outlined in our paper could facilitate these negotiations, by revealing savings in the DoD budget that will not damage our national security.

The savings options in the report focus on reducing or curtailing:

  •  Assets and capabilities that mismatch or substantially exceed current and emerging military challenges;
  • Assets and capabilities for which more cost-effective alternatives exist;
  • Investments that are tied to the past, reflecting bureaucratic inertia or individual’s service interests, rather than current collective defense needs;
  • Acquisition programs that exhibit serious, persistent cost overruns, while failing to deliver  promised capability, and
  • Acquisition programs that are based on immature or unproven technologies.

Further savings are possible if we rethink our strategy, missions, and national security commitments. Ben Friedman and I have long argued this point. Until then, the options presented in “Defense Sense” are limited in scope in an effort to pave the way toward responsibly balancing national security ends, ways, and means.

Although I encourage everyone to look at the report, here are just five of the 18 cuts that policymakers should immediately consider:

  • Military personnel in Europe: Remove additional 10,000 military personnel by end of FY 2013; save $100 million in FY 2013 and $188 million per year once complete
  • Active-component military personnel: Reduce end-strength by an additional 10,000 personnel; save $400 million in FY 2013 and $860 million recurring annual savings once complete
  • Missile Defense: Focus on procurement and end-stage development on systems with proven, reliable, cost-effective capability (see report for details); save $2.5 billion in FY 2013
  • F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Cancel USMC variant; buy equivalent numbers F/A-18 E/F; save $1.8 billion in FY 2013
  • Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): End procurement at 10 and seek alternative; save $2 billion in FY 2013

Cross-posted from the Skeptics at the National Interest.

Cooper vs. the Services

Congressman Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) has a fairly radical proposal for reforming defense acquisition in Politico.

Cooper wants to put the military services’ acquisition staffs under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense. The idea is to liberate the staffs from the parochial perspectives that cause various pathologies in acquisition programs.

The oped implicitly blames large and consistent cost overruns in weapons programs on the services’ interests, which manifest in excessive requirements for platforms. For example, the Air Force’s religious attachment to the over-designed and thus wildly expensive F-22 has its origin in a peculiar self-image, one that sees the establishment of air superiority for strategic bombing as the Air Force’s main mission. You can tell a similar story about another contender in the Pentagon’s biggest white elephant sweepstakes: the Marine’s amphibious Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

Cooper is rejecting the more popular view that the trouble in acquisition is the lack of independent cost estimates and other failures in the contracting process. That technocratic view underlies the acquisition bill that just became law. Cooper is saying that the trouble is more what we want than how we buy it, and what we want is a consequence of the services’ power. To deal with that, you must either change the services’ conception of their interests (and note that such efforts are arguably underway, especially in the Air Force) or take power from them. He’s pushing for the latter.

The weakness in the oped is a failure to explain how moving the military’s acquisition personnel to OSD would change the incentives that cause officers to do their service’s bidding. They would still work for a service, after all, and face its promotion board. A more radical proposal would be to hand more power over acquisition to the civilians in OSD and remove redundant positions from the services.

Cooper also takes (another) shot at constant service shares – the tradition, dating to the Kennedy Administration, where the Army, Navy and Air Force all get consistent shares of the budget each year. That tradition stifles interservice competition and therefore innovation. Giving the lion’s share of defense spending to the ground forces would be a sensible outgrowth of our current defense strategy, which is manpower-intensive. The Navy and Air Force might then be forced to scramble for relevance, causing them to initiate many of the reforms to their procurement programs that Secretary Gates has proposed. (An even better tact would be to cut the defense budget massively but give more of it to the Navy, given that our current strategy encourages dumb wars).

Note that the suggestion to enhance service competition relies on decentralized institutions competing, whereas the main suggestion of the oped is to heighten the centralized authority of the Secretary. Whether these are contradictory ideas is academic, for now, because at least one is not going to happen soon. The service’s would go the mattresses to protect their control of their acquisition programs, and there is a no sign of a political constituency willing to pick that fight.