Tag: TTIP

Time for Hillary to Speak Up on Trade

The Washington Post ran an editorial on Wednesday indicting Hillary Clinton for her silence on the trade agenda. Yesterday morning, the Post published an op-ed by Robert Kagan of Brookings titled “Clinton’s Cowardice on Trade.” Both pieces offer some valid observations, but the matter deserves more scrutiny still.

Is it just me or do others see it as presumptuous, disrespectful, and even contemptuous that the person who expects to head the Democratic Party ticket next year feels entitled to her silence on the single most divisive issue confronting that party? Trade policy is causing a schism between Democrats, and Clinton chooses to showcase her leadership bona fides by … refraining from taking a position? And what does that say about the judgment of her steadfast supporters, whose return silence countenances an evasion akin to deceit? On the other hand, Clinton’s supporters are accustomed to accommodating a more expansive definition of honesty, so perhaps they’re oblivious.

If I were an engaged Democrat, I’d demand to know, now, where Hillary Clinton stands on trade. And if I were a presidential candidate with a reputation for favoring expedience over principle and whose most compelling claim to the White House is that I really, really want to be president, I would want to demonstrate my worthiness by taking a firm position, explaining to my party why I believe that position is the right one, pointing out (as President Obama has) that many of the Left’s objections to trade are based on fallacies, and sticking to it, even if it alienates some factions. Making some people unhappy is a necessity of leadership.

Like President Obama, Hillary Clinton has a history of flip-flopping on trade, so people are understandably confused. As First Lady, she advocated on behalf of her husband’s efforts to forge NAFTA. As a U.S. senator, she was a solid protectionist, voting against trade barriers only 31 percent of the time and against trade-distorting subsidies only 13 percent of the time. As a candidate for president, she expressed skepticism and, at times, indignation about trade agreements and joined with the political left in vilifying NAFTA. As secretary of state, she not only embraced the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but was instrumental in making it the centerpiece of the administration’s “pivot to Asia.” Today, in the midst of a debate that will make or break the TPP and shape next year’s Democratic Party platform and more, Clinton is mum.

The Trade Promotion Authority legislation struggling to gain support from congressional Democrats would extend the terms of TPA through the entirety of the next president’s first term and into the second (it would expire in July 2021). It is a tool that would be welcomed by any president who sees trade agreements as channels for economic growth and diplomacy. Clinton’s silence implies indifference to the outcome of the TPA debate in Congress and, thus, indifference to trade liberalization as a policy tool. Clinton is well aware that the most important aspect of U.S. foreign policy to most countries is our trade and commercial policy.

So, unless the former top U.S. diplomat, as president, would turn her back on the TPP she once embraced, and pull the rug out from under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—outcomes that would deprive the economy of valuable growth opportunities, offend 39 foreign governments, and reinforce perceptions of U.S. decline—she should affirmatively endorse TPA now.

Clinton’s endorsement would signal leadership and provide cover for scores of Democrats in Congress who are wary of the party’s dash to the far left. It would provide refuge for members who want to be on the economically responsible side of the schism. It would create an environment where it is safe to say the anti-trade, progressive emperor is stark naked. 

Selling Trade Liberalization Like the Measles Vaccine

President Obama is presiding over what may prove to be the most significant round of trade liberalization in American history, yet he has never once made an affirmative case for that outcome. Despite various reports of intensifying outreach to members of Congress, the president’s “advocacy” is couched in enough skepticism to create and reinforce fears about trade and globalization.

Politico reports:

On Tuesday, Obama sent a letter directly to Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), arguing that reaching new trade agreements is the only way to stop China from dominating the global markets and letting its lax standards run the world.

“If they succeed, our competitors would be free to ignore basic environmental and labor standards, giving them an unfair advantage against American workers,” Obama wrote Gallego in a letter obtained by POLITICO. “We can’t let that happen. We should write the rules, and level the playing field for the middle class.”

Certainly, playing the China card could help win support for Trade Promotion Authority and, eventually, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but it needn’t be the first selling point.  Pitching trade agreements as though they were innoculations from an otherwise imminent disease betrays a profound lack of understanding of the benefits of trade. With TPP near completion and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership talks expected to accelerate, the president’s stubborn refusal to make an affirmative case for his trade initiatives to the public and the skeptics in his party is disconcerting. Bill Watson was troubled by the president’s feeble advocacy of trade liberalization in his SOTU address.

Trade Promotion Authority Is not an Executive Power Grab

With the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations reported to be nearing completion and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks kicking into higher gear, Congress is expected to turn its attention to Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation in the weeks ahead.

That’s where opponents of trade – mostly from the Left, but some from the Right – have decided to wage the next battle in their war against trade liberalization. Tactically, that makes some sense because, if they succeed, the TPP and the TTIP will be sidelined indefinitely. But, as observed by the Greek Tragedians and countless times in the millennia since, truth is the first casualty of war.

Trade opponents characterize TPA as an executive power-grab, a legislative capitulation, and a blank check from Congress that entitles the president to negotiate trade deals in secret without any congressional input except the right to vote “yea” or “nay” on an unalterable, unamendable, completed and signed agreement. But the truth is that TPA does not cede any authority from one branch to the other, but makes exercise of that authority more practicable for both branches.

Under the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Congress is given the authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” and to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” While the president has no specific constitutional authority over trade, Article II grants the president power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Accordingly, the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of trade agreements require the involvement and cooperation of both branches.

At a Minimum, Transatlantic Trade Negotiations Should Ditch Investor-State Provisions

Some exaggeration notwithstanding, Harold Meyerson, with whom the occasion to agree is rare, does a reasonably good job describing some of the pitfalls of the so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism in his Washington Post column yesterday.  ISDS has become a source of growing controversy, which threatens to derail the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, which are reported to be floundering during the seventh “round” of talks taking place this week in Chevy Chase, Maryland.

“Under ISDS,” Meyerson writes, “foreign investors can sue a nation with which their own country has such treaty arrangements over any rules, regulations or changes in policy that they say harm their financial interests.”  That is more or less correct, but the implication that the threshold for bringing a suit is simple harm to a foreign investor’s financial interests is misleading.  What is being disciplined under ISDS is not harm to financial interests of foreign investors, but harm that comes from discriminatory treatment of foreign investors.  Thus, ISDS avails foreign investors (i.e., U.S. companies invested abroad, foreign companies invested in the U.S.) of access to third-party arbitration tribunals as venues for determining whether and to what extent the plaintiff suffered economic damages on account of host-government actions or policies that fail to meet certain minimum standards of treatment.

Meyerson suggests that ISDS provisions be purged from the TTIP negotiations because they subordinate U.S. courts to unaccountable tribunals, which “invites a massive end-run around national regulations.” Though I firmly believe the U.S. economy is racked with superfluous and otherwise unnecessary regulations, I do believe that a successful foreign challenge of U.S. laws, regulations, or actions in a third-party arbitration tribunal (none has occurred, yet) would subvert accountability, democracy, and the rule of law.  For those and several other reasons, I’m on board with Meyerson’s suggestion to purge ISDS from TTIP, and would extend the purge to all trade agreements.  In fact, I developed eight reasons for purging ISDS from the trade negotiations in this paper earlier this year.

Fast Track Fallacies Knee-Capping the Trade Agenda

Media have been reporting lately about the public’s burgeoning opposition to the Congress granting President Obama fast track trade negotiating authority. Among the evidence of this alleged opposition is a frequently cited survey, which finds that 62 percent of Americans oppose granting fast track to President Obama.
 
Considering that the survey producing that figure was commissioned by a triumvirate of anti-trade activist groups – the Communication Workers of America, the Sierra Club, and the U.S. Business and Industry Council – I had my doubts about the accuracy of that claim. After all, would lobbyists who devote so much of their efforts to derailing the trade agenda risk funding a survey that might produce results contrary to their objectives?
 
My skepticism – it turns out – was warranted. The 62 percent who allegedly “oppose giving the president fast-track authority for TPP [the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement]” actually oppose giving the president a definition of fast track that is woefully inaccurate. The graphic below shows the question and response tally, as presented in the report showing the survey’s results, which is here.  Read the question that begins with “As you may know…”
 
 

Should Free Traders Support Free Trade Agreements?

With the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations allegedly near completion, the transatlantic talks kicking into higher gear, and debate in Congress over U.S. trade policy objectives about to intensify, 2014 is shaping up to be the most consequential year for the trade agenda in a long time. Whether real free traders should rejoice over these developments depends on the emerging details, as well as the ability to avoid making the perfect the enemy of the good.

Real free traders abhor domestic trade barriers and want them removed regardless of whether other governments remove their own barriers. The benefits of trade are the imports we obtain, not the exports we give up. The immediate benefits are measured by the value of imports that can be purchased for a given unit of exports – the more, the better – and domestic barriers reduce those terms of trade. Of course, there are also the secondary benefits of imports, which include greater variety, lower prices, more competition, better quality, and the innovation spawned by those and other factors.

The process of U.S. trade policy formulation has never been particularly accommodating of free traders’ perspectives. Free trade views have been marginalized by their being subsumed within a broader category of views labelled “pro-trade,” which is dominated by business lobbies and other “pro-export” mercantilists. As the definition of free trade has been expanded to mean pro-trade, the definition of protectionism has been narrowed to exclude views, such as: “I’m not a protectionist; I just want a level playing field,” or; “I’m for free trade, as long as it’s fair trade.” Those are the clichés of protectionists, who are now popularly grouped under the pro-trade umbrella.

So, today’s trade debate (framed as it is by media, lobbyists, and politicians) does not feature free-traders on one side and protectionists on the other. Instead, one is either pro-trade or anti-trade, supports corporations or their workers, and believes free trade agreements are either good or evil. In a world with these binary choices, nuance gets squeezed out. Where do you fit if you support the tariff reductions in a trade agreement, but are unhappy with the corporate welfare it bestows on particular industries? What if you know that trade liberalization is good for both corporations and their workers alike? What if you’re pro-market, but not pro-business?

Given these and other ambiguities, should free traders support free trade agreements? Let me lay down a marker for free trade – “real” free trade, that is.

Free markets are essential to our prosperity, and free trade is the extension of free markets across political borders. Making markets freer and expanding them to integrate more buyers, sellers, investors, and workers deepens and broadens that prosperity. When goods, services, capital, and labor flow freely across borders, Americans can take full advantage of the opportunities of the international marketplace. Free trade provides benefits to consumers and taxpayers in the form of lower prices, greater variety, and better quality. And, it enables businesses and workers to reap the benefits of innovation, specialization, and economies of scale that larger markets afford. Countless studies have shown that economies that are more open grow faster and achieve higher incomes than those that are relatively closed.

Bali’s Lessons for Trade Negotiators

The future of multilateral trade has presented some vexing questions for policy watchers over the past few years. With the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations hopelessly stalled and the proliferation of regional and bilateral agreements in its stead, contemplation and debate about the fate of the World Trade Organization, its successful adjudicatory body, international trade governance, and globalization have been all the rage.

December continues to shine a particularly bright light on these issues, as U.S. and EU negotiators are in Washington this week discussing the proposed bilateral Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Last week, negotiators from the United States and 11 other nations met in Singapore in an effort to advance the regional Trans-Pacific Partnership deal. The week prior, representatives of 159 WTO members were in Bali, Indonesia for the Ninth Ministerial Conference (MC-9), where a multilateral agreement was reached on a set of issues for the first time in the WTO’s 19-year history.

The significance of the Bali deal depends on whom you ask. Those heavily vested in the current architecture of the multilateral system tend to hail Bali as proof that multilateral negotiations are back in business and that there is renewed promise for completing the long-stalled Doha Round. Frankly, taking 12 years to forge an agreement on trade facilitation (basically, reform of customs procedures, which constitutes a tiny fraction of the Doha Round’s objectives) plus some concessions to permit more subsidization of agriculture in the name of food security is not exactly convincing evidence that Doha Round negotiators have demonstrated their cost effectiveness or the utility of this approach.