Tag: transportation security administration

TSA on the Prowl for Embezzlers

The TSA is exceeding its authority.

At what point does an airport search step over the line?

How about when they start going through your checks, and the police call your husband, suspicious you were clearing out the bank account?

This kind of thing was supposed to stop after the TSA revised its policies a year ago. The revision came in the wake of the unconstitutional seizure of Campaign for Liberty staffer Steven Bierfeldt for carrying cash donations (prompting a lawsuit from the ACLU). A federal judge had already determined that fake passports found on an airline passenger were inadmissible in court.

The TSA is not a law enforcement agency. TSA screeners aren’t supposed to search for anything beyond weapons and explosives. Or, as TSA policy currently reads, “Screening may not be conducted to detect evidence of crimes unrelated to transportation security.”

Kathy Parker, a business support manager for a large bank, was flying with a deposit slip and several checks made out to her and her husband. TSA screeners suspected she was skipping town in the midst of a “divorce situation.”

Two Philadelphia police officers joined at least four TSA officers who had gathered around her. After conferring with the TSA screeners, one of the Philadelphia officers told her he was there because her checks were numbered sequentially, which she says they were not.

“It’s an indication you’ve embezzled these checks,” she says the police officer told her. He also told her she appeared nervous. She hadn’t before that moment, she says.

She protested when the officer started to walk away with the checks. “That’s my money,” she remembers saying. The officer’s reply? “It’s not your money.”

Glad to see that we’re in good hands, and that no one has lost focus on the aviation security mission at TSA. Read the whole thing.

Strip-Search Images Stored

The Transportation Security Administration will be sure to point out that it was not them—it was the U.S. Marshals Service—that kept ”tens of thousands of images recorded with a millimeter wave system at the security checkpoint of a single Florida courthouse,” according to Declan McCullagh of C|Net news.

The TSA has taken pains to make sure that their use of strip-search machines does not produce compromising images of the traveling public, but rules are made to be broken. How do you protect privacy in the use of a technology that is fundamentally designed to invade privacy?

Stop ‘n’ Frisk Databases

Via Adam Serwer, New York governor David A. Paterson is expected to sign a bill today doing away with data collection on people the police stop and question, but who have done nothing wrong.

The Transportation Security Adminstration’s “SPOT” program—recently the subject of a scathing Government Accountability Office critique—does similar data collection about innocent people.

From late May 2004 through August 2008, “behavior detection officers” referred 152,000 travelers to secondary inspection at airports. Of those, TSA agents referred 14,000 people to law enforcement, which resulted in approximately 1,100 arrests. None had links to terrorism or any threat to aviation.

The data TSA collects “when observed behaviors exceed certain thresholds”—that is, when a traveler garners TSA suspicion—includes:

  • first, middle, and last names
  • aliases and nicknames
  • home and business addresses and phone numbers
  • employer information
  • identification numbers such as Social Security Number, drivers license number or passport number
  • date and place of birth
  • languages spoken
  • nationality
  • age
  • sex
  • race
  • height and weight
  • eye color
  • hair color, style and length
  • facial hair, scars, tattoos and piercings, clothing (including colors and patterns) and eyewear
  • purpose for travel and contact information
  • photographs of any prohibited items, associated carry-on bags, and boarding documents
  • identifying information for traveling companion.

Good Thing There Are So Few Bad Guys

Returning from Chicago this past weekend, I noticed that they were using strip-search machines in several security lanes at the TSA checkpoint (ORD Terminal 1). Naturally, after the ID check—yes, I did show ID this time—I chose a lane that lead to a magnetometer rather than a strip-search machine.

Annnnnd, anyone wanting to smuggle a plastic weapon could do the same.

For all the money spent on strip-search machines at ORD, and for all the exposure law-abiding travelers are getting, the incremental security benefit has been just about exactly zero. Security theater. TSA has to direct people to lanes mandatorily or install strip-search machines at all lanes to get whatever small security benefit they provide.

Going through the strip-search machine is optional—you can get a pat-down instead. Signage to that effect was poorly placed for informing the public, at the entrance to the strip-search machine. Travelers might read it as they stepped into the machine, realizing from that standing spread-eagle position that they didn’t have to be there.

EPIC: Suspend Airport Body Scanners

Last week, the Electronic Privacy Information Center released a petition from a group it spearheaded, asking the Department of Homeland Security to suspend deployment of whole-body imaging (aka “strip-search machines”) at airports.

The petition is a thorough attack on the utility of the machines, the process (or lack of process) by which DHS has moved forward on deployment, and the suitability of the privacy protections the agency has claimed for the machines and computers that display denuded images of air travelers.

The petition sets up a variety of legal challenges to the use of the machines and the process DHS has used in deploying them.

Whole-body imaging was in retreat in the latter part of last year when an amendment to severely limit their use passed the House of Representatives. The December 25 terror attempt, in which a quantity of explosives was smuggled aboard a U.S.-bound airplane in a passenger’s underpants, gave the upper hand to the strip-search machines. But the DHS has moved forward precipitously with detection technology before, wasting millions of dollars. It may be doing so again.

My current assessment remains that strip-search machines provide a small margin of security at a very high risk to privacy. TSA efforts to control privacy risks have been welcome, though they may not be enough. The public may rationally judge that the security gained is not worth the privacy lost.

Wouldn’t it be nice if decisions about security were handled in a voluntary rather than a coercive environment? With airlines providing choice to consumers about security and privacy trade-offs? As it is, with government-run airline security, all will have to abide by the choices of the group that “wins” the debate.

Making Sense of New TSA Procedures

Since they were announced recently, I’ve been working to make sense of new security procedures that TSA is applying to flights coming into the U.S.

“These new measures utilize real-time, threat-based intelligence along with multiple, random layers of security, both seen and unseen, to more effectively mitigate evolving terrorist threats,” says Secretary Napolitano.

That reveals essentially nothing of what they are, of course. Indeed, “For security reasons, the specific details of the directives are not public.”

But we in the public aren’t so many potted plants. We need to know what they are, both because our freedoms are at stake and because our tax money will be spent on these measures.

Let’s start at the beginning, with identity-based screening and watch-listing in general. A recent report in the New York Times sums it up nicely:

The watch list is actually a succession of lists, beginning with the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or TIDE, a centralized database of potential suspects.  … [A]bout 10,000 names come in daily through intelligence reports, but … a large percentage are dismissed because they are based on “some combination of circular reporting, poison pens, mistaken identities, lies and so forth.”

Analysts at the counterterrorism center then work with the Terrorist Screening Center of the F.B.I. to add names to what is called the consolidated watch list, which may have any number of consequences for those on it, like questioning by the police during a traffic stop or additional screening crossing the border. That list, in turn, has various subsets, including the no-fly list and the selectee list, which requires passengers to undergo extra screening.

The consolidated list has the names of more than 400,000 people, about 97 percent of them foreigners, while the no-fly and selectee lists have about 6,000 and 20,000, respectively.

After the December 25, 2009 attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam into Detroit, TSA quickly established, then quickly lifted, an oppressive set of rules for travelers, including bans on blankets and on moving about the cabin during the latter stages of flights. In the day or two after a new attempt, security excesses of this kind are forgivable.

But TSA also established identity-based security rules of similar provenance and greater persistence, subjecting people from fourteen countries, mostly Muslim-dominated, to special security screening. This was ham-handed reaction, increasing security against the unlikely follow-on attacker by a tiny margin while driving wedges between the U.S. and people well positioned to help our security efforts.

Former DHS official Stewart Baker recently discussed the change to this policy on the Volokh Conspiracy blog:

The 14-country approach wasn’t a long-term solution.  So some time in January or February, with little fanfare, TSA seems to have begun doing something much more significant.  It borrowed a page from the Customs and Border Protection playbook, looking at all passengers on a flight, running intelligence checks on all of them, and then telling the airlines to give extra screening to the ones that looked risky.

Mark Ambinder lauded the new policy on the Atlantic blog, describing it thusly:

The new policy, for the first time, makes use of actual, vetted intelligence. In addition to the existing names on the “No Fly” and “Selectee” lists, the government will now provide unclassified descriptive information to domestic and international airlines and to foreign governments on a near-real time basis.

Likely, the change is, or is very much like, applying a Customs and Border Patrol program called ATS-P (Automated Targeting System - Passenger) to air travel screening.

“[ATS-P] compares Passenger Name Record (PNR) and information in [various] databases against lookouts and patterns of suspicious activity identified by analysts based upon past investigations and intelligence,” says this Congressional Research Service report.

“It was through application of the ATS-P that CBP officers at the National Targeting Center selected Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate an explosive device on board Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, for further questioning upon his arrival at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.”

Is using ATS-P or something like it an improvement in the way airline security is being done? It probably is.

A watch-list works by comparing the names of travelers to the names of people that intelligence has deemed concerning. To simplify, the logic looks like something like this:

If first name=”Cat” (or variants) and last name=”Stevens”, then *flag!*

Using intelligence directly just broadens the identifiers you use, so the comparison (again simplified) might look something like this:

If biography contains “traveled in Yemen” or “Nigerian student” or “consorted with extremists”, then *flag!*

The ability to flag a potential terrorist with identifiers beyond name is a potential improvement. Such a screening system would be more flexible than one that used purely name-based matching. But using more identifiers isn’t automatically better.

The goal—unchanged—is to minimize both false positives and false negatives—that is, people flagged as potential terrorists who are not terrorists, and people not flagged as terrorists who are terrorists. A certain number of false positives are acceptable if that avoids false negatives, but a huge number of false positives will just waste resources relative to the margin of security the screening system creates. Given the overall paucity of terrorists—which is otherwise a good thing—it’s very easy to waste resources on screening.

I used the name “Cat Stevens” above because it’s one of several well known examples of logic that caused false positives. Utterly simplistic identifiers like “traveled in Yemen” will also increase false positives dramatically. More subtle combinations of identifiers and logic can do better. The questions are how far they increase false positives, and whether the logic is built on enough information to produce true positives.

So far as we know, ATS-P has never flagged a terrorist before it flagged the underwear bomber. DHS officials tried once to spin up a case in which ATS-P flagged someone who was involved in an Iraq car-bombing after being excluded from the U.S. However, I believe, as I suggested two years ago, that ATS-P flagged him as a likely visa overstayer and not as a terror threat. He may not have been a terror threat when flagged, as some reports have it that he descended into terrorism after being excluded from the U.S. This makes the incident at best an example of luck rather than skill. That I know of, nobody with knowledge of the incident has ever disputed my theory, which I think they would have done if they could.

The fact that ATS-P flagged one terrorist is poor evidence that it will “work” going forward. The program “working” in this case means that it finds true terrorists without flagging an unacceptable/overly costly number of non-terrorists.

Of course, different people are willing to accept different levels of cost to exclude terrorists from airplanes. I think I have come up with a good way to measure the benefits of screening systems like this so that costs and benefits can be compared, and the conversation can be focused.

Assume a motivated attacker that would eventually succeed. By approximating the amount of damage the attack might do and how long it would take to defeat the security measure, one can roughly estimate its value.

Say, for example, that a particular attack might cause one million dollars in damage. Delaying it for a year is worth $50,000 at a 5% interest rate. Delaying for a month an attack that would cause $10 billion in damage is worth about $42 million.

(I think it is fair to assume that any major attack will happen only once, as it will produce responses that prevent it happening twice. The devastating “commandeering” attack on air travel and infrastructure is instructive. The 9/11 attacks permanently changed the posture of air passengers toward hijackers, and subsequent hardening of cockpit doors has brought the chance of another commandeering attack very close to nil.)

A significant weakness of identity-based screening (which “intelligence-based” screening—if there’s a difference—shares) is that it is testable. A person may learn if he or she is flagged for extra scrutiny simply by traveling a few times. A person who passes through airport security six times in a two-month period and does not receive extra scrutiny can be confident enough on the seventh trip that he or she will not be specially screened. If a person does receive special scrutiny on test runs, that’s notice of being in a suspect category, so someone else should carry out a planned attack.

(“We’ll make traveling often a ground for suspicion!” might go the answer. “False positives,” my rejoinder.)

Assuming that it takes two months more than it otherwise would to recruit and clear a clean-skin terrorist, as Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda franchises have done, the dollar value of screening is $125 million. That is the amount saved (at a 5% interest rate) by delaying for one month an attack costing $15 billion (a RAND corporation estimate of the total cost of a downed airliner, public reactions included).

Let’s say that the agility of having non-name identifiers does improve screening and causes it to take three months rather than two to find a candidate who can pass through the screen. Ignoring the costs of additional false positives (though they could be very high), the value of screening rises to $187.5 million.

(There is plenty of room to push and pull on all these assumptions. I welcome comments on both the assumptions and the logic of using the time-value of delayed attacks to quantify the benefits of security programs.)

A January 2009 study entitled, “Just How Much Does That Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the Financial Costs and Benefits of the ‘No-Fly’ List,” put the amount expended on “no-fly” listing up to that time at between $300 million and $966 million, with a medium estimate of $536 million. The study estimated yearly costs at between $51 and $161 million, with a medium estimate of $89 million.

The new screening procedures, whose contours are largely speculative, may improve air security by some margin. Their additional costs are probably unknown to anyone yet as false positive rates have yet to be determined, and the system has yet to be calibrated. Under the generous assumption that this change makes it 50% harder to defeat the screening system, the value of screening rises, mitigating the ongoing loss that identity-based screening appears to bring to our overall welfare.

Hey, if you’ve read this far, you’ll probably go one or two more paragraphs…

It’s worth noting how the practice of “security by obscurity” degrades the capacity of outside critics to contribute to the improvement of homeland security programs. Keeping the contours of this system secret requires people like me to guess at what it is and how it works, so my assessment of its strengths and weaknesses is necessarily degraded. As usual, Bruce Schneier has smart things to say on security by obscurity, building on security principles generated over more than 125 years in the field of cryptography.

DHS could tell the public a great deal more about what it is doing. There is no good reason for the security bureaucracy to insist on going mano a mano against terrorism, turning away the many resources of the broader society. The margin of information the United States’ enemies might access would be more than made up for by the strength our security programs would gain from independent criticism and testing.