Tag: trade

Antidumping Reform Crucial to U.S. Competitiveness

The Cato Institute today published its 13th policy paper on the topic of antidumping. “Economic Self-Flagellation: How U.S. Antidumping Policy Subverts the National Export Initiative” describes with compelling anecdotes and data how the outdated assumptions of a 90-year-old law—one purported to “level the playing field” and protect U.S. companies from “unfair” foreign competition—conspire with its overzealous application to erode the competitiveness of U.S. firms.

During the decade from January 2000 through December 2009, the U.S. government imposed 164 antidumping measures on a variety of products from dozens of countries. A total of 130 of those 164 measures restricted (and in most cases, still restrict) imports of intermediate goods and raw materials used by downstream U.S. producers in the production of their final products. Those restrictions raise the costs of production for the downstream firms, weakening their capacity to compete with foreign producers in the United States and abroad.

In all of those cases, trade-restricting antidumping measures were imposed without any of the downstream companies first having been afforded opportunities to demonstrate the likely adverse impact on their own business operations. This is by design. The antidumping statute forbids the administering authorities from considering the impact of prospective duties on consuming industries—or on the economy more broadly—when weighing whether or not to impose duties.

That asymmetry has always been insane, but given the emergence and proliferation of transnational production and supply chains and cross-border investment (i.e., globalization)—evidenced by the fact that 55% of all U.S. import value consists of raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital equipment (the purchases of U.S. producers)—it is now nothing short of self-flagellation.

Most of those import-consuming, downstream producers—those domestic victims of the U.S. antidumping law—are also struggling U.S. exporters. In fact those downstream companies are much more likely to export and create new jobs than are the firms that turn to the antidumping law to restrict trade. Antidumping duties on magnesium, polyvinyl chloride, and hot-rolled steel, for example, may please upstream, petitioning domestic producers, who can subsequently raise their prices and reap greater profits. But those same “protective” duties are extremely costly to U.S. producers of auto parts, paint, and appliances, who require those inputs for their own manufacturing processes.

President Obama acknowledges as much. On August 11, 2010, at a White House signing ceremony, the president offered the following rationale for a bill that he was about to sign into law:

The Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010 will create jobs, help American companies compete, and strengthen manufacturing as a key driver of our economic recovery. And here’s how it works. To make their products, manufacturers—some of whom are represented here today—often have to import certain materials from other countries and pay tariffs on those materials. This legislation will reduce or eliminate some of those tariffs, which will significantly lower costs for American companies across the manufacturing landscape—from cars to chemicals; medical devices to sporting goods. And that will boost output, support good jobs here at home, and lower prices for American consumers.

Higher input prices stemming from antidumping measures are only the first assault on these downstream firms. The next wave usually takes the form of stiffer competition from firms in countries where there are no antidumping duties on the critical input. As a result, the foreign competition often operates at a cost advantage in the United States and in other markets that enables it to sell profitably at lower prices than U.S. firms can charge.

Accordingly, the profits of downstream firms are squeezed by both higher costs, due to import restrictions, and lower revenues, due to lost sales. As a consequence, countless U.S. producers in downstream industries—including firms that were once thriving in the United States and foreign markets—have suffered severe losses, contraction, and bankruptcy.

Again, the administration is well aware of this connection. Indeed, the U.S. Trade Representative launched a formal complaint against China in the WTO for that country’s restrictions on exports of certain crucial raw materials, providing the following rationale:

China maintains a number of measures that restrain exports of raw material inputs for which it is the top, or near top, world producer. These measures skew the playing field against the United States and other countries by creating substantial competitive benefits for downstream Chinese producers that use the inputs in the production and export of numerous processed steel, aluminum and chemical products and a wide range of further processed products.

Moreover, the USTR demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that restrictions on upstream products generate downstream costs that compound at successive stages in the production supply chain:

These raw material inputs are used to make many processed products in a number of primary manufacturing industries, including steel, aluminum and various chemical industries. These products, in turn become essential components in even more numerous downstream products.

If you need more evidence that the antidumping status quo is weighted heavily against import-consuming U.S. industries, consider this gem: three of the nine mineral raw materials that are the subject of the U.S. case against China in the WTO (magnesium, silicon metal, and coke) are simultaneously subject to U.S antidumping restrictions. That’s right! With our own import restrictions firmly in place, the United States is suing China to remove its export restrictions on the same products. That sounds like an excellent use of resources.

As a final indignity, many U.S. exporters suffer the wrath of foreign antidumping restrictions and other forms of protectionism that are often the result of persistent U.S. opposition to antidumping reform, as well as outright retribution for specific U.S. antidumping actions. Among recent victims are U.S. exporters to China of automobiles, fiber optic cable, chicken, grain, and paper. In countless ways, the antidumping status quo subverts U.S. competitiveness and is an albatross around the neck of the U.S. economy.

To bestow real and enduring benefits upon the U.S. economy, the antidumping law should be reformed to—at a minimum—give legal standing to manufacturers and workers in consuming industries; require the administering authorities to conduct an analysis of the economic impact of prospective antidumping duties and to deny imposition if the costs exceed a certain threshold; and require that any antidumping duties imposed not be excessive.

“Let Them [Safety Certified Mexican] Truckers Roll, 10-4”

OK, I took some editorial license on the line from the 1970s song by C.W. McCall about truckers bantering on their CB radios, but the spirit of the song applies to our ongoing dispute with Mexico over access to U.S. highways.

On Friday, the comment period will end in the Federal Register on a pilot program proposed by the Obama administration that would allow qualified Mexican trucks and their Mexican drivers to make long-haul deliveries within the United States. With the exception of a brief interlude from 2007 to 2009, the U.S. has banned Mexican trucks from serving destinations within the United States.

I explain why this is bad for our economy and our reputation as a nation in an op-ed this morning in the Washington Times and in my own comments filed with the Federal Register. As I wrote in the op-ed:

Despite the hundreds of complaints already posted in the Federal Register, the Mexican trucking issue has never been about safety. The proposed pilot program would require Mexican trucks entering the United States to meet all federal regulations on driver qualifications, truck safety, emissions, fuel taxes, immigration and insurance.

Experience from the previous pilot program in 2007-09 demonstrated that Mexican trucks and their drivers are fully capable of complying with all U.S. safety requirements.

An August 2009 report from the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General found that only 1.2 percent of Mexican drivers that were inspected were placed out of service for violations, compared with nearly 7 percent of U.S. drivers who were inspected. In February 2010, the Congressional Research Service reported that recent data provided by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration found that “Mexican trucks are as safe as U.S. trucks and that the drivers are generally safer than U.S. drivers.” What the Teamsters and their congressional allies really object to is that these trucks will be driven by Mexicans.

The Obama administration deserves credit for its effort to end this dispute in the face of pressure from its union base. The sooner we allow more freedom and competition in the cross-border trucking sector, the better.

Why Trading with China is Good for Us

Back in February, more than 100 House members introduced a bill that would make it easier to slap duties on imports from China. I explain why picking a trade fight with China would be a bad idea all around in an article just published in the print edition of National Review magazine.

Titled “Deal with the Dragon: Trade with the Chinese is good for us, them, and the world,” the article explains why our burgeoning trade with the Middle Kingdom is benefiting Americans as consumers, especially low- and middle-income families that spend a higher share on the everyday consumer items we import from China.

We also benefit as producers—China is now the no. 3 market for U.S. exports and by far the fastest growing major market. Chinese investment in Treasury bills keeps interest rates down in the face of massive federal borrowing, preventing our own private domestic investment from being crowded out.

The article also argues that, “As the Chinese middle class expands, it becomes not only a bigger market for U.S. goods and services, but also more fertile soil for political and civil freedoms.”

You can read the full article at the link above. Better yet, pick up the April 4 print edition of the magazine, the one with Gov. Rick Perry on the cover. My article begins on p. 20. (It might be a holdover from my newspaper days, but I still get an extra kick out of seeing an article printed in a real publication.)

P.S. For a fuller treatment of our trade relations with China, you can check out my 2009 Cato book, Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. China takes center stage in several places in the book, which—did I mention?—was just named a runner-up finalist for the Atlas Foundation’s 22nd Annual Sir Antony Fisher International Memorial Award for the best think-tank book of 2009-10.

Obama’s Trip to Latin America

As Ted Carpenter notes below, President Obama is departing on an important trip to Latin America. The countries that he will visit exemplify the macroeconomic stability and advancement of democratic institutions now found in much of the region.

Brazil, by far the largest Latin American economy, has enjoyed almost a decade of sound growth and poverty reduction. Chile is the most developed country in the region thanks to decades of economic liberalization, a process that has also made it Latin America’s most mature democracy. And El Salvador is undergoing a delicate period in its transition to becoming a full-fledged democracy with its first left-of-center president since the end of the civil war in 1992.

In an era when most Latin American nations are moving in the right direction—albeit at different speeds, with some setbacks, and with notable exceptions—the United States can serve as a catalyst of change by contributing to more economic integration and the consolidation of the rule of law in the region.

Unfortunately, despite President Obama’s assurances that he’s interested in strengthening economic ties with Latin America, his administration is still delaying the ratification of two important free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. President Obama also continues to support a failed war on drugs that significantly exacerbates violence and institutional frailty in the region, particularly in Mexico and Central America.

It’s good that President Obama’s trip will highlight significant progress in Latin America, but his administration’s policy actions still don’t match the U.S. goals of encouraging economic growth and sound institutional development in the region.

Despite Huawei’s Experience, America Is Open to Chinese Investment

After several days of defiance, Chinese telecom equipment manufacturer Huawei announced Monday that it would abide a recommendation from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) that it divest of U.S. technology company 3-Leaf. CFIUS is an inter-agency group charged with reviewing the national security implications of proposed foreign investments in U.S. companies and assets and advising the president about whether or not he should block those transactions on security grounds. CFIUS is composed of representatives from 16 different U.S. government departments and agencies and is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Last week, CFIUS issued a recommendation that the president block Huawei’s $2 million purchase of assets—including certain patents—from 3-Leaf on the grounds that the transaction presented a risk to national security. (Technically, the recommendation was for the president to compel Huawei to divest of 3-Leaf, since the transaction was consummated in May 2010, before CFIUS was made aware of the deal). Apparently, CFIUS was concerned about Huawei’s ties to the Chinese government—specifically the Chinese military.

Despite assurances from Huawei’s vice president of government affairs, William Plummer, that the company “is 100 percent employee-owned and has no ties with any government, nor with the PLA,” Huawei’s ownership structure is opaque. A letter submitted to administration officials from U.S. Senators Jim Webb (D-VA) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) alleged that Huawei has a “history of illegal behavior and ties with the People’s Liberation Army, Taliban and Iranian Revolutionary Guard.” The letter also accused Huawei of various patent and trademark infringements and suggested that the small scale of Huawei’s acquisition ($2 million) was designed to enable the transaction to avoid scrutiny—a theory that is lent credibility by Huawei’s decision not to inform CFIUS of its intention to purchase 3-Leaf.

Huawei’s decision this week to abandon the deal spares the president from issuing a formal opinion on the matter, and in all likelihood spares Huawei the added humiliation of a formal rejection from the U.S. president. Meanwhile, Huawei and officials of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce are lambasting the CFIUS decision as further evidence that the United States is closed to Chinese direct investment, and implying that U.S. investors might expect similarly shoddy treatment in China. What to make of all of this?

First, as I’ve argued before (e.g., here, here, and here), the United States should be open to foreign direct investment from all countries and the rules and regulations governing investment should be transparent, consistent, straightforward, and applied equally to suitors from all countries. That being said, state and local governments should be aggressively courting Chinese investment, for the reasons I gave in a paper published 14 months ago:

If it is desirable that China recycle some of its estimated $2.4 trillion in accumulated foreign reserves, U.S. policy … should be more welcoming of Chinese investment in the private sector. As of the close of 2008, Chinese direct investment in the United States stood at just $1.2 billion—a mere rounding error at about 0.05 percent of the $2.3 trillion in total foreign direct investment in the United States. That figure comes nowhere close to the amount of U.S. direct investment held by foreigners in other big economies. U.S. direct investment in 2008 held in the United Kingdom was $454 billion; it was $260 billion in Japan, $259 billion in the Netherlands, $221 billion in Canada, $211 billion in Germany, $64 billion in Australia, $16 billion in South Korea, and even $1.7 billion in Russia.

Some of China’s past efforts to take equity positions or purchase U.S. companies or buy assets or land to build new production facilities have been viewed skeptically by U.S. policymakers, and scuttled, ostensibly over ill-defined security concerns. But a large inflow of investment from China would have an impact similar to a large increase in U.S. exports to China on the value of both countries’ currencies, and on the level of China’s foreign reserves.

In light of China’s large reserves, its need and desire to diversify, America’s need for investment in the real economy, and the objective of creating jobs and achieving sustained economic growth, U.S. policy should be clarified so that the benchmarks and hurdles facing Chinese investors are better understood.

Since 2008, Chinese direct investment in the United States has increased from $1.2 billion to perhaps as much as $6.5 billion last year. If only President Obama’s speech last week at the Chamber of Commerce exhorting U.S. business to invest and hire were given at the Guandong Business Club…

Second, I am no security expert, so I cannot comment on the credibility of CFIUS’ concerns or the senators’ allegations about Huawei. But I think it is entirely reasonable to have a process, like that conducted by CFIUS under the Foreign Investment and National Security Act, to vet transactions to ensure that those presenting risks to national security are brought to the attention of the president, who can then exercise his discretion to block them. Like some prospective export transactions, some prospective purchases of U.S. assets present legitimate security risks that may warrant intervention. Is the process completely apolitical and immune from insider maneuvering? No. Is there scope for politically driven decision making? Yes. Can the process be used to steer a transaction away from the foreign suitor and toward a politically favored domestic entity? Sure. But so far there have been few accusations of that nature, so why make the perfect the enemy of the good?

Finally, in the immediate case, Huawei acted clumsily, if not irresponsibly, and in defiance of a process with which it should by now be quite familiar. In 2008, Huawei had to withdraw its bid for American company 3Com after CFIUS found national security problems, some of which could have been resolved had Huawei been more forthcoming about its ownership structure and business dealings. Likewise, Huawei was excluded from participation in a major network upgrade by Sprint Nextel over similar concerns about the company’s ties. That the company thought it could just circumvent CFIUS carrying that kind of historical baggage and quietly purchase 3-Leaf last May speaks to a profoundly amateurish decision making process at Huawei, or an imperative to conceal something.

Despite the sour grapes expressed by Huawei and its patron, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the United States is open and ready to welcome Chinese investment

Measuring Progress on Violence against Union Members in Colombia

During a recent Congressional hearing on President Obama’s trade agenda, Rep. Sander Levin (D-Mich.) stated his continued objections to the FTA with Colombia:

“Union worker violence in Colombia remains unacceptably high - if not the highest in the world. Limited progress is being made in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible. Additionally, reports indicate that threats against union workers and others have increased, and there has been little concrete action today to pursue these cases.” [Emphasis added].

Levin warned that, despite signs of a more constructive approach to this issue from Colombia’s new president Juan Manuel Santos, “The only adequate measuring stick is progress on the ground.”

Rep. Levin should take a look at the Free Trade Bulletin that my colleague Dan Griswold and I published this week: “Trade Agreement Would Promote U.S. Exports and Colombian Civil Society.” When it comes to progress on the ground regarding violence against union members, Colombia already has a remarkable record. The number of assassinations of trade unionists has dropped 77% since its peak in 2001, compared to the total number of homicides in the country, which declined by 44% in the same period.

 

 

 Sources: National Union School (ENS) and Ministry of Social Protection (MPS).

If we look at the homicide rate as defined by the number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants, the rate for union killings was 5.3 per 100,000 unionists in 2010, six times lower than the homicide rate for the overall population (33.9 per 100,000 inhabitants).

In our paper, we present evidence that shows that union members enjoy greater security than other vulnerable groups of Colombian civil society, such as teachers, councilmen and journalists. Also, we highlight research conducted by economists Daniel Mejía and María José Uribe of the Universidad de los Andes in Colombia, which found no statistical evidence supporting the claim that trade unionists are targeted for their activities. Instead, their results show that “the violence against union members can be explained by the general level of violence and by low levels of economic development.”

As for Rep. Levin’s claim that there has been “little concrete action” to pursue crimes against trade unionists, once again the evidence says otherwise. In 2010 there were over 1,400 trade unionists under a government protection program—more than any other vulnerable group of Colombia’s civil society. In 2007, a special department was created in the Office of the Prosecutor General dedicated exclusively to solving crimes against union members and bringing the perpetrators to justice. Close to 85 percent of the sentences issued since 2000 for assassinations of trade unionists were issued after the creation of this department.

If Rep. Levin’s “adequate measuring stick is progress on the ground,” then he should recognize the tremendous achievements made by Colombia so far in reducing violence against trade unionists, and solving the crimes committed against them.

You can read the full paper here.

Rising Exports — and Imports — Are Good News for U.S. Economy

The U.S. trade deficit rose in 2010, and the bilateral deficit with China reached a record high last year, according to the monthly trade report released this morning by the U.S. Commerce Department. The usual critics (such as Peter Morici of the University of Maryland) are already spinning it into yet another indictment of trade, but the report contains a lot of good news for the U.S. economy.

Last year, Americans bought $2,330 billion worth of goods and services from other countries, while selling $1,832 billion, for a trade deficit of $498 billion. Our bilateral deficit with China grew to a record $273 billion.

Politicians and commentators love to focus on the trade deficit, as though it were a scorecard of who is winning in global trade. But the real measure is the total volume of trade. As economies expand, so does trade, both imports and exports. Exports help us reach new markets and expand economies of scale, while imports bless consumers with lower prices and more choices, while stoking competition, innovation, and efficiency gains among producers.

By this measure the trade report was good news all around, and one more sign that the U.S. and global economies continue to recover from the Great Recession. Last year, U.S. exports of goods were up 21 percent from 2009, while imports were up 23 percent. In contrast, in the recession year of 2009, exports of goods dropped 18 percent from the year before while imports plunged 26 percent. (Unemployment soared in 2009, but, hey, at least the trade deficit was “improving”!)

Our trade with China last year tells the same story. The value of goods imported from China rose 23 percent in 2010 (the same rate as imports from the rest of the world), while the value of the goods we exported to China jumped by 32 percent. That’s a rate of export growth that is 50 percent higher than export growth to the rest of the world. Members of Congress who complain that China’s managed currency is somehow a major barrier to U.S. exports should take note.