Tag: tpa

The Benefit of Free Trade Is Not Exports, It’s Lower Prices on Things We Want

In the news this morning, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R–UT), author of the Trade Promotion Authority bill, makes the usual case for trade agreements and TPA:

We need to get this bill passed. We need to pass it for the American workers who want good, high-paying jobs. We need to pass it for our farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and entrepreneurs who need access to foreign markets in order to compete. We need to pass it to maintain our standing in the world.

It’s certainly good that the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee supports freer trade. But I fear he’s as confused as most Washingtonians about the actual case for free trade.

This whole “exports and jobs” framework is misguided. Thirty years ago in the Cato Journal, the economist Ronald Krieger explained the difference between the economist’s and the non-economist’s views of trade. The economist believes that “The purpose of economic activity is to enhance the wellbeing of individual consumers and households.” And, therefore, “Imports are the benefit for which exports are the cost.” Imports are the things we want—clothing, televisions, cars, software, ideas—and exports are what we have to trade in order to get them.

And thus, Krieger continues, point by point:

Cheap foreign goods are thus an unambiguous benefit to the importing country.

The objective of foreign trade is therefore to get goods on advantageous terms.

That is why we want free—or at least freer—trade: to remove the impediments that prevent people from finding the best ways to satisfy their wants. Free trade allows us to benefit from the division of labor, specialization, comparative advantage, and economies of scale.

I write about this in The Libertarian Mind (buy it now!):

Time for Hillary to Speak Up on Trade

The Washington Post ran an editorial on Wednesday indicting Hillary Clinton for her silence on the trade agenda. Yesterday morning, the Post published an op-ed by Robert Kagan of Brookings titled “Clinton’s Cowardice on Trade.” Both pieces offer some valid observations, but the matter deserves more scrutiny still.

Is it just me or do others see it as presumptuous, disrespectful, and even contemptuous that the person who expects to head the Democratic Party ticket next year feels entitled to her silence on the single most divisive issue confronting that party? Trade policy is causing a schism between Democrats, and Clinton chooses to showcase her leadership bona fides by … refraining from taking a position? And what does that say about the judgment of her steadfast supporters, whose return silence countenances an evasion akin to deceit? On the other hand, Clinton’s supporters are accustomed to accommodating a more expansive definition of honesty, so perhaps they’re oblivious.

If I were an engaged Democrat, I’d demand to know, now, where Hillary Clinton stands on trade. And if I were a presidential candidate with a reputation for favoring expedience over principle and whose most compelling claim to the White House is that I really, really want to be president, I would want to demonstrate my worthiness by taking a firm position, explaining to my party why I believe that position is the right one, pointing out (as President Obama has) that many of the Left’s objections to trade are based on fallacies, and sticking to it, even if it alienates some factions. Making some people unhappy is a necessity of leadership.

Like President Obama, Hillary Clinton has a history of flip-flopping on trade, so people are understandably confused. As First Lady, she advocated on behalf of her husband’s efforts to forge NAFTA. As a U.S. senator, she was a solid protectionist, voting against trade barriers only 31 percent of the time and against trade-distorting subsidies only 13 percent of the time. As a candidate for president, she expressed skepticism and, at times, indignation about trade agreements and joined with the political left in vilifying NAFTA. As secretary of state, she not only embraced the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but was instrumental in making it the centerpiece of the administration’s “pivot to Asia.” Today, in the midst of a debate that will make or break the TPP and shape next year’s Democratic Party platform and more, Clinton is mum.

The Trade Promotion Authority legislation struggling to gain support from congressional Democrats would extend the terms of TPA through the entirety of the next president’s first term and into the second (it would expire in July 2021). It is a tool that would be welcomed by any president who sees trade agreements as channels for economic growth and diplomacy. Clinton’s silence implies indifference to the outcome of the TPA debate in Congress and, thus, indifference to trade liberalization as a policy tool. Clinton is well aware that the most important aspect of U.S. foreign policy to most countries is our trade and commercial policy.

So, unless the former top U.S. diplomat, as president, would turn her back on the TPP she once embraced, and pull the rug out from under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—outcomes that would deprive the economy of valuable growth opportunities, offend 39 foreign governments, and reinforce perceptions of U.S. decline—she should affirmatively endorse TPA now.

Clinton’s endorsement would signal leadership and provide cover for scores of Democrats in Congress who are wary of the party’s dash to the far left. It would provide refuge for members who want to be on the economically responsible side of the schism. It would create an environment where it is safe to say the anti-trade, progressive emperor is stark naked. 

Rand Paul’s “No” on Trade Promotion Authority Gets It Backwards

Not entirely unsurprisingly, the Senate failed to reach cloture on Tuesday, falling eight votes shy of the 60 needed to start the timer on debate over Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which will be needed to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and bring it to a timely vote in Congress.  The cloture vote concerned two of four pieces of trade legislation voted out of the Finance Committee two weeks ago (TPA and Trade Adjustment Assistance).  Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell excluded the other two bills, which contain language that would attract Democratic support. So, while I wouldn’t bet the ranch on TPA’s passage, there’s still room for horse trading.

In more surprising (and disappointing) news, one senator who will say “no” if TPA makes it to the floor for a vote is Rand Paul, who explained his reasoning on a New Hampshire television news broadcast:

We give up so much power from Congress to the presidency, and with them being so secretive on the treaty, it just concerns me what’s in the treaty.

Let me take Paul’s issues with power, secrecy, and content in order.

Bridging the Hatch-Wyden Divide Over Trade Promotion Authority

The eyes of the international trade community are fixed on Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), upon whom responsibility for crafting bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation has fallen. At last report, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Wyden were at an impasse over some important components of the bill, passage of which is widely considered necessary to concluding the long-gestating, 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. That agreement must be concluded before the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations make any progress. Those negotiations will have far-reaching implications for the multilateral trading system, including China, India, Brazil and other countries not currently party to these mega-regional trade agreements. Hence, TPA’s outcome is of worldwide interest.

Trade Promotion Authority has been maligned as a congressional capitulation or executive power grab.  It is neither. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” and to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises” and grants the president power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Accordingly, the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of trade agreements require the involvement and cooperation of both branches. TPA is a compact between the branches that obliges these respective constitutional authorities, while guaranteeing an up-or-down vote by Congress, on an expedited basis, of any trade agreement negotiated by the executive branch with foreign governments, provided that the agreements meet the objectives spelled-out by Congress in the legislation. This conditionality is often ignored or brushed over by news reporters, who either spend too much time with trade skeptics or who are looking to economize on words.

Without such a compact, trade agreements would be nearly impossible to conclude because foreign negotiators – knowing that any agreement reached would be subject to congressional revisions – would never put their best offers on the table.  The process of negotiating and renegotiating with 535 officials (instead of one agency, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) would make for an interminable process too cumbersome and costly to pursue.  For practical purposes, negotiations have to occur between small parties vested with the authority to speak on behalf of those whom they represent. Trade Promotion Authority is the solution.

Don’t Envy Senator Wyden

Being a U.S. senator can be fun. The position brings with it a certain amount of influence, fame, and stature. However, serving in the Senate also is fraught with challenges. Much time must be spent away from family. Flying back and forth between home and Washington can wear a person out. And some voters always are unhappy with you, sometimes really unhappy.

This is a complicated moment for Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR). He has paid his dues in the Senate since 1997 and now is one of its more senior members. That seniority has brought him to the position of ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, which has the responsibility (among others) for establishing policies pertaining to international trade.

Congress is trying to decide whether to grant President Obama Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), formerly known as “fast track” authority. TPA commits Congress to an up-or-down vote (no amendments) on a trade agreement presented to it by the White House.  This procedure provides foreign negotiating partners with assurance that Congress will consider any agreement as a complete package, thus avoiding the risk that it might be amended in response to pressure from groups that are unhappy with one or more of its provisions. 

Such pressure dissuaded Congress from approving provisions that had been agreed to by the administration in the 1967 Kennedy Round of negotiations, which were conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Other countries were not amused when the United States didn’t live up to its Kennedy Round commitments. To rebuild its negotiating credibility, the United States needed to find a way to bridge the Constitution’s clear delineation of powers: the president has the right to negotiate with other countries, but Congress has authority to regulate foreign commerce. 

The response was the Trade Act of 1974, which developed the basic formula for approving trade agreements that has been used ever since. Congress granted the president five years of negotiating authority that covered both tariffs and non-tariff measures.

The most recent version of TPA expired in 2007. President Obama currently is seeking a new grant of negotiating authority in order to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other nations, and possibly also the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the 28 members of the European Union. 

Senator Wyden will play a crucial role in determining whether or not TPA is approved. Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), chairman of the Finance Committee, and Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, would like to introduce TPA legislation. However, they don’t want to do so without bipartisan support. There is a long tradition of Democrats and Republicans working together on behalf of trade liberalization. 

Rep. Sandy Levin (D-MI), the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, generally opposes trade reforms that could lead to a greater selection of affordable automobiles for consumers. In other words, he’s a lost cause when it comes to sponsoring a version of TPA that the White House might approve. This is why all eyes are on Senator Wyden.

Hyperbole Aside, Elizabeth Warren Is Right About the Risk of Investor-State

Sen. Elizabeth Warren takes to the Washington Post op-ed pages today to warn about the dangers of the so-called Investor-State Dispute Mechanism, which is likely to be a part of the emerging Trans-Pacific Partnership deal.  In substance, if not style, Sen. Warren’s perspective on ISDS is one that libertarians and other free market advocates should share. At least, my colleague Simon Lester and I do

ISDS grants foreign investors the right to sue host governments in third-party arbitration tribunals for treatment that allegedly fails to meet certain standards, such as new laws, regulations, or policies that might have a discriminatory effect on foreign investors that reduces the value of their assets. Certainly, investors – and in this context we’re talking mostly about multinational corporations (MNCs) – should have recourse to justice when these situations arise. But under ISDS, U.S. investors abroad and foreign investors in the United States can collect damages from the treasuries of their host governments by virtue of the judgments of arbitration panels that are entirely outside of the legal structure of the respective countries. This all raises serious questions about democratic accountability, sovereignty, checks and balances, and the separation of power.

An important pillar of trade agreements is the concept of “national treatment,” which says that imports and foreign companies will be afforded treatment no different from that afforded domestic products and companies. The principle is a commitment to nondiscrimination. But ISDS turns national treatment on its head, giving privileges to foreign companies that are not available to domestic companies. If a U.S. natural gas company believes that the value of its assets has suffered on account of a new subsidy for solar panel producers, judicial recourse is available in the U.S. court system only. But for foreign companies, ISDS provides an additional adjudicatory option.

Congress Should Decide Whether Trade Agreements Abide the Terms of Trade Promotion Authority

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA or Fast-Track Negotiating Authority) is not an executive power grab.  It is a compact between the legislative and executive branches, which each have distinct authorities under the Constitution when it comes to conducting trade policy. The purpose of forging such a compact is that negotiations would be impracticable – and likely interminable – if each provision were subject to the whims of 535 legislators.

Opponents of trade liberalization have smeared TPA as a wholesale capitulation to the president, who allegedly is freed of any congressional oversight and given a blank check to negotiate unamendable trade deals in secret without any input from Congress – only the capacity to vote up or down on the final deal. In reality, though, TPA is the vehicle through which Congress conveys its trade policy objectives, conditions, and demands to the president, who negotiates with those parameters in mind. Provided the president concludes a negotiation that abides those congressional parameters, the deal is given fast track consideration, which means essentially that legislative procedures are streamlined and expedited.

The trade committees are reportedly close to introducing trade promotion authority legislation, although there remains some debate about what it should include. Enforceable provisions to discipline currency manipulation would be a bad idea, as would be including provisions to reauthorize the ineffective and misguided Trade Adjustment Assistance program (which is widely acknowledged to be a payoff to organized labor).

But one important provision (or set of provisions) that has created a bit of an impasse between Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and its Ranking Member Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) concerns certification that an agreement abides the requisite congressional conditions to be afforded fast track treatment. Those of us who argue that TPA is not an executive power grab, but a practical, constitutional solution to a policymaking quandary must acknowledge the propriety of such a provision – or a provision that accomplishes as much. There must be a mechanism through which the president is held to account – that the deal reflects the broad wishes of Congress.