Tag: takings

A Million Homes Taken Since Kelo

It has been just over a decade since the Supreme Court decided in Kelo v. New London that local governments can take private property by eminent domain under a very broad reading of “public use”.  Cato held an event earlier this year to examine the legal impact of Kelo, featuring remarks from George Mason Law Professor Ilya Somin based upon his recent book, The Grasping Hand.  Not only has Kelo spawned widespread public backlash, but its also given birth to renewed interest by legal scholars.  As an economist, I am a little more interested in the direct impact on families.

Unfortunately, I have had no luck finding a database of all U.S. takings.  The American Housing Survey (AHS), conducted by the Census Bureau every two years, does, however, offer some estimates.  For survey respondents who moved within the previous year, the AHS asks respondents the “main reason” for leaving their previous unit.  One option offered is “government displacement”. For the survey years since Kelo, the average has been 109,000 households who state that government action displaced them from their previous home.  If that average holds for non-survey years, then a good estimate is that just over a million households have been displaced by government action since Kelo

The Grapes of Wrath: California Raisins Are Back at the Supreme Court

When Marvin Horne told the United States Raisin Administrative Committee (yes, there’s a raisin administrative committee) that he wasn’t going to turn over nearly 30 percent of his crop to the government in exchange for nothing, he probably didn’t expect his case would go to the Supreme Court—twice. That little act of civil disobedience was thirteen years ago, and the Hornes now stand on the precipice of vindicating an important constitutional right—the Fifth Amendment right not to have your property taken without just compensation—as well as putting a wrench in the gears of what Justice Elena Kagan called “the world’s most outdated law.”

Like much of our agricultural policy, the Raisin Administrative Committee (RAC) is a relic of New Deal-era cartelization schemes. Trying to understand the logic behind American agricultural policy is like trying to find the logic in a Marx Brothers movie—it can’t be done and you’re better off just sitting back and laughing at the antics. Yet our agricultural policy has real-world effects on farmers like the Hornes, who are subject to the whims of the RAC as it tries to stabilize the price and supply of raisins. Sometimes the RAC pays for the raisins it takes, and sometimes not. In 2002-2003, the RAC offered far less than the cost of production for 47 percent of the Hornes’ raisins, and in 2003-2004 they offered nothing for 30 percent of the raisins. The Hornes had had enough, and they refused the order, arguing the seemingly simple point that the confiscation would be a taking without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

Supreme Court to Government: Stop Railroading Property Owners

Today, in Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, the Supreme Court rebuked another attempt by the Obama administration to adopt a novel and extreme litigating position that was contrary to well-established precedent. Eight justices agreed with Cato’s amicus brief, holding that the United States does not retain a property interest in former railroad lands that are no longer used by railroads. Although this may seem like an arcane issue for Cato to be involved in, the case actually resembles a typical takings case, but this time the government tried to define a property right out of existence rather than pay compensation to the owners.

To be fair to the Obama administration, this case began in 2006, and both Republican and Democratic administrations have been litigating similar cases for some time. Brandt is a best seen as an example of how governments of all stripes will find the path of least resistance to accomplish its goals, including defining a property right out of existence to avoid paying for it.

Building Housing That Some People Can’t Afford Isn’t Racist

“Disparate impact” theory holds someone liable for discrimination for a race-neutral policy that statistically disadvantages a specific racial group — say, blacks score lower on a firefighter-promotion test than whites — even if that negative “impact” was neither foreseen nor intended. The application of this theory has been fraught with controversy, to say the least, but it comes up again and again, in contexts ranging from employment to education to voting.

While disparate impact claims have sometimes been sustained under the federal Fair Housing Act (which makes it unlawful to deny housing on the basis of race) since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has only recently agreed to decide whether these claims are lawful. Two years ago, the Court was about to hear such a case, Magner v. Gallagher, when the Justice Department, led by now-Labor Secretary Tom Perez, pressured the city of St. Paul, Minnesota to settle it. The same sort of political pressure is now being brought to bear on Mount Holly Township, New Jersey; supporters of disparate impact theory simply don’t think that it can survive legal scrutiny.

The current case involves a redevelopment plan for a blighted Mount Holly neighborhood (“the Gardens”) that would transform the neighborhood into mid-range single-family dwellings. (Thus far, the township has acquired 259 of 329 properties through various financial incentives, without yet resorting to eminent domain.) The Gardens’ residents sued, arguing that the redevelopment plan violated the FHA because a majority of them would not be able to afford the new homes.

The district court dismissed this argument, holding that the redevelopment plan affected Gardens residents equally, without regard to race, and was tied only to economic considerations. The court of appeals reversed that ruling, holding that the residents’ association had set out a case of discrimination under the theory of disparate impact because a majority of the affected residents were non-white.

Cato has now joined the Pacific Legal Foundation and four other public-interest organizations on an amicus brief arguing not only that disparate impact claims are impermissible under the text of the FHA, but that such claims force unconstitutional actions when applied to governments. Before putting race-neutral policies into effect, government agencies would have to determine whether a particular racial group would be disproportionately impacted and take steps to remedy that difference. By mandating an equality of ends — as opposed to an equality of opportunity — disparate impact liability encourages the adoption of discriminatory quota systems.

The Takings Clause Has No Expiration Date

The Obama Administration has had a bad time recently in property rights cases. In particular, three cases, Arkansas Game & Fish Commision v. United States, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, and Sackett v. EPA, were big losses for the government and big wins for the private property owners who are increasingly subject to unconstitutional attempts to take land. Last week, Cato, along with the National Federation of Independent Business and the Chapman Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, filed a brief asking the Supreme Court to review a circuit court decision that could have far-reaching implications for property owners everywhere.

The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause guarantees that private land cannot be taken for public use without “just compensation.” But apparently, according to the Federal Circuit, this right has an expiration date. Specifically, the Federal Circuit ruled that Mike Mehaffy purchased his land too late to claim that the government regulated away most of his property value. Mehaffy should’ve known, said the court, that the Clean Water Act had been passed and degraded the value of the land he had purchased. This is called the “Notice Rule,” and it leaves Mehaffy without a claim, unable to recoup most of his property investment.

While the Supreme Court has never given specific guidance on how a court should balance whether a regulation that takes or lowers the value of property should be compensated, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island the Court was very specific about one thing: no one factor should decide. Despite this admonition, the Federal and Ninth Circuits focus solely on notice to effectively bar anyone from bringing suit if they bought land too late. Cato’s brief argues that Nollan v. California Coastal Commission implicitly recognized that a challenge can be brought despite the fact that property was obtained after the regulatory act in question. Later, in Palazzolo, the Court unmistakably drove this point home: “[A takings claim] is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction.” To do so, said the Palazzolo Court, would “put an expiration date on the Takings Clause” and would absolve the state of its duty to defend its actions, no matter how unreasonable.

Despite the Supreme Court’s clear rejection of a test based solely on the Notice Rule, the Federal and Ninth Circuits circumvented the Supreme Court’s holding in Palazzolo and revived the Notice Rule. This is especially far reaching, as so many takings claims are brought in the Court of Federal Claims where the Notice Rule now controls. Moreover, by solely looking at the issue of notice, the Federal Circuit gave federal agencies an incentive to run out the clock, as once all the land has been transferred, no owner can bring a takings suit. The takings problem is compounded by difficulties in determining if land is subject to the Clean Water Act in the first place—a new owner might find himself newly regulated under changing interpretations of the Clean Water Act, and yet be denied remedy by application of the Notice Rule. Most modest landowners won’t have the means to take such a case to the government but also can’t sell the property without extinguishing their claim. This manipulates the property market, with some owners avoiding transactions that might destroy their takings claims, while most will be forced to sell at a significantly depreciated rate. This burden will likely fall most heavily on groups without the time or resources to fight, like the elderly.

The Notice Rule’s resurrection is plainly at odds with the Supreme Court’s precedent, creates a near total ban on those takings claims that are economically viable, and whittles away property rights. Cato urges the Supreme Court to enforce its own precedent, and make it clear that that there is no ban on pursuing “just compensation” simply because they purchased their property a little too late.

Raisin-Taking Claim Now Ripe for Consideration on the Merits

As Ilya noted, the Supreme Court yesterday cleared the procedural roadblocks for the Horne family, which grows and processes raisins in California, to challenge the operations of the USDA’s marketing order system as an unlawful taking of their property without compensation. The Hornes say that under the USDA’s California Raisin Marketing Order, the Raisin Administrative Committee demanded that they hand over 47 percent of their raisins to be disposed of in ways that do not compete with sales in the domestic retail raisin market, such as export programs and school lunches. 

47 percent! Back in January that figure reminded me of an earlier scale of government extraction: 

Max Boot, who has written a new book on the history of guerrilla movements, tells how Shamil, firebrand leader of a celebrated 19th-century Muslim insurgency in Chechnya and Dagestan, began to lose the allegiance of “many ordinary villagers who balked at his demands for annual tax payments amounting to 12 percent of their harvest.” Instead, they switched their allegiance instead to the rival Russian czar, whose demands were more modest.

If only Washington were content with the czar’s less-than-12 percent. For more on regulatory takings, check out this testimony from way back in 1995 by Cato’s own Roger Pilon before the House Judiciary Committee.

Government’s Legal Arguments Shrivel on the Vine

Yet again the unanimous Supreme Court has slapped down a government attempt to deprive property owners of their civil rights.  What was at stake in Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture wasn’t even the property – raisins! – but the mere ability to challenge the government’s desire to take that property without meaningful judicial review.

Nobody should have to suffer a needless, Rube Goldberg-style litigation process to vindicate their constitutional rights. Yet that’s exactly what the U.S. Department of Agriculture sought to impose on raisin farmers Marvin and Laura Horne when they protested the enforcement of a USDA “marketing order” that demanded that the Hornes turn over 47% of their crop without compensation.

These New Deal-era regulations are bad enough – forcing raisin “handlers” to turn over some of their crop to the government so it can control raisin supply and price – but here the government kept throwing up obstacles to the Hornes’ attempts to assert that they shouldn’t legally be subject to them.  The government demanded about $650,000 from the Hornes and didn’t want to give them a day in court until they paid the money and jumped through assorted administrative hoops.

The Supreme Court correctly rejected that absurd position and reversed the California-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that upheld it, reinforcing the line drawn by five other circuit courts.  “In the case of an administrative enforcement proceeding,” Justice Thomas wrote on all his colleagues’ behalf, “when a party raises a constitutional defense to an assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the party to pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn around and sue for recovery of that same money in another.”

Indeed, there’s no reason to treat Fifth Amendment takings claims any differently than lawsuits against government violations of other constitutional provisions.

Here’s more background on the case and Cato’s amicus brief.