Tag: Taiwan

Taiwan’s Best Option for Deterring China? Anti-Access/Area Denial

There are few David versus Goliath matchups in the international system quite like Taiwan versus China. Across virtually every indicator of national power, Taiwan is completely outclassed. In the past, Taiwan relied on a qualitatively superior military and an implicit U.S. security guarantee to maintain its de facto independence, but advances in military technology have enabled Beijing to close the quality gap. Taiwan’s military equipment and doctrine is ill-suited to this new reality. If Taiwan wishes to preserve its de facto independence, it must take a page out of Beijing’s playbook and adopt an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.

A2/AD incorporates guided weapons and intelligence/observation systems to prevent enemy military forces from entering a specified area, and, failing that, make it costly for forces to operate within said area. Relatively inexpensive weapons systems that are difficult to defend against, such as long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, are a hallmark of A2/AD. American military and political objectives in East Asia require power projection, the moving of air and naval power close to China’s shores. A2/AD is designed to make that difficult.

The same A2/AD concepts and technology that threaten U.S. forces’ freedom of movement can be used by Taiwan to defend against a Chinese invasion. This is just one of several military scenarios that could unfold, but the Taiwanese military should be prepared for the worst. The first phase of a Chinese invasion would be establishing air superiority over the Taiwan Strait and control of the sea around Taiwan. China needs to project power in order to accomplish its objectives. Taiwan can’t defeat China in a stand-up fight, but it can deny the PLA from achieving its objectives with an A2/AD strategy.

Today, Taiwan does not have the necessary military equipment, especially air and naval forces, to conduct an effective A2/AD strategy. Despite having talented pilots, the fighter aircraft of Taiwan’s air force are outclassed by new and numerous Chinese aircraft and missile systems. Earlier this week, the RAND Corporation published a study assessing Taiwan’s air defense options. The study recommends reducing the size of Taiwan’s relatively costly, aging, and increasingly vulnerable fighter fleet to invest a limited military budget toward mobile surface to air (SAM) missile systems. The relatively few surface warships in Taiwan’s navy are similarly vulnerable to Chinese weapons systems. James Holmes of the Naval War College recently recommended that Taiwan’s navy acquire more numerous, fast missile boats armed with anti-ship missiles instead of fewer, larger surface warships that would be relatively easy for the PLA to locate and sink.

Will China Accept Taiwan’s Political Revolution?

In one of the least surprising election results in Taiwanese history, Tsai Ing-wen has won the presidency in a landslide. Even more dramatically, the Democratic Progressive Party will take control of the legislature for the first time. Tsai’s victory is a devastating judgment on the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou.

With the imminent triumph of the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek moved his government to the island in 1949. For a quarter century Washington backed Chiang. Finally, Richard Nixon opened a dialogue with the mainland and Jimmy Carter switched official recognition to Beijing. Nevertheless, the U.S. maintained semi-official ties with Taiwan.

As China began to reform economically it also developed a commercial relationship with Taipei. While the ruling Kuomintang agrees with the mainland that there is but one China, the DPP remains formally committed to independence.

Beijing realizes that Tsai’s victory is not just a rejection of Ma but of China. Support even for economic cooperation has dropped significantly over the last decade.

Thus, China’s strategy toward Taiwan is in ruins. In desperation in November Chinese President Xi Jinping met Ma in Singapore, the first summit between the two Chinese leaders. Beijing may have hoped to promote the KMT campaign or set a model for the incoming DPP to follow.

Xi warned that backing away from the 1992 consensus of one China could cause cross-strait relations to “encounter surging waves, or even completely capsize.” While Tsai apparently plans no formal move toward independence, she also rejects the 1992 consensus of “one China, separate interpretations.”

As I point out in Forbes: “Washington is in a difficult position. The U.S. has a historic commitment to Taiwan, whose people have built a liberal society. Yet America has much at stake with its relationship with the PRC. Everyone would lose from a battle over what Beijing views as a ‘renegade province’.”

Washington should congratulate President-elect Tsai, but counsel Taipei to step carefully. Taiwan’s new government shouldn’t give the PRC any reason (or excuse) to react forcefully.

The U.S. should accelerate efforts to expand economic ties with Taiwan. Doing so would affirm America’s commitment to a free (if not exactly independent) Taiwan by other than military means.

America should continue to provide Taipei with weapons to enable it to deter if not defeat the PRC. At the same time, the new government should make good on the DPP’s pledge to make “large investments” in the military. It makes little sense for the U.S. to anger Beijing with new arms sales if Taipei is unwilling to spend enough to make a difference.

Washington should press friendly states throughout Asia, Europe, and elsewhere to communicate a consistent message to China: military action against Taiwan would trigger a costly reaction around the world. The mainland would pay a particularly high economic and political price in East Asia, where any remaining illusions of a “peaceful rise” would be laid to rest.

Finally, American officials should explore ideas for a peaceful modus vivendi. One possibility is for Washington to repeat its acceptance of “one China” and eschew any military commitment to Taiwan.

Taipei would accept its ambiguous national status and announce its neutrality in any conflicts which might arise in East Asia, including involving America and Japan. The PRC would forswear military means to resolve Taiwan’s status and reduce the number of missiles in Fujian targeting the island.

The objective would be to make it easier for both China and Taiwan to “kick the can down the road.” A final resolution of their relationship would be put off well into the future.

 The ROC’s people have modeled democracy with Chinese characteristics. Hopefully someday the PRC’s people will be able to do the same.

In the meantime, President-elect Tsai is set to govern a nation which has decisively voted for change. However, if the PRC’s leaders fear they are about to “lose” the island—and perhaps even power at home—they may feel forced to act decisively and coercively. International ambiguity remains a small price to pay to avoid a cross-strait war.

More Light than Heat: The Latest U.S. Arms Sale to Taiwan

The $1.83 billion arms sale package to Taiwan that the Obama administration announced to Congress in mid-December won’t change the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. Hawkish American commentators criticized the arms sale for not doing enough to provide for Taiwan’s security, but this misses the point. The most important aspect of the arms sale is not the kind of equipment being sold but the message sent by the transaction.

From a military perspective, the equipment in the arms sale is nothing to get excited about. The most prominent items are two refurbished Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and 36 AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles. Guided missiles, Phalanx ship defense systems, and communications equipment make up the rest of the package. None of these capabilities will significantly change the balance of power between Taiwan and mainland China.

What does it accomplish?

First, the timing of the arms sale announcement is important. On January 16th, voters in Taiwan will go to the polls to select a new President and legislators. The period of rapprochement between Taiwan and mainland China championed by President Ma Ying-jeou since 2008 will likely come to an end. It is too early to tell how the election will impact cross-strait relations, but announcing an arms sale so close to the election demonstrates a continued U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense.

China and Taiwan Meet: A Brief Opportunity for U.S. to Promote Peace?

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou recently met in Singapore. Never before has Beijing treated the island’s government as an equal. It was a small step for peace, but the circle remains to be squared.

China insists that Taiwan is a wayward province, while the vast majority of Taiwanese feel no allegiance to the People’s Republic of China. If, as expected, Taiwan’s opposition presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen wins in January, relations between the two states are likely to shift into reverse.

The island of Formosa, or Taiwan, separated from the mainland when the Kuomintang government relocated to Taipei following the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party. Taipei continues to promote a separate identity.

The PRC insists that the island should return to Beijing. China’s growing power has encouraged its leaders to press Taiwan to accept some form of “one country, two systems.”

The PRC has hoped that closer economic and cultural ties would move the two countries closer to union. Yet Taiwan is steadily moving away from the PRC. More than 80 percent of Taiwanese back independence—if it would not trigger Chinese military action.

Now the KMT is likely to lose the presidency and possibly the legislature. The opposition is unlikely to enter into serious negotiations leading to reunification.

If Poor Nations Want Economic Convergence and Capital Accumulation, They Need Good Policy

There’s a “convergence” theory in economics that suggests, over time, that “poor nations should catch up with rich nations.”

But in the real world, that seems to be the exception rather than the rule.

There’s an interesting and informative article at the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank which explores this theory. It asks why most low-income and middle-income nations are not “converging” with countries from the developed world.

…only a few countries have been able to catch up with the high per capita income levels of the developed world and stay there. By American living standards (as representative of the developed world), most developing countries since 1960 have remained or been “trapped” at a constant low-income level relative to the U.S. This “low- or middle-income trap” phenomenon raises concern about the validity of the neoclassical growth theory, which predicts global economic convergence. Specifically, the Solow growth model suggests that income levels in poor economies will grow relatively faster than developed nations and eventually converge or catch up to these economies through capital accumulation… But, with just a few exceptions, that is not happening.

Here’s a chart showing examples of nations that are – and aren’t – converging with the United States.

Taiwan Is the Success Story, not China

Which nation is richer, Belarus or Luxembourg?

If you look at total economic output, you might be tempted to say Belarus. The GDP of Belarus, after all, is almost $72 billion while Luxembourg’s GDP is less than $60 billion.

But that would be a preposterous answer since there are about 9.5 million people in Belarus compared to only about 540,000 folks in Luxembourg.

It should be obvious that what matters is per-capita GDP, and the residents of Luxembourg unambiguously enjoy far higher living standards than their cousins in Belarus.

This seems like an elementary point, but it has to be made because there have been a bunch of misleading stories about China “overtaking” the United States in economic output. Look, for instance, at these excerpts from a Bloomberg report.

China is poised to overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy earlier than expected, possibly as soon as this year… The latest tally adds to the debate on how the world’s top two economic powers are progressing. Projecting growth rates from 2011 onwards suggests China’s size when measured in PPP may surpass the U.S. in 2014.

There are methodological issues with PPP data, some of which are acknowledged in the story, and there’s also the challenge of whether Chinese numbers can be trusted.

But let’s assume these are the right numbers. My response is “so what?”

I’ve previously written that the Chinese tiger is more akin to a paper tiger. But Mark Perry of the American Enterprise Institute put together a chart that is far more compelling than what I wrote. He looks at the per-capita numbers and shows that China is still way behind the United States.

To be blunt, Americans shouldn’t worry about the myth of Chinese economic supremacy.

But that’s not the main point of today’s column.

Instead, I want to call attention to Taiwan. That jurisdiction doesn’t get as much attention as Hong Kong and Singapore, but it’s one of the world’s success stories.

And if you compare Taiwan to China, as I’ve done in this chart, there’s no question which jurisdiction deserves praise.

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