Tag: Supreme Court

Supremes Take Gun Rights Issue Nationwide

Supreme CourtWith its decision today to hear the case of McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court should settle the question of whether states must recognize the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. In June of 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court found, for the first time, that the federal government must recognize the Second Amendment right of individuals, quite apart from their belonging to a militia, to have an operational firearm in their home. But the decision left open the question whether states were similarly bound.

Thus, the so-called incorporation doctrine will be at issue in this case – the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates” the guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the states. The Bill of Rights applied originally only against the federal government. But the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, left open the question of which rights states were bound to recognize. The modern Court has incorporated most of the rights found in the Bill of Rights, but the Second Amendment’s guarantees have yet to be incorporated.

Moreover, a question that will arise in this case is whether the Court, if it does decide that the states are bound by the Second Amendment, will reach that conclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or under its Privileges or Immunities Clause, which has been moribund since the infamous Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873. In its brief urging the Court to hear the McDonald petition, the Cato Institute urged the Court to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Under Current Law, Can the Government Ban Books?

The Citizens United case currently before the Supreme Court may radically reshape campaign finance law for years to come. Former FEC commissioner Bradley A. Smith spoke at a forum on the case a day before the rehearing before the high court.

According to Smith, who is also the founder of the Center for Competitive Politics,  under current law, the government does have the power to ban certain books  if those books are published by a corporation, as ruled by the Supreme Court in 1990.

Watch:

NYT: We Don’t Deserve First Amendment Protection!

I assume others have pointed this out already, but there’s something very odd about a Tuesday editorial in The New York Times arguing that campaign finance regulations that stifle the political speech of corporations must be upheld in the Citizens United case currently under consideration before the Supreme Court:

The question at the heart of one of the biggest Supreme Court cases this year is simple: What constitutional rights should corporations have? To us, as well as many legal scholars, former justices and, indeed, drafters of the Constitution, the answer is that their rights should be quite limited — far less than those of people.

In that case, surely it’s time to revisit some of the 20th century’s seminal free speech rulings. The idea that public figures cannot use libel law to squelch criticism unless they can prove an attack is intentionally or recklessly false, for instance, comes to us by way of New York Times Company v. Sullivan—a case in which the so-called “protected speech” was a paid advertisement run by a filthy corporation!  And what about the celebrated Pentagon Papers case, in which the Court found that only in the most extreme cases can the government resort to “prior restraint” of speech? Why that’s New York Times Company v. United States. In both cases, of course, the speech in question had political significance—perhaps even the potential to affect elections. In the Pentagon Papers case, by the way, the counsel for the Times was famed First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams, who also argued Citizens United.

Don’t worry, though, it’s only corporations like The New York Times that will lose speech protections.  If you, as a brave individual, want to say something controversial on your blog—though you’ll probably want to do it on a server you own personally, just in case—you’re totally in the clear. And if the federal government decides to sue, you’ll be totally free to use as much of your personal savings as you want to fight back.

Cato Supreme Court Review on the Road

With last week’s Constitution Day conference behind us (watch it here) – and the release of the 2008-2009 Cato Supreme Court Review – I can finally escape the office where I’ve been holed up all summer.  Yes, it’s time to go on the road and talk about all these wonderful legal issues we’ve learned about over the past year, as well as previewing the new Supreme Court term.

To that end, below the jump is my fall speaking schedule so far.  All these events are sponsored by the Federalist Society (and in some cases co-sponsored by other organizations) and all are open to the public.

If you decide to attend one of the presentations after learning of it from this blog post, please feel free to drop me a line beforehand, and do introduce yourself after the event.

Sept. 24 at 11:50am - DePaul Law School, Chicago - Debate on the Second Amendment post-Heller

Sept. 24 at 4:30pm - Chicago-Kent School of Law - Panel on Rule of Law in Iraq

Sept. 29 at 5:00pm - University of Cincinnati Law School - Rule of Law and Economic Development

Sept. 30 at 12:00pm - Capital University Law School (Columbus, OH) - Review of October Term 2008/Preview of October Term 2009

Sept. 30 at 3:30pm -  Ohio Northern School of Law (Ada, OH) - Debate on Ricci and Affirmative Action in Employment

Oct. 1 at 12:00pm - University of Toledo Law School - Debate on Ricci and Affrimative Action in Employment

Oct. 1 at 5:00pm - Thomas M. Cooley Law School (Auburn Hills, MI) - Immigration and the Constitution

Oct. 5 at 12:00pm - University of Pennsylvania Law School - Debate on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation

Oct.6 at 5:30pm - Blank Rome LLP in Philadelphia (Federalist Society Lawyers Chapter; small admission fee) - Panel on Rule of Law in Iraq

Oct. 8 at 1:00pm - Penn State-Dickinson Law School (University Park) - October Term 2009 Preview

Oct. 13 at 5:15pm - George Mason University Law School (Arlington, VA) - October Term 2009 Preview

Oct. 26 at 12:00pm - Florida International University Law School (Miami) - Topic TBA

Oct. 27 at 12:30pm - University of Miami Law School - Topic TBA

Use Only U.S. Law to Interpret the U.S. Constitution

This fall, the Supreme Court will hear two cases involving Eighth Amendment challenges to the sentencing of juveniles to life without parole (“LWOP”) – Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida – claims that these types of sentences are “cruel and unusual.”  Cato takes no position on the wisdom of these types of sentences, but when evaluating their constitutionality the Court should only consider American law.

That is, regardless of the criminological or moral merits of juvenile LWOP sentences, the Supreme Court ought not consider non-binding provisions of international human rights treaties and customary international law in its analysis (as it has in cases like Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia).  To that end, Cato joined the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, the Sovereignty Network, and 10 other groups in a brief urging the Court to limit its constitutional analysis to domestic law and the decisions of U.S. courts.

Our brief argues that the Court should leave to the political branches the decision of whether to transform international norms into domestic law and only allow duly ratified international agreements to override domestic law – in the way the Court has set out in cases such as Medellin v. Texas. It further contends that if the Court believes this is one of the rare cases where international norms are relevant, it should follow the test it laid out in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, which addressed the (unrelated) Alien Tort Statute: The relevant norm must be widely accepted by the civilized world and as clearly defined as the historic “law of nations” norms regarding safe conduct permits, ambassadorial rights, and piracy on the high seas.

The brief also cautions that reliance on non-binding and indefinite international norms will undermine the democratic process and rule of law, casting considerable uncertainty over many U.S. laws.

More generally, while looking to foreign and international example is prudent when designing constitutions and drafting legislation – or even adjudicating complex international legal disputes – it is simply not relevant to interpreting the nation’s founding document.

Prosecutors Should Not Be Allowed to Fabricate Evidence

In 1977, county attorney David Richter and assistant county attorney Joseph Hrvol worked side by side with police to investigate and “solve” the notorious murder of a former police officer in Pottawattamie County, Iowa. The prosecutors fabricated evidence and used it to charge and convict Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington, sending them to prison for 25 years.

After the convictions were overturned for prosecutorial misconduct, McGhee and Harrington sued the county and prosecutors. The defendants in that civil suit invoked the absolute immunity generally afforded prosecutors to try to escape liability. After the Eighth Circuit ruled against them, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

On Friday, Cato joined the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the ACLU on a brief supporting the men unjustly imprisoned. We argue that prosecutors should be responsible for their role in manufacturing a false “case,” just as police officers would be under the same circumstances. As the Court has held, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity only during the prosecutorial phase of a case, not its investigatory phase. Were prosecutors to receive absolute immunity here, citizens would have no protection from or recourse against prosecutors who frame the innocent by fabricating evidence and then using that evidence to convict them.

To read Cato’s brief in the case of Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, see here.

Washington Legal Foundation Opposes GBS Deal

Via James Grimmelmann, the Washington Legal Foundation, a group known for its defense of property rights, filed an objection to the Google book deal earlier this month focusing on concerns related to those I raised in my posts earlier this week.

WLF points out that the Supreme Court has mandated that plaintiffs seeking to certify a class must make a diligent effort to notify all affected class members. According to the high court’s Shutts decision, this effort must include—at a minimum—sending a letter to every identifiable member of the class. In this case, this would mean sending a letter to every address in the US Copyright Office’s database of authors. WLF questions whether this was done; the foundation reports that it never received notification related to any of the books for which it holds the copyrights.

Now, it might be objected that this process would be prohibitively expensive. But if the class is so large that it’s impractical to notify all of its members, then the class is certainly too large to expect a judge to verify that the interests of all class members is being served by the settlement. If the class is too large to notify, then it’s too large to certify.

WLF also points out that the sprawling and heterogeneous class of plaintiffs makes it unlikely that the plaintiffs’ lawyers can fairly represent all parties who would be bound by the settlement:

For example, only those class members whose works have already been copied by Google are entitled to cash payments under the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the financial interests of those whose works have been copied diverge from the interests of class members whose works have not been copied. The former have an interest in maximizing cash payments, while the latter would prefer to see a smaller portion of the settlement pot allocated to those cash payments and a larger portion allocated to compensation for copying to be performed by Google in the future.

Another distinction among class members involves orphan works – that is, works whose owners are difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain. The owners of orphan works (who may not even know that they hold any ownership interests) have an obvious interest in ensuring that a large portion of settlement funds is dedicated to identifying the ownership of orphan works. On the other hand, the owners of works whose ownership is readily identifiable have an interest in holding down such search costs. If less money is devoted to such search efforts, a correspondingly greater percentage of settlement funds will be available to provide compensation
to them.

The point here isn’t that the amount allocated to orphan works searches is too high (or too low), or that more (or less) should be allocated to pay for previously-scanned books. The point is that a settlement involving millions of plaintiffs will inevitably enrich some plaintiffs at the expense of others. This isn’t a problem that can be solved by changing the details of the settlement. It’s a problem that can only be solved by limiting the scope of the settlement to parties whose interests are actually represented by the plaintiffs’ attorneys.