Tag: Supreme Court

Supreme Court Reinforces Jones Conception of 4th Amendment

In a per curiam opinion this week, Grady v. North Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court reinforced recent 4th Amendment decisions in holding that when the government physically occupies private property for the purpose of obtaining information, it engages in a search under the 4th Amendment.

The State of North Carolina subjects certain repeat offenders to a lifetime of satellite-based monitoring (SBM) after they complete their sentences.  The plaintiff, Torrey Dale Grady, argued that such a program represents a violation of his 4th Amendment rights under recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions, including a 2012 case called United States v. Jones (installing a GPS tracker on a suspect’s car represents a search) and a 2013 case called Florida v. Jardines (using a drug-sniffing dog on a suspect’s porch represents a search).

The Supreme Court agreed with Grady that such monitoring constitutes a search. In light of these decisions, it follows that a state also conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.

In concluding otherwise, the North Carolina Court of Appeals apparently placed decisive weight on the fact that the State’s monitoring program is civil in nature. See Jones, ___ N. C. App., at ___, 750 S. E. 2d, at 886 (“the instant case … involves a civil SBM proceeding”). “It is well settled,” however, “that the Fourth Amendment’s protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal investigations,” Ontario v. Quon, 560 U. S. 746, 755 (2010), and the government’s purpose in collecting information does not control whether the method of collection constitutes a search. A building inspector who enters a home simply to ensure compliance with civil safety regulations has undoubtedly conducted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 

The court also rejected North Carolina’s somewhat strange argument that its monitoring program is not meant to collect information:

Colorado Pushes Back against Oklahoma and Nebraska Marijuana Suit

In 2012, the people of Colorado voted to legalize marijuana through a state constitutional amendment, which went into effect in January of 2014.  Two of Colorado’s neighbors, Nebraska and Oklahoma, subsequently filed a lawsuit urging the U.S. Supreme Court to prohibit the state of Colorado from constructing a regulatory regime for the marijuana industry.  Last Friday, Colorado filed its response.

The Nebraska/Oklahoma argument: because the federal government, through the Controlled Substances Act, has banned marijuana, states are not allowed to contradict that ban by creating a regulatory framework for legalization.  Further, Colorado’s official regulation of recreational marijuana imposes a nuisance burden on surrounding states due to an alleged increase in drug trafficking.  While Nebraska and Oklahoma disclaim any intent to force Colorado to “re-criminalize” marijuana, the suit argues that Colorado’s official efforts to regulate the legal marijuana industry bring the state into conflict with federal and international drug laws.

Colorado’s response: there is no conflict.  Federal marijuana prohibition is still in effect, and the decision not to prioritize enforcement in states that legalize marijuana came from the federal government, not Colorado.  If Nebraska and Oklahoma object to the manner in which the federal government is discharging its law enforcement duties in Colorado, they should be suing the federal government.  Colorado’s regulation of the marijuana industry is within its prerogatives under the CSA. As to the nuisance claim, Colorado argues that mere policy differences between states that don’t directly injure the sovereignty of other states are not actionable nuisances.

The legal basis for the lawsuit has been questionable from the beginning, with legal commentators both challenging its merits and pointing out the irony in two of America’s “reddest” states taking a legal posture that overruns state sovereignty in favor of federal power.

And, of course, if prohibition states are concerned with the costs, they could always legalize and regulate marijuana themselves and spare their justice systems the immense costs of prohibition.  

While some notable conservatives appear to be coming around in favor of a federalist experiment on drug legalization, it is a testament to the unfortunate power of the drug war that two state governments that routinely invoke the merits of federalism would abandon it in favor of federal prohibition.  As discussed previously, federalism would hardly be the only cherished principle to be left in the drug war’s wake.

The Grapes of Wrath: California Raisins Are Back at the Supreme Court

When Marvin Horne told the United States Raisin Administrative Committee (yes, there’s a raisin administrative committee) that he wasn’t going to turn over nearly 30 percent of his crop to the government in exchange for nothing, he probably didn’t expect his case would go to the Supreme Court—twice. That little act of civil disobedience was thirteen years ago, and the Hornes now stand on the precipice of vindicating an important constitutional right—the Fifth Amendment right not to have your property taken without just compensation—as well as putting a wrench in the gears of what Justice Elena Kagan called “the world’s most outdated law.”

Like much of our agricultural policy, the Raisin Administrative Committee (RAC) is a relic of New Deal-era cartelization schemes. Trying to understand the logic behind American agricultural policy is like trying to find the logic in a Marx Brothers movie—it can’t be done and you’re better off just sitting back and laughing at the antics. Yet our agricultural policy has real-world effects on farmers like the Hornes, who are subject to the whims of the RAC as it tries to stabilize the price and supply of raisins. Sometimes the RAC pays for the raisins it takes, and sometimes not. In 2002-2003, the RAC offered far less than the cost of production for 47 percent of the Hornes’ raisins, and in 2003-2004 they offered nothing for 30 percent of the raisins. The Hornes had had enough, and they refused the order, arguing the seemingly simple point that the confiscation would be a taking without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

Sec. Burwell: Right Now, My Focus is on Taking Hostages. I’ll Inform Them of Their Hostage Status When I’m Ready

Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell is the lead defendant in King v. Burwell, in which the plaintiffs claim the Obama administration is taxing millions of employers and individuals and subsidizing millions of HealthCare.gov enrollees contrary to the plain language of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a., ObamaCare). The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in the case on March 4, and will likely rule by late June. If the Court rules against Burwell, 57 million individuals and employers will be freed from those illegal taxes and maybe four million HealthCare.gov enrollees will lose subsidies that the administration never had the authority to issue in the first place. Those four million people could see their insurance bills quadruple, face an unexpected tax liability of up to $5,000, and lose their health insurance. You might think they have a right to know about that risk. You might think a responsible public servant like Secretary Burwell would inform them of that risk. 

You would be wrong.

Today, Burwell appeared before the Senate Finance Committee. Though HHS has already deployed its contingency plan for HealthCare.gov-participating insurers, she refused to answer whether HHS has a contingency plan for HealthCare.gov enrollees:

Right now, my focus is on completing and implementing the law, which we believe is the law. Right now, what we’re focused on is the open enrollment.

HHS Head Ducks Questions On ACA Tax Credit Backup Plan,” wrote Law360. Modern Healthcare wrote, “HHS Stonewalls on King v. Burwell,” while The Hill seemed to laud Burwell because she “did not back down” from her firm stand against transparency and consumer information. Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) fumed, “to come here and repeatedly refuse to answer the questions strikes me as nothing less than contempt of our oversight responsibility.”

Employers Aren’t Mind-Readers and Shouldn’t Be Forced to Pry Into Employees’ Religious Beliefs

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing federal laws against employment discrimination. Along with enforcing these laws—most notably, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which outlaws discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin—the EEOC tells employers how not to discriminate. For example, the EEOC’s Best Practices for Eradicating Religious Discrimination in the Workplace instructs that an employer should “avoid assumptions or stereotypes about what constitutes a religious belief” and that managers “should be trained not to engage in stereotyping based on religious dress and grooming practices.” 

It’s passing strange, then, that the government is now arguing before the Supreme Court not only that employers can do these things, but that they must, or face liability under Title VII, in the context of reasonable accommodations that companies have to make for religious practice. Discerning when such accommodations are necessary can be difficult because people practice religion differently—and often in their own personal, non-obvious way. 

Title VII has thus traditionally been understood to leave it to the employee to determine when a company policy conflicts with his or her religious practice and then to request an accommodation. This interpretation leaves employers free to pursue neutral policies up to the point that they have actual knowledge of such a conflict. 

In the last several years, however, the EEOC has apparently taken the position that employers must pry into their employees’ religious practices whenever they have an inkling of suspicion that an accommodation may be needed. Abercrombie & Fitch is one company that has found out just how impossible a situation this puts employers into. When Abercrombie decided not to hire Samantha Elauf as a sales associate based on her violation of the company’s “Look Policy”—a branding guide that, among other things, prohibits the wearing of clothing generally not sold by the store, like Elauf’s black headscarf—the company found itself on the wrong end of a government lawsuit. 

A federal district court ruled for the EEOC even though Elauf never informed them that she would need a religious accommodation.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that an employer must actually know about a religious practice before it can be held liable for discriminating on that basis. The Supreme Court took the case at the EEOC’s request and Cato has now filed a brief in support of Abercrombie. 

We argue that employers must have actual knowledge of the potential need for a religious accommodation before they can be held liable for violating Title VII because the EEOC hasn’t offered any coherent alternative and because employers already know how to use this tried-and-true actual-knowledge standard. In addition, the burden of identifying the need for accommodations has to be on the employee because, after all, it’s their religion, and thus they are in a significantly better position to identify conflicts than employers—who aren’t mind-readers and shouldn’t have to rely on crude stereotypes or pry into employees’ personal lives. 

An opposite rule would create an awkward and uncomfortable scenario all-around. The EEOC’s position is short-sighted; if the agency somehow prevails, it will have done what federal agencies do best: turn minimal burdens for some people into heavy burdens for everyone.

The Supreme Court will hear argument in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. on February 25.

Harvard Study of CBO Reports Says Nothing New or Interesting about King v. Burwell

Vox’s Sarah Kliff reports that Harvard University’s Theda Skocpol has produced a study purporting to show Congress intended for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) to authorize health-insurance subsidies through exchanges established by the federal government—even though the statute expressly and repeatedly says those subsidies are available only “through an Exchange established by the State.” Whether the PPACA authorizes those subsidies in the 36 states with federal exchanges is the question presented in King v. Burwell. The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in King on March 4, with a ruling expected by June. Unfortunately for the administration and its supporters, Skocpol offers nothing either new or that supports the notion that Congress intended something other than what it expressly said in the statute.

What evidence does Skocpol claim to have found in support of her counter-textual interpretation of congressional intent? She combs through 68 analyses issued by the Congressional Budget Office during 2009 and 2010. She finds that in none of those reports did the CBO entertain the idea that the PPACA’s exchange subsidies might be available in some states but not others. She interprets this as both “excellent evidence” and “the best objective evidence we have that no one in Congress considered premium subsidies restricted to certain states to be either possible or desirable.”

Yeah, about that.

An alert Vox reader already informed Kliff that the claim that CBO never considered the possibility of exchange subsidies in some states but not others isn’t exactly true. The comprehensive health care bill approved by Democrats on the Senate’s Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee in 2009 (S. 1679) would have given states four years to establish exchanges themselves, after which point the federal government would establish an exchange. As my partner-in-crime-fighting Jonathan Adler and I write in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court in King:

S. 1679 asked each state to adopt certain health insurance regulations, and either establish an Exchange itself or ask the federal government to establish one “in” the state… S. 1679 withheld Exchange subsidies, as well as many of its insurance regulations, for up to four years until the state complied.

The CBO scored S. 1679 assuming that some states would establish exchanges early and some would not. Thus the agency’s cost projections assumed that exchange subsidies would be available in some states but not in others. So we’ve already got a problem with Skocpol’s analysis.

Senate Leaders Demand Treasury, HHS Inform Consumers About Risks Of HealthCare.gov Coverage

The Obama administration is boasting that 2.5 million Americans have selected health insurance plans for 2015 through the Exchanges it operates in 36 states under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and that they are well on their way to enrolling 9.1 million Americans in Exchange coverage next year. But there’s a problem. The administration is not warning ObamaCare enrollees about significant risks associated with their coverage. By mid-2015, 5 million HealthCare.gov enrollees could see their tax liabilities increase by thousands of dollars. Their premiums could increase by 300 percent or more. Their health plans could be cancelled without any replacement plans available. Today, the U.S. Senate leadership – incoming Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Majority Whip John Cornyn (R-TX), Conference Chairman John Thune (R-SD), Policy Committee Chairman John Barrasso (R-WY), and Conference Vice Chairman Roy Blunt (R-MO) – wrote Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew and Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia M. Burwell to demand the administration inform consumers about those risks.

First, some background.

  • The PPACA directs states to establish health-insurance Exchanges and requires the federal government to establish Exchanges in states that fail to do so.
  • The statute authorizes subsidies (nominally, “tax credits”) to certain taxpayers who purchase Exchange coverage. Those subsidies transfer much of the cost of ObamaCare’s many regulations and  mandates from the premium payer to the taxpayer. For the average recipient, Exchange subsidies cover 76 percent of their premium.
  • But there’s a catch. The law only authorizes those subsidies “through an Exchange established by the State.” The PPACA nowhere authorizes subsidies through federally established Exchanges. This makes the law’s Exchanges operate like its Medicaid expansion: if states cooperate with implementation, their residents get subsidies; if not, their residents get no subsidies.
  • Confounding expectations, 36 states refused or otherwise failed to establish Exchanges. This should have meant that Exchange subsidies would not be available in two-thirds of the country, and that many more Americans would face the full cost of the PPACA’s very expensive coverage.
  • Yet the Obama administration unilaterally decided to offer Exchange subsidies through federal Exchanges despite the lack of any statutory authorization. Because those (illegal) subsidies trigger (illegal) penalties against both individuals and employers under the PPACA’s mandates, the administration soon found itself in court.
  • Two federal courts have found the subsidies the administration is issuing to 5 million enrollees through HealthCare.gov are illegal. The Supreme Court has agreed to resolve the issue. It has granted certiorari in King v. Burwell. Oral arguments will likely occur in February or March, with a ruling due by June.
  • If the Supreme Court agrees with those lower courts that the subsidies the administration is issuing through HealthCare.gov are illegal, the repercussions for enrollees could be significant. Their subsidies would disappear. The PPACA would require them to repay the IRS whatever subsidies they already received in 2015 and 2014, which could top $10,000 for many enrollees near the poverty level. Their insurance payments would quadruple, on average. Households near the poverty level would see even larger increases. Their plans could be cancelled, and they may not be able to find replacement coverage.
  • The Obama administration knows it is exposing HealthCare.gov enrollees to these risks. But it is not telling them.

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