Tag: subsidies

TTIP Could Rein in the Abuse of Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Investment

I’ve written often about the global competition to attract foreign investment, and have made the point that investment flows to jurisdictions with good policies in place. Globalization of production and the mobility of capital mean that national policies (regulations, tax policy, immigration, trade, energy, education, etc.) are on trial, with net investment inflows rendering the verdicts.

But some countries (and some U.S. states) use tax holidays and other forms of tax forgiveness, in lieu of adopting good policies, to attract investment, which burdens taxpayers and subverts the process of matching investment to its optimal location. These are subsidies – like so many other programs – that distort markets and should be discouraged.

In today’s Cato Online Forum essay, which is associated with the TTIP conference taking place on October 12, Ted Alden from the Council on Foreign Relations puts forward a strong proposal to end this madness via the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations.

Read it.  Provide feedback.  And please register to attend the conference.

Solyndra: A Case Study in Green Energy, Cronyism, and the Failure of Central Planning

Back in 2011 I wrote several times about the failure of Solyndra, the solar panel company that was well connected to the Obama administration. Then, as with so many stories, the topic passed out of the headlines and I lost touch with it. Today, the Washington Post and other papers bring news of a newly released federal investigative report:

Top leaders of a troubled solar panel company that cost taxpayers a half-billion dollars repeatedly misled federal officials and omitted information about the firm’s financial prospects as they sought to win a major government loan, according to a newly-released federal investigative report.

Solyndra’s leaders engaged in a “pattern of false and misleading assertions” that drew a rosy picture of their company enjoying robust sales while they lobbied to win the first clean energy loan the new administration awarded in 2009, a lengthy investigation uncovered. The Silicon Valley start-up’s dramatic rise and then collapse into bankruptcy two years later became a rallying cry for critics of President Obama’s signature program to create jobs by injecting billions of dollars into clean energy firms.

And why would it become such a rallying cry for critics? Well, consider the hyperlink the Post inserted at that point in the article: “[Past coverage: Solyndra: Politics infused Obama energy programs]” And what did that article report?

King v. Burwell: How the Supreme Court Helped President Obama Disenfranchise His Political Opponents

Criticizing my recent post-mortem on King v. Burwell, Scott Lemieux kindly calls me “ObamaCare’s fiercest critic” for my role in that ObamaCare case. Other words he associates with my role include “defiant,” “ludicrous,” “farcical,” “dumber,” “snake oil,” “ludicrous” (again), “irrational,” “aggressive,” “comically transparent,” and “dishonest.”

Somewhere amid the deluge, Lemieux reaches his main claim, which is that (somehow) I admitted: “the King lawsuit wasn’t designed to uphold the statute passed by Congress in 2010. It was intended to ‘enfranchise’ the people who voted against the bill.” I’m not quite sure what Lemieux means. But perhaps Lemieux doesn’t understand my point about how the Supreme Court helped President Obama disenfranchise his political opponents.

As all nine Supreme Court justices acknowledged in King, “the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase” is that Congress authorized the Affordable Care Act’s premium subsidies, employer mandate, and (to a large extent) individual mandate only in states that agreed to establish a health-insurance “Exchange.” That is, all nine justices agreed that the plain meaning of the operative statutory language allows states to veto key provisions of the ACA—sort of like the Medicaid veto that has existed for 50 years and lets states destroy health insurance for millions of poor Americans. The Exchange veto includes the power to shield millions of state residents from the ACA’s least-popular provisions: the individual mandate and the employer mandate.

Video: Teachers Victimized by IRS’s Illegal Taxes Call King v. Burwell a “Godsend”

Yesterday, I blogged about the 70 million Americans President Obama is subjecting to illegal taxes, who would be freed from those taxes by a ruling for the challengers in King v. Burwell. Many of the victims of those illegal taxes are teachers. Kevin Pace, for example, is a jazz musician and music professor in Northern Virginia who lost $8,000 of income in one year alone when the Obama administration unlawfully imposed ObamaCare’s employer mandate on his employer. 

A group called American Commitment has produced a short video telling the stories of two more victims of these illegal taxes. One says these illegal taxes reduced his hours worked by 40 percent, calling it “absurd” and “unfair.” Another says a ruling for the King v. Burwell challengers would be a “godsend” and asks Congress to “come to its senses and give me back my hours, please.”

State-by-State Data on the Number of Taxpayers King v. Burwell Would Free from Illegal Taxes

A ruling for the challengers in King v. Burwell would have benefits that swamp other effects of the ruling, including:

  • More than 67 million Americans would be freed from illegal taxes in the form of ObamaCare’s employer mandate.
  • More than 11 million Americans would be freed from an illegal tax averaging $1,200 (i.e., ObamaCare’s individual mandate).
  • Affected workers could receive a pay raise of around $900 per year.
  • The ruling could create an estimated 237,000 new jobs.
  • It could add an estimated 1.3 million workers added to the labor force.
  • It could result in more hours and higher incomes for 3.3 million part-time workers.

The number of people who could benefit from a ruling for the challengers is, therefore, more than ten times the number who would lose an illegal subsidy. And, as discussed here, the pool of people who need such subsidies may be as small as one-tenth the number receiving them.

Click here for state-by-state data on the number of employers and taxpayers who would benefit from King v. Burwell.

Unsettling Cotton Settlement at the WTO

Last week the U.S. government settled a long-running trade dispute with Brazil, winning taxpayers the privilege of continuing to subsidize America’s wealthy cotton farmers in exchange for our commitment to subsidize Brazilian cotton farmers, as well. That’s right! We get to pay U.S. cotton farming businesses to overproduce, export, and suppress global prices to the detriment of Brazilian (and other countries’) cotton farmers provided that we compensate the Brazilians to the tune of $300 million.

Some background. Ten years ago, in a case brought by Brazil, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that the United States was exceeding its subsidy allowances for domestic cotton farmers and that it should bring its practices into compliance with the relevant WTO agreements. After delays and half-baked U.S. efforts to comply, Brazil sought and received permission from the WTO to retaliate (or, in WTO parlance, to “withdraw concessions” because opening one’s own market in a world of mercantilist reciprocity is, perversely, considered a cost or concession). Under the threat of such retaliation, instead of bringing its cotton subsidies into WTO compliance, the U.S. government agreed to pay $147 million per year to Brazilian farmers so that it could continue subsidizing U.S. farmers beyond agreed limits. That arrangement prevailed for a few years until the funds were cut during the budget sequester earlier this year – an event that triggered a renewed threat of retaliation from Brazil, which now has been averted on account of last week’s $300 million settlement.

The Peterson Institute’s Gary Hufbauer characterized the agreement as a “good deal” because it ends the specter of soured bilateral relations, which $800 million of targeted retaliation against U.S. exporters and intellectual property holders would likely produce, for a reasonable price of $300 million “spread widely across the US population, around 90 cents a person.” In Hufbauer’s opinion:

Money damages, paid in this way, are much fairer, and do not destroy the benefits of international commerce, unlike concentrated retaliation against firms that had nothing to do with the original dispute. The WTO system is only designed to authorize such retaliation, but the US-Brazil settlement points the way towards a better way of satisfying breaches of WTO obligations.

While I share Hufbauer’s desire to avoid retaliation and soured relations, his rationale for endorsing the settlement seems a bit strained. If the settlement is justifiable because the costs are spread across 300-plus million Americans, then Hufbauer can probably lend his support to most subsidies, tariffs, and other forms of protectionism, which endure because the concentrated benefits accruing to the favor-seekers are paid through costs imposed, often imperceptibly, on a diffuse base of unorganized consumers or taxpayers. Does the smallness or the imperceptibility of the costs make it right? No, but it makes it easy to get away with, which is why I think it’s pennywise and pound foolish to endorse such outcomes. There are all sorts of federal subsidies to industries and tariffs on goods that may be small or imperceptible as a cost on a standalone basis at the individual level.  But when aggregated across programs, the costs to individuals become more significant. It’s death by 10,000 cuts.

Cotton Subsidies and the Upside of Wasteful Government Incompetence

An internal audit by the U.S. Department of Agriculture of the “Economic Adjustment Assistance to Users of Upland Cotton Program” (EAAP) has revealed widespread misuse of subsidies given to owners of textile mills.  The program pays mills based on how much cotton they buy and requires that they spend the money on capital improvements at the mill.  It turns out some owners were just buying whatever the heck they wanted with the money—and that’s probably a good thing.

The primary purpose of the EAAP is to increase the demand for cotton.  The money goes to the mills, but the intended beneficiary is the cotton farmer, who gets an overpaying customer.  By conditioning the payment on an equivalent reinvestment in the cotton mill, the program also hopes to artificially increase the supply of cotton mills.  This, too, is meant to benefit cotton farmers by keeping their customers invested in buying their product. 

If the textile mill owners are using the subsidies to purchase—as the Washington Free Beacon reports—“Ford Explorers, artwork, sound systems, and elephant lamps,” then the program is ultimately less distortive of the U.S. and global cotton market.  That’s a good thing.  If the government is going to take money from some people and give it to others, at the very least we should hope that they do it in the least destructive way possible.

On the other hand, if the mill owners get the money with no strings attached, that increases the incentive for them to take the subsidy in the first place.  My guess, though, is that paying people to buy things they actually want is less distortive than paying them to buy things the government wants them to buy.

So, a toast to government incompetence (this time).  If someone’s going to do bad things, I’m glad it’s these idiots.