Tag: public opinion

Internet Industry More Popular Than Ever-60% Have Favorable View

New polling from Gallup finds that more Americans view the internet industry favorably than any time since Gallup began asking the question in 2001. Today, 60% of Americans have either a “very positive” or “somewhat positive” view of the industry, compared to 49% in 2014.

Favorability toward the Internet industry has ebbed and flowed during the 2000s, but today marks the most positive perception of the industry. Compared to other industries, Gallup found that the Internet industry ranks third behind the restaurant and computer industries.

Perceptions have improved across most demographic groups, with the greatest gains found among those with lower levels of education, Republicans and independents. It is likely these groups are “late adopters” of technology and have grown more favorable as they’ve come to access it. Indeed, late adopters have been found to be older, less educated and more conservative. Pew also finds that early users of the Internet have been younger, more urban, higher income Americans, and those with more education. Indeed, as Internet usage has soared from 55% to 2001 to 84% in 2014, many of these new users come from the ranks of conservative late adopters.

These data suggest the more Americans learn about the Internet the more they come to like it and appreciate the companies who use it as a tool to offer consumer goods and services.

Please find full results at Gallup.

Research assistant Nick Zaiac contributed to this post.

54% of Americans Say America Is Not Divided into “Haves” and “Have Nots”

Recent Gallup polling finds that 58% of Americans view themselves as “haves” while 38% say they are “have nots.” Nevertheless, most Americans (54%) reject the premise that the United States is a rigid economic hierarchy, while 45% say it’s a fair depiction.

When asked to choose, 58% of Americans view themselves as “haves,” a share fairly constant since 2003, and similar to 59% found in 1989. (There was a blip in the late 1990s when 60-67% said they were “haves.”) However, the share who say they are “have nots” has more than doubled from 17% in 1989 to 38% in 2015, as fewer Americans say they “don’t know.” In line with this trend, more Americans view the United States as a society divided into “haves” and “have nots” increasing from 39% in 1998 to 45% in 2015.* Similarly the share who say the US is not divided has declined rom 59% in 1998 to 54% today.

These data suggest that Americans have begun to focus more on economic status with increasing debate over rising income inequality.

Interestingly, while Hispanics are more likely (51%) to say they are a “have not” when pressed, a fully 60% reject the premise that America is “divided into haves and have nots.” This suggests that Hispanic Americans believe in upward income mobility. While some may not view themselves as a “have” today they or their children could be eventually.

While African-Americans are about equally likely as Hispanics to say they personally are a “have not” (48%), 69% view the country as divided between “haves” and “have nots,” 32 points higher than Hispanics.

White Americans tend to agree (57%) with Hispanics that America is not a divided land of “have” and “have nots,” however, they are about 20 points less likely to say, when pressed, they personally are a “have not.”

The share of Americans who think they are winners of the economic system has remained fairly constant over the past decade. However, more Americans are beginning to think the overall system is rigged in favor of economic division, but this view is not necessarily a product of their own experience. Instead, passionate public discourse over income inequality has likely played a key role in changing Americans’ perceptions about how the system works for others.

Read the full Gallup post here.

For more public opinion analysis sign up here for Cato’s weekly digest of Public Opinion Insights.


* Note: Gallup found in 1998 that 71% of Americans rejected the idea that America is divided into two economic groups while 26% accepted the premise. However by 1998 59% rejected and 39% accepted the idea. It’s unclear if the decline between 1988 to 1998 is a a trend, or if 1988 registered an unusual response.

Does Donald Trump Really Do Best Among Less Educated Voters?

Gage Skidmore/flickr

The short answer is: Yes, Donald Trump likely has greater appeal among less educated Americans.

While we should keep in mind that the margins of error are wider for subsets of national polls—Trump consistently performs better among Americans who have not graduated from college than among college graduates.

For instance, Rasmussen finds that among Republicans who have not finished college, 25 percent support Trump for president compared to 11 percent among Republican college grads.

No other Republican candidate comes within 16 points of Trump among GOP non-college grads. However, among Republicans with college degrees, Trump is just one of many favored candidates: Scott Walker (13 percent), and Carly Fiorina (12 percent) score slightly better, and Marco Rubio (11 percent) ties Trump. All of these are within the margin of error.

Similarly, an August CNN/ORC poll finds that in a hypothetical match-up, Hillary Clinton leads Trump by 15 points among college graduates nationally, but only leads by two points among non-college graduates. Moreover, another CNN/ORC poll found that among all Americans, Trump’s favorables were underwater: -32 points among college grads but only by -8 points among non-college grads.

These August polls line up with July polls finding Trump performing better among less educated voters, as I detail in this piece at Federalist.

Does this mean that Trump’s appeal is any less genuine or meaningful? Definitely not. But his candidacy has the capacity to divide the more educated from the less educated.

For more public opinion analysis sign up here for weekly digest of Cato Public Opinion Insights.

Social Liberalism in the U.S. on the Rise, Fiscal Conservatism Remains Strong

Gallup’s latest report of American ideology shows the public is becoming increasingly socially liberal but not more economically liberal. Putting these trends together, you have an increasing number of Americans who are both socially liberal and fiscally conservative. This is probably why pundits are talking about a libertarian impulse trending in the United States. America is not becoming more liberal across the board, we are becoming more libertarian on social issues. In sum, the country is more libertarian today in 2015 than it was 10 years ago.

Social Liberalism on the Rise

Since the late 1990s Gallup has tracked the share of Americans who say their views on social issues are “liberal” or “very liberal.” In 1999 Americans were nearly twice as likely to say they were socially conservative as socially liberal (39 to 21 percent). However, throughout the 2000s the share of Americans who viewed themselves as liberal on social issues has steadily increased. In Gallup’s latest poll, Americans are equally likely to say they are socially liberal as socially conservative (31 percent each).

The rise in social liberalism is largely due to Democrats’ embracing the term rather than Republicans becoming more liberal. In 2015 fully 53 percent of Democrats say they are social liberals, up from only 38 percent 10 years ago. Among Republicans there has been no significant change in the share who say they are social liberals. Compared to 10 years ago, almost the same share of Republicans say they are social conservatives. However, there was a surge in social conservatism on the right between 2007 and 2012, reaching 67 percent in 2009. From that, there has been a marked decline to 53 percent. Only 11 percent of Republicans say they are social liberals, while 8 percent used the label 10 years ago.

Fiscal Conservatism Maintains Strong Advantage

Nevertheless, despite the 2008 Financial Crisis and Great Recession, talk of who built what and who’s paying their fair share, Americans continue to see themselves as fiscal conservatives by a wide margin. Gallup found that 39 percent of Americans self identify as fiscal conservatives compared to 19 percent who say they are fiscal liberals—a 20-point advantage.

Maybe Deceive-and-Denigrate Isn’t Such a Great Strategy

Yesterday, I wrote about new survey results from the Friedman Foundation showing that the Common Core, if even close to fairly presented, has either negative, or thinly positive, levels of public support. But I posted that too soon; not long after I wrote it, two new polls came out showing even bigger trouble for the Core.

The first was a Rasmussen survey that revealed plummeting support for the Common Core effort among parents of school-aged children. Support dropped from 52 percent in November 2013 to just 34 percent in yesterday’s release. Opposition now outweighs support 47 percent to 34 percent. Assuming the question was unchanged between surveys, that is a huge drop.

The second survey was a University of Southern California poll of Golden State residents. The Core hasn’t been as controversial there as in many states–at least, there doesn’t seem to be a major groundswell to dump it–but it’s getting drubbed there, too. The USC research showed a marked increase in the percentage of Californians who claimed to know about the Core since the survey’s 2013 administration, and among those who reported knowing something only 38 percent had a positive feeling about the Core. Some 44 percent had negative impressions. Presented with pro- and anti-Core statements, a larger percentage of respondents–41 percent to 32 percent–agreed more with the negative statement. In 2013, the pro statement got the plurality, 36 percent to 25 percent.

The Core has clearly been taking a public relations beating. Why? No doubt largely because most people only started to become aware of the Core a couple of years ago as long-silent implementation hit districts and schools. And the more aware they became, the more they disliked what they saw and learned about how the Core ended up in their schools.  

It is also quite possible that the primary strategy Core proponents have employed in the face of mounting opposition–deceive the public about everything from the federal role in moving the Core, to its impact on curricula, and denigrate opponents as misinformed, loony, or both–has blown up in their faces. Perhaps it has amplified the impression that the Core has been foisted on Americans by a relatively small, well-connected group of elites who hold regular people in contempt. I don’t think that most supporters actually are contemptuous of the average American, but it is almost impossible not to feel they are given how many have used the tactic of belittling Core opponents, who are, in many cases, just concerned citizens.

I have long thought Core supporters should publicly admit the truth about the Core–it is heavily federalized and intended, along with related tests, to direct curricula–and apologize to the public for having dodged those basic truths. Maybe now, for their own cause’s sake, they’ll do that.

The Council on Foreign Relations Doesn’t Care What You Think

Bruce Stokes has a piece up at Foreign Policy describing the disconnect between public opinion on US foreign policy and elite opinion. The point has been made many times before. Benjamin Page and Marshall Bouton wrote a book arguing that there is a disconnect in that the public wants more liberal foreign policies—focusing on multilateral cooperation, protecting weak nations from one another, improving foreigners’ standards of living, and promoting democracy abroad—but elites are more realist, focused on power and dominance. Dan Drezner, on the other hand, argued that there is a disconnect, but in exactly the opposite direction: the public is more realist, focused on power and security, and cool to the liberal views and policies of America’s foreign-policy elite.

Tabling who is right and who is wrong about what the public wants, everyone making this sort of argument is at least implicitly acknowledging that the foreign-policy elite defies public preferences on foreign policy. This is pretty easy to explain. Since the United States is so safe, foreign policy isn’t salient to voters in the way that their proximate interests—getting a tax credit or transfer payment—are. Some scholars have pointed out that public opinion on foreign policy has a lot to do with voters’ identity: right-thinking sorts of people hold these sorts of foreign policy views: “I am a right-thinking person, therefore I will hold these sorts of views.” This is why you hear foreign policy elites bleating endlessly about leadership, American exceptionalism, strength, et cetera. Those concepts zap the public in ways that wonky arguments about how extended deterrence or alliance politics work don’t.

As Ben Friedman and Chris Preble recently wrote in the LA Times, the public is moving closer to the views of Cato’s defense and foreign policy scholars. A disastrous decade of foreign policy brought to them by the foreign-policy elite, combined with an economic slowdown and growing concerns about our domestic economy and politics, have created a come home, America sentiment among the public. Academic scholars, as well, have become more Cato-ish. As three academic proponents of the status quo recently admitted with alarm, “According to…most scholars who write on the future of U.S. grand strategy,” restraint’s time has come.

Washington Post: Democrats Are Abandoning Obamacare

From The Washington Post’s The Fix:

Moderate Democrats are quitting on Obamacare

By Scott Clement, Published: July 23 at 9:00 am

The landmark health-reform law passed in 2010 has never been very popular and always highly partisan, but a new Washington Post-ABC News poll finds that a group of once loyal Democrats has been steadily turning against Obamacare: Democrats who are ideologically moderate  or conservative.

Just after the law was passed in 2010, fully 74 percent of moderate and conservative Democrats supported the federal law making changes to the health-care system. But just 46 percent express support in the new poll, down 11 points in the past year. Liberal Democrats, by contrast, have continued to support the law at very high levels – 78 percent in the latest survey. Among the public at large, 42 percent support and 49 percent oppose the law, retreating from an even split at 47 percent apiece last July.

2013-07-22 hcare among Democrats

The shift among the Democratic party’s large swath in the ideological middle– most Democrats in this poll, 57 percent, identify as moderate or conservative – is driving an overall drop in party support for the legislation: Just 58 percent of Democrats now support the law, down from 68 percent last year and the lowest since the law was enacted in 2010. This broader drop mirrors tracking surveys by the non-partisan Kaiser Family Foundation and Fox News polls, both of which found Democratic support falling earlier this year.

Read the whole thing.

This news comes on the heels of a significant fissure among House Democrats over Obamacare.

It also deflates an already weak talking point Obamacare supporters have used to pooh-pooh the law’s persistent unpopularity. As Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institution once put it:

Of [the] 51 percent [who oppose the law], somewhere between a quarter and a third oppose the bill not because they are against it, but because they don’t think it went far enough.

They can’t use that excuse here. If Democratic support for Obamacare fell because more Democrats suddenly wish the law went farther, that drop would occur first and primarily among left-wing Democrats, not moderates and conservatives. It’s hard to come up with a story that explains why that dynamic would cause a drop in support only among moderates and conservatives. 

(HT: Veronique de Rugy.)

Pages