Tag: public choice

Subsidies and Votes — in India and the United States

When Americans suggest that government transfer programs might affect the way people vote, the mainstream media react with the indignation that greeted Mitt Romney’s “47 percent” comment. Of course, in other contexts the media certainly know that programs like Social Security, Medicare, and farm subsidies impact voting, but Republicans seem to get pounded for making that point.

But when it comes to other democracies, such as India, journalists don’t seem to have any trouble seeing the electoral advantages of government spending. Jim Yardley reports from India for the New York Times:

Frustrated by delays in Parliament, and eager to gain favor with rural voters ahead of national elections, India’s cabinet has approved a sweeping executive order that establishes a legal right to food and will create what is likely to be the world’s largest food subsidy system for the poor….

For the governing Congress Party, the new ordinance fulfills a campaign pledge made by Mrs. Gandhi and provides her party with something tangible to offer voters as the country prepares for national elections next year. The coalition government has been battered by corruption scandals and a sinking economy. With polls suggesting a loss of public support for the Congress Party, the food ordinance is good politics, some analysts say, if uncertain economics.

I noted a few months ago that the Washington Post had made a similar point:

Trying to rekindle the fire of India’s economy, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram promised Thursday to rein in a runaway deficit even as he raised spending on welfare schemes that the government hopes will woo voters in elections scheduled for next year….

“The finance minister faced two counter-veiling pressures: to present a populist, voter-friendly budget and also control the huge fiscal deficit,” said Vir Sanghvi, a political analyst. “What he presented was a ‘this-is-the-best-we-can-manage-under-the-circumstances’ kind of a budget. . . . He is hoping that the economy will improve and prices will come down by the time of the election. That is a big political gamble.”

Chidambaram promised to increase spending on rural welfare schemes, rural roads and jobs, food guarantees for the poor, women’s safety programs, tax breaks on loans for first-time home buyers and a women’s bank.

Is it really so hard to imagine that American politicians might also see transfer programs as measures that would benefit them on election day? Of course, the more fundamental impact of transfer programs may be to make both parties afraid to cut spending. What politician in either party wants to propose cuts in Social Security, Medicare, student loans, or farm subsidies? It’s not that transfer recipients all vote for the same party; it’s just that both parties fear the loss of votes if they interfered with the flow of subsidies. And not just in India.

How to Tell If the Government Has Taken over Health Care

From the Washington Post:

Hedge fund executives and other investors are increasingly interested in the timing and nature of health-policy decisions in Washington because they directly affect the profits and stock prices of pharmaceutical, insurance, hospital and managed-care companies…

[Former Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services] director Thomas Scully, who served during the Bush administration…said he thought that it was useful for CMS officials to have more communication with Wall Street investors as a way for regulators to learn and “explain what an $800-billion-a-year agency” does with its money.

So long as someone is still making a buck, it’s not socialized medicine…right?

Government on the Friends and Family Plan

In his stirring speech to the 1984 Democratic National Convention, then-New York governor Mario Cuomo used an extended metaphor of the whole nation as a family. So maybe it should come as no surprise to discover that his son, current New York governor Andrew Cuomo, uses the New York State government as a jobs program for his friends and their families. The Empire State Development Corporation in particular is chock-full of his donors and friends, and their young sons–not to mention Cuomo’s political advisers.

He’s not alone in spending (other people’s) money to help family and friends. The Washington Post reported in December on the family-friendly atmosphere at the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority:

Meet the Kulle family: mom Helen, daughter Ann Kulle-Helms, son-in-law Douglas Helms, son Albert, daughter-in-law Michele Kulle and Michele’s brother, Jeffrey Thacker.

They all worked for the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority. All at the same time.

One MWAA board member, 

who has had at least three relatives, including a daughter-in-law, work at the agency, said family members are employed frequently, particularly among board members.

“If you ask a third of those folks, their relatives work there,” he said. “I never thought that we were doing anything wrong.”

“This is a government town and an agency town,” Crawford said. “If there’s a possibility that you can hire a relative … it was the norm.”

This Month at Cato Unbound: What Keeps Money Out of Politics?

It’s called the Tullock Paradox: if you run the numbers, the expected returns to lobbying commonly appear much larger than they ought to be. Bad behavior pays really well, and yet corporations and interest groups routinely pass on what would seem, from a coldly amoral stance, to be easy money. Rational economic actors ought to bid up the price of government favor—and thus bid down the rate of return—but real-world actors don’t do so.

Why don’t we see even more money in politics? That’s the question we ask in the April, 2013 issue of Cato Unbound.

To answer that question, we have invited Fred L. Smith, founder and chairman of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a man who has spent much of his career pondering just this question, and who benefits from an insider’s view of political advocacy. His lead essay suggests that there is a widespread distaste for political activity among people who would otherwise turn to lobbying, and often that’s with good reason.

To discuss with him the potential pitfalls of public choice modeling, we have invited a panel of distinguished academics: Professors Stephen Ansolabehere of Harvard University, Francesco Parisi of the University of Minnesota School of Law, and Raymond J. La Raja of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

As always, Cato Unbound readers are encouraged to take up our themes and enter into the conversation on their own websites and blogs, or on other venues. We also welcome your letters. Send them to jkuznicki at cato dot org. Selections may be published at the editors’ option.

Better than Medicaid Expansion: Missouri Senate Approves ‘Good Samaritan’ Law

Never mind Medicaid expansion. The Missouri Senate has approved a bill that would allow doctors to give free medical care to the poor. 

You wouldn’t think the government would have to pass a law to let doctors give free health care to the poor. Yet nearly every state prohibits out-of-state physicians and other clinicians from providing free charitable care to the poor unless those clinicians obtain a new medical license from that state.

In a forthcoming paper for the Cato Institute, I explain how medical licensing laws deny care to the poor, and how reforming those laws is a better alternative than Medicaid expansion:

Remote Area Medical has had to turn away patients or scrap clinics in places California, Florida, and Georgia. “Before Georgia told us to stop,” says founder Stan Brock, “we used to go down to southern Georgia and work with the Lions Club there treating patients.” After a tornado devastated Joplin, Missouri, Remote Area Medical arrived with a mobile eyeglass lab, yet state officials prohibited the visiting optometrists from giving away free glasses.

These stories belie the claim that government licensing of medical practitioners protects patients. Instead, they block access to care for the most vulnerable patients.

States should adopt “Good Samaritan” laws, like those enacted in Tennessee, Illinois, and Connecticut. Those states allow out-of-state-licensed clinicians to deliver free charitable care in their states without obtaining a new license. To protect patients, visiting clinicians are and should be subject to the licensing malpractice laws of the state in which they are practicing.

This week, Missouri’s Senate passed such a Good Samaritan law. (It even lets licensed veterinarians come to the state to provide free charitable care to animals.) The bill also provides an inducement to out-of-state clinicians by reducing their liability exposure for malpractice. It would be better if the state were to let doctors and patients choose their own malpractice liability rules via contract. Unlike ObamaCare’s massive Medicaid expansion, this bill would expand access to care for the poor without costing states or taxpayers a dime.

Here’s a video on Remote Area Medical, the good that it does–and the good that licensing laws prevent it from doing.

Even if you’re not ready to concede that medical licensing laws are harmful and should be repealed, you would have to admit it makes no sense for the government to block licensed doctors from treating the poor for free.

ObamaCare’s False Promise of Cost Savings: ACO Edition

One of ObamaCare’s selling points was that it would supposedly reduce costs through such innovations as “accountable care organizations” or ACOs. I have explained how ACOs are an innovation with many benefits, how markets developed ACOs decades before the government’s central planners caught on, and have predicted that ObamaCare’s centrally planned ACO program would fail to deliver on the promised savings. The reason is simple, and explained by industry expert Robert Laszewski:

Here’s a flash for the policy wonks pushing ACOs. They only work if the provider gets paid less for the same patient population. Why would they be dumb enough to voluntarily accept that outcome?

Turns out, health care providers are not that dumb. They have threatened to bolt ObamaCare’s ACO program in the past, and are doing so again [$] if Medicare tries to cut their pay:

One of CMS’ highest profile health care delivery reform initiatives is on rocky ground as most of the Pioneer ACOs are threatening to drop out of the demonstration if CMS makes them start meeting quality measures instead of merely requiring that they report the measures, according to a letter [$] obtained by Inside Health Policy…The Pioneer ACOs were supposed to be the few shining examples of organizations that could handle outcomes-based pay…

CMS often touts the high level of participation in ACOs, and it would seem that CMS has too much at stake to ignore the Pioneers’ requests and let the demo implode, a health care consultant says. However, it’s difficult to believe that this is the first time that the ACOs have brought these concerns to CMS – some innovation center officials come from the very organizations in the Pioneer demo – all of which indicates that negotiations have not gone well with the agency, the sources say. CMS could make changes to the quality metrics without announcing them in the Federal Register because the Pioneer ACOs are a demonstration, but the cat is out of the bag now, the sources note.

The Pioneer ACOs account for a little more than 30 of the some 250 ACOs in Medicare, and the Pioneers are supposed to be the most advanced, integrated systems of them all.

And thus ObamaCare’s false promise of cost savings comes into sharper focus. File this one under “markets are smart, government is stupid.”

Holman Jenkins: ObamaCare Is Part of the Insanity, Not Its Cure

I’m a week late on this, but Holman Jenkins has an excellent discussion of why health care costs and pricing (not the same thing!) are insane, and why ObamaCare will only make it worse:

Duke University’s Clark Havighurst [wrote] a brilliant 2002 article that describes the regulatory, legal and tax subsidies that deprive consumers of both the incentive and opportunity to demand value from medical providers. Americans end up with a “Hobson’s choice: either coverage for ‘Cadillac’ care or no health coverage at all.”

“The market failure most responsible for economic inefficiency in the health-care sector is not consumers’ ignorance about the quality of care,” Mr. Havighurst writes, “but rather their ignorance of the cost of care, which ensures that neither the choices they make in the marketplace nor the opinions they express in the political process reveal their true preferences.”

You might turn next to an equally fabulous 2001 article by Berkeley economist James C. Robinson, who shows how the “pernicious” doctrine that health care is different—that consumers must shut up, do as they’re told and be prepared to write a blank check—is used to “justify every inefficiency, idiosyncrasy, and interest-serving institution in the health care industry.”

Hospitals, insurers and other institutions involved in health care may battle over available dollars, but they also share an interest in increasing the nation’s resources being diverted into health care—which is exactly what happens when costs are hidden from those who pay them.

Put aside whether President Obama could have pushed real reform if he wanted to. ObamaCare as it emerged from Congress fulfills the insight that any highly regulated system ends up benefiting those with influence, i.e., health-care providers and high-end customers, not those of modest means.

What are ObamaCare’s mandates on individuals and employers except an attempt to force back into the insurance market those who have been priced out by previous “reforms” so their money can be used to prop up a system of gold-plated coverage that mostly benefits those in the highest tax brackets? What are ObamaCare’s minimum coverage standards except a requirement that these customers buy more costly coverage than they would choose for themselves so their money can be used for somebody else?

I include a lengthy excerpt from Robinson’s excellent article in my chapter for the Encyclopedia of Libertarianism.