Tag: occupational licensing

Federal Judge to Kentucky Bureaucrats: Stop Prohibiting Free Competition

Last Thursday, a federal district court judge issued an injunction blocking the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet – the genteel name given the Bluegrass State’s department of transportation – from enforcing the state’s anti-competitive licensing law for movers.

In Bruner v. Zawacki, which is being litigated by Cato adjunct scholar Timothy Sandefur and our other friends at the Pacific Legal Foundation, small business owner Raleigh Bruner argues that the licensing laws, which allow existing moving companies to file “protests” to block new companies from opening, create a “Competitor’s Veto” that has no rational basis. Judge Danny Reeves ordered the state not to enforce those laws, at least until he has the opportunity to issue a complete opinion – but he strongly indicated that he already thinks those laws are unconstitutional:

The Sixth Circuit has held that “protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.” And it appears that the notice, protest, and hearing procedure in the statutes – both facially and as applied – operate solely to protect existing moving companies from outside economic competition. The defendants have admitted that they know of no instance where, upon a protest by an existing moving company, a new applicant has been granted a certificate … .  [O]ver the past five years, no protest filed has been regarding an applicant’s safety record. Likewise, no applications have been denied on the grounds that the applicant was a danger to public health, safety, or welfare.

You can read more about the case at PLF’s Liberty Blog.

States Shouldn’t Discriminate Against Out-of-State Retailers

The National Association of Optometrists & Opticians represents eyewear manufacturers and distributors in California, where state officials have been myopic with respect to business regulation.

Under California’s Business and Professions Code, state-licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists are allowed to conduct eye exams and sell glasses at their place of business, while commercial retailers—such as the national eyewear chains represented by the NAOO—are barred from furnishing onsite optometry services. Since consumers have a strong preference for “one stop shopping”—buying their glasses at the same place where they have their eye exams—California’s law gives instate retailers a crucial competitive advantage. Businesses that cannot co-locate their services have quickly vanished from the market.

The NAOO thus sued California officials for discriminating against out-of-state retailers in violation of the “dormant” Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from imposing unjustifiable burdens on interstate commerce. The district court ruled in the group’s favor, concluding that the relevant statutes have a widespread and unjustified discriminatory effect that can’t be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, however, holding that state-licensed optometrists and out-of-state retailers aren’t similarly situated competitors—even though they compete for the same customers in the same market.

On the case’s second round in the Ninth Circuit, the court scrutinized the California law under a more lenient balancing test and again upheld the ban on co-location by out-of-staters. Cato now joins the Opticians Association of America and five individual optometrists on an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take the case (supporting a petition for review filed by former solicitor general Paul Clement).

We argue that California’s laws are unconstitutional because their true purpose—as revealed through legislative history and the scheme’s hollow public health rationale—was merely to protect in-state business interests. California’s protectionist regime also has an adverse impact on poor and minority consumers, who confront increased costs and diminished access to eye care while also being disproportionately afflicted with visual impairments.

Not only does the Ninth Circuit’s ruling stifle competition, restrict consumer choice, and increase prices, it also encourages state and local governments to evade scrutiny of discriminatory regulations by relying on superficial distinctions between in- and out-of-state businesses that warp the meaning of “similarly situated competitors.”  The Supreme Court should intervene to prevent any further erosion of its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and uphold the anti-protectionism principles envisioned by the Founders when they abandoned the Articles of Confederation in favor of the Constitution.

The Court will decide whether to take up National Association of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris later this year or in early 2013.

The Institute for Justice Exposes the Plague of Occupational Licensing

Today, the Institute for Justice released a 200-page, comprehensive study on occupational licensing in the United States. The report details the plague of occupational licensing that has swept the country over the past 60+ years. According to the study, “In the 1950s, only one in 20 U.S. workers needed the government’s permission to pursue their chosen occupation. Today, that figure stands at almost one in three.”

Fifty years ago, in Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman warned against the dangers of professional licensing. At that time, Friedman quoted a previous study on licensure by Walter Gellhorn:

By 1952 more than 80 separate occupations exclusive of ‘owner-businesses,’ like restaurants and taxicab companies, had been licensed by state law; and in addition to the state laws there are municipal ordinances in abundance, not to mention the federal statutes that require the licensing of such diverse occupations as radio operators and stockyard commission agents. As long ago as 1938 a single state,North Carolina, had extended its law to 60 occupations. One may not be surprised to learn that pharmacists, accountants, and dentists have been reached by state law as have sanitarians and psychologists, assayers and architects, veterinarians and librarians. But with what joy of discovery does one learn about the licensing of threshing machine operators and dealers in scrap tobacco? What of egg graders and guide dog trainers, pest controllers and yacht salesmen, tree surgeons and well diggers, tile layers and potato growers? And what of the hypertrichologists who are licensed in Connecticut, where they remove excessive and unsightly hair with the solemnity appropriate to their high sounding title?

The Institute for Justice’s study found that licensing has only become more wide-spread and more absurd. But an increase in licensure is expected when interest groups are allowed to capture government and violate our economic liberties. Public choice theory predicts a growth in licensing if the anti-competitive interests of trades are not checked by constitutional rights. As Friedman observed,

In the absence of any general arrangements to offset the pressure of special interests, producer groups will invariably have a much stronger influence on legislative action and the power that be than will the diverse, widely spread consumer interest. Indeed from this point of view, the puzzle is not why we have so many silly licensure laws, but why we don’t have far more.

There are significant real-world effects to these laws. In a world of nine percent unemployment, barriers to work should be the last thing we want, particularly if those barriers do not make us safer or better off. The study found that the average license forces would-be workers to pay an average of $209 in fees, take one exam, and complete nine months of training. In the four places in which they are licensed (three states and DC), interior designers have the highest barriers to entry, apparently to save us from shag carpeting and misuses of the Pottery Barn. In the face of such requirements, particularly the months of training, it’s easy to see how someone can be discouraged from even looking for a job.

In addition, out-of-control licensing has other, more human costs, such as the monks of Saint Joseph Abbey, who were prohibited from building caskets in their monastery unless they obtained a funeral director license. The Institute for Justice won that case. Here’s hoping the new study gives IJ’s attorneys the data they may need to defeat other unconstitutional licensing regimes.

Below is the video announcing the study:

Biometrics—-and the Curious Relevance of Occupational Licensing

Yesterday, I testified (by remote communications) in the Alaska House of Representatives’ Health and Social Services Committee, which is considering a bill to heavily regulate the collection and use of biometrics. The bill is inspired by a man who was denied entry into the CPA exam when he refused to have his fingerprints scanned for that purpose. You can read more about his campaign at the PrivacyNOWalaska.org site.

I’m entirely sympathetic to his concerns about potential overcollection of biometrics in digital form, and what may happen to biometric data after it is collected. As I said in my testimony, “a digital record of a biometric can be stored indefinitely, copied an infinite number of times, and transmitted around the globe at the speed of light. This creates security and privacy concerns cutting against the use of machine-biometrics.” On the other hand, the CPA exam apparently has a problem with imposter fraud and faux test-takers who go simply to memorize questions and sell them on a test-prep black market.

Unfortunately, the bill is not callibrated to balance the competing interests at stake. It would create a “notice and consent” regime for biometrics collection, an idea that has failed to produce privacy protection in other areas. It would require massive and expensive re-tooling of data systems to provide consumers a right to amend or revoke their permission to use biometrics or order destruction of biometric data. And it would flatly outlaw marketing that uses biometric information—not just the stuff we learned to be spooked about in the film Minority Report, but knowingly agreed-to tailoring of discounts at the grocery store if we used a biometrically-secured payment system, for example.

I urged the Alaska legislators to ensure that biometrics collectors account for and prevent potential harm to Alaskans when they design and use their systems, but not to constrain biometrics so much that their security benefits never materialize.

There are a number of things Alaska and other states could do to help society callibrate the use of biometrics. They could ensure that biometrics collectors are liable and subject to jurisdiction in the state of collection when contract violations and harms arise from the use or misuse of biometric data.

Alaska could also establish that there is no “third-party doctrine” under its state constitution. A person sharing data under contractual or regulatory protections should maintain his or her search-and-seizure rights in that data. The government should not be able to access such data—though shared—without proper suspicion, warrants, and subpoenas.

Alaska has rejected the REAL ID Act, and it could do more to prevent the emergence of national identity systems by rejecting any E-Verify mandate. I encouraged the Alaskans to follow the lead of New Hampshire and bar state identity data from being shared with any national ID system.

The root of the problem in Alaska, though, may be the accountancy cartel. This is an area I know precious little about, but it appears that you must take the CPA exam to act as an accountant in the state. This positions the administrators of the CPA exam to make unreasonable, privacy-invasive demands for biometric data on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to … restrict the right to earn a living!

My testimony starts with a primer on biometrics. We have much to learn yet about biometric technologies, their uses, and their consequences. Banning them would deny the public many benefits. Using them promiscuously would have many costs.

Should You Need a License to Help Someone Find an Apartment?

Kansas City Premier Apartments v. Missouri Real Estate Commission is quite similar to the occupational licensing case of Locke v. Shore, in which Cato also recently filed a brief, except that the speech-licensing regulation here concerns not artistic expression but rather the dissemination of consumer-demanded commercial information — specifically, rental property listings that are free to the public.

The Missouri Real Estate Commission, acting on a complaint by a licensed realtor, decided that Kansas City Premier Apartments, which provides local rental listings, was acting as an unlicensed real estate broker and was therefore subject to fine and even criminal prosecution. (Before KCPA began operations, it had asked the Commission whether it needed a license and did not receive a clear answer other than that it was a “grey area” of law.)

KCPA challenged the Commission’s decision on First Amendment grounds, but the trial court found it to be constitutional without giving a reason for its conclusion. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court after simply presuming the constitutionality of the speech restriction — contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. that “[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it” — and placing the burden of proving unconstitutionality on KCPA.

Cato has now joined the Pacific Legal Foundation on a brief supporting KCPA’s request that the U.S. Supreme Court hear the case. Our brief notes that “this case combines the nationally important commercial speech issue with the equally nationally important question of the extent to which the Constitution tolerates occupational licensing.” We explain the difficulties that the Court’s “commercial speech doctrine” has caused and argue for a movement toward greater protection for collective and commercial speech, and away from a confusing four-part test established in a 1980 case called Central Hudson.

As in Locke, this latest case raises the question of whether occupational licensing schemes that have an effect on speech are constitutional. Also as in Locke, an infinite array of professionals and ordinary people could get caught up in this regulation, including even a friend helping another friend find an apartment.

Beyond the technical legal points, the case implicates broader policy issues such as the right to earn a living and the impact that speech monopolies have on consumers. Indeed, the consumer impact may be even more apparent here than in other occupational licensing cases because so many people struggle to find affordable apartments and other rentals in this economy — not to mention over the course of their lives.

The Supreme Court will decide early in the new year whether to hear Kansas City Premier Apartments v. Missouri Real Estate Commission.

Praise (Sort of) for Latest Cato Health Care Study

Physician assistant and health policy wonk Michael Halasy blogs about Shirley Svorny’s new study on medical malpractice liability reform:

Cato has truly shocked me….stupefied really…

Well, just the other day, I received an update from Cato. Now, Michael Cannon is a good guy, and while he and I simply don’t agree on … well much of anything from a health policy perspective, his colleague, Shirley Svorny, wrote this: “…Reducing physician liability for negligent care by capping court awards, all else equal, will reduce the resources allocated to medical professional liability underwriting and oversight and make many patients worse off. Legislators who see mandatory liability caps as a cost-containment tool should look elsewhere.”

I believe that I have been consistent with this…over and over…caps on noneconomic damages DO NOT WORK.

So, I have to (gulp) swallow some pride, and tip my hat to Cato…Now I need to go take a shower. I feel a little dirty.

It’s a good reminder that libertarians do not fit neatly into the usual political categories. We oppose direct government regulation of health care quality, such as through clinician licensing. But we support indirect regulation, such as through the medical malpractice system, and defend that system from critics who want to impose top-down rules on that system like mandatory caps on noneconomic damages. We prefer bottom-up approaches, like letting free individuals choose their own med mal reforms.