Tag: Obamacare

Review of Side Effects and Complications: The Economic Consequences of Health-Care Reform

In the latest issue of Cato Journal, I review Casey Mulligan’s book, Side Effects and Complications: The Economic Consequences of Health-Care Reform.

Some ACA supporters claim that, aside from a reduction in the number of uninsured, there is no evidence the ACA is having the effects Mulligan predicts. The responsible ones note that it is difficult to isolate the ACA’s effects, given that it was enacted at the nadir of the Great Recession, that anticipation and implementation of its provisions coincided with the recovery, and that administrative and congressional action have delayed implementation of many of its taxes on labor (the employer mandate, the Cadillac tax). There is ample evidence that, at least beneath the aggregate figures, employers and workers are responding to the ACA’s implicit taxes on labor…

Side Effects and Complications brings transparency to a law whose authors designed it to be opaque.

Have a look (pp. 734-739).

Gerson: If Trump Wins, Blame ObamaCare

Washington Post columnist and former Bush 43 speechwriter Michael Gerson has not always been charitable toward libertarians. He has been pretty good on Donald Trump and ObamaCare, though, and today he ties the two together:

Only 18 percent of Americans believe the Affordable Care Act has helped their families…A higher proportion of Americans believe the federal government was behind the 9/11 attacks than believe it has helped them through Obamacare…

Trump calls attention to these failures, while offering (as usual) an apparently random collection of half-baked policies and baseless pledges (“everybody’s got to be covered”) as an alternative. There is no reason to trust Trump on the health issue; but there is plenty of reason to distrust Democratic leadership. No issue — none — has gone further to convey the impression of public incompetence that feeds Trumpism.

Read the whole thing.

Urban Institute Study Only Counts Part of ObamaCare Premiums When Comparing Them to Employer Plans

In a new report, scholars from the Urban Institute claim ObamaCare premiums “are 10 percent below average employer premiums nationally.” There is variation among states. The authors report ObamaCare premiums are actually higher in 12 states, by as much as 68 percent. 

At Forbes.com, I explain the Urban scholars aren’t making the “apples to apples” comparison they claim to be:

The Urban Institute study instead engages in what my Cato Institute colleague Arnold Kling calls a game of “hide the premium.” As ACA architect Jonathan Gruber explained, “This bill was written in a tortured way” to create a “lack of transparency” because “if…you made explicit that healthy people pay in and sick people get money, it would not have passed.” When it did pass, it was due to what Gruber called the “huge political advantage” that comes from hiding how much voters are paying, as well as ”the stupidity of the American voter.”

That lack of transparency has allowed supporters to claim the ACA is providing coverage to millions who are so sick that insurance companies previously wouldn’t cover them, while simultaneously claiming Exchange coverage is no more expensive than individual-market coverage prior to the ACA or than employer-sponsored coverage. When we incorporate the full premium for Exchange plans, the smoke clears and we see Exchange coverage is indeed more expensive than employer-sponsored coverage. There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.

If you think this is fun, just imagine the shell games we could play with a public option.

Read the whole thing.

A 51-Percent Premium Hike Rescues ObamaCare In Pinal County

Demonstrator Ryan Thomas, a supporter of U.S. President Barack Obama's health-care law, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), holds an "ACA is here to Stay" sign after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 to save Obamacare tax subsidies outside the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Thursday, June 25, 2015. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the nationwide tax subsidies that are a core component of President Barack Obama's health-care law rejecting a challenge that had threatened to gut the measure and undercut his legacy. Photographer: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Ryan Thomas

Pinal County, Arizona was in danger of being the first second third fourth place where ObamaCare caused insurance markets to collapse. As of last month, every private health insurance company now selling ObamaCare coverage in the county announced it would no longer do so in 2017. Had that scenario come to pass, it would have tossed nearly 10,000 residents out of their Exchange plans and left them to buy ObamaCare coverage outside of the Exchange, with no taxpayer subsidies to make the coverage “affordable.” If they didn’t buy that unaffordable coverage, ObamaCare would still subject them to penalties, at least until the Secretary of Health and Human Services intervened.

It appears that Pinal County has avoided that fate. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona has announced that, despite reservations, it will sell ObamaCare coverage in Pinal County next year. Pinal County now joins 13 other Arizona counties, one third of counties nationwide, and seven states that will have only one carrier in the Exchange.

In Fact, Prof. Reinhardt, This Is ObamaCare’s Fourth Death Spiral

Dr. Uwe Reinhardt, Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, speaks at a Bloomberg News health-care panel discussion in Princeton, New Jersey, March 23, 2004. Photographer: Christopher Barth/ Bloomberg News.

Princeton economist Uwe Reinhardt supports ObamaCare. He also thinks the law’s health-insurance Exchanges are doomed. An exodus of insurers—lots of Exchanges are down to one carrier; Pinal County, Arizona is down to zero carriers—has taken supporters and the media by surprise. It shouldn’t. Similar laws and even ObamaCare itself have caused multiple insurance markets to collapse.

Reinhardt jokes ObamaCare’s Exchanges look like they were designed by “a bunch of Princeton undergrads.” Those Exchanges are now experiencing “a mild version” of “the death spiral that actuaries worry about.” The extreme version has happened before. “We’ve had two actual death spirals: in New Jersey and in New York,” Reinhardt explains. “New Jersey passed a law that had community rating but no mandate, so that market shrank quickly and premiums were off the wall. You look at New York and the same thing happened; they had premiums above $6,000 per month. The death spiral killed those markets.” Community rating is a system of government price controls that supposedly prohibit insurers from discriminating against people with preexisting conditions.

And it’s not just New York and New Jersey where ObamaCare-like laws have caused health insurance markets to collapse. It also happened in Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Washington State.

In fact, the death spiral Reinhardt sees in the Exchanges would itself be the fourth death spiral ObamaCare itself has caused:

  1. Before they even took effect, ObamaCare’s preexisting conditions provisions began driving insurers out of the market for child-only health insurance. Insurers ultimately exited that market in 39 states, causing the markets in 17 states to collapse.
  2. ObamaCare’s long-term care insurance program – the CLASS Act – failed to launch when the administration could not make it financially sustainable. President Obama and Congress repealed it.
  3. Exchanges effectively collapsed in every U.S. territory, again prior to launch.
  4. Now, a nationwide exodus of insurers has left one third of counties, one in six residents and seven states with only one carrier. In Pinal County, Arizona, every insurer has exited the Exchange. The exodus goes beyond greedy, for-profit insurers. It includes more than a dozen government-chartered nonprofit “co-op” plans.

When Exchanges Collapse, ObamaCare Penalizes You Even If Coverage Is Unaffordable

MIAMI, FL - NOVEMBER 02: Martha Lucia (L) sits with Rudy Figueroa, an insurance agent from Sunshine Life and Health Advisors, as she picks an insurance plan available in the third year of the Affordable Care Act at a store setup in the Mall of the Americas on November 2, 2015 in Miami, Florida. Open Enrollment began yesterday for people to sign up for a 2016 insurance plan through the Affordable Care Act. (Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images)

In opeds at Time and National Review Online, I discuss how ObamaCare’s health-insurance Exchange has collapsed in Pinal County, Arizona, throwing some 10,000 residents out of their ObamaCare plans. Charles Gaba of ACASignUps.net and Cynthia Cox of the Kaiser Family Foundation asked me to explain a claim I make in the NRO piece:

Obamacare will still penalize those residents if they don’t buy coverage — even if the amount they must pay increases tenfold or more.

Before I explain, let me first apologize on behalf of the Affordable Care Act’s authors for the complicated mess that follows.

ObamaCare’s individual mandate penalizes taxpayers who fail to purchase health insurance. But there are so many exemptions that of the 33 million or so people who lacked insurance in 2014, the IRS levied the penalty against only 6.6 million tax filers (which actually represents a larger number, maybe 17 million people).

For example, the Affordable Care Act exempts “individuals who cannot afford coverage” from the penalty. You qualify for this exemption if your “required contribution” exceeds roughly 8.13 percent of your household income. For individuals who don’t have access to a suitable employer plan, the “required contribution” is equal to “the annual premium for the lowest cost bronze plan available in the individual market through the Exchange in the State in the rating area in which the individual resides,” minus “the amount of the credit allowable under section 36B for the taxable year (determined as if the individual was covered by a qualified health plan offered through the Exchange for the entire taxable year).” In other words, if you would have to pay more than 8.13 percent of your income for an ObamaCare plan, even after accounting for premium subsidies, then coverage is unaffordable for you and ObamaCare doesn’t penalize you for not buying coverage.

You would think this exemption would somehow apply to the 10,000 residents of Pinal County, for whom coverage will become dramatically more expensive when the Exchange collapses. If those folks are like Exchange enrollees in the rest of the country, the vast majority of them (85 percent or so) receive premium subsidies. When their Exchange coverage disappears next year, so will those subsidies. If they wish to purchase coverage off the Exchange, they will face, for the first time, the actual cost of ObamaCare coverage. Given that the amount Pinal County residents will have to pay for ObamaCare coverage could rise by several multiples, from a fraction of the premium to the full premium, given that the lowest-income enrollees will see the largest increases, given that the large year-to-year rate increases occurring nationwide will only add to the suffering, you would think the ACA’s unaffordability exemption would somehow cover those 10,000 Pinal County residents. But you would be wrong.

ObamaCare: Not Promoting Quality Care As Planned

At The Health Care Blog, Jeff Goldsmith and Bruce Henderson of Navigant Healthcare offer a grim assessment of ObamaCare’s performance that is worth quoting at length:

The historic health reform law passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in March, 2010 was widely expected to catalyze a shift in healthcare payment from “volume to value” through multiple policy changes. The Affordable Care Act’s new health exchanges were going to double or triple the individual health insurance market, channeling tens of millions of new lives into new “narrow network” insurance products expected to evolve rapidly into full risk contracts.

In addition, the Medicare Accountable Care Organization (ACO) program created by ACA would succeed in reducing costs and quickly scale up to cover the entire non-Medicare Advantage population of beneficiaries (currently about 70% of current enrollees) and transition provider payment from one-sided to global/population based risk. Finally, seeking to avoid the looming “Cadillac tax” created by ACA, larger employers would convert their group health plans to defined contribution models to cap their health cost liability, and channel tens of millions of their employees into private exchanges which would, in turn, push them into at-risk narrow networks organized around specific provider systems. 

Three Surprising Developments
Well, guess what? It is entirely possible that none of these things may actually come to pass or at least not to the degree and pace predicted. At the end of 2015, a grand total of 8.8 million people had actually paid the premiums for public exchange products, far short of the expected 21 million lives for 2016. As few as half this number may have been previously uninsured. It remains to be seen how many of the 12.7 million who enrolled in 2016’s enrollment cycle will actually pay their premiums, but the likely answer is around ten million. Public exchange enrollment has been a disappointment thus far, largely because the plans have been unattractive to those not eligible for federal subsidy. 

Moreover, even though insurers obtained deep discounts from frightened providers for the new narrow network exchange products (70% of exchange products were narrow networks), the discounts weren’t deep enough to cover the higher costs of the expensive new enrollees who signed up. Both newly launched CO-OP plans created by ACA and experienced large carriers like United and Anthem were swamped in poor insurance risks, and lost hundreds of millions on their exchange lives. As for the shifting of risk, it looks like 90% plus of these new contracts were one-sided risk only, shadowing and paying providers on the basis of fee-for-service, with bonuses for those who cut costs below spending targets. Only 10% actually penalized providers for overspending their targets.

The Medicare Accountable Care Organization/Medicare Shared Savings Program, advertised as a bold departure from conventional Medicare payment policy, has been the biggest disappointment among the raft of CMS Innovation Center initiatives. ACO/MSSP enrollment appears to have topped out at 8.3 million of Medicare’s 55 million beneficiaries. The first wave, the Pioneer ACOs, lost three-fourths of their 32 original participating organizations, including successful managed care players like HealthCare Partners, Sharp Healthcare, and Presbyterian Healthcare of New Mexico and others. The second, much larger wave of regular MSSP ACO participants lost one third of their renewal cohort. Only about one-quarter of ACO/MSSP participants generated bonuses, and those bonuses were highly concentrated in a relative handful of successful participants. 

Of the 477 Medicare ACO’s, a grand total of 52, or 11%, have downside risk, crudely analogous to capitation. As of last fall, CMS acknowledged that factoring in the 40% of ACO/MSSP members who exceeded their spending targets and the costs of the bonuses paid to the ACOs who met them, the ACO/MSSP programs have yet to generate black ink for the federal budget. And this does not count the billions care systems have spent in setting up and running their ACOs. It is extremely unlikely that the Medicare ACO program will be made mandatory, or voluntarily grow to replace DRGs and the Medicare Part B fee schedule. 

And the Cadillac Tax, that 40% tax imposed by ACA on high cost employee benefit plans, a potentially transformative event in the large group health insurance market, which was scheduled to be levied in 2018, was “postponed” for two years (to 2020) by an overwhelming Congressional vote. In the Senate, a 90-10 bipartisan majority actually voted to kill the tax outright, strongly suggesting that strong opposition from unions and large employers will prevent the tax from ever being levied. Presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton has announced her support for killing the tax. So the expected transformative event in the large group market has proven too heavy a lift for the political system. 

As a result, the enrollment of large group workers in private health exchanges, the intended off-ramp for employers with Cadillac tax problems, has arrested at about 8 million, one-fifth of a recent forecast of 40 million lives by 2018. Thus, the conversion of the enormous large group market members to narrow network products seems unlikely to happen. As a recent New York Times investigation revealed, the reports of the demise of traditional group health insurance coverage (based on broad network PPO models) have been greatly exaggerated.