Tag: obama

Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal Reached! Now What?

After six years of negotiations, a final Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has been reached in Atlanta.  Check your pacemakers, trade policy wonks. This is about as exciting as it gets in our world.

First, congratulations are in order for the TPP negotiators, who worked extremely hard over the past several years in an environment of profound public skepticism – much of it driven by pervasive scaremongering – to arrive at this moment. Reaching accord on a broad array of subjects between 12 countries at different levels of economic development with disparate policy objectives is not a task for the faint of heart.

Second, there is still quite a bit of work to be done on the domestic front. Even with the deal “concluded,” the president cannot sign the agreement until 90 days after he officially announces his intention to do so.  During that period, there will be intensive consultations between the administration and Congress over the details; the legal text of the agreement will be made available to the public on the internet; the USTR advisory committees will submit their assessments of the deal to Congress; and there will be ample opportunity for informed, robust domestic debate about the deal’s pros and cons.

After the 90-day consultation period, the president can return to the TPP partners with input from Congress, which may or may not warrant modifications to the deal to improve its chances of ratification. Once the deal is signed, the administration then has a maximum of 60 days to prepare a list of all U.S. laws that will need to be changed on account of TPP; the U.S. International Trade Commission will have a maximum of 105 days to do an analysis of the likely impact of the TPP on the U.S. economy; the congressional trade committees will perform mock markups of the implementing legislation; and, then, the final TPP implementing legislation will be introduced in both chambers.  After the legislation is introduced, the House will have 60 days and the Senate will have 30 days to hold votes.

These requirements stem from the Trade Promotion Authority legislation enacted over the summer. If the TPP is going to be ratified by this Congress under this president, the timelines suggest that there isn’t much room for delay. Although it has become an article of faith that trade bills don’t move during election years, there is simply no avoiding the TPP landing in Congress’s lap and animating the presidential debates and primary elections. Expect a vote anytime after July 2016, including, possibly, during the lame duck. (And watch to see whether and how Hillary Clinton contorts her position to come back around to supporting the deal she helped launch as Sectretary of State.)

As to substance, I’m not offering any endorsements until I have a chance to review the text.  In fact, my trade center colleagues and I intend to do a chapter-by-chapter assessment of the deal, rating each on a scale of 0 (protectionist) to 10 (free trade), and providing an aggregate TPP grade.  We expect the scores for some chapters will be pulled down by certain terms that amount to baked-in protectionism.  For example, apparently the United States “secured” a 25 year phase-out period for our 2.5% auto import tariffs and a 30 year phase-out for our 25% pick-up truck tariff.  Gee, thanks for that shot glass of economic freedom.

Like most legislation that comes before Congress, there will be both good and bad terms in the TPP.  If the agreement is net liberalizing, I will likely offer my endorsement.  And, as I like to say about these trade deals, don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good.

Syria at the UN General Assembly

Presidents Putin and Obama presented two radically different worldviews at the UN yesterday morning, but both obliquely described the other as the key cause of global unrest. Putin took aim at the United States, implying that the Arab Spring was orchestrated by the United States and that sanctions on Russia are undermining global trade, while President Obama called for a return to the rule of law, and lambasted human rights violators. These disagreements reportedly carried on into the private meeting held by both leaders last night on Syria and Ukraine. 

But the root of the disagreement on Syria isn’t differing objectives: both Russia and the United States want to see ISIS contained and degraded, and an end brought to the terrible conflict in Syria and Iraq. The difference lies in the means both sides want to use to achieve this objective. The Russians want to protect the sovereignty and power of the Assad regime, while U.S. leaders insist that Assad must go, to be replaced with a government which includes representation from the Syrian opposition.

Strange Bedfellows, Schisms, and Subterfuge: Where Does the Trade Agenda Stand?

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a still-evolving trade agreement that would reduce tariffs and other barriers to goods and services trade between the United States and 11 other countries. It also would likely include provisions designed to protect certain U.S. industries from the full effects of competition.  A TPP agreement, then, would likely increase our economic freedoms in some realms and reduce them in others.  How these pros and cons would be manifest is unclear at the moment, given the fact that the deal is not done.  But it would a mistake to forego the opportunity to evaluate a completed trade deal that could deliver significant benefits. 

It is broadly understood that the TPP negotiations cannot be concluded without the Congress passing, and the president signing, Trade Promotion Authority legislation.  Without TPA, the president could not be sure that any trade deal brought home reflected the official wishes of Congress, and the likelihood that foreign negotiators would put their best and final offers on the table—knowing that Congress could unravel the deal’s terms—is close to zero.

The Senate passed TPA legislation (along with language reauthorizing the Trade Adjustment Assistance program) on May 22.  The House is likely to take up the bill this week.  At the moment, the president is in lockstep with a large majority of congressional Republicans, who support trade liberalization and see TPA as essential to the process.  But some Republicans (mostly from the conservative wing), who are wary of giving this president any more power, have joined ranks with the vast majority of congressional Democrats in opposition to TPA.  Meanwhile, Democratic presidential frontrunner Hillary Clinton—an architect of the TPP as Secretary of State and a potential heir to the trade agenda—has refused to take a position on TPA.

The spotlight on trade policy has generated much more heat than light.  Misinformation abounds.  Rationalizations masquerade as rationales.

This new Cato Free Trade Bulletin is intended to dispel some of the nonsense that has been circulating and to present a brief, objective assessment of what has transpired and what lies ahead for TPA and TPP.

Rand Paul’s “No” on Trade Promotion Authority Gets It Backwards

Not entirely unsurprisingly, the Senate failed to reach cloture on Tuesday, falling eight votes shy of the 60 needed to start the timer on debate over Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which will be needed to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and bring it to a timely vote in Congress.  The cloture vote concerned two of four pieces of trade legislation voted out of the Finance Committee two weeks ago (TPA and Trade Adjustment Assistance).  Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell excluded the other two bills, which contain language that would attract Democratic support. So, while I wouldn’t bet the ranch on TPA’s passage, there’s still room for horse trading.

In more surprising (and disappointing) news, one senator who will say “no” if TPA makes it to the floor for a vote is Rand Paul, who explained his reasoning on a New Hampshire television news broadcast:

We give up so much power from Congress to the presidency, and with them being so secretive on the treaty, it just concerns me what’s in the treaty.

Let me take Paul’s issues with power, secrecy, and content in order.

Nike, Trade, and the Left’s “Race to the Bottom” Canard

To capitalism’s detractors, Nike symbolizes the Dickensian horrors of trade and globalization – a world ripened for mass exploitation of workers and the environment for the impious purpose of padding the bottom line. They are offended by President Obama’s selection of Nike headquarters as the setting for his speech, last week, in which he touted the benefits of the emerging Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. But Nike exemplifies the redeeming virtues of globalization and illustrates how self-interested capitalism satisfies popular demands – including, even, the demands of its detractors.

Fealty to the reviled bottom line incentivizes companies like Nike to deliver, in a sustainable manner, what those genuinely concerned about development claim to want. U.S. and other Western investments in developing-country manufacturing and assembly operations tend to raise local labor, environmental, and product safety standards. Western companies usually offer higher wages than the local average to attract the best workers, which can reduce the total cost of labor through higher productivity and lower employee turnover. Western companies often use production technologies and techniques that meet higher standards and bring best practices that are emulated by local firms, leading to improvements in working conditions, environmental outcomes, and product safety.

Perhaps most significantly, companies like Nike are understandably protective of their brands, which are usually their most valuable assets. In an age when people increasingly demand social accountability as an attribute of the products and services they consume, mere allegations – let alone confirmed instances – of labor abuses, safety violations, tainted products, environmental degradation, and other objectionable practices can quickly degrade or destroy a brand. Western brands have every incentive to find scrupulous supply chain partners and even to submit to third party verifications of the veracity of all sorts of practices in developing countries because the verdict of the marketplace can be swift and unambiguous.

Nike remembers the boycotts and the profit losses it endured on account of global reactions to its association with “sweatshop” working conditions in the past. Mattel’s bottom line took a beating when some of its toys manufactured in certain Chinese factories were found to contain dangerous levels of lead paint. There have been numerous examples of lax oversight and wanting conditions, but increasingly they are becoming the exception and not the rule.

Chairmen of House and Senate Budget Committees Propose Good Fiscal Frameworks, Particularly Compared to Obama’s Spendthrift Plan

Earlier this year, President Obama proposed a budget that would impose new taxes and add a couple of trillion dollars to the burden of government spending over the next 10 years.

The Republican Chairmen of the House and Senate Budget Committees have now weighed in. You can read the details of the House proposal by clicking here and the Senate proposal by clicking here, but the two plans are broadly similar (though the Senate is a bit vaguer on how to implement spending restraint, as I wrote a couple of days ago).

So are any of these plans good, or at least acceptable? Do any of them satisfy my Golden Rule?

Here’s a chart showing what will happen to spending over the next 10 years, based on the House and Senate GOP plans, as well as the budget proposed by President Obama.

Keep in mind, as you look at these numbers, that economy is projected to expand, in nominal terms, by an average of about 4.3 percent annually.

The most relevant data is that the Republican Chairmen want spending to climb by about $1.4 trillion over the next decade (annual spending increases averaging about 3.3 percent per year), while Obama wants spending to jump by about $2.4 trillion over the same period (with annual spending climbing by an average of almost 5.1 percent per year).

The Iran Policy Clownshow

I’ve been talking about U.S.-Iran policy to groups around the United States for about eight years now. Many members of these groups—World Affairs Councils, university groups, local groups interested in Middle East policy—disagree with my general take on Iran and the Middle East, but I’ve always gotten a fair hearing and good questions.

Given that, it’s been both amusing and depressing to watch the political spectacle that’s been happening in Washington this week. It all began when Bill Kristol’s favorite senator, Tom Cotton (R-AR), got 46 of the other 53 Republican Senators to join him in signing an “open letter to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” trying to scare the clerical leadership away from a diplomatic deal by threatening to scotch it themselves once Barack Obama is out of office. Cotton, a Harvard Law grad, was subsequently chided on his understanding of the U.S. Constitution both by the Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif, as well as by Jack Goldsmith, a conservative lawyer who worked on the legal aspects of the war on terror for the George W. Bush administration.

In response to media inquiries, GOP Senators gave embarrassing explanations of the letter. Most absurd was Cotton’s protestation that the letter was intended to help produce a better deal. This claim is absurd not because the causal pathway from this letter to a better deal is dubious (although it is), but because Cotton has made perfectly clear that his goal is the destruction of negotiations, not improving them. As he remarked at a January Heritage Foundation event:

the end of these negotiations isn’t an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence. A feature, not a bug, so to speak.