Tag: Iran

Has Mitt Romney Ditched His Neoconservative Talking Points?

We don’t want another Iraq, we don’t want another Afghanistan. That’s not the right course for us. - Mitt Romney, Presidential Debate, Boca Raton, Florida, October 22, 2012

With these words, Mitt Romney might have made the final, crucial connection to an American public tired of more than a decade of war, and desperate not to start any new ones.

Obama did his best to remind voters of why they haven’t trusted Republicans on foreign policy since 2005. He uttered the word Iraq 10 times. Romney mentioned it three times, once by accident—referring mistakenly to “the president of Iraq—excuse me, of Iran”— and once to explicitly and categorically deny that he had any intentions of going back down that road by launching another war.

Such sentiments can’t make Romney’s neoconservative advisers happy. They are the ones who sold the war in the first place, they peddled a “surge” in a desperate attempt to create a narrative that resembled victory, and it is they, who, to this day, proudly declare that the war was worth fighting. Their every statement betrays how truly marginalized they are, isolated from a public that can see the facts plainly before it, and concludes something very different: this war was a horrible mistake, and one that we are determined not to repeat. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal all but avoided commenting on the substance of Romney’s statements last night—probably because there wasn’t much substance.

Questions remain, however. First, is Mitt Romney truly committed to avoiding Iraq-style wars in the future? If so, why did he choose to surround himself with so many of the war’s most fervent advocates? Second, why is he opposed to additional reductions in the Army and Marine Corps, forces that grew specifically to fight the war that was supposed to be a “cakewalk” but that turned out to be something very different? If Mitt Romney doesn’t intend to engage in costly, open-ended nation-building missions abroad, why does he need a conventional military geared for that purpose? And, third, what lessons from the Iraq war inform his conduct of foreign policy? Was Iraq a good idea, poorly executed, or was this a bad idea from the get-go?

A recent article explained how Romney wanted to draw distinctions between himself and President George W. Bush, starting with the war in Iraq. “The idea that Romney is following the George W. Bush approach is a caricature the Democrats want to draw,” a senior Romney foreign policy adviser told the Los Angeles Times’s Paul Richter, “We’re not going to help them with that.”

They didn’t last night. We’ll find out soon enough if it worked.

Wall Street Journal: Romney Should Be a Neocon, but Hide It in Debate

Would you buy a foreign policy from this man?

Imagine a world in which the Iraq War had gone exactly as marketed. The United States invaded in March 2003. The Iraqis, with the help of Ahmed Chalabi, rapidly transitioned to become a stable, liberal democracy allied with the United States against Iran. The marvelous and smooth transformation had ripple effects throughout the region: a handful of Arab states followed suit, and the United States had drawn down to under 30,000 troops in country by September 2003, setting up a basing agreement with the new Iraqi government to stay indefinitely. Few American lives were lost, the swamp of terrorism was drained, and an oil pipeline has just been completed running from Iraq to the Israeli port city of Haifa.

Imagine, at the same time, that opponents of the war, despite having gotten every major judgment about the prudence and consequences of the war comically wrong, had been vaulted to positions of power and prestige in foreign affairs commentary. Meanwhile, the war’s proponents, despite their support for a strategy that yielded huge strategic dividends for the United States at a low cost, were banished to the wilderness, heard from sporadically on a few blogs and at a think tank or two.

It would be strange, wouldn’t it?

And yet that situation is roughly analogous to the one in which we find ourselves today, except in real life the war was an enormous disaster, just as its opponents predicted, and the proponents of the war are the ones in denial about its implications. Foremost among the salespeople for war who have yet to come to grips with the facts are the members of the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board.

But hey, let’s let bygones be bygones: they’ve got some advice for Mitt Romney in his upcoming foreign policy debate.

First, the good news: Even the editorial board of the Journal seems to understand that speaking openly about their plans for more wars would be bad politics. Accordingly, the Journal doesn’t “expect Mr. Romney to offer an explicit defense of the Bush Doctrine” and they worry about the implications of Obama charging Romney with wanting to get the United States into a third (and fourth) Middle East war. This is in keeping with the previous assurance of Bret Stephens (pictured above) that Romney wouldn’t start any new wars. Romney should deny wanting any more wars while doing a number of things that make them inevitable.

Second, the bad news: Instead of suggesting that Romney actually trim the neocon sail a bit, the article suggests Romney continue his strategy of wheeling out a fog machine and saying “leadership” and “strength” instead of discussing details. The American people who tune in Monday night deserve to hear some specifics. Not the level of specifics that would satisfy the people who think about international politics for a living, sure, but some specifics. Instead, while suggesting that Romney “offer[] a serious critique of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy that doesn’t descend to clichés,” the article suggests clichés but not seriousness.

This blends with the ugly news: like an insular clique of Bourbon royalty, the neocons at the Journal appear to have learned nothing and forgotten nothing about strategy over the last 10 years. To the extent their suggestions do go beyond clichés, they are a reminder that Bush-era neoconservatism still lies at the center of their world view, and the world view of the Republican establishment. A few examples:

  • The war in Iraq, we are informed, had “already been won when Mr. Obama became president.” Mission accomplished? Come again?
  • Obama turned that win into a loss by failing to secure “a viable alliance with Baghdad and a bulwark against Tehran.” When you have allocated yourselves 1,608 words, you may want to show your work about how this could have happened.
  • Another Obama failure is that he allowed Israel to have a partially independent defense strategy. He should have “provide[d] Israel with reassurances that it needn’t consider its own military options” on Iran. If Israelis should just rely on the United States to defend them from the most important threats facing their country, why does Israel have such a powerful military in the first place?
  • Obama’s “policies of premature military withdrawals [in Iraq and Afghanistan] have increased rather than diminished the chances that we will be at war in the Middle East again.” How? In which countries?

One could go on. But more broadly the piece suffers from the flaw that has characterized the whole foreign-policy discussion in the election: the idea that the outside world begins at Algeria and ends at Afghanistan. The sprawling essay says exactly nothing useful when it comes to the most important foreign policy challenges facing the United States: the prospect of a European implosion, the wreckage of our war on drugs in Mexico, and preventing American entanglement in a prospective World War III in Asia.

The essay closes by invoking Robert Gates’s invocation of Ronald Reagan, who said that he had lived through many wars but none of them began because the United States was too strong. Gates and the WSJ’s editorial board probably ought to think a little harder about whether the United States blundered into any costly quagmires as a function of its overweening strength and insulation from the costs of its strategic choices. The answer is obvious.

The Duration of Iran’s Hyperinflation?

Since I first estimated Iran’s hyperinflation at 69.6% per month, many people have asked, how long will it last? To answer that question, I have posted my “Hanke Chart of the Day” and will let the data speak for themselves.

 

On second thought, perhaps I should offer some “tweet-able”  hyperinflation-duration takeaways:

  • The average duration of hyperinflation is roughly 12 months.
  • The longest duration of hyperinflation is 58 months (4 years and 10 months), which occurred in Nicaragua from June 1986 until March 1991.
  • The shortest duration of hyperinflation is one month (see numbers 46-57).

When it comes to Iran and the probable duration of its hyperinflation, the specter of  “a horrible end” or “a horror without end” comes to mind.

For the latest news on Iran’s hyperinflation, follow my Twitter: @Steve_Hanke

Obama, Romney Avoiding a Serious Discussion on China

Mitt Romney attempted to refine his foreign policy platform in a speech at the Virginia Military Institute on Monday, but he was again long on rhetoric and short on strategy. What passed for substance in the speech was largely focused on the Middle East. Predictably, most of the reactions to the speech also focused on the Middle East, mainly President Obama’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program and his response to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, last month.

Notably absent from the media coverage and the speech itself was China. In fact, Romney mentioned China only once. This is discouraging since the U.S.-China relationship will likely be the most important foreign policy issue over the next few decades.

In today’s Cato Podcast, Justin Logan, director of foreign policy studies, discusses America’s China policy and the presidential candidates’ lack of focus on the issue. Obama and Romney have each spent time demagoguing China on their currency and other trade issues. But this political rhetoric has been at the expense of any serious effort to discuss at length how the candidates disagree when it comes to the U.S.-China relationship. Instead, the foreign-policy debate has centered on the greater Middle East, where U.S. interests are much smaller. The candidates exemplify a bipartisan obsession with the Middle East when in large part the consequential issues that the United States will face in the years to come will be much further to the east.

Iran’s Lying Exchange Rates

On September 24th, the Iranian government announced that it would adopt a three-tiered, multiple-exchange-rate regime. This wrong-headed attempt to exert more control over the price of domestic goods and combat inflation has failed (and will continue to fail). Since the rial began its free-fall in early September, international observers and the Iranian people have struggled to understand the implications of this exchange-rate regime.

Iran has a history of implementing a variety of multiple-exchange-rate regimes – with mixed results, to say the least. Indeed, at its peak of currency confusion, the Iranian government set seven different official exchange rates. As the accompanying chart illustrates, the story of Iran’s hyperinflation has been one of divergence between the official and black-market (read: free-market) exchange rates.

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This divergence is a product of the declining value of the rial – freely traded on the black market. In consequence, prices are rising dramatically in Iran – by almost 70% per month, according to my estimates. That said, in order to make sense of this phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the system whose failure we are witnessing.

Currently, Iran has three exchange rates:

  • The Official Exchange Rate: 12,260 IRR/USD
  • The “Non-Reference” Rate: 25,480 IRR/USD
    • Purportedly 2% lower than the black-market rate
    • Available to importers of important, but non-essential goods, such as livestock, metals and minerals
  • The Black-Market Exchange Rate: Approximately 35,000  IRR/USD
    •  The last freely-reported black-market rate was 35,000 IRR/USD (2 October 2012). The most recent anecdotal reports confirm this number as the current exchange rate.
    • The Iranian government (read: police) has recently cracked down on currency traders and has also censored websites that report black-market IRR/USD exchange rates.

This complex currency system results in lying prices that distort economic activity. By offering different exchange rates for different types of imports, the Iranian government is, in effect, subsidizing certain goods – distorting their true price. In consequence, any fluctuations in the black-market exchange rate – and, accordingly, in the price level – will be amplified to different degrees for different goods. The end result for Iranian consumers is confusion and mistrust, which, as we have seen, are feeding the panic that has been driving the collapse of the rial and Iran’s hyperinflation.

For the latest news on Iran’s hyperinflation, follow my Twitter: @Steve_Hanke

The Iran Hyperinflation Fact Sheet

For months, I have been following the collapse of the Iranian rial, tracking black-market (free-market) exchange-rate data from foreign-exchange bazaars in Tehran. Using the most recent data, I now estimate that Iran is experiencing hyperinflation – a price-level increase of over 50%, per month.

In recent days, Iranians have taken to the streets in protest over the collapse of the rial. In response, the Iranian government has cracked down on the protestors and shuttered Tehran’s foreign-exchange black market.  Moreover, it has effectively cut off the supply of reliable economic information. Indeed, the signal-to-noise ratio in the Iranian economic sphere, which is normally quite low, is now even lower than usual.

To address this, I have prepared a fact sheet of the top 10 things you should know about Iran’s hyperinflation.

  1. Iran is experiencing an implied monthly inflation rate of 69.6%.
    • For comparison, in the month before the sanctions took effect (June 2010), the monthly inflation rate was 0.698%.
  2. Iran is experiencing an implied annual inflation rate of 196%.
    • For comparison, in June 2010, the annual (year-over-year) inflation rate was 8.25%.
  3. The current monthly inflation rate implies a price-doubling time of 39.8 days.
  4. The current inflation rate implies an equivalent daily inflation rate of 1.78%.
    • Compare that to the United States, whose annual inflation rate is 1.69%.
  5. Since hyperinflation broke out, Iran’s estimated Hanke Misery Index score has skyrocketed from 106 (September 10th) to 231 (October 2nd).
    • See the accompanying chart.

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  6. Iran is the first country in the Middle East to experience hyperinflation.
  7. Iran’s Hyperinflation is the third hyperinflation episode of the 21st century.
  8. Since the sanctions first took effect, in July 2010, the rial has depreciated by 71.4%.
  9. At the current monthly inflation rate, Iran’s hyperinflation ranks as the 48th worst case of hyperinflation in history.
  10. The Iranian Rial is now the least-valued currency in the world (in nominal terms).
    • In September 2012, the rial passed the Vietnamese dong, which currently has an exchange rate of 20,845 VND/USD.

Hyperinflation Has Arrived In Iran

Since the U.S. and E.U. first enacted sanctions against Iran, in 2010, the value of the Iranian rial (IRR) has plummeted, imposing untold misery on the Iranian people. When a currency collapses, you can be certain that other economic metrics are moving in a negative direction, too. Indeed, using new data from Iran’s foreign-exchange black market, I estimate that Iran’s monthly inflation rate has reached 69.6%. With a monthly inflation rate this high (over 50%), Iran is undoubtedly experiencing hyperinflation.

When President Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, in July 2010, the official Iranian rial-U.S. dollar exchange rate was very close to the black-market rate. But, as the accompanying chart shows, the official and black-market rates have increasingly diverged since July 2010. This decline began to accelerate last month, when Iranians witnessed a dramatic 9.65% drop in the value of the rial, over the course of a single weekend (8-10 September 2012). The free-fall has continued since then. On 2 October 2012, the black-market exchange rate reached 35,000 IRR/USD – a rate which reflects a 65% decline in the rial, relative to the U.S. dollar.

The rial’s death spiral is wiping out the currency’s purchasing power. In consequence, Iran is now experiencing a devastating increase in prices – hyperinflation.  As Nicholas Krus and I document in our recent Cato Working Paper, World Hyperinflations, there have been 57 documented cases of hyperinflation in history, the most recent of which was North Korea’s 2009-11 hyperinflation. That said, North Korea’s hyperinflation did not come close to the magnitudes reached in the recent, second-highest hyperinflation in the world, that of Zimbabwe, in 2008, nor has Iran’s hyperinflation – at least not yet.