Tag: insurance markets

Instant Analysis of Implicit Tax Rates in New Obama Proposal

The Cato Institute had already scheduled a policy forum for noon today where the Urban Institute’s Gene Steuerle and I will discuss the implicit tax rates in the House and Senate health care bills.

We’ve already been able to calculate the implicit tax rates that President Obama’s new proposal would impose on low- and middle-income workers. We have also been able to calculate the incentives to drop coverage under the president’s proposal. Upshot:

  • The president’s proposal would result in higher implicit tax rates on low-wage workers than the House and Senate bills.
  • The president’s proposal would result in greater incentives for higher-income workers to drop coverage than under the House and Senate bills. That would cause insurance markets to unravel even faster.

Zip over to Cato right now to hear me present the results – or watch the forum streaming here.

Weekend Links

  • “Government should not subsidize health insurance — for the uninsured, the poor, the elderly or anyone else — or regulate health insurance markets.” Here’s why.
  • An update on the EU Lisbon Treaty.
  • Skepticism over nuclear diplomacy with Iran. (PDF) Subscribe to the Nuclear Proliferation Update here.

Nice Insurance Company. Shame If Anything Were to Happen to It.

Just days after the health-insurance lobby released a report criticizing the Senate Finance Committee’s health care overhaul (for not expanding government enough!), Democrats and President Barack Obama lashed out at health insurers, threatening to revoke what the Government Accountability Office calls the insurers’ “very limited exemption from the federal antitrust laws.”

Democrats say they’re motivated by the need to increase competition in health insurance markets.  Right.

According to Business Week:

David Hyman, a professor of law and medicine at the University of Illinois College of Law and adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute…considers it unlikely that repeal would fundamentally change the nature of the market. While it might increase competition in some markets, he says, it could actually decrease it in others, such as those where small insurers survive because they have access to larger providers’ data. Changes to the act could therefore hurt smaller companies more than larger ones, he says.

Because the act doesn’t outlaw the existence of a dominant provider but simply prohibits collusion, says Hyman, a repeal would fall short of breaking up existing market monopolies that are blamed for artificially inflating prices. The current move against [the] McCarran-Ferguson [Act], he says, “has more to do with the politics of pushing back against the insurance industry’s opposition to health reform than it does with increasing competition in health-insurance markets.”

Combined with what The New York Times described as the Obama administration’s “ham-handed” attempt to censor insurers who communicated with seniors about the effects of the president’s health plan – the Times editorialized: “the government’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had to stretch facts to the breaking point to make a weak case that the insurers were doing anything improper” – it’s hard to argue that this is anything but Democrats threatening to use the power of the state to punish dissidents.

When Republicans were in power, dissent was the highest form of patriotism.  Now that Democrats are in power, obedience is the highest form of patriotism.

Why a “Public Option” Is Hazardous to Your Health

President Obama and other leading Democrats have proposed creating a new government health insurance program as an “option” for Americans under the age of 65. In a new study, Cato scholar Michael F. Cannon shows that government programs cost more and deliver lower-quality care than private insurance. “If Congress wants to make health care more efficient and increase competition in health insurance markets, there are far better options,” argues Cannon.

Fannie Med? Why a “Public Option” Is Hazardous to Your Health, Cato Policy Analysis No. 642