Tag: immigration

Reflections on the Immigration Act of 1924

Last week marked the 92nd anniversary of the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the National Origins Act.  This bill marked the permanent end of America’s nearly open borders policy with Europe.  Other previously passed laws like the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Literacy Act of 1917, and the Page Act restricted immigration from elsewhere.

The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the annual number of new immigrants by country to just 2 percent of the number of immigrants from that country who were already living in the United States in 1890.  This was a reform of the temporary Emergency Quota Act of 1921 that limited immigration to just 3 percent of the number of immigrants from any country who were already living in the United States in 1910.  Congress picked 1890 as the target date for the 1924 Act because that would exclude most of the Italian, Eastern European, and other Southern Europeans who came to dominate immigration since then (Charts 1 and 2).  The 1924 Act also created family reunification as a non-quota category. 

 

Chart 1   

Immigrants by Region of Origin (1820-1889)

Source: Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

 

Chart 2

Immigrants by Region of Origin (1890-1920)

 

Source: Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

 

The supporters of the 1924 Act gave several reasons for blocking immigration from Europe. 

Prescott Hall, co-founder of the Immigration Restriction League that concocted the national origin scheme, wrote: “Do we want this country to be peopled by British, German, and Scandinavian stock … or by Slav, Latin, and Asiatic races, historically downtrodden, atavistic, and stagnant?” 

Representative Albert Johnson, chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, was also the head of the Eugenics Research Association.  One of Johnson’s key advisers on immigration was Madison Grant, author of the 1916 best seller The Passing of the Great Race, a tract that denigrated Asians, blacks, and split Europeans along absurdly antiquated racial lines.  They wrote Hall’s scheme into law.

Why did the 1924 Act use a complex national-origins system to discriminate (mostly) based on race and ethnicity when they could have just explicitly discriminated based on race and ethnicity?  Prominent 1924 Act supporter and New York University sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild explained the answer to that in his 1926 book The Melting Pot Mistake:

 

“The question will probably at once arise, why, if this legislation was a response to a demand for racial discrimination, was it expressed in terms of nationality?  The answer is simple.  As has already been shown, our actual knowledge of the racial composition of the American people, to say nothing of the various foreign groups, is so utterly inadequate that the attempt to use it as a basis of legislation would have led to endless confusion and intolerable litigation.  So Congress substituted the term nationality, and defined nationality as country of birth.  It is clear, then, that ‘nationality,’ as used in this connection, does not conform exactly to the correct definition of either nationality or race.  But in effect it affords a rough approximation to the racial character of the different immigrant streams [Emphasis added].”

 

Fear of litigation, administrative simplicity, and the knowledge that nationality and race were close enough for this piece of discriminatory legislation to achieve their goals made explicit discrimination unnecessary. 

Some of the worst provisions of the 1924 Act were changed in 1952 and the rest of it was obliterated in 1965, with the exception of the immediate family exemptions from the quota.  The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 corrected another serious deficiency of the 1924 Act by creating the first refugee law in U.S. history.  The Displaced Persons Act was in response to the U.S. government denying Jewish refugees during the 1930s and to help absorb the refugees of communism in the newly declared Cold War.

The brutal justifications for the 1924 Act and its terrible consequences should make us all glad that it’s a dead and buried law.  

Drones Are a Must For Trump’s Nativist Police State

Yesterday my colleague Alex Nowrasteh wrote an extensive list of reasons why Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican Party presidential nominee, is the nativist dream candidate. The list leaves little doubt that if Trump makes it to the White House he will seek to violate the Constitution, create a police state, put citizens’ privacy at risk, and build a border wall (despite its estimated $25 billion price tag) all in the name of reducing legal and illegal immigration to the United States.

Trump’s immigration plan ought to worry civil libertarians because, as Alex points out, he supports mandatory E-Verify, the ineffective employment eligibility verification program that puts privacy at risk. Trump’s disregard for effective policy and privacy rights can be seen not only in his views on E-Verify but also his support for 24/7 border drones.

Last month Trump told Syracuse.com that he would order the 24/7 surveillance of the U.S. borders, adding, “I want surveillance for our borders, and the drone has great capabilities for surveillance.”

What Trump might not know is that drones on the U.S. border don’t have a great track record. At the end of 2014 the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General released an audit of the Customs and Border Protection’s Unmanned Aircraft System Program. The program includes MQ -9 Predator B drones (also called “Reapers”), perhaps best known for its combat missions abroad, as well as the Guardian, the Predator B’s maritime variant. The program’s audit was unambiguous:

The program has also not achieved the expected results. Specifically, the unmanned aircraft are not meeting flight hour goals. Although CBP anticipated increased apprehensions of illegal border crossers, a reduction in border surveillance costs, and improvement in the U.S. Border Patrol’s efficiency, we found little or no evidence that CBP met those program expectations.

Unsurprisingly, cartels at the southern border are taking part in an arms race with CBP, using jamming devices on patrol drones. Almost a year after the inspector general’s audit Timothy Bennett, a science-and-technology program manager at the Department of Homeland Security, explained how the cartels hinder CBP operations:

DHS was unable to say just how often smugglers tried to jam or spoof border-watching UAVs. But Bennett said the attacks are hindering law enforcement abilities to map drug routes. “You’re out there looking, trying to find out this path [they’re] going through with drugs, and we can’t get good coordinate systems on it because we’re getting spoofed. That screws up the whole thing. We got to fix that problem,” he said.

The ineffectiveness of drones on the border is not the only concern. CBP drones also pose privacy concerns. Predator B drones carrying out combat missions abroad have been outfitted with Gorgon Stare, a wide-area surveillance technology that allows users to track objects within an area at least 10 square kilometers in size. Almost two years ago it was reported that once incorporated with Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System (ARGUS-IS), another wide-area surveillance tool, Gorgon Stare can monitor 100 square kilometers. A video outlining ARGUS-IS’ capabilities is below.

Trump Is the Nativist Dream Candidate

Donald Trump’s win in Indiana has practically clinched the Republican nomination.  Since July 2015, Trump has led in most polls of GOP candidates.  Immigration restrictionism is his most popular policy position.  That position and the way he’s talked about it have defined his candidacy and set him apart from the get go.  Trump is the nativist dream candidate – virtually whatever happens now can be blamed on his anti-immigration position. 

Here’s a list of Trump’s anti-immigration credentials:

You can read more about Trump’s immigration policies in his plan – which Ann Coulter called “the greatest political document since the Magna Carta.”

Trump is the real anti-immigration candidate that nativists have been praying for.  He owns the anti-immigration label no matter what he does or says to distance himself from it in the general election.  He spouts their ideas and appeals to their biases on a national stage.  He is the perfect spokesman in tone and style for such a policy position.  The political failure of immigration restrictionists in the past was always blamed on their moderation.  Now they have a real anti-immigration radical to test their theory – so we should give them appropriate credit for Trump’s failure in November.

Arizona’s SB1070 and Crime

Arizona state representative Sonny Borrelli (R) remarked that crime rates in his state dropped 78 percent since the passage of that state’s infamous SB1070 in 2010. His remark was thoroughly debunked. Below are a few charts to put Arizona’s crime rates in context. 

It is very difficult to show causality between a law and its effect on crime in later years. Crime rates have trended downward in the United States for over 20 years now. It is difficult to credit any decline after 2010 to a specific Arizona immigration law.  Also, Arizona’s crime rate cannot be considered in isolation. Comparing it to neighboring states and the country as a whole which did not pass an SB1070-type bill is necessary to even get a slight hint of how that law on crime.  Furthermore, there is a vast empirical literature on the effect of immigration on crime. At worst, immigration has almost no effect on crime. At best, immigration decreases crime rates.   

All of the figures are presented as a rate of crime per 100,000. The violent crime rate in Arizona was declining before SB 1070 and continued to decline afterward (Figure 1). From 2009 to 2014, the Arizona violent crime rate declined by 6.3 percent while it dropped 13 percent nationally. There was a decline of 16.3 percent in California, 9.9 percent  in Nevada, and 5.5 percent in New Mexico. 

Figure 1

Violent Crime Rate

 

Source: FBI.

Like the violent crime rate, the property crime rate in Arizona was also declining before SB 1070 and continued to decline afterward (Figure 2). From 2009 to 2014, the Arizona property crime rate decline by 10.9 percent while it dropped 14.6 percent nationally. It declined in every other state: 10.6 percent in California, 14.3 percent in Nevada, and 4.6 percent in New Mexico.

Do Immigrants Have “Trust” Issues?

One common criticism of immigrants is that they could undermine American institutions, weakening them so much that future economic growth will decrease so that the long run costs of liberalization are greater than the benefits. As I’ve written before this criticism doesn’t hold up to empirical scrutiny but a new line of attack is that immigrant trust levels could weaken productivity.  I decided to look at trust variables in the General Social Survey (GSS), a huge biennial survey of households in the United States, to see if immigrants and their children are less trusting than other Americans. The results were unexpected.

The first variable examined was “trust.” The question asked was: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in life?” I confined the results to the years 2004-2014 to measure more recent immigrants. The first generation is the immigrant generation, the second generation are children of immigrants, the third generation are the grandchildren of immigrants, and the fourth+ generation includes their great grandchildren and every older generation.

The first and second generations are less trusting than the third generation, confirming the findings of the literature. However, the fourth-plus generation is about as distrustful as the first and second generations. The immigrants and their children are not the trust anomaly, the third generation is. They are more trusting than every other generation of Americans (Figure 1).           

Figure 1

Trust

Source: General Social Survey

Related to “trust,” the “fair” variable asks: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” It reveals the same pattern as “trust” –first and second generations are much more likely to say people try to take advantage than the third generation (Figure 2). However, the fourth+ generations are nearly indistinguishable from the immigrant generation and their children. Only the third generation sees other people as particularly fair. 

Figure 2

Fair

Source: General Social Survey

The third variable examined was “helpful,” which asks: “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” The same pattern emerged – the first and second generations were more similar to the fourth-plus generation. The second generation is nearly identical to the fourth-plus generation. The third generation was most likely to say that most people were helpful and least likely to say that people look out for themselves. Again, the third generation is the trust anomaly, not the immigrants.    

Figure 3

Helpful

Source: General Social Survey

The differences between immigrants, their children, and fourth-plus generation Americans are small when it comes to levels of trust, opinions of fairness, and whether people are helpful. It’s hard to see how these small differences could comprise the micro foundations of an institution-based argument against liberalized immigration. The question is not why native-born Americans trust and immigrants don’t, it’s why do third generation Americans trust so much while all other Americans and immigrants do not?

Notes:

For “trust,” there were 1039 first generation respondents, 364 from the second generation, 327 for the third generation, and 4988 for the fourth-plus generation. For “fair,” there were 972 first generation respondents, 345 from the second generation, 304 for the third generation, and 4699 for the fourth-plus generation. For “helpful,” there were 986 first generation respondents, 347 from the second generation, 303 from the third generation, and 4700 from the fourth-plus generation. 

Immigration Restrictionism Hasn’t Helped Japan’s Labor Market

Japan is a developed nation that allows little immigration, thus winning occasional praise from American immigration restrictionists. If the reason for copying Japan’s immigration policy of almost no immigrants is that it will improve the labor markets, conditions there do not provide evidence for that claim, at least on the surface. 

Japan’s immigrant population is minuscule compared to the United States, as a percent of either country’s population (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Immigrant Stock as Percentage of Population

Source: World Bank.

Although there is little immigration to Japan, real average monthly cash earnings have declined slightly since 1995 (Figure 2). During the same time period, U.S. wages have actually grown, albeit not as fast as many want (Figure 3). If those graphs were unlabeled, my hunch is that most immigration restrictionists would assume the better graph is Japan. Japan’s sluggish wage growth in a low-immigration environment doesn’t match the restrictionist fairytale while American wage growth contradicts it.

Emigrants Transform Institutions - For the Better

The potential negative impact of immigrants on American political and economic institutions is the best argument against liberalized immigration and the economic, social, national security, and criminal objections are not convincing.  Michael Clemens and Lant Pritchett dig into this argument, which they call the “Epidemiological Case for efficient migration restrictions,” and find it mostly wanting (their paper is the best I’ve read in a long while).  I’ve co-written an academic journal article, Cato policy paper, and other work about how immigration could affect institutions.  There is more evidence that immigration improves institutions than that it worsens them although there is still much work to be done on this issue and questions remain.

But there is evidence that emigration improves a source country’s institutions.  Fredrik Segerfeldt summarizes some of the evidence in his new book for the Adam Smith Institute in the UK.  In Chapter 6 of his book, Segerfeldt observes:

Mexican migrants play an important role in shaping political atti­tudes in the country, both through social remittances and after returning home. Political participation increases, democratic com­petition intensifies, it becomes more difficult for leading members of the party in power to enrich themselves and the chance that the rul­ing coalition will retain power decreases. In short, Mexico’s exodus makes it more democratic.

Although much of the research above deals with Mexico, there are other results indicating that emigration can strengthen democracy. In a macro study of a large number of poor countries, economists find that emigration increases both democracy and economic freedom in the sending country.

How does emigration improve Mexican economic and political institutions?  By breaking up cronyist and interventionist political arrangements:

Emigration can also help to break up or at least weaken governance based on patronage. In such countries voters tend to vote for the rul­ing party, because otherwise they risk losing the benefits that the power distributes. Entire communities will be dependent on the rul­ing party, which impairs democracy. But when people in a commu­nity receive income that is not from the state or the ruling party, citi­zens become more independent and can therefore vote for the oppo­sition if they want to. In Mexico, remittances reduce the support for the PRI, the party which, with the help of patron-client methods, managed to retain control of the country during most of the 20th cen­tury (between 1929 and 2000).

Migration and remittances may also be a way to break up old hierar­chies based on class and ethnicity. In San Pedro Pinula in Guatemala, for example, residents of the Mayan people, with the help of both returning migrants and remittances, have slowly but surely been able to challenge the ethnic underclass role they had for five centu­ries. In the oases of southern Morocco, the Haratin, poor black, land­less workers, have enhanced their status thanks to remittances from abroad.

Segerfeldt’s summary of that research can help explain the important finding by Joshua C. Hall that the ability to emigrate is correlated with improvements in source country economic freedom: 

Exitability, a variable created by Brown (2014) to capture how easy it is for citizens to “vote with their feet” is related to the change in economic freedom from 1980 to 2010 in a statistically significant manner across all specifications. This provides some indirect evidence to the importance of “exit” versus “voice” with respect to the question of institutional reform.

Emigration benefits governance in sending countries, increasing the returns from liberalized immigration policies in the developed world.  This is an exciting time to be working on how immigrants affect economic and political institutions.   

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