Tag: illegals

Donald Trump on Immigration: Same Anti-Immigration Ideas, New Salesman

Donald Trump’s newly released position paper on immigration is the precise mix of fantasy and ignorance that one has come to expect from the recently self-described Republican.  Specifically, his position paper reads like an outline of this April op-ed by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL).  Trump is still a candidate in the GOP primary supported mainly by older white men who are not particularly conservative.  Although the electorate has never been more supportive of expanding legal immigration, Trump has never been more opposed.

Trump’s position paper attempts to lay the foundation for his immigration policy as president. Below, I review how his ideas measure up. Quotes from his paper are in quotes, my responses follow.

Here are the three core principles of real immigration reform:

  1. A nation without borders is not a nation. There must be a wall across the southern border.
  2. A nation without laws is not a nation. Laws passed in accordance with our Constitutional system of government must be enforced.
  3. A nation that does not serve its own citizens is not a nation. Any immigration plan must improve jobs, wages and security for all Americans.

The first sentence is true by definition, but assumes that for a border to be real, it must have a wall around it. Whether a wall is warranted should depend on the circumstances at the border, which are vastly more safe than Trump claims. 

The last two principles are vague enough that they could support any immigration policy from a total ban on immigration to open borders. The rest of his position paper narrows their focus.

U.S. taxpayers have been asked to pick up hundreds of billions in healthcare costs, housing costs, education costs, welfare costs, etc. Indeed, the annual cost of free tax credits alone paid to illegal immigrants quadrupled to $4.2 billion in 2011.

This analysis factors in only fiscal costs, which will always lead to negative fiscal outcomes. It ignores the fiscal benefits that come from a larger economy.  The fact remains that poor immigrants use less welfare than poor Americans.  They contribute mightily to Social Security, Medicare, and other portions of the U.S budget.  Over time, immigration’s impact on the U.S. taxpayer is about a net-zero.  In other words, immigrants and their descendants pay for themselves. 

Immigration can turn fiscally positive by further restricting welfare access.  Right now illegal immigrants do not have access to means tested welfare programs, but their American born children do.  However, their benefit levels are adjusted downwards to account for the non-eligible members of their households.  Short of lowering welfare benefit levels for everybody, which would be a positive move, the government cannot deny citizens access based on who their parents are.  However, Congress can deny all non-citizens access to welfare.  Cato has published the only guide of how to do that. Removing the Earned Income Tax Credit for unauthorized or other categories of non-citizens would also be easy.

The position paper doesn’t factor in the estimated $400 to $600 billion government cost of removing all unauthorized immigrants as well as the lost tax revenue from the subsequently smaller economy.  Doing so reveals how fiscally damaging this immigration plan would be if it ever became law. 

The effects on jobseekers have also been disastrous …

The influx of foreign workers holds down salaries, keeps unemployment high, and makes it difficult for poor and working class Americans – including immigrants themselves and their children – to earn a middle class wage.

There is a lot of research on whether immigrants displace Americans in the job market – and the general finding is that immigrants displace very few American workers. 

What Explains the Flow of Unlawful Immigration?

The flow of unauthorized immigrants to the United States has collapsed.  The apprehension of illegal immigrants by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the best proxy measurement of the flow of such people, along the Southwest Border is way down (see below). 

All Apprehensions on Southwest Border

                       

Source: Customs and Border Protection.

What explains this?  A number of factors are at play.  Economic conditions in the United States, economic or other conditions in other countries, and immigration enforcement all explain part of the decrease in unauthorized immigration over the years.    

Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) gives most of the credit to beefed up immigration enforcement along the border.  Krikorian seconds a quote by Marc Rosenblum, deputy director of the Migration Policy Institute, who says:

Every month or quarter that the economy continues to improve and unauthorized immigration doesn’t pick up supports the theory that border security is a bigger factor, and it’s less about the economy and we have moved into a new era.

But if immigration enforcement is the main reason why unauthorized immigration collapsed, why are the numbers of unlawful immigrants from countries Other than Mexico (OTMs) increasing?  CBP apprehensions don’t discriminate based on country of origin because they can’t tell where the immigrants are from until they’re apprehended.

Response to Bryan Caplan

Bryan Caplan of George Mason University posted some comments I sent him along with some questions about a recent blog post of his.  His questions are in quotes, my responses follow.  First, some background.

It’s important to separate immigration (permanent) from migration (temporary).  Much of what we think of as “immigration” is actually migration as many of them return home.  Dudley Baines (page 35) summarizes some estimates of return migration from America’s past.

Country/Region of Origin            Return Rates

Nordics                                     20%

English & Welsh                         40%

Portuguese                                30-40%

Austro-Hungarians & Poles          30-40%

Italians                                      40-50%           

 

Gould estimates a 60 percent return rate for Italians – similar to Mexican unauthorized immigrants from 1965-1985. 

There were three parts to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that all affected both immigration and migration.  The first part was the amnesty.  The second was employer sanctions through the I-9 form that was supposed to turn off the jobs magnet.  The third was increased border security to keep them out.  For the first two questions, I assume the rest of IRCA was passed.

Interpreting the New Deportation Statistics

Shortly before Christmas the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a report detailing deportations (henceforth “removals”) conducted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) during fiscal year 2014.  Below I present the data on removals in historical context – combined with information from the Migration Policy Institute and Pew.  See my previous writings on this topic here and here.       

ICE deported 102,224 unauthorized immigrants from the interior of the United States in 2014, down from a peak of 188,422 in 2011.  Removals from the interior are distinct from removals of recent border crossers.  Removals from the interior peaked during the Obama administration and have since fallen to a level equal to that of 2007. 

Source: MPI and DHS.

The number of interior removals under the last six years of the Bush administration (the first two years are unavailable so far) was about 475,000.  From 2009-2014, the Obama administration removed about 950,000 from the interior of the United States.  

President Bush’s administration removed an average of about 276,000 unauthorized immigrants per year for the years available and an average of 79,000 of them annually were interior removals.  President Obama’s administration has removed an average of 405,000 unauthorized immigrants a year, an average of 158,000 of them annually were interior removals.  There were a large numbers of unknowns during the Bush administration that decreased as the years progressed. 

 

Source: MPI and DHS.

The Obama administration’s recent decrease in the number of interior removals is not the whole story.  The best way to measure the intensity of immigration enforcement is to look at the percentage of the unauthorized immigrant population removed in each year.  Based on estimates of the total size of the unauthorized immigrant population, 0.89 percent of that population was removed from the interior of the United States in 2014 – down from 1.15 percent in 2013. 

 

Source: MPI, Department of Homeland Security, Pew, Author’s Calculations. 

For every year for which data was available, the Bush administration removed an average of 0.7 percent of the interior unauthorized immigrant population.  President Obama’s administration has removed an average of 1.39 percent of the interior unauthorized immigrant population every year of his presidency – about twice the rate as under the Bush administration.  Even when focusing on interior removals, President Obama is still out-deporting President Bush based on the data available.

The unauthorized immigrant population increased under the Bush administration from 9.4 million in 2001 to a peak of 12.2 million in 2007 and then declined to 11.7 million in 2008.  During Obama’s administration, the number of unauthorized immigrants has, so far, stayed at or below 11.5 million.    

Obama’s interior removal statistics show a downward trend beginning in 2012 through to 2014.  The Obama administration has also focused immigration enforcement on criminal offenders (not all unlawful immigrants are criminals) but the data is a little difficult to disentangle for 2014 so I left it out of this blog post – stay tuned for a future one on that topic. 

The Obama administration has clearly not gutted interior immigration enforcement as their 2014 figures for interior removals are higher than they were for every year of the Bush administration except for 2007 and 2008.  

Do Amnesties Increase Unlawful Immigration?

One popular argument against a legalization, or amnesty, of unlawful immigrants is that it will merely incentivize future unlawful immigration.  Unlawful immigrants will be more likely to break immigration laws because they will eventually be legalized anyway, so why bother to attempt to enter legally (ignoring the fact that almost none of them could have entered legally)?  This claim is taken at face value because the stock of unlawful immigration eventually increased in the decades after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that amnestied roughly 2.7 million.

However, that doesn’t prove that IRCA was responsible for the increase in the stock of unlawful immigrants.  The stock of unlawful immigrants may have been increasing at a steady rate prior to the amnesty and that rate may have just continued after the amnesty.  Measuring the flows of unlawful immigrants is the best way to gauge whether the 1986 Reagan amnesty incentivized further unlawful immigration.  If the flows increased after IRCA, then the amnesty likely incentivized more unlawful immigration.  The number of annual apprehensions of unlawful immigrants on the Southwest border is a good way to approximate for these cross-border flows.

It’s perfectly reasonable to think that an amnesty of unlawful immigrants could increase their numbers in the future.  There are at least two ways this could occur.  The first is through knowledge of an imminent amnesty.  If foreigners thought Congress was about to grant legal status to large numbers of unlawful immigrants, then some of those foreigners may rush the border on the chance that they would be included.  Legislators were aware of this problem, which was why IRCA did not apply to unlawful immigrants who entered on January 1st 1982 or after.  IRCA had been debated for years before passage and Congress did not want to grant amnesty to unlawful immigrants who entered merely because they heard of the amnesty.  To prevent such a rush, subsequent immigration reform bills have all had a cutoff date for legalization prior to Congressional debate on the matter. 

Even with the cutoff date, some recent unlawful immigrants would still be able to legalize due to fraud or administrative oversights.  An unlawful immigrant who rushes the border to take advantage of an imminent amnesty still has a greater chance of being legalized than he did before, so legalization might be the marginal benefit that convinces him to try.  This theory of a rush of unlawful immigrants prior to an imminent amnesty is not controversial.

Legalization or Amnesty for Unlawful Immigrants – An American Tradition

Legalization of unlawful immigrants, commonly referred to as amnesty, has been hyperbolically described as an affront to U.S. national sovereignty, the rule of law, and even our Constitutional Republic.  However, the U.S. government has a long history of successfully legalizing violators of immigration laws.

In 1929, the year the Immigration Act of 1924 went in effect, Congress passed an amnesty to allow for the voluntary registration of all unlawful immigrants who wished to legalize their unrecorded entry.  Beginning a familiar pattern, Congress combined this 1929 amnesty with severe legal penalties on unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States without inspection after the amnesty was complete.[i]

As part of the reforms of the Bracero Program’s guest worker visa in the late 1940s and early 1950s, many unauthorized Mexican migrants were legalized and granted a visa on the spot.  According to Professor Kitty Calavita, 55,000 unlawful Mexican immigrants were legalized as Bracero workers in 1947 through a process derogatively referred to as “drying out” unlawful migrant workers.[ii] Under the auspices of an increase in immigration enforcement and the expansion of the Bracero guest worker visa, other unlawful Mexican migrants were driven down to the Mexican border and made to take one step across the border and immediately reenter as a legal Bracero worker, a process referred to as “a walk around statute.”[iii]

In 1958, the cutoff date for the 1929 amnesty was advanced to June 28, 1940 – meaning that unlawful immigrants who entered before that later date could legalize.  The Immigration Act of 1965 again advanced the cut off date for the 1929 amnesty to June 30, 1948.[iv]

Year

 Legalizations of Unauthorized Immigrants

1959

4,321

1960

4,773

1961

5,037

1962

3,399

1963

2,680

1964

2,585

1965

2,064

1966

2,595

1967

3,195

1968

2,148

1969

1,565

1970

1,520

1971

1,190

1972

1,653

1973

1,254

1974

875

1975

556

1976

796

1977

546

1978

423

1979

262

1980

428

1981

241

Total

44,106

Source: Vernon M. Briggs Jr., Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984, p. 66.

The Immigration Reform and Control (IRCA) Act in 1986 – the so-called Reagan Amnesty – legalized 2.7 million unauthorized immigrants who had been residing in the United States since 1982.  After IRCA, the Section 245(i) legalization passed in 1994 and was then extended again in 1997.  The 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief (NACARA) Act also legalized close to one million unlawful immigrants from Central America.  The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness (HRIFA) Act legalized around 125,000 unauthorized immigrants from Haiti in 1998.  The Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000 reinstated the rolling 245(i) legalization provision. 

So long as there are immigration restrictions on the movement of peaceful and healthy people, and Americans want to continue to hire and sell products to immigrants, some will always come whether the immigration laws allow it or not.  To address the unlawful immigrant population, Congress periodically passes a legalization or amnesty bill, but the number of unlawful immigrants rises again because lawful immigration has not been sufficiently liberalized – despite vast increases in enforcement.

Past amnesties and legalizations of unauthorized immigrants didn’t destroy U.S. national sovereignty (the United States is still a sovereign country), the rule of law (in tatters for many reasons, including efforts to enforce our arbitrary and capricious immigration laws), or our Constitutional Republic.  It’s hard to see why another one passed by Congress and signed by the President would produce those grave harms.


[i] Vernon M. Briggs Jr., Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984, p. 47.

[ii] Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subject in the Postwar United States and Mexico, University of North Carolina Press, 2011, p. 209, Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS, Quid Pro Books, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2010, pp. 25-26, 34.

[iii] Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS, Quid Pro Books, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2010, p. 43.

[iv] Vernon M. Briggs Jr., Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984, p. 66.

E-Verify Does Not “Turn Off” Job Magnet

One of the main claims of E-Verify’ ssupporters is that it will turn off the job magnet that incentivizes unauthorized immigration.  A recent Working Paper by economists Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny casts doubt on that.

They find that E-Verify mandates in the states have decreased wages of likely Mexican unauthorized immigrant men by about 7.8 percent and unauthorized immigrant Mexican women by 1.2 percent.  The likelihood of men being employed is not much affected by E-Verify but it does increase female employment and labor force participation – which makes sense in the context of making migration and employment decisions on the family level.  Clearly, E-Verify has diminished the anticipated wage gains from illegally immigrating to the United States.

However, E-Verify has not turned off the job magnet.  Assuming that unauthorized immigrant men and women earn the same wages, the estimated gains to coming here for the marginal Mexican immigrant is only slightly lowered.  Based on gender data from Pew and comparing the wages of identical workers in Mexico and the United States, here are some back of the envelope calculations showing how E-Verify has affected wages for unauthorized Mexican immigrants:

Unauthorized Immigrant Workers 

 

Female

Male

All

Gender

39.4%

60.6%

100.0%

Monthly Wages in U.S. (Pre-E-Verify)

 $  1,470.80

 $  1,470.80

 $  1,470.80

Monthly Wages in Mexico

      $580.90

     $580.90

     $580.90

Wages Multiple from Working in U.S.

2.53

2.53

2.53

Monthly Wages (Post E-Verify)

$1,453.15

$1,356.08

$1,394.32

Wages Multiple from Working in U.S. Under E-Verify

2.50

2.33

2.40

Sources: Center for Global Development, Pew Hispanic Center, and Dallas Fed Working Paper

E-Verify lowers the wage gain for all Mexican unauthorized workers from 2.53 times as great as in Mexico to 2.4 times as great – a whopping 5 percent decrease.  That’s not much to brag about considering E-Verify is supposed to be the lynchpin of future immigration enforcement.  It’s hard to see how E-Verify proponents can look at this small wage effect and conclude that E-Verify is worth it, given the enormous array of problems and burdens caused by it.  In practice, E-Verify does not turn off the job magnet that attracts unauthorized immigrants to our shores and will not if it is ever mandated.