Tag: free trade agreement

African Free Trade Zone Is Good News - If Properly Implemented

According to the South African newspaper Mail and Guardian, “African leaders on Wednesday signed a potentially historic, 26-nation free-trade pact to create a common market spanning half the continent, from Cairo to Cape Town. The deal on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) is the culmination of five years of negotiations to set up a framework for preferential tariffs easing the movement of goods in an area that is home to 625-million people…. The deal will integrate three existing trade blocs – the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) – whose countries have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of more than $1-trillion.”

“Potentially historic” is the right term for what could be a greatly beneficial agreement. African parliaments will have two years to ratify the agreement – and that is the easy part. Proper implementation and enforcement will be much more difficult in countries with deeply underdeveloped institutions of rule of law and protection of private property. Still, the TFTA is a step in the right direction, for it signals an important ideological shift on the part of the African elite. Historically, African governments have been deeply skeptical of free trade and capitalism. Instead, they preferred protectionism and state-led development. To the extent that they were interested in trade, the African governments emphasized access to Western markets, while eschewing liberalization of their own. The consequences were catastrophic. As I wrote in a 2005 Cato paper,  

[T]rade liberalization in the developed world as a cure for world poverty is often overemphasized. Simply abandoning developed-world protectionism would not substantially change the lives of the people in the poorest parts of the developing world. That is particularly true of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where the main causes of impoverishment are internal. SSA is not poor because of lack of access to world markets. SSA is poor because of political instability and because of a lack of policies and institutions, such as private property rights, that are necessary for the market economy to flourish.

Despite substantial declines in applied and bound tariffs throughout the world, protectionism [in SSA] is still very much alive. Developing countries’ average tariff rates are more than three times higher than those of developed countries… According to the WTO, only 10 percent of African (including sub-Saharan African) exports were intraregional (i.e.: traded to other African countries). In contrast, 68 percent of exports from countries in Western Europe were exported to other Western European countries. Similarly, 40 percent of North American exports were to other countries in North America.

It is hypocritical for African leaders to call for greater access to global markets while rejecting trade openness at home. It is also self-defeating, because domestic protectionism contributes to perpetuating African poverty. Research shows that countries with the greatest freedom to trade tend to grow faster than countries that restrict trading. SSA governments have complete control over the reduction of their own trade barriers. If they are truly serious about the benefits of trade liberalization, they can immediately free trade relations among SSA countries and with the rest of the world. They should do so regardless of what the developed world does.

The TPP and GDP: Let’s Wait and See

In discussions of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), there are often very specific figures put out there as the estimated economic gains of this trade deal.  $78 billion of annual income gains for the U.S. is a commony cited number.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that these gains are based on assumptions about what might be in the TPP, not what is actually in the TPP.  That’s because there is no TPP yet.  

The estimates come from this study, and a more detailed previous study, by a group of trade economists.  But if you read the fine print, for example on p. 23 of the second link, they make clear that they are simply estimating the TPP benefits based on the liberalization coverage of past agreements among the same parties.

The extent of the liberalization that will be in the TPP is not clear because that’s what the parties are negotiating about right now: How much to liberalize each sector.  If trade policy were run by free market economists, everyone would liberalize on their own right now.  But trade policy is influenced heavily by special interest groups.  As a result, some import restrictions remain even after a trade negotiation.

Many commentators have come out for or against the TPP already, based on assumptions about what will be in it.  I’m waiting to see the full scope of what’s in the TPP (if the negotiations are ever concluded) before making a decision.  Any liberalization needs to be balanced out against “governance” parts, such as intellectual property protection, where the impact on GDP and welfare more generally are more uncertain.  We can’t really make that calculation until we see the final deal.

U.S.-EU Free Trade Agreement? A Pep Talk or Overhaul at USTR Is the Place to Start

In its first 49 months, the Obama adminstration has paid lip service to trade liberalization. There have been the announcements, the platitudes, the initiatives, the task forces, and the interminable negotiations, but no new trade agreements. Not one. Still, in his State of the Union speech tonight, the president will offer assurances that his rhetorical commitment to trade liberalization remains steadfast, when he announces grand plans to pursue a trans-Atlantic free trade deal. Of course, rhetorical commitments and pursuing free trade don’t exactly get the job done.

Whether anything comes of prospective U.S.-EU trade negotiations or the still-brewing Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations depends, more than anything else, on whether President Obama believes his own rhetoric. Of course, actions speak louder than words and on that score things don’t look especially promising.

Exhibit A is the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, where employee morale has gone from bad to worse. In a 2012 OPM survey of 29 small federal agencies published in a report titled “Best Places to Work in the Federal Government,” USTR ranked dead last. The results showed employee dissatisfaction with their jobs, their organization, and their senior leadership.

The overall weighted index score of 32.7 (out of a possible 100) in 2012 is the latest point in a continuous and steep decline in satisfaction, which was 74.2 in 2009, 57.4 in 2010, and 47.7 in 2011. The sub-index for “Effective Leadership - Senior Leaders” declined from 71.2 to 49.7 to 37.5 to 18.6 over those same four years. Only 17.7 percent of the 101 USTR respondents said they had a high level of respect for their organization’s senior leaders, while 62.1 dissented from that view. Only 12.8 percent of 102 USTR respondents said their organization’s leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce, while 67.3 dissented.

These are some profound rebukes of U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, and by extension, President Obama.

Finally, a Breakthrough on the Colombia Trade Agreement

To no great surprise, the Obama administration announced today that it has cut a deal with the government of Colombia to address concerns about labor protections and to finally move toward enacting the long-stalled free-trade agreement between our two countries. This is welcome news for trade expansion and for strengthening our ties to a key Latin American ally.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos is expected to arrive later this week in Washington to cement the deal. In exchange for the agreement, Colombia has reportedly agreed to expand its efforts to protect union members from violence and to more vigorously prosecute those responsible.

As my Cato colleague Juan Carlos Hidalgo and I documented in a Cato study earlier this year, concerns about labor protections were never a valid reason for holding up this agreement. The overall murder rate in Colombia has declined dramatically in the past decade, and the murder rate against members of labor unions has declined even more rapidly. A union member in Colombia today is one-sixth as likely to be a victim of homicide as a fellow citizen who does not belong to a union. Meanwhile, the Colombia government has increased convictions for homicides against union members by eight-fold in the past three years.

As Democratic Senators John Kerry and Max Baucus pointed out in an op-ed this week that endorsed the agreement, the International Labor Organization has certified that Colombia is complying with its international labor agreements.

The obstacle of labor violence was just a political smokescreen that had been raised by labor-union leaders in the United States looking for any shred of an argument to oppose the agreement. Even the agreement announced this week is not going to win over the AFL-CIO. The Colombia government could have raised a hundred murdered union members from the dead, and organized labor in American would still chant that not enough was being done.

The breakthrough this week clears the path for Congress to approve, by what I predict will be comfortable bipartisan majorities, the pending trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea.

Promoting Free Trade—Sort Of

The U.S. and South Korean governments have agreed to changes in the free trade agreement negotiated by the Bush administration. The president rightly lauded the FTA as a good deal for Americans:

“This agreement shows the U.S. is willing to lead and compete in the global economy,” the president told reporters at the White House, calling it a triumph for American workers in fields from farming to aerospace.”

Approving the FTA has taken on added urgency after the European Union negotiated a similar accord with the South. Once that agreement takes effect, Europeans would have better access than Americans to the world’s 13th largest economy. Protectionism is always foolish, but especially so when one’s competitors are promoting open markets.

The accord also offers important geopolitical benefits. With much nervousness in the U.S. and throughout East Asia over an increasingly assertive China, Washington should work to break down barriers to Americans trading with China’s neighbors. Already Koreans do more business with China than the U.S. While the FTA won’t reduce the appeal of products from next door China in South Korea, it will allow American producers to compete more freely in that market.

The president deserves credit for pushing the agreement forward, but he also needlessly held up ratification by two years. Moreover, his “fix” punishes American consumers. As the official government fact sheet explains:

Car Tariff Elimination: The 2007 agreement would have immediately eliminated U.S. tariffs on an estimated 90 percent of Korea’s auto exports, with remaining tariffs phased out by the third year of implementation. The 2010 supplemental agreement keeps the 2.5 percent U.S. tariff in place until the fifth year. At the same time, Korea will immediately cut its tariff on U.S. auto imports in half (from 8 percent to 4 percent), and fully eliminate that tariff in the fifth year.

Truck Tariff Elimination: The 2007 agreement would have required the United States to start reducing its tariff on Korean trucks immediately and phase it out by the agreement’s tenth year. The 2010 supplemental agreement allows the United States to maintain its 25 percent truck tariff until the eighth year and then phase it out by the tenth year – but holds Korea to its original commitment to eliminate its 10 percent tariff on U.S. trucks immediately.

That is, the Obama administration forced a delay in the reduction of U.S. auto tariffs. This obviously hurts Korean exporters, but the highest price will be paid by American consumers. The provision is simply a special interest payoff to the auto industry, which already has benefited from a big federal financial bail-out. So much for bringing “change” to Washington.

Free trade is good for Americans. That means bringing down foreign trade barriers. It also means bringing down U.S. trade barriers.

Upcoming G20 Summit in Seoul Raises Stakes for U.S.-Korea Trade Deal

The next G20 Summit, to be held November 11-12 in South Korea, is right around the corner. For free traders, the summit has taken on added meaning because of the promise President Obama made during the most recent G20 Summit held last June in Toronto to advance the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (FTA):

The last time I was in Korea, I said that I would be committed to moving [the FTA] forward. And today I indicated to President Lee that it is time that our United States Trade Representative work very closely with his counterpart from the ROK to make sure that we set a path, a road, so that I can present this FTA to Congress…. I want to make sure that everything is lined up properly by the time that I visit Korea in November. And then in the few months that follow that, I intend to present it to Congress. It is the right thing to do for our country.

We agree, Mr. President. To help policymakers understand the high stakes and potential gains of the agreement, Cato Senior Fellow Doug Bandow has authored the new Cato Trade Briefing Paper, “A Free Trade Agreement with South Korea Would Promote Both Prosperity and Security,” released today.

A preview of Doug’s analysis also was published yesterday in the Daily Caller, under the title “South Korea Free Trade Agreement Key to Prosperity and Security.”

Free the Colombia Trade Agreement

Thirty-nine members of Congress from both major parties sent a letter to President Obama this week urging him to seek passage of the long-stalled free trade agreement with our South American ally Colombia.

The agreement to eliminate trade barriers between our two countries was signed in November 2006, but under the influence of their trade-union allies, Democratic leaders in the House have refused to even allow a vote.

As signers of the letter point out (go here for a Cato analysis), the agreement would be good for our economy and good for U.S. foreign policy.  So far, the delay in passage has forced U.S. exporters to Colombia to pay $2.7 billion in extra duties that would have been eliminated if the agreement had become law.

The bipartisan supporters also rightly note that Colombia is a key ally, standing as a democratic alternative to both the Marxist FARC guerrillas and their authoritarian friend, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. As the letter correctly states:

Colombia has made remarkable progress on many fronts, emerging as a major growth market and leading center for Latin American business. In a region that has seen a disturbing increase in hostility to U.S. interests and values, Colombia has consistently proven itself to be an important friend, a reliable partner and a bulwark for democracy.

With Colombia in the process of electing a new president after eight years of progress under Alvaro Uribe, it is more important than ever that we strengthen our ties with Colombia through peaceful commerce.

The 20 House Democrats who signed the June 2 letter prove that this need not be a partisan issue. If President Obama is serious about boosting U.S. exports, building friendships abroad, and reaching across the aisle for the good of the country, he should heed the wise words of this letter.