Tag: Fourteenth Amendment

Supporting Marriage Equality in Utah and Oklahoma

Utah Constitutional Amendment 3, passed by referendum in 2004, states that no union other than one between a man and a woman may be recognized as a marriage. Derek Kitchen and five co-plaintiffs took issue with this definition and filed a lawsuit in federal district court last year to challenge the gay marriage ban. In a surprising and widely publicized December 2013 ruling, the court invalidated the amendment, finding that such a restriction was an affront to equal protection and the fundamental right to marry.

Meanwhile, Mary Bishop and Sharon Baldwin also filed a federal suit to challenge a similar provision that was added to Oklahoma’s constitution by referendum in 2004. Like Utah’s district court, the Oklahoma district court found the amendment unconstitutional. Following on the heels of last term’s Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Windsor—which struck down part of the Defense of Marriage Act—these ground-breaking red-state cases are now both before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which will consider the constitutionality of a state’s decision to exclude same-sex unions from the definition of marriage.

Reprising our collaboration in Hollingsworth v. Perry—the Prop 8 case in which the Supreme Court avoided ruling on the merits—Cato and the Constitutional Accountability Center have filed a brief supporting the Utah and Oklahoma plaintiffs’ fight for equality under the law in their respective challenges. We argue that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect from this same type of arbitrary and invidious singling-out that the Utah and Oklahoma marriage restrictions effect; that the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause confirms that its protections are to be interpreted broadly; and that the clause provides every person the equal right to marry a person of his or her choice. We believe that the Utah and Oklahoma constitutional amendments conflict with the equal protection rights of those same-sex couples whose unions are treated differently than those of opposite-sex couples.

Every person has the right to choose whom to marry, and to have that decision respected equally by the state in which they live. Especially in the wake of Windsor, it is becoming clearer that laws like these that force same-sex unions into second-class status have no place in a free society. The Tenth Circuit should affirm the district courts’ decisions.

With briefing in Kitchen v. Herbert and Bishop v. Smith now complete, the Tenth Circuit will be hearing argument shortly, with a decision expected in late spring or summer.

This blogpost was co-authored by Cato legal associate Julio Colomba.

 

Supporting Individual Rights, Opposing Eminent Domain Abuse

A recent blogpost published by Doug Kendall of the Constitutional Accountability Center (with whom we sometimes work with on op-eds and briefscriticized Cato’s involvement in Mount Holly v. Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action as cowardly, and inconsistent with our ideals. While Cato has great respect for any organization that, like the CAC, works “to preserve the rights and freedoms of all Americans,” their criticism of our brief is baseless, and grossly mischaracterizes Cato’s position in the case and track record generally. 

While I’m wary of misrepresenting the post through over-simplification, it can be boiled down to the following: 

  1. Mount Holly is a case about eminent domain;
  2. Pro-property rights groups (including Cato) have a history of “howling” against eminent domain;
  3. Those groups’ failure to argue against eminent domain in this case (and their support of the Township of Mount Holly), is inconsistent with their previous stance on property rights, and evinces a lack of moral courage;
  4. That failure can be explained because this case is also about civil rights and equality, and conservative groups hate equality, and live to help the state further oppress the downtrodden masses. 

 CAC’s criticism stems from an incorrect framing of the case at hand:

an important case out of Mount Holly, New Jersey, that involves Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims in the context of an effort by Mount Holly Township to use eminent domain to redevelop its only predominately minority community—and in the process, displace and raze the homes of its residents.

While that description is accurate in that the case is important, originates in Mount Holly, and concerns the applicability of the Fair Housing Act to a redevelopment plan, the case before the Supreme Court has nothing to do with eminent domain. The question to be argued before high court couldn’t be plainer: “Whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.”

It’s surprising that CAC would make such a basic mistake about the case, given that they filed a brief in the case, supporting the Mount Holly residents (a brief which makes no mention of eminent domain – at all).

“Eminent domain” refers to a specific way that the government can acquire private property against the will of the owner. So far, Mount Holly Township hasn’t resorted to eminent domain. Of the 329 properties that the township wants to include in the redevelopment plan, it has been able to acquire all but 70 of them through voluntary sales. If those remaining 70 owners – some of whom are parties to the case – were to challenge any attempts to expropriate their homes, Cato would be first in line to file a brief in their support, probably joined by those “howling”  pro-property groups like the Institute for Justice and Pacific Legal Foundation. (Sadly, it’s unlikely that we would garner CAC’s support, because the group has “long supported the reasonable use of eminent domain for redevelopment purposes.”)

No, this case isn’t about eminent domain because the residents aren’t challenging the township’s acquisition of property, but what it intends to do with that property. In a nutshell, the plaintiffs argue that the Fair Housing Act – which forbids governments and private individuals from refusing “to sell or rent … or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” – bars not just intentional discrimination like restrictive covenants, but also any action that, even if entirely neutral and colorblind,  has a “disproportionate impact” on the ability of members of a protected class to buy or rent a home. They argue not that Mount Holly is intentionally discriminating against minority residents, but that the increase in property values as a result of redevelopment would effectively price the poor out of the neighborhood – and that counts as discrimination because the poorer residents are disproportionately drawn from minority groups

Cato opposes that theory of law generally, for the same reason that we oppose governmental abuse of eminent domain: we stand firmly against attempts by the government to control how people may dispose of their property. A homeowner should be able to sell his house for whatever price he thinks fair – without worrying that if his asking price is too high, he’ll be accused of racism and forced to defend himself in court. Our position in Mount Holly is the product of the reasoned and consistent application of well-articulated liberal principles, not “cowardice.”

As a closing note, we take issue with the implication that Cato “detests civil rights statutes.” Cato supports laws that protect individual freedom and opposes those that don’t. We may disagree with CAC on whether a law falls in the first or second category, regardless of whether it’s a “civil rights” statute or otherwise, but make no mistake that we support individual civil (and other) rights.

Indeed, we believe that the first and foremost duty of civil rights legislation (and constitutions) is to protect citizens from undue state interference with their daily lives and liberties. A reading of the FHA that embraces disparate impact claims doesn’t protect individuals from the state but instead represents an expansion of state interference. Behavior that was once lawful – selling your home for whatever price you wish – would become sanctionable. Disparate impact theory holds private individuals responsible not for personal bigotry, or the direct consequences of their actions, but for economic realities beyond their control – and that makes no one freer, nor more equal.

Update: Repeating what happened in the previous disparate-impact FHA case, Magner v. Gallagher, this case has apparently settled. The only question now is what the administration did to keep this issue away from the Supreme Court again. 

Further update: A couple of readers familiar with the facts on the ground in Mount Holly point out that while it’s technically correct that Mount Holly “hasn’t resorted to eminent domain,” the town’s redevelopment plan is indeed all-too-typical of eminent-domain abusers. That is, while not employing eminent domain – no condemnation proceedings have (yet) been filed – the town threatened to use it and then claimed “voluntary” sales when the homeowners capitulated. The redevelopment authority has represented that the incentives it offered for relocation were greater than what homeowners would’ve gotten from the eminent domain process – that alas is probably true, because the compensation paid for government takings is rarely “just” – but of course they would’ve had to sweeten the deal even more if they couldn’t threaten eminent domain in the first place. In other words, as we and our pro-property-rights allies have long argued, the ultimate solution is to reverse Kelo v. New London and take away the government’s ability to forcibly transfer property from one private party to another. If such eminent-domain-abuse claims aren’t foreclosed by the Mount Holly settlement, I suggest that the town’s residents hire IJ to litigate them. Cato would look forward to filing an amicus brief in support.

This blogpost was co-authored by Cato legal associate Gabriel Latner.

Government Racism on Trial: Schuette and EEOC v. Kaplan

Today the Supreme Court hears argument in the Schuette case, regarding the constitutionality of Michigan voters’ decision to ban racial discrimination and preferences in public university admissions (the equivalent bans for public employment and contracting haven’t been legally challenged). In no conceivable world can the Equal Protection Clause – the constitutional provision that bans racial discrimination – prohibit a state law that bans racial discrimination. The Supreme Court should and almost certainly reverse the lower court’s ridiculous judgment to the contrary, and will likely do so with a great degree of unanimity on the “political structure” aspect of the case.

Coinciding with that oral argument, Cato is getting involved in a lower-court case called EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education Corp. Here’s the situation: Following several incidents of employee theft, Kaplan University did what any reasonable employer might do in similar circumstances: it instituted heightened screening procedures for new hires. This process included credit checks to filter out potential employees at greater risk of committing theft. These checks made no mention of any applicant’s race and Kaplan didn’t collect any race information from applicants, thus making the hiring process both race-neutral and race-ignorant. Nevertheless, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which itself uses credit checks in hiring decisions, sued Kaplan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that the use of credit checks has an unlawfully disparate impact on African American applicants.

Because Kaplan doesn’t keep racial data for applicants, the EEOC had to come up with its own data to prove its case. The agency thus created a team of “race raters,” a group of seemingly random people who sorted Kaplan’s job applicants into racial categories based only on the applicant’s name and DMV photo. (You can’t make this stuff up!) Because of the unscientific and unreliable nature of this data, the EEOC was soundly rebuffed in the federal district court in Ohio where it brought its case.

Now before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the EEOC is continuing its awkward crusade against employers’ use of credit checks. Cato, joining the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Center for Equal Opportunity, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Project 21, has filed a brief supporting Kaplan and arguing that the EEOC’s use of “race raters” and its incautious application of disparate-impact theory violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.

Classifying people into racial categories based on their name and physical features is a demeaning violation of the Constitution’s mandate that individuals be treated as individuals and not reduced to mere members of a racial class. We also argue that the EEOC’s irresponsible use of disparate-impact theory to attack reasonable business practices contradicts the spirit of equal protection by forcing employers to consider race for all of their business-related decisions in order to avoid bureaucratic entanglement.

When combined with the ongoing Fisher v. UT-Austin saga, we see that while Jim Crow is dead, various government actors continue to offer massive resistance to the ideal of a colorblind society.

Obama Administration Ignores Supreme Court, Encourages Racial Preferences

Two months ago I wrote about the University of Texas’s attempts to delay the final reckoning from the Supreme Court’s near-unanimous ruling in the Fisher case that public institutions must overcome a high constitutional bar when they use race in admissions decisions. Courts must make “a careful judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.”

“The university must prove,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the 7-justice majority, “that the means chosen by the university to attain diversity are narrowly tailored.” Far from attempting to prove that, however, UT-Austin is playing lawyer games and trying to re-litigate previously decided procedural issues.

But at least UT-Austin recognizes that its back is against the wall. The Obama administration, for its part, is pretending that nothing has changed, that colleges can continue discriminating based on skin color to achieve their elusive “diversity.”

On Friday, the federal Justice and Education Departments issued a joint “guidance” on the meaning of Fisher v. UT-Austin. This advice, consisting of a platitudinal cover letter and a superficial Q & A. The government’s position, remarkably, is that Fisher simply reaffirmed 2003’s ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, which held that educational diversity could be a compelling interest that justified racial preferences at the University of Michigan. “Run along, nothing to see here,” the various civil-rights-division bureaucrats seem to say, “the Supreme Court just vacated the lower court’s decision because it didn’t check all the procedural boxes.

To say that the government is being disingenuous here would be like saying that Ted Cruz has a mild distaste for Obamacare. As Richard Kahlenberg comments at the blog of The Chronicle of Higher Education:

This reading of the two Supreme Court cases as essentially identical would presumably be surprising to the justices of the court. Five Supreme Court justices participated in both Grutter and Fisher, yet four of them switched sides in the two cases. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas dissented in Grutter, in part because universities were not made to demonstrate that race-neutral strategies were insufficient to produce racial diversity, yet those justices were in the majority in Fisher.

Meanwhile, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg switched in the other direction, from the majority in Grutter to the dissent in Fisher. Her dissent complained that the majority would push universities to adopt race-neutral strategies like Texas’ top 10-percent plan, which she viewed as disingenuous. (Justice Stephen G. Breyer, alone, was in the majority in both cases.)

Moreover, the government is green-lighting any and all diversity initiatives rather than giving actual guidance about how to survive the legal minefield that administrators now inhabit. As Roger Clegg put it at National Review Online:

The fact is that this guidance is designed not to help schools follow the law, but to push them to adopt dubious race-based policies that the Supreme Court has warned against, and that have prompted lawsuits in the past, but that the Obama administration and its political allies stubbornly support. The whole tone of the new guidance is to offer encouragement to schools that want to engage in racial and ethnic discrimination: The administration promises that it “will continue to be a resource” for such schools.

It is as if the FBI offered eager encouragement to state and local police that wanted to engage in racial profiling without violating the law. Whether such discrimination may sometimes be legally permissible or not, why should the federal government issue a document the tone of which is not a stern warning about the many legal pitfalls, but cheerful encouragement to the police to do as much of it as they can get away with? Why urge schools to get as close to the legal line as they can, when it is unnecessary and bad policy for them to approach it at all?

In short, the government not only pretends that the Supreme Court didn’t mean what it said, but is encouraging college officials in their massive resistance to yet another Supreme Court ruling on civil rights. These actions enable the type of “holistic” racial balancing that results in greater racial-achievement gaps than illegal quotas ever did. Racial preferences today, racial preferences tomorrow, racial preferences forever.

It would be comical if it weren’t so sad – and if it weren’t backed by the full force of the nation’s chief law enforcement officers.

Defending the Right to Public Presence

The essential distinction between “private” and “public” property is the egalitarian nature of the latter. There’s no true equality in private property: its owners are free to set whatever restrictions on its use they wish.

On the other hand, public property, especially public fora such as sidewalks, parks, and roads—which have traditionally been available for public speeches, protests, and rallies—is entirely different. Just as we’re all equal in a court of law, or at the ballot box, we’re all supposed to be equal in our freedom to use and enjoy public spaces.

In 2008, however, Massachusetts turned this understanding on its head, declaring that in certain public spaces, some people are more equal than others. The state passed a law making it a crime to physically come within 35 feet of abortion clinics unless you’re a clinic patient, staff member, or government agent, or are using a public road or sidewalk to travel past the clinic. By the state’s own admission, the law was designed to prevent anti-abortion advocates from engaging in “sidewalk counseling.”

When a group of peaceful anti-abortion advocates challenged the law as a violation of their free speech rights, the district and circuit courts accepted the state’s argument that the law was valid as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner in which the public may engage in free speech. The Supreme Court has now taken up the case, and the petitioners argue that a law designed to target one type of speech, in one type of location, cannot be considered content- or viewpoint-neutral.

While this is indeed an important test-case for the First Amendment, Cato filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners to present a separate point. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental rights against government infringement: rights that are essential to the enjoyment of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, or that are part of the meaning of “ordered liberty,” or that are part of America’s history and traditions.Regardless of your preferred formulation for these protected rights, we argue that one of them is the right to public presence: the right to peacefully use public property in any manner that doesn’t harm others or unreasonably restrict their freedom to use that same public space.

You Shouldn’t Have to Ask Your Competitors for Permission to Start a Business

Occupational licensing laws make it harder and more expensive for people to get jobs or to create innovative businesses that might not fit into to conceptual box designed by last generation’s regulators. Worse, while these laws are supposed to be about protecting consumers against dangerous or inept practitioners, they’re often exploited by existing businesses to bar newcomers from competing against them.

But these problems are nothing compared to “Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity” laws, also called “Certificate of Need” or CON laws. Unlike typical licensing rules, CON laws don’t have anything to do with whether a person is educated or qualified. Instead, they prohibit you from going into business unless you first prove to bureaucrats that a new business is “needed.” And these laws rarely define “need,” or explain how to prove it. Still worse, such laws usually allow existing firms to block a newcomer from staring a competing business. In short, CON laws bar you from going into business until you get permission from your own competitors. (It sounds like something from an Ayn Rand novel, right?)

Last week, Cato adjunct scholar Timothy Sandefur and his colleagues at the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a motion with a federal judge in Kentucky asking the court to strike down that state’s CON law for moving companies. The details are here, and they’re telling.

There have been 39 applications for new moving licenses since 2007. Those that were not “protested” by existing moving companies were approved without incident. But in 19 cases,  existing firms did object. And in all of those cases, one of two things happened: either the applicant gave up and abandoned the application, or the government denied it on the grounds that existing moving services were “adequate.” The state never approved an application that was protested by existing firms, no matter what. In one case, an applicant who’d been working for moving companies for 39 years was denied a license in a decision that declared him fully qualified–but said existing companies didn’t need the competition. No wonder Sandefur calls the law “the Competitor’s Veto.”

Requiring Equal Protection Doesn’t Violate the Equal Protection Clause

It’s unusual that the Supreme Court would choose to review an affirmative action case even though Fisher v. UT-Austin was still pending. Ordinarily, when faced with a second case on the same legal issue, the justices “hold” it until they decide the first, then either send the second one back to the lower court to apply the newly announced rule or, perhaps, schedule it for oral argument on any additional issues that need to be addressed. Yet Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action is no ordinary case. 

Schuette asks whether a ban on racial preferences — or at least how that ban was enacted — violates the Equal Protection Clause, whereas Fisher asked whether their use does. In Schuette, 58% of Michigan voters approved Proposal 2 (a.k.a. the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative), a state constitutional amendment that prohibited racial preferences in public education, employment, or contracting. That ban was challenged by a coalition of groups and individuals who support the continued use of affirmative action, particularly at institutions of higher education.

A federal district court upheld the ban, but then a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck it down by a 2-1 vote. The full Sixth Circuit then agreed that Prop 2 was unconstitutional, in a contentious 8-7 ruling that produced five separate dissenting opinions. Now before the Supreme Court, Cato has joined the Pacific Legal Foundation and four other organizations on an amicus brief arguing that Michigan voters have acted constitutionally by prohibiting race- and sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in public university admissions.

We contend that Prop 2 doesn’t violate the Equal Protection Clause under the Court’s “political structure” precedent, which outlaws subtle distortions of governmental processes in a way that places special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation. The measures struck down in under that line of precedent differ marked from Prop 2 because, unlike in those older cases, minorities now have more protections against discrimination. Moreover, these protections apply across all levels of state government, not just discrete functions like housing and school busing.

Furthermore, Prop 2 creates no racial classifications so it cannot trigger “strict scrutiny” review. The simple fact that Prop 2 deals with race does not imply that it somehow disenfranchises racial minorities. If the Court finds that the “political structure” doctrine prohibits Prop 2, that precedent must be overruled as inconsistent with the text of the U.S. Constitution — though this is probably unnecessary given more modern precedent.

Interestingly, the California Civil Rights Initiative, known as Proposition 209, has been upheld repeatedly by the (notoriously left-wing) Ninth Circuit. Indeed, there is a wealth of evidence showing that minorities are succeeding under that system, which also prohibits the consideration of skin color in college admissions — and has led to higher attendance and graduation rates.

We urge the Supreme Court to side with Michigan’s voters and hold their ban on racial preferences (which the Court itself has admitted to be on shaky constitutional ground) to be constitutional.

The Court will hear the Schuette case in October or November.

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