Tag: First Amendment

Corporations Aren’t People But They Are (Legal) Persons

Recently, activist and filmmaker Annie Leonard released a video titled “The Story of Citizens United v. FEC,” an eight-and-a-half-minute criticism of last year’s Supreme Court case of the same name.

Well, sort of.

Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Lee Doren made his own video critique in response to Ms. Leonard’s offering, and points out quite clearly that Ms. Leonard doesn’t really deal with any actual constitutional problems in her position—essentially ignoring the decision and its rationale—and instead spends most of her time corporation bashing.

Lee was kind enough to cite, inter alia, a blogpost I wrote last year about what “corporate personhood” does and does not mean. If Ms. Leonard was going to ignore the decision, it may have at least served her well to read that post before producing her video. As I pointed out, under the logic she puts forth, “individuals acting through corporations should be denied their freedom of speech because corporations are ‘state-created entities.’ The theory goes that if a state has the power to create corporations, then it has the power to define those entities’ rights.” Ms Leonard’s video was made by (or coordination with) Free Range Studios—a corporation—and thus she’s making the argument that Congress should be able to keep her from or punish her for making that video because Free Range Studios shouldn’t have rights.

Despite the misinformation in Ms. Leonard’s video, we believe she and Free Range Studios have every right to be wrong as publicly as they see fit, even if she doesn’t.

Please watch Lee’s full video below, and look for the Cato shout-out around the 12:20 mark. If you’re in the Chicagoland area, I’ll be speaking about corporate rights and corporate personhood at John Marshall Law School tomorrow at 10:15AM local time. Feel free to stop by and please introduce yourself. 


Defending the Undefendable

Freedom requires tolerance. That principle will be put to the test today as Americans respond to the Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Phelps.

As Ilya Shapiro first noted below, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court, with a thoughtful dissent by Justice Samuel Alito, upheld the right of Rev. Fred Phelps and members of the Westboro Baptist Church to picket at military funerals, carrying signs that read “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “America is Doomed,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “You’re Going to Hell.” It is a mark of our liberty that in most cases we defend even the most despicable speech. And in that we stand in stark contrast to much of the world.

In truth, we should also defend most (but not all) despicable actions — short of those that violate the rights of others. But at least we defend speech, even though the line between speech and action is not always clear. But here, the Court set forth the issues carefully and correctly, examining the content, form, and context of the speech as revealed by the whole record — none of which is to say that governments cannot regulate the time, place, and manner of speech under content-neutral provisions. But as Chief Justice Roberts concluded, “As a Nation we have chosen … to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”

By contrast, just today the New York Times reports that Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian member of Pakistan’s cabinet, was shot dead as he left his home this morning. His sin? He opposed Pakistan’s blasphemy law, despite threats to his life by Islamist extremists. And only two months ago the governor of Pakistan’s Punjab province, Salman Taseer, was shot and killed by one of his guards for speaking out in defense of a Christian woman sentenced to death under Pakistan’s blasphemy law. Tolerance is all too rare around the world, but it is the foundation of liberty. We’re fortunate to live in a nation whose Founders implanted that principle in our Constitution.

Love the Right to Free Speech, Hate the Speaker

As I predicted after oral argument last October, today the Court ruled 8-1 (Alito dissenting) in favor of free speech at the expense of giving a legal victory to a repugnant group.  While the Westboro Baptist Church hates what they view as both the sinner and the sin, the Court properly rebuked the Phelpses while correctly expressing utmost devotion to their right to propagate their wayward message.

Stepping aside from the emotions and bizarre facts, this case implicates all sorts of legal issues aside from the First Amendment.  A private cemetery can and should remove unwanted visitors for trespassing — but the Phelpses didn’t enter the cemetery.  A town can pass ordinances restricting the time, place, and manner of protests — but the Phelpses stayed within all applicable regulations and followed police instructions.  Violent or aggressive protestors can be both prosecuted and sued for assault, harassment, and the like — but the Phelpses’ protests did not involve “getting up in the grill” of people, as their lawyer put it during oral argument. 

As the brevity of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion confirms, there’s very little to this case and the Phelpses’ actions, ugly and objectionable as they are, are as constitutionally protected as a neo-Nazi parade.  If people don’t like that, they can change state laws to put certain further restrictions on protests near funerals or other sensitive areas — or federal laws in the case of military cemeteries — but they shouldn’t be able to sue simply for being offended. 

See also Josh Blackman’s parsing of the opinion’s highlights.

When Should Courts Overturn Precedent?

Cato legal associate Nick Mosvick and I explain that Citizens United overturned one 20-year-old court decision in the name of restoring an older tradition upholding First Amendment rights, in a new article about to be published in the (Chapman University Law School) Nexus Journal of Law & Public Policy

Here’s the abstract:

Stare decisis is an important doctrine with deep roots in the common law. It “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Indeed, our interest in the law’s stability and predictability, and the reliance interests produced by judicial decisions, sometimes dictate that incorrect legal rulings be maintained — because the social disruptions from correction outweigh the benefits of reaching better decisions.

Still, stare decisis is neither an “inexorable command,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003), nor a “mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). Instead it is a prudential policy, one in which courts have to decide, based on factors such as the correctness, antiquity, and workability of the legal regime a precedent created, whether to overturn their earlier rulings. As Chief Justice Roberts put it in his Citizens United concurrence, “abrogating the errant precedent, rather than reaffirming or extending it, might better preserve the law’s coherence and curtail the precedent’s disruptive effects.” 130 S. Ct. 876, 921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

And so the Court in Citizens United found that both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), that relied on it were not worthy of preservation. They created an arbitrary and increasingly irrational campaign finance system that was an aberration of restrictions in a sea of protections for political speech.

Moreover, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan abandoned Austin’s speech-equality rationale during oral argument, undercutting any possible reliance interests. Only by overturning precedent could the Court contribute to the stable and orderly development of the law. This article will explain the role stare decisis played in Citizens United and build on the Chief Justice’s concurrence to describe the current state of the doctrine.

Thanks to Larry Solum for featuring us on his Legal Theory Blog.

R.I.P. Bill Monroe, a First Amendment Champion

Bill Monroe, who was moderator for NBC’s Meet the Press for about 10 years, has died at 90. The Washington Post does a fine job with his long career, from his pro-civil-rights journalism in Lousiana in the 1950s to his years with NBC and Meet the Press.  

I want to draw attention to his longtime advocacy of extending the First Amendment to broadcasting. Actually, I’m sure he thought that the First Amendment did cover all forms of the news media — but he knew that Congress and the courts didn’t see it that way, so he wanted an explicit amendment to make that clear. Because his articles on this topic were published in the pre-Internet Dark Ages (yes, children, there are great ideas not online), I can’t link to any of them. 

He spoke at the Cato Institute in 1984 on the topic:

The First Amendment sets up a clear-cut independence of press from government as the journalistic principle most vital to the American people.  But the existing regulatory approach to broadcasting offers exactly the opposite formula:  government guidance and government rules to protect the American people from independent journalism. The First Amendment idea and the regulation idea are mortal enemies.

And in 2007 he briefly reprised the argument in the letters column of the Washington Post, concluding:

Broadcasters are also open to government pressure through the Federal Communications Commission, whose members are appointed by the president. Newspapers are specifically protected against government interference by the granite wall known as the First Amendment.

When the present form of broadcast regulation was set up early in the previous century, nobody understood what powerful instruments of news and information would evolve from the primitive radio stations of that day. Now that we do understand it, we can repair that historic mistake. We can extend the clear, stirring language of the First Amendment to equal protection for freedom of the electronic media. The problem of allocating broadcast licenses does not have to cost the American people the benefit of free broadcasting.

R.I.P.

A Year After Citizens United, Campaign Finance Back at the Court

As Caleb noted earlier, today marks the one-year anniversary of Citizens United, a case I first thought ”just” concerned some weird regulation of pay-per-view movies, but turned out to be about asserted government power to ban political speech — including books and TV commercials — simply because the speaker was not one individual but a group (in corporate or or other associational form).  See also this op-ed by ACLU lawyer Joel Gora.

Roger similarly noted the continuing discussion in Congress and elsewhere about the public financing of elections.  As it turns out, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a challenge to such a system, specifically Arizona’s Clean Elections Act.  Brought by our friends at the Institute for Justice and the Goldwater Institute and supported by our brief at the cert petition stage, this lawsuit challenges a law that aimed to “clean up” state politics by creating a system for publicly funding campaigns.

Participation in the public funding is not mandatory, however, and those who do not participate are subject to rules that match their “excess” private funds with disbursals to their opponent from the public fund. That is, if a privately funded candidate spends more than her publicly funded opponent, then the publicly funded candidate receives public “matching funds.”

Whatever the motivations behind the Clean Elections Act, the effects have been to significantly chill political speech: privately funded candidates changed their spending — and thus their speaking — as a result of the matching funds provisions. In elections, where there is no effective speech without spending money, matching funds provisions such as those at issue here diminish the quality and quantity of political speech.

In 2008, however, the Supreme Court struck down a similar part of the federal McCain-Feingold law in which individually wealthy candidates were penalized for spending their own money by triggering increased contribution limits for their opponents (Davis v. FEC, in which Cato also filed a brief). Even this modest opportunity for opponents to raise more money was found to be an unconstitutional burden on political speech.

Cato’s latest brief thus asks the following question: Whether Arizona may give a publicly funded candidate extra money because a privately funded opponent or his supporters have, in the state’s judgment, spoken too much. We highlight Davis and numerous other cases that point to a clear answer: if the mere possibility of your opponent getting more money is unconstitutional, then the guarantee that your opponent will get more money is even more so. Allowing the government to abridge political speech in this fashion not only diminishes the quality of political debate, but ignores the fundamental principle upon which the First Amendment is premised: that the government cannot be trusted to regulate political speech for the public benefit. Moreover, the state cannot condition the exercise of the right to speak on the promotion of a viewpoint contrary to the speaker’s.

The case is McComish v. Bennett, consolidated with Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.  The Court will hear it March 28, with a decision expected by the end of June.

Citizens United Turns One

The Supreme Court majority in Citizens United asserted plainly that the federal government’s powers are few and defined in the realm of political speech. The decision has since been cast as one that does little more than give “corporations and unions the freedom to spend as much as they like to support or attack candidates.” Of course, the stakes were far higher. As the government’s attorney asserted during the initial oral argument, the Federal Election Commission retained the authority to ban the sale of certain books (e-books included) in the weeks leading up to an election, a fact opponents of Citizens United rarely mention.

Shortly after that oral argument, Austin Bragg and I made a short video with Steve Simpson of the Institute for Justice, Allison Hayward of George Mason University School of Law (and now of the Center for Competitive Politics) and John Samples, director of the Center for Representative Government at the Cato Institute.