Tag: Federal Reserve

New Paper: Would a Stricter Fed Policy and Financial Regulation Have Averted the Financial Crisis?

Many commentators have argued that if the Federal Reserve had followed a stricter monetary policy earlier this decade when the housing bubble was forming, and if Congress had not deregulated banking but had imposed tighter financial standards, the housing boom and bust—and the subsequent financial crisis and recession—would have been averted.

In a new study, Cato scholars Jagadeesh Gokhale and Peter Van Doren investigate those claims and dispute them.

CAP’s Proposal to Add ‘Public Members’ to Corporate Boards Is Flawed

Today the Center for American Progress rolled out its proposal that we add “public directors” to the boards of companies that have been bailed out by the government.  CAP scholar Emma Coleman Jordan argues that “public directors will provide a corrective to the boards of the financial institutions that helped cause the crisis.”

One has to wonder whether Ms. Jordan has ever heard of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  If she had, she might recall that a substantial number of the board members of Fannie and Freddie were so-called “public” members appointed by the President.  Perhaps she can ask CAP adjunct scholar and former Fannie Mae executive Ellen Seidman to review the history of those companies for her.

Where’s the evidence that any of those Fannie/Freddie “public” directors, whether they were appointed by Republican or Democrat Presidents, ever once look out for the public interest?  In fact all the evidence points to these public directors looking out for the interests of Fannie and Freddie, often lobbying Congress and the Administration on the behalf of these companies.

I suppose CAP would tell us that having the regulators pick the directors instead of the president would protect us from having those positions filled with political hacks.  Ms. Jordan argues that “regulators should determine most of the details of the public directorships—after all, they have the most direct experience in trying to regulate private companies that have received public funds.”  We tried that route as well.  In contrast to Fannie/Freddie, each of the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks had to have a number of its directors appointed by its then regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Board.  It was well known within the Beltway that these appointments were more often political hacks than not.  For instance one long time director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh was the son of a senior member of the US House Committee on Finance Services.  Once again we’ve gone down this road, we know how this story ends.

If we are truly interested in protecting the taxpayer, we should, first, end the ability of the Federal Reserve to bailout companies, and second, as quickly as possible remove any government involvement in these companies.  Having the government appoint board directors only further entangles the government into our financial system; and if Fannie and Freddie are a good guide, actually increases the chances of future bailouts.

Reform Needed, but Obama Plan Would Result in More Financial Crises, not Less

Today President Obama took his financial reform plan to the airwaves.  While there is no doubt our financial system is in need of financial reform, the President’s plan would make bailouts a permanent feature of the regulatory landscape.  Rather than ending “too big to fail” – the President wants us to believe that with additional discretion and power, the same Federal Reserve that missed the boat last time will save us next time.

The truth is that the President’s plan will result in a small number of companies being viewed by debtholders as “too big to fail”.  These companies would see their funding costs decline, allowing them to gain market-share at the expense of their rivals, making these firms even larger.  Greater concentration in our financial services industry is the last thing we need, yet the Obama plan all but guarantees it.

Obama also chooses myth’s over facts.  The President claims that de-regulation and competition among regulators caused the crisis.  The facts could not be more different.  Those institutions at the center of the crisis – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, Lehman –could not choose their regulator.

The President’s plan chooses convenient targets and protects entrenched interests, rather than address the true underlying causes of the crisis.  At no time have we heard the President discuss the expansionary monetary policies that helped fuel the bubble.  Nor has the President talked about the global imbalances – the global savings glut that poured surplus savings from the rest of the world into the US.  But then the President appears to hope that loose monetary policy and continued American consumption funded by China will get him out of his own political problems with the economy.  It is especially striking that the President makes little mention of the housing bubble, as if it was only the bust that was the problem.

The President continues to say he inherited this crisis.  While true, he did not inherit the same individuals – Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke – who were at the center of creating the crisis.  All Obama needs to do is find a position for Hank Paulson and he will have completely re-assembled the Bush financial team.

Without real reform – fixing Fannie and Freddie, scaling back the massive subsidies for leverage in our tax code, loose monetary policy – it will only be a matter of time before the next crisis hits.  If we implement the President’s plan, we will, however, guarantee that the next crisis will be even larger and severe than the current one.

No, the Fed Did Not Stabilize the Economy

Commenting on a recent article of mine in The Wall Street Journal, Peter Gartside claims that:

Prior to 1913, the U.S. annual gross domestic product changes oscillated between extremes of approximately plus or minus 15%.   After the establishment of the Federal Reserve Board, the limits of GDP oscillations narrowed to approximately plus or minus 6%.

You may well wonder where he got that idea, since there are no official estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) for years before 1929.  In the early 1960s, however, John Kendrick and Simon Kuznets bravely attempted to construct such estimates for gross national product (GNP).  That would be close enough to modern GDP data were it not for the primitive statistics and technology they had to work with.

The table (after the jump) shows these heroic old estimates for real GNP from 1889 to 1914.  In that period, there was only one year (1908) in which the drop in GNP exceeded 6% and none that remotely approaches the  “minus 15%” figure of Mr. Garstide’s imagination.

Real GNP
billions of 1958$

1889    49.1
1890    52.7
1891    55.1
1892    60.4
1893    57.5
1894    55.9
1895    62.6
1896    61.3
1897    67.1
1898    68.6
1899    74.8
1900    76.9
1901    85.7
1902    86.5
1903    90.8
1904    89.7
1905    96.3
1906    107.5
1907    109.2
1908    100.2
1909    116.8
1910    120.1
1911    123.2
1912    130.2
1913    131.4
1914    125.6

Historical Statistics of the U.S., Series F4

CEA chair Christina Romer’s research shows that these early estimates “exaggerate the size of cycles because they are based on the assumption that GNP moves approximately one for one with commodity output valued in producer prices.” If we tried to estimate recent GDP figures on the basis of commodity output and prices, then postwar cycles would look even wilder than they already do.  Consider, for example, using the recent gyrations in producer prices of oil and metals as a proxy for GNP.

Even if we relied on the ancient and flawed pre-Romer GNP estimates above, however, there were still no downturns before 1913 that were nearly as extreme as 1929-33 or even 1920-21.  And there was no recession between the 1870s and 1913 that lasted as long as the slump of 2008-2009.

Whether we’re talking about fiscal or monetary fine-tuning, all the technocrats efforts at taming the business cycle in the past 40 years appear no more successful than the pre-Fed policies of doing without a central bank and doing without deferred tax increases (debt-financed “fiscal stimulus” plans).

Embracing Bushonomics, Obama Re-appoints Bernanke

bernanke1In re-appointing Bernanke to another four year term as Fed chairman, President Obama completes his embrace of bailouts, easy money and deficits as the defining characteristics of his economic agenda.

Bernanke, along with Secretary Geithner (then New York Fed president) were the prime movers behind the bailouts of AIG and Bear Stearns. Rather than “saving capitalism,” these bailouts only spread panic at considerable cost to the taxpayer. As evidenced in his “financial reform” proposal, Obama does not see bailouts as the problem, but instead believes an expanded Fed is the solution to all that is wrong with the financial sector. Bernanke also played a central role as the Fed governor most in favor of easy money in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble – a policy that directly contributed to the housing bubble. And rather than take steps to offset the “global savings glut” forcing down rates, Bernanke used it as a rationale for inaction.

Perhaps worse than Bush and Obama’s rewarding of failure in the private sector via bailouts is the continued rewarding of failure in the public sector. The actors at institutions such as the Federal Reserve bear considerable responsibility for the current state of the economy. Re-appointing Bernanke sends the worst possible message to both the American public and to government in general: not only will failure be tolerated, it will be rewarded.

Would Summers Be Any Worse than Bernanke?

As I have argued elsewhere, Bernanke’s record as both a Fed governor and Chair suggest we be better off with a new Fed Chair come January 2010, when Bernanke’s term as Chair expires. Outside of those who believe the bailouts have saved capitalism, two very reasonable arguments are put forth for keeping Bernanke at the helm:  1) in a time of crisis, the markets need certainty and dislike change; and 2) the alternatives, such as Larry Summers, would be worse.  Both these points have real merit, however I believe in both cases the pros of change outweigh the cons of staying the course with Bernanke.  I will save the “certainty” debate for another time, for now, let’s ask ourselves:  Would Summers really be any worse than Bernanke?

Before I make the case for Summers, I do want to make clear, President Obama, and the country, would best be served by a “Carter picks Volcker” type moment.  Go outside the Administration, go beyond the usual circle of easy-money, new Keynesians.  The Fed lacks creditability in two (at least two) important areas: bailouts and inflation.  And one doesn’t even need to go outside of the Federal Reserve System to find candidates.  Topping my list would be Jeff Lacker (Richmond Fed), Gary Stern (Minn Fed) and Charles Plosser (Philly Fed).  Any of these three know the workings of the Fed, have the respect of the Fed staff, and have taken strong positions on both “too big to fail” and easy money.  In the case of Gary Stern, it would seem especially appropriate, as his early warnings (see his 2004 book on bank bailouts) were largely ignored and dismissed.  If we want to reward and promote those who got it right, these guys are at the top of the list.

But let’s reasonably suppose that Obama wants someone close, someone he personally knows and will stick with tradition by picking a member of his own administration.  Without going into any detail, picking Romer would offer little substantial difference with keeping Bernanke.  The case for Summers is essentially that here is one instance where his enormous ego would be an asset.  One easily gets the sense that when Summers sits next to President Obama, Summers is thinking to himself just how lucky the President is to be sitting next to Larry Summers.  One can call Summers lots of things, starstruck is not one of them.  Given what we now need most in a Fed Chair is true independence, from especially the Administration but also from Congress, Summers is the only qualified economist close to the President who displays even the slightest streak of independent thinking.  Bernanke, in contrast, has endlessly pandered to the Administration and to Congressional Democrats.  Summers has been willing on occasion to actually defend the sanctity of contract (remember the debates over the AIG bonuses), a rarity on the Left, and more than Bernanke was willing to say.  

So forced to choose between Bernanke and Summers, the need for an independent Fed Chair willing to take on the Administration and Congress, when appropriate, makes Summers a far better choice.  That said, here’s to encouraging Obama go outside his comfort zone and pick someone who has the will to remove excess liquidity from the system before the next bubble gets going.

Gallup Poll: Federal Reserve Makes the IRS Look Good

A recent Gallup Poll surveyed the public’s impression of how various federal agencies were doing their job.  Of the agencies evaluated, on the bottom was the Federal Reserve Board.  Only 30 percent of the respondents rated the Fed’s performance as either excellent or good.  I can understand now why Chairman Bernanke felt the need to take his act on the road.  Even the IRS managed to get 40 percent of respondents to see its job performance as excellent or good. A majority of the public, 57 percent, sees the Fed’s current performance as either poor or fair.

The result is not just driven by a general public disdain for federal agencies; over a majority of respondents thought such agencies as the Center for Disease Control, NASA and the FBI were doing an excellent or good job.

Nor is the result driven by public ignorance or indifference to the Fed; only a few years ago, back in 2003, 53 percent of Americans said the Federal Reserve was doing an excellent or good job and only 5% called its job performance poor.  But then, the Fed was also giving us negative real interest rates at that time as well.  Perhaps there’s a good reason to insulate the Fed from short-term public and political pressures.  Let’s hope Chairman Bernanke does not read these results as an excuse for repeating the Fed’s 2003 monetary policies.