Tag: Federal Reserve

Thursday Links

  • Doug Bandow:  “Congress has spent the country blind, inflated a disastrous housing bubble, subsidized every special interest with a letterhead and lobbyist, and created a wasteful, incompetent bureaucracy that fills Washington. But now, legislators want to take a break from all their good work and save college football.”

Does CRA Undermine Bank Safety?

A recent policy forum here at Cato discussed the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the financial crisis.  While the forum focused on the federal push for ever expanding homeownership to marginal borrowers, the analysis did not touch directly upon the question of whether CRA lending undermines bank safety.

Fortunately this is a question that one economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas bothered to ask.  While his research findings were available before the crisis, they were clearly ignored.

In a peer-reviewed published article, appearing in the journal Economic Inquiry, economist Jeff Gunther concludes that there is “evidence to suggest that a greater focus on lending in low-income neighborhoods helps CRA ratings but comes at the expense of safety and soundness.”  Specifically he finds an inverse relationship between CRA ratings and safety/soundness, as measured by CAMEL ratings.

In another study Gunther finds that increases in bank capital are associated with an increase substandard CRA ratings.  Apparently bank CRA examiners prefer that capital to be lend out, rather than serve as a cushion in times of financial distress.

Given the current attempts in Washington to expand CRA, it seems some people never learn.  One can always argue over how CRA should work, but the evidence is quite clear how it has worked, once again proving: there’s no free lunch.

Remembering the Reporter Who Sued the Fed

With the Washington Post and other mainstream media outlets publishing endless defenses of “Federal Reserve independence” and proclaiming the Fed as savior of our financial system, it is all to easy to dismiss much of the media as simply defenders of the status quo.  There were many, however, willing to challenge this orthodoxy.  Standing out among them was Mark Pittman, reporter for Bloomberg.  It was Mr. Pittman who sued the Federal Reserve, winning a victory on August 24, as the Manhattan Federal Court allowed the suit to proceed.  Sadly, Mark Pittman passed away on November 25th. 

Mark Pittman and his employer, Bloomberg News, sought details on the Federal Reserve’s numerous special lending facilities.  Which firms were getting loans, and for how much and at what terms?  These were all details the American public were entitled to, yet were denied by the Federal Reserve.  We all remember the Fed’s warnings that if AIG counter-parties were named, there would be market disruptions.  Yet, after much public and Congressional pressure, those firms were named, with no adverse market consequences. 

While Mark Pittman’s efforts will be greatly missed, his suit continues, as does the efforts by Rep. Ron Paul and others in Congress, to bring transparency to the activities of the Federal Reserve.

Monday Links

  • Nancy Pelosi: “The power of Congress to regulate health care is essentially unlimited.”

A Plug for Financial Fiasco

The distinguished Harvard economist Richard N. Cooper, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, praises Johan Norberg’s Financial Fiasco: How America’s Infatuation With Homeownership and Easy Money Created the Economic Crisis in Foreign Affairs:

The economic crisis of 2008-9 will no doubt spawn dozens of books. Here are two good early ones….

Norberg, a knowledgeable Swede, provides a much more detailed account of the broader events of 2007-9, from the useful perspective of a non-American. He finds plenty of blame with all the major players in the U.S. financial system: politicians, who thoughtlessly pushed homeownership on thousands who could not afford it; mortgage loan originators, who relaxed credit standards; securitizers, who packaged poor-quality mortgage loans as though these were conventional loans; the Securities and Exchange Commission, which endowed the leading rating agencies with oligopoly powers; the rating agencies, which knowingly overrated securitized mortgages and their derivatives; and investors, who let the ratings substitute for due diligence. Senior management in large parts of the financial community lacked an attribute essential to any well-functioning financial market: integrity. But solutions, Norberg warns, do not lie in greater regulation or public ownership. Politicians and bureaucrats are not immune from the “short-termism” that plagues private firms.

The other book he praises, by the way, is Paul Krugman’s The Return of Depression Economics. And oddly, his list of Norberg’s villains doesn’t include one implied in the title: the Federal Reserve Bank, which issued the “easy money” that allowed the boom to happen. Purchase Financial Fiasco here or on Kindle.

The Fed and Policy Uncertainty

How and when should the Fed unwind the enormous monetary expansion it undertook in response to the financial crisis and recession? The WSJ reports [$]:

As the Federal Reserve’s next meeting approaches in early November, an internal debate is brewing about how and when to signal the possibility of interest-rate increases.

The Fed has said since March that it will keep rates very low for an “extended period.” Long before it raises rates, however, it will need to change that public signal to financial markets.

Because the recovery is so young and is expected to be so weak, many central bank officials are comfortable, for now, keeping rates very low. But they are beginning to strategize about how to walk away from the “extended period” language.

My suggestion is that the Fed announce a path of gradual increases in the federal funds rate, say beginning next year and lasting for two years, until the rate is at some “normal level.”

This approach is different than what the Fed is likely to undertake; it will probably want to maximize “discretion,” the ability to adjust on the fly as conditions unfold.

My approach maximizes predictability and reassurance: it commits the Fed to shrinking the money supply and heading off future inflation. This reassures markets and takes substantial uncertainty out of the picture.

The problem with my approach is the pre-commitment: everyone knows the Fed could abandon a pre-announced path.

But such an announcement might still give markets useful guidance, and the Fed would know that any deviation would itself upset markets, and this might encourage adherence to the pre-commitment.

C/P Libertarianism, from A to Z