Tag: fannie mae

ARMs as Automatic Stabilizers

By
Mark A. Calabria

An argument often heard for keeping Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or some sort of subsidy for mortgages, is the desire to keep the 30 year fixed rate mortgage “affordable.” The 30 year fixed certainly has some merits - which borrowers should be willing to pay for - but it also has the downside of reducing the impact of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy.

Generally interest rates go down in a recession and up in an expansion.  Part of this is the reaction of the Federal Reserve, which tends to cut rates in a recession, but part is also the fact that the demand for credit also declines in a recession and increases in an expansion.

If borrowers moved to adjustable rate mortgages, then in recessions they would likely see a reduction in their mortgage rate, resulting in a reduction in their monthly payment, which would increase their disposable income, which itself should have some positive impact on consumption, helping to stabilize a weak economy.

The reverse would work in an expansion.  If the economy became over-heated, interest rates would likely go up, pushing up monthly payments, resulting in reductions in income and consumption.  While of course this would be unpleasant for the borrower, it would have the benefit of moderating a booming economy, reducing the likelihood of inflation and the occurrence of bubbles.

The latter effect would also increase the degree to which consumers care about inflation and demand price stability from the central bank.  Normally, borrowers have an incentive to favor inflation, as it reduces the real value of their debt.  If however, inflation resulted in an increase in their mortgage rate, their preference could switch toward price stability, which would in the long run be better for growth and the overall economy.

While I do not expect the above to settle the debate over the role of the 30 year fixed rate mortgage, we, as a society, should openly and loudly debate its costs and benefits before we simply assume it needs to be subsidized.

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy

If Not Fannie, then Who?

By
Mark A. Calabria

A common defense offered for keeping Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or something like them, is that the market simply cannot absorb the same level of mortgage lending without them.  The central flaw in this argument is that Fannie and Freddie themselves must be funded by the market.  So if the financial markets can absorb X in GSE debt, then the financial markets can absorb X in mortgages.

Different market participants currently face different capital requirements for the same assets.  To some extent, Fannie and Freddie were a vehicle for shifting mortgage risk from higher capitalized institutions to less capitalized.  If the Obama administration and bank regulators are serious about closing “regulatory gaps” then all entities backed by the govt, implicit or otherwise, should hold the same capital against the same risks.  In the following I will thus assume that differences in capital requirements behind mortgages are irrelevant.

So to determine who could absorb the GSEs’ buying of mortgages, let’s look at who holds GSE debt.  Of the approximately $5 trillion in GSE debt and mortgage backed securities (MBS), about a trillion is held by commercial banks and thrifts.  Another trillion is held by insurance companies and pension funds.  Close to a trillion is held by mutual funds.  That quickly gets one to 3 trillion.  Households and state/local governments also hold close to a trillion.  That leaves us with about a trillion left, held mostly by foreign governments (usually central banks).  For this analysis, I am using data pre-Federal Reserve purchases of GSE debt/MBS.

Given that banks hold about a trillion in excess reserves and over 9 trillion in deposits, I think its fair to assume commercial banks could easily absorb another $1 trillion in mortgages, as represented by foreign holders.   Some holders of GSE debt are legally prohibited from holding mortgages.  These entities can generally hold bank commercial paper (think mutual funds) which could then fund the same level of mortgages.  

The point here should be clear, by swapping out GSE debt for mortgages, our financial markets have sufficient capacity to replace Fannie and Freddie.  In fact, we are the only advanced country that does not fund our mortgage market primarily or exclusively with bank deposits.  This analysis also does not assume any reduction in the size of our mortgage market, which should actually be an objective of reform.  We devote too much capital to mortgages, at the expense of more productive sectors of our economy.

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy

A Fannie Mae for Intrastructure?

By
Mark A. Calabria

Like President Bush before him, Obama has a knack for taking the worst ideas of his opponents and making them his own.  It is truly bipartisanship in the worst of ways (think Sarbanes-Oxley, the TARP or No Child Left Behind).  The newest example is the President’s proposed “infrastructure bank.”  A bill along those lines was introduced a few years ago by then Senator Hagel, although the idea is far from new.

First, let’s get out of the way the myth that we have been “under-funding” intrastructure.  Take the largest, and usually most popular, piece:  transportation.  Over the last decade, transportation spending at all levels of government has increased over 70 percent.  One can debate if that money has been spent wisely, but there’s no doubt we’ve been spending an ever-increasing amount on infrastructure - so there goes one rationale for an infrastructure bank.

The real rationale for an infrastructure bank is to transfer the risk of default away from investors, bankers and local/state governments onto the federal taxpayer, but to do so in such a manner that the taxpayer has no idea what they are on the hook for.

If there are truly great projects out there that will pay their own way, then they should have no trouble getting private funding.

Of course, we will be told that the bank will charge an interest rate sufficient to cover losses and that the taxpayer won’t be on the hook.  Again, if it is charging an appropriate rate, then why does the bank need to be chartered (and backed) by the taxpayer?  We’ve heard this story before…with Social Security, flood insurance, FHA, Fannie/Freddie…the list goes on, that all of these programs would pay their own way and never cost the taxpayer a dime.  If there are truly outstanding infrastructure needs, then appropriate the money and pay for them.  An infrastructure bank is just another way to allow Wall Street to line its pockets while leaving the risk with the taxpayer.  If bankers aren’t willing to actually take the risks, then why exactly do we need them?

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy

Mortgage Finance around the World

By
Mark A. Calabria

As the debate on the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac heats up, a useful exercise is to ask how does the U.S. system of mortgage finance compare to other countries, with the obvious caveat that there are a lot of differences to account for. 

A good place to start is a recent working paper by Michael Lea at San Diego State University.  The first observation from Dr. Lea’s paper is that several countries, with far less government involvement in the mortgage market, have comparable, if not higher, homeownership rates than the United States.  These countries include Australia, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and Canada.  He also found that countries with less government support of their rental markets also have higher ownership — not surprising since higher rental subsidies would discourage ownership.

Other differences:  the United States and Denmark are the only developed countries where the predominate type of mortgage is a long-term, fixed rate.  Most countries have variable rate or fixed rate for shorter periods. For instance in Germany, many mortgages offer a fixed term for 10 years, then either adjust or roll-over. 

The United States is also almost alone in having no prepayment penalties and no recourse.  Where a mortgage is recourse, the lender is not limited to collecting just on the house but can go after a borrowers’ income or other assets.  So apparently, in the rest of the World, a borrower is expected to pay his mortgage regardless of the value of his house.

In most other countries, even those with comparable homeownership rates, most funding for mortgages is via bank deposits.  That is surprising given how often I’ve heard it claimed that you can’t rely on just deposits to fund the mortgage system. Somehow the rest of the world manages to do so.

That’s just a few of the interesting comparisons in Lea’s paper.  It is an easy read and has some great charts and tables.

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy, Government and Politics, International Economics and Development

Krugman’s Fannie Mae Fantasyland

By
Mark A. Calabria

An insightful op-ed in yesterday’s Financial Times by Raghu Rajan (who will be presenting his latest book soon here at Cato), apparently was too much for Paul Krugman to bear.  What was Rajan’s great crime that so upset Krugman?  Rajan, correctly, pointed out that US policies, such as Fannie Mae and the Community Re-investment Act, were direct contributors to the financial crisis and that bankers shouldn’t be blamed for simply reacting to perverse government incentives.

Now Krugman cannot bear to see CRA and Fannie questioned.  He claims that Rajan is relying on some blind faith that has been disproven by all thinking people.  Krugman offers two points (his supposed “facts”) that prove Fannie Mae and CRA are innocent.

First, he argues that the bad lending was done not by banks covered by CRA, but by non-banks that were exempt from CRA.  Now in Krugman’s defense, there is a grain of truth to this.  For instance, up until its purchase of a thrift, Countrywide, the largest subprime player, was not covered by CRA.  However, comparing Countrywide to say Bank of America, which was covered by CRA, misses a crucial point:  these non-CRA lenders were selling their loans to Fannie and Freddie, who were getting housing goal credit for those loans.  For instance, 25% of Fannie’s whole loan purchases were from Countrywide.  So rather than, as Paul claims that CRA didn’t matter, what the comparison shows is that the GSE housing goals were more damaging than CRA.

Krugman tries to cover this base by claiming that Fannie and Freddie were “sidelined by Congress” during the worst years of the boom.  As someone who spent the boom years as staff on the Senate Banking Committee, I found that claim to be insane.  For every Senator Shelby who tried to sideline the GSE’s, there was 10 Senators Sarbanes, Dodd and Schumer who pushed the GSEs to do more.  Krugman needs to move past empty assertions and offer some, any, evidence that Congress sidelined Fannie and Freddie.

What evidence he does offer is to show that during the boom, the percent of the market that was securitized by Fannie/Freddie fell, while the percent securitized by the private-label market increased.  Krugman has that fact correct, yet he misses a critical point.  That increase in private-label securities was being funded/purchased by Fannie and Freddie.

As my chart illustrates, the more involved were Fannie and Freddie in purchasing subprime MBS, the more the subprime market grew.  During the bubble years, Fannie and Freddie were the largest single source of liquidity for the subprime market.  And the chart doesn’t even take into account all the subprime whole loans being purchased by the GSEs.

Sadly Krugman has his facts on CRA wrong as well.  I point the reader to Ed Pinto’s work in this area, as well as my post on CRA from a few months ago.

We have little hope of avoiding a future financial crisis if we do not undo all the perverse government incentives for irresponsible lending.  Krugman’s presentation of selective and misleading data only makes true and meaningful reform all the more difficult.

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy

George Will on Rand Paul

By
David Boaz

George Will, whose speech at the Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty Dinner can be heard here, writes today about Rand Paul’s victory in Kentucky:

Democrats and, not amazingly, many commentators say Republicans are the ones with the worries because they are nominating strange and extreme candidates. Their Exhibit A is Rand Paul, winner of Kentucky’s Republican primary for the U.S. Senate.

Well. It may seem strange for a Republican to have opposed, as Paul did, the invasion of Iraq. But in the eighth year of that war, many Kentuckians may think he was strangely prescient. To some it may seem extreme to say, as Paul does, that although the invasion of Afghanistan was proper, our current mission there is “murky.” But many Kentuckians may think this is an extreme understatement.

These critical commentators range from David Frum and Commentary to the Huffington Post – the entire spectrum of the welfare-warfare state. But as Will says, Paul’s opposition to the Iraq war is shared by 60 percent of Americans. And plenty of mud was thrown at Paul by his Republican opponents, and Republican voters had this reply:

(H/T: DailyPaul.com)

Will also notes the surprising support for Rep. Ron Paul’s book End the Fed from Arlo Guthrie, whose anti-bailout song “I’m Changing My Name to Fannie Mae, was celebrated here.

Topics: 
Government and Politics

SEC vs. Goldman Sachs: Legislation by Demonization

By
Alan Reynolds

The Obama administration thinks it has discovered the perfect formula to cram legislation through in a hurry:  Demonize some prominent firm within an industry you plan to redesign, and then pass a law that has nothing to do with the accusation against the demonized firm.  They did this with health insurance and now they’re trying it with finance.

With health insurance, the demon was Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of California, which Obama accused of raising premiums by “anywhere from 35 to 39 percent.” Why didn’t some curious reporter interview a single person who actually paid 39% more, or quote from a letter announcing such an increase?  Because it didn’t happen.  Insurance premiums are regulated by the states, and California wouldn’t approve such a boost.  Yet the media’s uncritical outrage over that 39% rumor helped to enact an intrusive, redistributive health bill that has nothing to do with health insurance premiums (which remain regulated by the states).

Today, the new demon de jour is Goldman Sachs, a handy scapegoat to promote hasty financial rejiggering schemes  The SEC’s suspiciously-timed civil suit against Goldman looks as flimsy as the last month’s health insurance story.  It also looks unlikely to win in court.

As Washington Post columnist Sebastian Mallaby explains, “This is a non-scandal. The securities in question, so-called synthetic collateralized debt obligations, cannot exist unless somebody is betting that they will lose value.”  In such a zero-sum contest, big investors who went long knew perfectly well that other investors had to be taking the other side of the bet.  Goldman lost $90 million by betting this CDO would go up; John Paulson went short.

Columnists have moralized about the unfairness of the short investor (Paulson) negotiating the terms of this deal with a long investor, ACA Management, which had the last word. This too, notes Mallaby, “is another non-scandal.  An investor who wants to bet against a bundle of mortgages is entitled to suggest what should go into the bundle. The buyer is equally entitled to make counter-suggestions.  As the SEC’s complaint states clearly, the lead buyer in this deal, a boutique called ACA that specialized in mortgage securities, did precisely that.”

Like the earlier fuming about Anthem California, this new SEC publicity stunt is likewise irrelevant to the pending legislation.  Congress hopes to get standardized derivatives traded on an exchange. But synthetic collateralized debt obligations dealing with a customized bundle of securities could not possibly be traded on an exchange, and would therefore be untouched by reform.

Losses sustained by a few financial speculators on one exotic derivative had nothing to do with starting a global recession in December 2007 or the related financial crisis of September 2008. The core of the latter crisis was mortgage-backed securities per se, yet Goldman was only the 12th largest private MBS issuer in 2007.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were and are the biggest risk; any reform that excludes them is a fraud.

The SEC’s dubious civil suit against Goldman is a wasteful diversion at best. It has nothing to do with the Obama administration’s suicidal impulse to impose more tough regulations and taxes on banks to encourage them to lend more.

[Cross-posted at NRO’s The Corner]

Topics: 
Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy, Law and Civil Liberties, Regulatory Studies

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