Tag: egyptian military

Egypt’s Shambolic Constitutional Process

Don’t let yourself be fooled by the overwhelming approval of the new Egyptian constitution in the referendum held earlier this week. While, according to preliminary results, the vast majority of roughly 37 percent of Egyptians who showed up at the polls backed the proposal, very little about the document itself or about the process through which it has come about is consistent with the idea of liberal democracy and limited government. Yesterday’s Bloomberg View editorial summarizes all one needs to know about the new constitution:

The armed forces would for at least the next eight years be independent of civilian control, including over their budget, as they were under former President Hosni Mubarak, himself an air force commander. Military courts would remain autonomous and would have jurisdiction over civilians in many instances. The hated police would also get greater independence, while the Supreme Court would be able to decide its size and membership for itself.

Neither should there be any illusions about the events leading to the adoption of the document. The referendum followed months of a deliberate crackdown on the opposition and disbanding of the largest political force in the country – not to speak of the arrests of activists of the ‘no’ campaign.

In short, Egypt seems to be coming full circle to where it was before the events of the Arab Spring, particularly if General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announces his candidature for the country’s highest office. The question is how long the Egyptians are willing to put up with it.

As a side note, the constitutional process in Tunisia looks much more encouraging, although as Emmanuel Martin and I argue here, the new constitution is unlikely to be a an impetus for the badly needed economic reforms.

Nothing New on the Egyptian Front?

Four months after the military takeover in Egypt, the country’s economy is still a train wreck. With growth well below government forecasts, the budget deficit in 2013/2014 may get to 15 percent of GDP, bringing Egypt into truly dangerous territory, unless the inflow of aid from the Gulf countries continues indefinitely. And instead of reforms, there are discussions of a new stimulus plan, worth $3.6 billion.

Nor are there many reasons for optimism in the political arena. Mohamed Morsi appeared in court on Monday, charged with inciting violence and murder. If convicted, he can face the death penalty. Unsurprisingly, the trial, alongside with the ongoing crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, has fostered further violent protests in Cairo.

However, if instead of following the news, one listened to U.S. officials, one could not avoid the impression that everything is going swimmingly. Today’s Washington Post has a brilliant editorial describing the state of denial in the administration:

Not surprisingly, a Freedom House report released Monday concludes that “there has been virtually no substantive progress toward democracy … since the July 3 coup,” despite the military regime’s supposed “road map.” But that’s not how Secretary of State John F. Kerry sees it. “The road map is being carried out to the best of our perception,” he pronounced during a quick trip to Cairo on Sunday. A liberal constitution and elections? “All of that is, in fact, moving down the road map in the direction that everybody has been hoping for.”

Suspending Egypt’s Military Aid: Too Little, Too Late

Three months since the military coup in Egypt, U.S. military aid to the country is being reconsidered. It appears that the administration will

withhold the delivery of several big-ticket items, including Apache attack helicopters, Harpoon missiles, M1-A1 tank parts and F-16 warplanes, as well as $260 million for the general Egyptian budget.

The details of the freeze have not been disclosed. But after its refusal to call the events in Egypt a coup and a half-hearted cancellation of joint military exercises scheduled for September, this is certainly a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, it is too small and too equivocal as the administration is stressing that it wants to keep a door open to restore the aid in its entirety. More importantly, the announcement comes too late to make a meaningful difference to Egyptians.

Why all the reluctance? For years, Americans were told that aid to Egypt was a mechanism that gave the U.S. government leverage over developments in the most populous Arab country. The only sense in which that has worked is that aid has helped to deeply entrench authoritarian rule in the country. Egypt’s military has slowly built an opaque economic empire and a network of patronage with very little accountability. And even if one believes that a strong military and an autocratic secular state is what it takes to save Egypt from becoming a theocracy, there is nothing for Americans to gain from being complicit in the process and in everything that might possibly go wrong.

Indeed, many things have already gone wrong. The bloody aftermath of the coup might be just a foretaste of more violence looming on the horizon. Following the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt has seen a rise in Islamic radicalization, especially in the Sinai. In the meantime, the secular government has shown itself no more capable of tackling the country’s numerous economic challenges than the thoroughly inept cabinet of Hisham Qandil. And as American money keeps flowing in, ordinary Egyptians will keep blaming the United States for the rebirth of the militarized authoritarian state in their country and for its ugly repercussions.

The Ban on Muslim Brotherhood Will Backfire

With today’s ruling by the ‘Cairo Court for Urgent Matters’, banning the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and ordering a confiscation of its assets by the government, the Egyptian regime is taking the crackdown against its political opponents to the next level. While it is unclear what the decision means for the future of the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, the government has committed itself to disbanding an organization which counts between 300,000 and 1 million members and which has been in existence since 1928.

That is unlikely to work. The Brotherhood was banned during Nasser’s presidency. In Syria, Brotherhood membership was a capital offence between 1980 and 2011. If anything, these and similar bans strengthened the organization’s narrative of victimhood and enabled it to reemerge strengthened and relying on broader popular support. In a recent paper, I show that the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of Arab Spring was foreseeable and resulted from the fact that the group had been actively involved in the provision of social services, particularly to poorer segments of the Egyptian population, and possessed a well-recognized brand name. Over time, this electoral advantage would have dissipated, particularly as the Brethren proved to be rather inept policymakers.

Alas, with the crackdown on the organization, the current leadership of the country seems to be determined to drive the organization underground and to radicalize it. At this moment, Alan Krueger’s characterization of terrorism sounds as an ominous warning of what is to come unless the Egyptian military relinquishes its grip to power:

[t]errorists and their organizations seek to make a political statement; terrorists arise when there are severe political grievances with no alternatives for pursing those grievances.

Egypt’s Vanishing Currency Black Markets

Despite escalating tensions between Egypt’s new military-backed government and supporters of ousted president Mohammed Morsi, there is at least one positive development coming out of the Land of the Nile. Yes, at long last, some semblance of stability appears to be returning to Egypt’s economy.

After the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the Egyptian economy took a turn for the worse. In particular, the Egyptian pound began to slide shortly after Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-backed government took power, sparking the development of a black market for foreign currency. The accompanying chart tells the tale: the official and black-market EGP/USD exchange rates began to diverge sharply in late 2012. In recent weeks, however, they have converged.

Recent currency auctions by the central bank, coupled with improved expectations about the country’s economic prospects, have begun to buoy the struggling pound. Indeed, the black-market exchange rate is now 7.13 EGP/USD, very close to the official rate of 7.00 EGP/USD. So, with Morsi, the black market appeared, and with the military’s re-entry, the black market has all but vanished.

The Egyptian stock market is echoing the confident sentiments displayed by the foreign exchange markets (see the accompanying chart). But, it remains to be seen if this newfound confidence in the Egyptian economy will be sustained.