Tag: dodd

The CAP-AEI Fannie Mae Food Fight

It’s probably never wise to inject oneself into the middle of a food fight, but since I think both sides actually have something right and something wrong, its been a worthwhile debate to follow.  That is the ongoing debate between Peter Wallison at the American Enterprise Institute and David Min at the Center for American Progress (at least we can all agree we love America) on the role of Fannie Mae (and Freddie Mac) in the financial crisis.  If you can’t guess, Peter says Fannie/Freddie caused the crisis, David says they didn’t.

David makes an interesting point, one I’ve actually argued, in his latest retort.  That is, this wasn’t exclusively a housing crisis/bubble.  Other sectors, like commercial real estate, boomed and then went bust; other countries, with different housing policies, also had bubbles.  True from what I can tell.  I will also add that the U.S. office market actually peaked and fell before the housing market, so we can safely say there wasn’t contagion from housing to other parts of the real estate market. 

But the problem with this argument, at least for David, is that it undercuts the Dodd-Frank Act, which he has regularly defended.  The implicit premise of Dodd-Frank is that predatory mortgage lending caused the crisis, so now we need Elizabeth Warren to save us from evil lenders.  But how does predatory lending explain the office market bubble?  Do we really believe that deals between sophisticated parties, poured over by lawyers, were driven by predatory lending practices?  Do we also believe that other countries were also plagued by bad mortgage brokers?  Again, I think David is right about the problem being beyond housing, but he can’t have it both ways.

What is the common factor driving bubbles in commercial real estate, housing, and foreign real estate markets?  Maybe interest rates.  This was a credit bubble after all.  Especially since the Fed basically sets interest rate policy for the world.  It is hard for me to believe that three years (2002–2004) of a negative real federal funds rate isn’t going to end badly.  This is what I think Peter misses, the critical role of the Federal Reserve in helping blow the bubble.  But Dodd-Frank does nothing to change this. 

Now there are a ton of things I think both still miss.  We could argue all day about what a subprime mortgage is.  I think the definitions used by Wallison (and Pinto) are reasonable.  There is also a degree, a large one, to which David and Peter are just talking past each other.  For instance, there is something special about the U.S. housing market that transfers much of the risk to the taxpayer.  In contrast, the bust in the office market didn’t leave the taxpayer to pick up the tab.  That has to count for something, unless one just doesn’t care about the taxpayer. 

There are a few other issues that make Fannie/Freddie uniquely important in the crisis, but I lack the space to go into them here. Instead, I’ll wrap up by saying that their role in the overnight repurchase (re-po) market is under-appreciated and their ability to essentially neuter the Fed was critical in keeping the bubble going.  What’s for dessert?

Exit Interview with Sheila Bair

Sunday’s New York Times Magazine has an interesting exit interview with Sheila Bair, who until this past Friday served as Chair of Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC). While I haven’t always been her biggest fan, I did find it refreshing to hear a bank regulator state the obvious:  we should have let Bear Stearns fail. As she puts it:

Bear Stearns was a second-tier investment bank, with — what? — around $400 billion in assets? I’m a traditionalist. Banks and bank-holding companies are in the safety net. That’s why they have deposit insurance. Investment banks take higher risks, and they are supposed to be outside the safety net. If they make enough mistakes, they are supposed to fail.

I’d be hard-pressed to say it better. Assisting the sale of Bear to JP Morgan created the expectation that anyone larger, like Lehman, would be assisted as well. Perhaps the most interesting part of the interview is that Bair gets right to the heart of the matter: the treatment of bondholders. ”Why did we do the bailouts?” Bair states “It was all about the bondholders.” Again she couldn’t be more correct. If there was anything Dodd-Frank should have fixed it was this, ending the rescue of bondholders and injecting market discipline back into bank.  It is also refreshing to hear her admit: ”I don’t think regulators can adequately regulate these big banks, we need market discipline. And if we don’t have that, they’re going to get us in trouble again.”

Where I disagree, besides her misguided take on mortgage re-sets, is whether Dodd-Frank will actually impose losses on bondholders. Bair expresses some optimism that such is the case, but there are just too many holes in Dodd-Frank to make that believable. Plus you pretty much have the same set of rules in place for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, yet the last time I checked the bondholders are still being protected at the expense of the taxpayer. If we don’t impose losses on Fannie creditors, even now after the panic, what makes anyone think we will do so to Citibank. Section 204 of Dodd-Frank is quite clear that the FDIC indeed retains the power to rescue creditors. Something that Bair was willing to do during the crisis, even if pushed to do so by Tim Geithner. Despite some errors, the interview is really a worthwhile read and has some real lessons for avoiding the next financial crisis.

We Don’t Need No Art in Kansas

At POLITICO this morning we find a long opinion piece by Matt Stoller, “Public Pays Price for Privatization,” summarized as “The real infrastructure trend in America today is privatizing what is left.” If that weren’t enough to give you the flavor of the piece, the bio line tells us that “Stoller worked on the Dodd-Frank financial reform law and Federal Reserve transparency issues as a staffer for Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.). He is currently a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.” Say no more – except, there’s more to say.

Stoller notes, among much else, that Kansas Gov. Sam Brownback just turned over arts funding to the private sector, making Kansas the only state without a publicly funded arts agency.” Don’t reel in horror; the cited Los Angeles Times article has already done it for you: “The governor erased state funding for arts programs, leaving the Kansas Arts Commission with no budget, no staff and no offices.” One imagines there will now be no art at all in Kansas.

Not surprisingly, Stoller extols the giant public works of the New Deal and after, which petered out in the 1970s, he says, after which “international competitiveness and environmental costs drove the logic of cost reductions into our political order. Today, we are still living in the Ronald Reagan-Paul Volcker era of low taxes, low regulations, low pay, low spending and high finance.” It seems not to have occurred to Stoller that perhaps the prior absence of “the logic of cost reductions” in our political order might have contributed to why, as he says, “the New Deal coalition melted in the 1970s.”

Art aside – that’s an easy case for defunding – Stoller does go on to criticize much of the “privatization” that’s taken place since – starting with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He’s right there: These “private-public partnerships” are fraught with peril, not least by giving privatization a bad name, something he doesn’t consider. The idea of “public goods” is not meaningless, but the definition has to be strict, as economists know, and the means for privatizing ersatz “public goods” have to be clean. Given the vast public sector before us, we’ve got years of privatization ahead. Let’s hope it’s done right.

Senate Rejects Capping Fannie/Freddie Losses

Yesterday the Senate rejected an amendment by Senators McCain, Shelby and Gregg that would have capped the taxpayer losses on Fannie and Freddie at $200 billion each.  The amendment would have also brought Fannie and Freddie onto the Federal budget, forcing the government to admit what most of us already suspect: we’re on the hook for their bad behavior.  All Republicans, with the additions of Democrats Feingold and Bayh, voted for the failed amendment.  As a substitute, which passed along party lines, Senator Dodd proposed that the Treasury Department would “study” the issue and report back to Congress.

While it was not surprising that Dodd lead the opposition to the McCain amendment (it is not the first time he’s protected Fannie and Freddie), what was surprising was his repeated explanation that the National Association of Realtors and National Association of Home Builders opposed the amendment.  With all of Obama’s talk about taking on special interests, I was starting to think the Senate might be serious.  But what’s a few $100 billion of taxpayer dollars to insure that real estate agents can get a few more fat commissions.

Even more bizarre was Dodd’s claim that his substitute amendment was a “tough study”.  What exactly is so tough about requiring Treasury to do a study that they’ve already said they were going to do.  For that matter, what’s so tough about a “study”?  The failings of Fannie and Freddie, and their inherent conflicts, have been studied extensively for years. The rejection of the McCain amendment illustrates why we need GSE reform now, as the special interests are already claiming that another study is all we need.

Not Too Late to “Audit the Fed”

Last week I wrote about Senator Sanders’ “compromise” with Senator Dodd and the White House on auditing the Federal Reserve.  To re-cap, the compromise would drop any auditing of monetary policy and simply focus on the Fed’s emergency lending facilities.  See my previous post for why I believe that compromise is a big win for the Fed and a loss for the American public.

The good news is that Senator Sanders’ compromise does not end the debate.  Senator Vitter has filed an amendment (#3760) that mirrors the original Sanders’ amendment, including an audit of monetary policy.  With any luck, other Senators will be able to decide for themselves whether the Sanders-Dodd compromise offers sufficient transparency of the Fed’s actions.

I also highly suggest reading Arnold Kling’s recent Cato briefing paper on the issue, “The Case for Auditing the Fed Is Obvious.”

Litan Warns Dodd Bill Would Harm Startups

I haven’t been following the debate over Sen. Dodd’s financial overhaul closely enough to have an opinion on the overall package, but Mike Masnick flags one aspect of the legislation that seems really troubling. Bob Litan explains:

Under existing law, startup companies can raise money easily and quickly from “accredited investors” – individuals with substantial wealth or income. There is no need for the companies or the investors to gain approval from any state or regulatory official.

All of this would change if Section 926 of the Dodd bill is included in any final reform legislation. That section would require, for the first time, companies seeking angel investment to make a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which would have 120 days to review it. This would both raise the cost of seeking angels and delay the ability of companies to benefit from their funding.

The negative impact of the SEC filing requirement would be aggravated by the proposed doubling of the net worth or income thresholds required for investors to be “accredited.”

It’s hard to overstate how important a favorable regulatory climate is to the success of startups. Some of the most important startups have been founded by 20-somethings without the resources to hire lawyers or navigate regulatory bureaucracies. And startups frequently find themselves within weeks of insolvency before they have a big breakthrough. Having a crucial round of funding delayed by four months can be the difference between success and failure. If this description of the bill is accurate (and I have no reason to doubt that it is), this provision would be very bad for the future of high-tech innovation in the United States.