Tag: defense spending

America Should Charge the World for Defending It

Today the U.S. underwrites the defense of wealthy nations across the globe. Washington should stop using the Pentagon as a global welfare agency.

Uncle Sam at least should charge for his defense services, as Donald Trump has suggested. America shouldn’t be defending its rich friends for free.

Most Republican Party presidential candidates insist that Washington do more on behalf of its already subsidized, protected, coddled, and reassured allies. Why do U.S. politicians put the interests of other nations before those of America?

The Pentagon devotes much of its resources to defend other nations, mostly wealthy industrialized states. In most of these cases America has no important, let alone vital, interests at stake. Instead, Washington should allow allies and friends to protect themselves.

Waste in Military Purchasing

The longest running show on Broadway is The Phantom of the Opera at 27 years. The longest running show on television is Meet the Press at 68 years. The longest running show of waste in Washington is cost overruns on Pentagon weapon systems. That show has been ongoing for more than 220 years.

As one of the first major procurements under the Constitution, the federal government bought six Navy frigates in 1794. The ships were projected to cost $688,889, but a myriad of problems pushed the ultimate cost up 70 percent to $1,176,721. Nicole Kaeding and I mention that project and many recent ones in our new study “Federal Government Cost Overruns.”

The Washington Post reports today on yet another troubled defense program:

As the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier enters the annals of troubled acquisition programs—billions over budget, years behind schedule—it follows a familiar script, becoming yet another example of how the Pentagon struggles with buying major weapons systems.

The Navy’s program has become “one of the most spectacular acquisition debacles in recent memory. And that is saying something,” McCain (R-Ariz.) said during a Senate hearing on the troubled program Thursday.

The program is now $6 billion over budget, according to a review by McCain’s staff. And while the lead ship is expected to be delivered next year, the second ship in the fleet is five years behind schedule and won’t be ready until 2024.

Like many other programs, the Ford-class carriers suffered from unrealistic cost estimates and overly optimistic timelines. And key Pentagon officials pushed the program forward even though key technologies hadn’t been fully tested, developed or designed, officials testified.

The problem with Pentagon procurement is not just that federal officials deceive taxpayers about the costs of projects, but also that many cancelled projects—which never should have been started—end up throwing billions of dollars down the drain.

A story yesterday in the Washington Post put a staggering number on that aspect of waste:

The Pentagon spent $46 billion on at least a dozen programs, including a new fleet of presidential helicopters, between 2001 and 2011 that never became operational, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The Post reports that there are serious efforts to reform procurement currently moving forward. After 220 years of waste, military purchasing is long overdue for an overhaul.

This Is What Defense Consolidation without BRAC Looks Like

For the past few months, nearly thirty communities around the country have been anxiously awaiting an announcement from the Pentagon concerning the military bases that would be affected by the planned drawdown of 40,000 active-duty Army personnel, plus another 17,000 or so civilian employees. Local news outlets have been filling in the details as they become available. Some communities, including Leesville, Louisiana (Fort Polk), and northern New York (Fort Drum) are breathing a “sigh of relief.” Others, in Georgia (Fort Benning) and Alaska (Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson), are crying foul.

Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA) seems especially peeved. “I am demanding answers from the Department of Defense on how they are justifying these troop cuts in Georgia,” Isakson said. And, in the meantime, he plans to block the nomination of a “new congressional liaison for the Department of Defense in light of the Department’s failure to give Congress a heads up before these cuts were made public.”

This is what defense consolidation looks like without the formality and relative transparency of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.

I am in the midst of a major research project studying the effects of military spending cuts on local communities. With the help of my excellent research assistant, Connor Ryan, I am looking at some familiar cases, such as San Francisco’s Presidio and Monterey’s Fort Ord, and some that are more obscure (e.g. Portsmouth, New Hampshire’s Pease AFB). I’m also writing about some bases closed before BRAC (e.g. Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia; the Springfield Arsenal in Massachusetts; and Dow AFB in Bangor, Maine), and some facilities that were privately owned and operated, but that grew primarily by supplying products to the military (including the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia; and DuPont’s Eleutherian Mills in Wilmington, Delaware). The project aims to go beyond studying the economic effects predicted and observed by economists (e.g. here and here), but to also get a feel for the history of each place, what it built, or how it fit into the nation’s defenses, and, ultimately, each facility’s denouement. To oversimplify: “How’s it goin’?”

My preliminary conclusions, after having visited about half of the places that I plan to study (and I will visit all of them), is that communities do adapt and recover, some more quickly than others, and many emerge after the transition period with a robust and more diversified economic base. In other words, the resources once directed toward the military do eventually find their way to more productive uses.

The Future of NATO (Event: March 4th)

Russian aggression in Eastern Europe during the last year has brought to the fore many of the issues surrounding the transatlantic security relationship, in particular, the role of NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been floundering, seeking new missions and goals, with recent involvement in military campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya emblematic of this search. In some ways, Russia’s recent actions have brought back a sense of purpose to the alliance.

Unfortunately, NATO still has many problems. Common vision among members is lacking, a problem exacerbated by the expansion of NATO from sixteen members at the end of the Cold War to twenty-eight members today. Many of these new member states in Central and Eastern Europe feel – understandably – more threatened by Russian aggression than West European or North American member states, creating tension within the organization.

NATO itself has increasingly become a political entity. Indeed, the growth of NATO membership among East European states during the last decade has been a key impediment to improved relations with Russia. The suggestion that Georgia and Ukraine might become EU or NATO members has also been widely discussed as one of the roots of the current conflict.

NATO funding is a big problem. Though most member states hail NATO’s importance and demand its services, few are willing to pay the costs, which fall disproportionately on the United States. In 2012-2013, only three other member states met NATO’s stated military spending target of 2% of GDP: the United Kingdom, Estonia and Greece. Many countries which rely heavily on NATO nonetheless contribute little to the alliance or their own defense, relying instead on the United States.

Pentagon Spending and Bureaucratic Bloat

There are major spending battles on the Washington agenda this year, including over the defense budget. Congress needs to decide whether to stick with capped spending levels agreed to in 2011, or allow its past restraint efforts to unravel.

Republican defense hawks want to bust the spending caps, while the small-government wing of the party wants to hold the line. Rep. Justin Amash (R-Mich.) told the Wall Street Journal, “We’ve been spending too much on defense for years because we have a lot of waste within the Department of Defense … There’s room to cut, and I think we are perfectly capable of staying within the sequester caps.” Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) noted, “To defend ourselves, we need a lean, mean fighting machine that doesn’t waste money on a bloated civilian bureaucracy.”

Amash and Paul’s position is buttressed by a new GAO study on the management bloat in Department of Defense (DoD) headquarters.

It is also buttressed by looking at DoD civilian and uniformed employment levels. The chart below shows that civilian DoD employment has grown 105,000 since 2001, while uniformed employment has grown just 22,000. Based on numbers in the chart, the ratio of bureaucrats-to-soldiers has increased from 47 percent in 2001 to 54 percent in 2014. But with the advance of computer power and other technologies, one would think that the bureaucratic overhead costs of our fighting force would be falling over time, not increasing.

How much could we save by improving bureaucratic efficiencies, and cutting the number of Pentagon civilians by at least the apparent excess of about 100,000? Annual pay and benefits for federal civilians is about $120,000 a year, so we could save roughly $12 billion a year by trimming this aspect of Pentagon bloat.

All data from the “Analytical Perspectives” sections of the FY2003 and FY2015 federal budgets. Data for 2014 are OMB estimates.

Congress Should Stand Firm on Spending Caps

Rumors abound that budget negotiators are nearing a possible deal to reverse spending cuts required under the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA).

Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell is hoping his colleagues will stand firm and reject any deal. He told reporters last week that it would be “a bad idea to revisit a law that’s actually working and reducing spending.” But he is competing with military spending advocates such as Reps. Buck McKeon and Mac Thornberry. They claim that the dangers confronting the United States today are graver than ever, that the costs to address these threats are rising and cannot be contained, and removing the defense spending caps is necessary to ensure the United States remains safe and secure.

They are wrong on all counts.

First, some context on spending: The Pentagon’s base budget, excluding the costs of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, remains 26 percent higher than in 2000, in inflation-adjusted dollars. Under the spending caps established by BCA, Pentagon spending would average around $528 billion per year from 2013 to 2021, over 18 percent higher than during a typical year in the Cold War.

This is curious considering the threats facing the United States were far greater then. The threats today are declining, not rising. In fact, all forms of violence, from cataclysmic great power wars, to civil wars and ethnic conflicts, have declined to historic lows.

To be sure, some insurance against potential threats is wise, in the unlikely event that current favorable trends are reversed, but we can maintain our safety while spending less because technological advances allow today’s military to address possible threats with fewer people and fewer platforms. U.S. naval vessels have far more striking power than the early 20th century dreadnaughts, just as precision-guided munitions have rendered today’s aircraft at least 10 times more capable of striking targets as their dumb-bomb-dropping precursors. To be sure, these new platforms are much more expensive, but the military services and their suppliers are more cost-conscious today than a decade ago, as when the Air Force recently killed a plan to outfit the next-generation bomber with a $300,000 kitchenette. Such excesses might be resurrected if BCA opponents succeed in changing the law.

The reforms extend well beyond procurement. In 2011, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen admitted that the military hadn’t been forced “to make the hard choices” because they had all the money they requested, plus a little more. Today, the spending caps are forcing the services to prioritize.

For example, austerity has focused attention on the military’s antiquated compensation system. Today’s soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are better compensated than those who served during World War II or the Cold War. And they should be. A modern military must compete to attract and retain the best and the brightest, and that costs money.

The current trajectory of personnel costs is unsustainable, however. Pay and benefits are already eating into other Pentagon spending accounts, including procurement, operations and maintenance, and training. The net effect may impair military readiness. Now, even outspoken military spending advocates, such as Reps. Duncan Hunter and Adam Kinzinger, both veterans of the post-9/11 military, have endorsed changes, including expecting working-age retirees to pick up more of their health care costs.

There is, in fact, broad, bipartisan support for proposals that touch what were once thought of as the third-rails of Pentagon politics. In addition to compensation reform for active-duty military personnel, a letter signed by scholars from the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for American Progress, and the Brookings Institution, among others, also calls for shrinking the Pentagon’s sprawling civilian workforce and reducing overhead, including eliminating excess base capacity.

The most important piece of the military spending puzzle remains the United States’ hyperactive foreign policy. Even if we were to implement the sensible reforms made politically realistic by spending caps, we would still spend more than we need to keep Americans safe. That is because today’s military is mainly geared toward defending others. By discouraging our allies from doing more to defend themselves and their interests, U.S. policymakers have ensured that U.S. troops bear disproportionate burdens, and U.S. taxpayers pay disproportionate costs. If we are going to spend less on the military in the next ten years than we have over the last ten, we must ask our smaller, cheaper military to do less. And we must expect others to do more.

The Budget Control Act, for all its flaws, has managed to deliver something once thought impossible: actual spending cuts. Our military remains second to none, despite those cuts, and might be stronger in the future because of them. A deal to cancel or reverse those cuts threatens to derail sensible reform proposals that could deliver far larger savings to taxpayers in the future.

Sen. McConnell is right: Congress should stand firm.

Barro and de Rugy on Defense Spending and the Economy

Earlier this week, Harvard economist Robert Barro and Veronique de Rugy of the Mercatus Center published a short paper assessing the economic effects of defense spending. Their findings are consistent with those of other studies, including one that Cato published last year by Benjamin Zycher. To wit, from Barro and de Rugy’s abstract:

While the impact of across-the-board federal defense spending cuts on national security may be up for debate, claims of these cuts’ dire impact on the economy and jobs are grossly overblown…

[A] dollar increase in federal defense spending results in a less-than-a-dollar increase in GDP when the spending increase is deficit-financed…

[O]ver five years each $1 in federal defense-spending cuts will increase private spending by roughly $1.30

The Barro-de Rugy paper should be of particular interest to Republican politicians and those who advise them. 2012 GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney and his fellow Republicans attracted considerable scorn (including from yours truly) during a campaign in which they railed against government spending, but also wailed against military spending cuts. His critique was not primarily, or even chiefly, about the potential impact of sequestration on national security; rather, echoing the hardly objective estimates flogged by the Aerospace Industries Association and the National Association of Manufacturers, Romney asserted that cuts in military spending would result in the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs.