Tag: defense spending

Europeans, not Americans, Should Spend More on Europe’s Defense

The U.S. plans on filling Eastern Europe with thousands of troops along with vehicles and weapons to equip an armored combat brigade. That will require a special budget request of $3.4 billion for next year.

An unnamed administration official told the New York Times, that the step “fulfills promises we’ve made to NATO” and “also shows our commitment and resolve.” Moreover, said another anonymous aide: “This reflects a new situation, where Russia has become a more difficult actor.”

However, the basic question remains unanswered: Why is the U.S. defending Europe? The need for America to play an overwhelming role disappeared as the continent recovered and the Cold War ended.

U.S. Military Should Do Less, Not Spend More

Much is said these days about the mismatch of missions and resources for the military. A recent Rand Corporation report warned that failing to deploy a large enough Army could “lead to a failure of the U.S. strategy and subsequent regret.”

But as I point out in National Interest online, “the solution is not to spend more. It is to reassess foreign policy objectives. Better to scale back an over-ambitious strategy than to waste scarce resources pursuing dubious goals.”

For instance, Rand pointed to 2007-2008, when the Bush administration decided to increase combat forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The report explained: “Unfortunately, insufficient ground forces existed to meet the demands in both Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Yet what was achieved by both of these wars? The disastrous Iraq invasion was misguided from the start. Little more has been achieved in Afghanistan after14 year of nation-building.

The problem was not too few troops. It was the wrong objectives.

America Should Charge the World for Defending It

Today the U.S. underwrites the defense of wealthy nations across the globe. Washington should stop using the Pentagon as a global welfare agency.

Uncle Sam at least should charge for his defense services, as Donald Trump has suggested. America shouldn’t be defending its rich friends for free.

Most Republican Party presidential candidates insist that Washington do more on behalf of its already subsidized, protected, coddled, and reassured allies. Why do U.S. politicians put the interests of other nations before those of America?

The Pentagon devotes much of its resources to defend other nations, mostly wealthy industrialized states. In most of these cases America has no important, let alone vital, interests at stake. Instead, Washington should allow allies and friends to protect themselves.

Waste in Military Purchasing

The longest running show on Broadway is The Phantom of the Opera at 27 years. The longest running show on television is Meet the Press at 68 years. The longest running show of waste in Washington is cost overruns on Pentagon weapon systems. That show has been ongoing for more than 220 years.

As one of the first major procurements under the Constitution, the federal government bought six Navy frigates in 1794. The ships were projected to cost $688,889, but a myriad of problems pushed the ultimate cost up 70 percent to $1,176,721. Nicole Kaeding and I mention that project and many recent ones in our new study “Federal Government Cost Overruns.”

The Washington Post reports today on yet another troubled defense program:

As the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier enters the annals of troubled acquisition programs—billions over budget, years behind schedule—it follows a familiar script, becoming yet another example of how the Pentagon struggles with buying major weapons systems.

The Navy’s program has become “one of the most spectacular acquisition debacles in recent memory. And that is saying something,” McCain (R-Ariz.) said during a Senate hearing on the troubled program Thursday.

The program is now $6 billion over budget, according to a review by McCain’s staff. And while the lead ship is expected to be delivered next year, the second ship in the fleet is five years behind schedule and won’t be ready until 2024.

Like many other programs, the Ford-class carriers suffered from unrealistic cost estimates and overly optimistic timelines. And key Pentagon officials pushed the program forward even though key technologies hadn’t been fully tested, developed or designed, officials testified.

The problem with Pentagon procurement is not just that federal officials deceive taxpayers about the costs of projects, but also that many cancelled projects—which never should have been started—end up throwing billions of dollars down the drain.

A story yesterday in the Washington Post put a staggering number on that aspect of waste:

The Pentagon spent $46 billion on at least a dozen programs, including a new fleet of presidential helicopters, between 2001 and 2011 that never became operational, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

The Post reports that there are serious efforts to reform procurement currently moving forward. After 220 years of waste, military purchasing is long overdue for an overhaul.

This Is What Defense Consolidation without BRAC Looks Like

For the past few months, nearly thirty communities around the country have been anxiously awaiting an announcement from the Pentagon concerning the military bases that would be affected by the planned drawdown of 40,000 active-duty Army personnel, plus another 17,000 or so civilian employees. Local news outlets have been filling in the details as they become available. Some communities, including Leesville, Louisiana (Fort Polk), and northern New York (Fort Drum) are breathing a “sigh of relief.” Others, in Georgia (Fort Benning) and Alaska (Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson), are crying foul.

Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA) seems especially peeved. “I am demanding answers from the Department of Defense on how they are justifying these troop cuts in Georgia,” Isakson said. And, in the meantime, he plans to block the nomination of a “new congressional liaison for the Department of Defense in light of the Department’s failure to give Congress a heads up before these cuts were made public.”

This is what defense consolidation looks like without the formality and relative transparency of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.

I am in the midst of a major research project studying the effects of military spending cuts on local communities. With the help of my excellent research assistant, Connor Ryan, I am looking at some familiar cases, such as San Francisco’s Presidio and Monterey’s Fort Ord, and some that are more obscure (e.g. Portsmouth, New Hampshire’s Pease AFB). I’m also writing about some bases closed before BRAC (e.g. Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia; the Springfield Arsenal in Massachusetts; and Dow AFB in Bangor, Maine), and some facilities that were privately owned and operated, but that grew primarily by supplying products to the military (including the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia; and DuPont’s Eleutherian Mills in Wilmington, Delaware). The project aims to go beyond studying the economic effects predicted and observed by economists (e.g. here and here), but to also get a feel for the history of each place, what it built, or how it fit into the nation’s defenses, and, ultimately, each facility’s denouement. To oversimplify: “How’s it goin’?”

My preliminary conclusions, after having visited about half of the places that I plan to study (and I will visit all of them), is that communities do adapt and recover, some more quickly than others, and many emerge after the transition period with a robust and more diversified economic base. In other words, the resources once directed toward the military do eventually find their way to more productive uses.

The Future of NATO (Event: March 4th)

Russian aggression in Eastern Europe during the last year has brought to the fore many of the issues surrounding the transatlantic security relationship, in particular, the role of NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been floundering, seeking new missions and goals, with recent involvement in military campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya emblematic of this search. In some ways, Russia’s recent actions have brought back a sense of purpose to the alliance.

Unfortunately, NATO still has many problems. Common vision among members is lacking, a problem exacerbated by the expansion of NATO from sixteen members at the end of the Cold War to twenty-eight members today. Many of these new member states in Central and Eastern Europe feel – understandably – more threatened by Russian aggression than West European or North American member states, creating tension within the organization.

NATO itself has increasingly become a political entity. Indeed, the growth of NATO membership among East European states during the last decade has been a key impediment to improved relations with Russia. The suggestion that Georgia and Ukraine might become EU or NATO members has also been widely discussed as one of the roots of the current conflict.

NATO funding is a big problem. Though most member states hail NATO’s importance and demand its services, few are willing to pay the costs, which fall disproportionately on the United States. In 2012-2013, only three other member states met NATO’s stated military spending target of 2% of GDP: the United Kingdom, Estonia and Greece. Many countries which rely heavily on NATO nonetheless contribute little to the alliance or their own defense, relying instead on the United States.

Pentagon Spending and Bureaucratic Bloat

There are major spending battles on the Washington agenda this year, including over the defense budget. Congress needs to decide whether to stick with capped spending levels agreed to in 2011, or allow its past restraint efforts to unravel.

Republican defense hawks want to bust the spending caps, while the small-government wing of the party wants to hold the line. Rep. Justin Amash (R-Mich.) told the Wall Street Journal, “We’ve been spending too much on defense for years because we have a lot of waste within the Department of Defense … There’s room to cut, and I think we are perfectly capable of staying within the sequester caps.” Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) noted, “To defend ourselves, we need a lean, mean fighting machine that doesn’t waste money on a bloated civilian bureaucracy.”

Amash and Paul’s position is buttressed by a new GAO study on the management bloat in Department of Defense (DoD) headquarters.

It is also buttressed by looking at DoD civilian and uniformed employment levels. The chart below shows that civilian DoD employment has grown 105,000 since 2001, while uniformed employment has grown just 22,000. Based on numbers in the chart, the ratio of bureaucrats-to-soldiers has increased from 47 percent in 2001 to 54 percent in 2014. But with the advance of computer power and other technologies, one would think that the bureaucratic overhead costs of our fighting force would be falling over time, not increasing.

How much could we save by improving bureaucratic efficiencies, and cutting the number of Pentagon civilians by at least the apparent excess of about 100,000? Annual pay and benefits for federal civilians is about $120,000 a year, so we could save roughly $12 billion a year by trimming this aspect of Pentagon bloat.

All data from the “Analytical Perspectives” sections of the FY2003 and FY2015 federal budgets. Data for 2014 are OMB estimates.

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