Tag: climate change

Taming the Greenland Melting Global Warming Hype

Global Science Report is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science, where we highlight one or two important new items in the scientific literature or the popular media. For broader and more technical perspectives, consult our monthly “Current Wisdom.”

There is a new paper generating some press attention (e.g. Chris Mooney at the Washington Post) that strongly suggests global warming is leading to specific changes in the atmospheric circulation over the Northern Hemisphere that is causing an enhancement of surface melting across Greenland—and of course, that this mechanism will make things even worse than expected into the future.

We are here to strongly suggest this is not the case.

The new paper is by a team of authors led by Marco Tedesco from Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. The main gist of the paper is that Arctic sea ice loss as a result of human-caused global warming is causing the jet stream to slow down and become wigglier—with deeper north-south excursions that hang around longer.  This type of behavior is referred to as atmospheric “blocking.”

If this sounds familiar, it’s the same theoretical argument that is made to try to link wintertime “polar vortex” events (i.e., cold outbreaks) and blizzards to global warming. This argument which has been pretty well debunked, time and time again.

Well, at least it has as it concerns wintertime climate.

The twist of the new Tedesco and colleagues’ paper is that they’ve applied it to the summertime climate over Greenland. They argue that global warming is leading to an increase in blocking events over Greenland in the summer and that is causing warm air to be “locked” in place leading to enhanced surface melting there. Chris Mooney, who likes to promote climate alarm buzzwords, refers to this behavior as “weird.” And he describes the worrysome implications:

The key issue, then, is whether 2015 is a harbinger of a future in which the jet stream keeps sending Greenland atmospheric systems that drive major melt — and in turn, whether the Arctic amplification of climate change is driving this. If so, that could be a factor, not currently included in many climate change simulations, that would worsen the ice sheet’s melt, drive additional sea level rise and perhaps upend ocean currents due to large influxes of fresh water.

As proof that things were weird over Greenland in recent summers, Tedesco’s team offers up this figure in their paper:

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This chart (part of a multipanel figure) shows the time history of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO—a pattern of atmospheric variation over the North Atlantic) as red bars and something called the Greenland Blocking Index (GBI) as the black line, for the month of July during the period 1950-2015. The chart is meant to show that in recent years, the NAO has been very low with 2015 being “a new record low of -1.23 (since 1899),” and the GBI has been very high with the authors noting that “[c]oncurrently, the GBI also set a new record for the month of July [2015].” Clearly the evidence is showing that atmospheric blocking increasing over Greenland which fits nicely into the global warming/sea ice loss/wiggly jet stream theory.

So what’s our beef?

A couple of months ago, some of the same authors of the Tedesco paper (notably Ed Hanna) published a paper showing the history of the monthly GBI going back to 1851 (as opposed to 1950 as depicted in the Tedesco paper).

Here’s their GBI plotted for the month of July from 1851 to 2015:

This picture tells a completely different story. Instead of a long-term trend that could be related to anthropogenic global warming, what we see is large annual and multidecadal variability, with the end of the record not looking much different than say a period around 1880 and with the highest GBI occurring in 1918 (with 1919 coming in 2nd place). While this doesn’t conclusively demonstrate that the current rise in GBI is not related to jet stream changes induced by sea ice loss, it most certainly does demonstrate that global-warming induced sea ice loss is not a requirement for blocking events to occur over Greenland and that recent events are not  at all “weird.”  An equally plausible, if not much more plausible, expectation of future behavior is that this GBI highstand is part of multidecadal natural variability and will soon relax back towards normal values.  But such an explanation isn’t Post-worthy.

Another big problem with all the new hype is that history shows the current goings-on in Greenland to be irrelevant, because humans just can’t make it warm enough up there to melt all that much ice. For example, in 2013, Dorthe Dahl-Jensen and her colleagues published a paper in Nature detailing the history of the ice in Northwest Greenland during the beginning of the last interglacial, which included a 6,000 year period in which her ice core data showed averaged a whopping 6⁰C warmer in summer than the 20th century average. Greenland only lost around 30% of its ice with a heat load of (6 X 6000) 36,000 degree-summers. The best humans could ever hope to do with greenhouse gases is—very liberally—about 5 degrees for 500 summers, or (5 X 500) 2,500 degree-summers. In other words, the best we can do is 500/6000 times 30%, or a 2.5% of the ice, resulting in a grand total of seven inches of sea level rise over 500 years. That’s pretty much the death of the Greenland disaster story, despite every lame press release and hyped “news” article on it.

While you won’t find this kind of analysis elsewhere, we’re happy to do it here at Cato. 

References:

Dahl-Jensen, D., et al., 2013.  Eemian interglacial reconstructed from a Greenland folded ice core.  Nature 489, doi: 10.1038/nature11789.

Hanna, E., et al., 2016. Greenland Blocking Index 1851-2015: a regional climate change signal. International Journal of Climatology, doi: 10.1002/joc.4673.

Tedesco, M., et al., 2016. Arctic cut-off high drives the poleward shift of a new Greenland melting record. Nature Communications, DOI: 10.1038/ncomms11723, http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2016/160609/ncomms11723/full/ncomms11723.html

The Climate Alarm Death Knell Sounds Again

Global Science Report is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science, where we highlight one or two important new items in the scientific literature or the popular media. For broader and more technical perspectives, consult our monthly “Current Wisdom.” 

Currently, details are few, but apparently the results of a major scientific study on the effects of anthropogenic aerosols on clouds are going to have large implications for climate change projections—substantially lowering future temperature rise expectations.

In a blog post from the Department of Meteorology of the University of Reading, Dr. Nicolas Bellouin describes some preliminary results from a research study he leads that is investigating the influence of aerosols on cloud properties.  The behavior of clouds, including how they are formed, how long they last, how bright they are, etc., plays a very large role in the earth’s climate system, and is considered the weakest part of global climate models. The climate model cloud deficiency results from a combination of scientific uncertainty about cloud behavior, as well as the modeling challenges that come from simulating the small spatial and temporal scales over which the important processes take place.

When it comes to the influence of human aerosol emissions on cloud properties, the scientific mainstream view is that aerosols modify clouds in such a way as to result in an enhanced cooling of the earth’s surface—a cooling influence which has acted to offset some portion of the warming influence resulting from human emissions of greenhouse gases (primarily from the burning of fossil fuels, like coal, oil, and natural gas to produce energy).  In the absence of this presumed aerosol cooling effect, climate models predict that the earth should warm at a much faster rate than has been observed.  A large cooling effect from aerosols was thus introduced in the early 1990s as a way to “fix” the climate models and bring them closer in line with the modest pace of observed warming. Despite that “fix,” climate models continue to overpredict the observed warming rate—which is bad enough news for climate models already.

You Ought to Have a Look: A Shout-Out to Lukewarming, a Look at the Republic of Science and a “Roundup” of EPA and Glyphosate

You Ought to Have a Look is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science posted by Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. (“Chip”) Knappenberger.  While this section will feature all of the areas of interest that we are emphasizing, the prominence of the climate issue is driving a tremendous amount of web traffic.  Here we post a few of the best in recent days, along with our color commentary.

We’ve put together an interesting collection of articles this week for your consideration.

First up is a shout out to lukewarming from Bloomberg View columnist Megan McArdle. In her piece “Global Warming Alarmists, You’re Doing It Wrong,” McArdle suggests that lukewarmers have a lot to bring to the climate change table, but are turned away by the entrenched establishment and tarred with labels like climate “denier”—a label which couldn’t be further from the truth. McArdle writes:

Naturally, proponents of climate-change models have welcomed the lukewarmists’ constructive input by carefully considering their points and by advancing counterarguments firmly couched in the scientific method.

No, of course I’m just kidding. The reaction to these mild assertions is often to brand the lukewarmists “deniers” and treat them as if what they were saying was morally and logically equivalent to suggesting that the Holocaust never happened.

In her article, McArdle calls for less name calling and less heel digging and more open, constructive discussion:

There is a huge range of possible beliefs that go into assessing the various complicated theories about how the climate works, and the global-warming predictions generated by those theories range from “could well be catastrophic” to “probably not a big deal.” I know very smart, well-informed, decent people who fall at either end of the spectrum, and others who are somewhere in between. Then there are folks like me who aren’t sure enough to make a prediction, but are very sure we wouldn’t like to find out, too late, that the answer is “oops, catastrophic.”

These are not differences that can be resolved by name calling. Nor has the presumed object of this name calling – to delegitimize thoughtful opposition, and thereby increase the consensus in favor of desired policy proposals – been a notable political success, at least in the U.S. It has certainly rallied the tribe, and produced a lot of patronizing talk about science by people who aren’t actually all that familiar with the underlying scientific questions. Other than that, we remain pretty much where we were 25 years ago: holding summits, followed by the dismayed realization that we haven’t, you know, really done all that much except burn a lot of hydrocarbons flying people to summits. Maybe last year’s Paris talks will turn out to be the actual moment when things started to change – but having spent the last 15 years as a reporter listening to people tell me that no, really, we’re about to turn the corner, I retain a bit of skepticism.

How was this bit of advice from McArdle received by some of the loudest name-callers? Not well, as she describes in this follow-up:

Arctic Methane Scare Oversold

Global Science Report is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science, where we highlight one or two important new items in the scientific literature or the popular media. For broader and more technical perspectives, consult our monthly “Current Wisdom.”

Methane is all the rage. Why? Because 1) it is a powerful greenhouse gas, that molecule for molecule, is some 25 times as potent as carbon dioxide (when it comes to warming the lower atmosphere),  2) it plays a feature role in a climate scare story in which climate change warms the Arctic, releasing  methane stored there in the (once) frozen ground, which leads to more warming and more methane release, ad apocalypse, and 3) methane emissions are  also be linked to fossil fuel extraction (especially fracking operations). An alarmist trifecta!

Turns out, though, that these favored horses aren’t running as advertised.

Elevated CO2 and Temperature Enhance the Grain Yield and Quality of Rice

Setting the stage for their study, Roy et al. (2015) write that rice is “one of the most important C3 species of cereal crops,” adding that it “generally responds favorably to elevated CO2.” However, they note that the actual response of rice crops to elevated CO2 and warming “is uncertain.” The team of five Indian scientists set out “to determine the effect of elevated CO2 and night time temperature on (1) biomass production, (2) grain yield and quality and (3) C [carbon], N [nitrogen] allocations in different parts of the rice crop in tropical dry season.”

The experiment they designed to achieve these objectives was carried out at the ICAR-Central Rice Research Institute in Cuttack, Odisha, India, using open-top-chambers in which rice (cv. Naveen) was grown in either control (ambient CO2 and ambient temperature), elevated CO2 (550 ppm, ambient temperature) or elevated CO2 and raised temperature (550 ppm and +2°C above ambient) conditions for three separate growing seasons.

In discussing their findings, Roy et al. write that the aboveground plant biomass, root biomass, grain yield, leaf area index and net C assimilation rates of the plants growing under elevated CO2 conditions all showed significant increases (32, 26, 22, 21, and 37 percent, respectively) over their ambient counter-parts. Each of these variables were also enhanced under elevated CO2 and increased temperature conditions over ambient CO2 and temperature, though to a slightly lesser degree than under elevated CO2 conditions alone. 

With respect to grain quality, the authors report there was no difference among the parameters they measured in any of treatments, with the exception of starch and amylose content, which were both significantly higher in the elevated CO2 and elevated CO2 plus elevated temperature treatments. The C and N grain yields were also both significantly increased in both of these treatments compared with control conditions.

The results of this study thus bode well for the future of rice production in India during the dry season. As the CO2 concentration of the air rises, yields will increase.  And if the temperature rises as models project, yields will still increase, though by not quite as much. These findings, coupled with the fact that the grain nutritional quality (as defined by an increase in amylose content) was enhanced by elevated CO2, suggest there is a bright future in store for rice in a carbon dioxide-enhanced atmosphere.

 

Reference

Roy, K.S., Bhattacharyya, P., Nayak, A.K., Sharma, S.G. and Uprety, D.C. 2015. Growth and nitrogen allocation of dry season tropical rice as a result of carbon dioxide fertilization and elevated night time temperature. Nutrient Cycling in Agroecosystems 103: 293-309.

Do Negative Climate Impacts on Food Production Lead to Violence?

Introducing their important work, Buhaug et al. (2015) note that earlier research suggests there is “a correlational pattern between climate anomalies and violent conflict” due to “drought-induced agricultural shocks and adverse economic spillover effects as a key causal mechanism linking the two phenomena.” But is this really so?

Seeking an answer to this question, the four Norwegian researchers compared half a century of statistics on climate variability, food production and political violence across Sub-Saharan Africa, which effort, in their words, “offers the most precise and theoretically consistent empirical assessment to date of the purported indirect relationship.” And what did they thereby find?

Buhaug et al. report that their analysis “reveals a robust link between weather patterns and food production where more rainfall generally is associated with higher yields.” However, they also report that “the second step in the causal model is not supported,” noting that “agricultural output and violent conflict are only weakly and inconsistently connected, even in the specific contexts where production shocks are believed to have particularly devastating social consequences,” which fact leads them to suggest that “the wider socioeconomic and political context is much more important than drought and crop failures in explaining violent conflict in contemporary Africa.”

“Instead,” as they continue, “social protest and rebellion during times of food price spikes may be better understood as reactions to poor and unjust government policies, corruption, repression and market failure,” citing the studies of Bush (2010), Buhaug and Urdal (2013), Sneyd et al. (2013) and Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015). In fact, they state that even the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report concludes “it is likely that socioeconomic and technological trends, including changes in institutions and policies, will remain a relatively stronger driver of food security over the next few decades than climate change,” citing Porter et al. (2014).”

And so we learn that alarmist claims of future climate-change-induced reductions in agricultural production that lead to social unrest and violent conflicts simply are not supported by real-world observations.

 

References

Buhaug, H., Benjaminsen, T.A., Sjaastad, E. and Theisen, O.M. 2015. Climate variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental Research Letters 10: 10.1088/1748-9326/10/12/125015.

Buhaug, H. and Urdal, H. 2013. An urbanization bomb? Population growth and social disorder in cities. Global Environmental Change 23: 1-10.

Bush, R. 2010. Food riots: poverty, power and protest. Journal of Agrarian Change 10: 119-129.

Chenoweth, E. and Ulfelder, J. 2015. Can structural conditions explain the onset of nonviolent uprisings? Journal of Conflict Resolution 10.1177/0022002715576574.

Porter, J.R. et al. 2014. Food security and food production systems. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Ed. C.B. Field et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 485-533.

Sneyd, I.Q., Legwegoh, A. and Fraser, E.D.G. 2013. Food riots: media perspectives on the causes of food protest in Africa. Food Security 5: 485-497.

You Ought to Have a Look: Ontario’s Energy Plan, Evidence-based Policy and a New Climate Sensitivity Estimate

You Ought to Have a Look is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science posted by Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. (“Chip”) Knappenberger.  While this section will feature all of the areas of interest that we are emphasizing, the prominence of the climate issue is driving a tremendous amount of web traffic.  Here we post a few of the best in recent days, along with our color commentary.

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First up in this week’s edition of You Ought to Have a Look is an op-ed by Ross McKitrick (one-time Cato Adjunct who is now Chair of Energy, Ecology & Prosperity at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and Economic Professor at the University of Guelph) who shreds the energy policy being forwarded by Kathleen Wynne, the Liberal Party Premier of Ontario. Wynne’s proposed plan—aimed to combat climate change—includes, among other things, a requirement that all homes eventually be heated by electricity (i.e., no natural gas, etc.).

McKitrick describes up the plan,

Around the time that today’s high-school students are readying to buy their first home, it will be illegal for builders to install heating systems that use fossil fuels, in particular natural gas. Having already tripled the price of power, Queen’s Park will make it all but mandatory to rely on electricity for heating.

There will be new mandates and subsidies for biofuels, electric buses for schools, extensive new bike lanes to accommodate all those bicycles Ontario commuters will be riding all winter, mandatory electric recharging stations on all new buildings, and many other Soviet-style command-and-control directives.

distills what’s wrong with it,

[E]ven if the…plan were to stop global warming in its tracks, the policies would do more economic harm than the averted climate change.

and, in inimitable Ross fashion, throws in this zinger,

The scheme is called the Climate Change Action Plan, or CCAP, but it would be more appropriately called the Climate Change Coercion Plan: the CCCP.

The entire op-ed appearing in the Financial Post is a must read.

Next up is a post at the blog IPKat (a U.K.-based Intellectual Property news blog) by Nicola Searle that provides an interesting review of a new book by Paul Cairney titled The Politics of Evidence-Based Policy Making.

Evidenced-based policy making (EBPM) is the idea that, well, policy should be based on some sort of evidence. But as Searle (and Cairney) point out, this is a lot more complicated than it seems. Searle eloquently describes the situation as: “Policymaking isn’t a Mondrian, it’s a Monet.”

Rather than the (utopian) linear view that “evidence” clearly informs the best “policy,” the situation is much more complex and involves uncertainties, interpretations, personal beliefs, outside pressures, policy goals, etc.

Searle provides this analogy:

As Cairney puts it, “in the real world, the evidence is contested, the policy process contains a large number of influential actors, and scientific evidence is one of many sources of information.” I’d described policy making in general as akin to an extended family choosing which film to watch. Uncle Alex campaigns for Barbarella, cousin Vic, holding the remote, decides you’re all watching Hulk until your sister Pat throws a tantrum unless you watch Frozen. You might consult the Rotten Tomatoes rating, but you’re convinced that critic from the New York Post is on the payroll of a major studios and the popular rating seems to have been spammed by bots… In the end you watch a Jude Law rom-com. And that’s the simplified version.

For more insight, check out Searle’s full post, or perhaps even Cairney’s book. This is a topic that is quite relevant to the subject of climate change policy (as well as a litany of policy that is rooted in U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency “evidence”).

And finally, we’d be remiss if we didn’t draw attention to a new study appearing in the AGU journal Earth and Space Science by University College Dublin’s J. Ray Bates that finds that the equilibrium climate sensitivity—that is, the earth’s total surface temperature rise that results from a doubling of the atmospheric effective concentration of carbon dioxide—is “~1°C.”

Bates’ work is an update and extension of the methods and findings of (Cato Center for the Study of Science’s Distinguished Senior Fellow) Richard Lindzen and Yong-Sang Choi and represents another estimate of the climate sensitivity that falls well below the average of the climate models (3.2°C) used in the most recent IPCC report.  The lower the climate sensitivity to greenhouse gas increases, the lower the overall impacts when measured over comparative time-scales.

We’ve added the new Bates results to our lower-than-model climate sensitivity compilation (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) estimates from new research beginning in 2011 (colored), compared with the assessed range given in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the collection of climate models used in the IPCC AR5. The “likely” (greater than a 66% likelihood of occurrence) range in the IPCC Assessment is indicated by the gray bar. The arrows indicate the 5 to 95 percent confidence bounds for each estimate along with the best estimate (median of each probability density function; or the mean of multiple estimates; colored vertical line). The right-hand side of the IPCC AR5 range is actually the 90% upper bound (the IPCC does not actually state the value for the upper 95% confidence bound of their estimate). Ring et al. (2012) present four estimates of the climate sensitivity and the red box encompasses those estimates. Likewise, Bates (2016) presents eight estimates and the green box encompasses them. Spencer and Braswell (2013) produce a single ECS value best-matched to ocean heat content observations and internal radiative forcing.

 

Figure 1. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) estimates from new research beginning in 2011 (colored), compared with the assessed range given in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the collection of climate models used in the IPCC AR5. The “likely” (greater than a 66% likelihood of occurrence) range in the IPCC Assessment is indicated by the gray bar. The arrows indicate the 5 to 95 percent confidence bounds for each estimate along with the best estimate (median of each probability density function; or the mean of multiple estimates; colored vertical line). The right-hand side of the IPCC AR5 range is actually the 90% upper bound (the IPCC does not actually state the value for the upper 95% confidence bound of their estimate). Ring et al. (2012) present four estimates of the climate sensitivity and the red box encompasses those estimates. Likewise, Bates (2016) presents eight estimates and the green box encompasses them. Spencer and Braswell (2013) produce a single ECS value best-matched to ocean heat content observations and internal radiative forcing.

As the Bates results are just-released, we await to see how they stand up to scrutiny (and the test of time).

The journal Earth and Space Science is open access, so everyone can go and have a look for themselves (although, fair warning, the article is very technical).