Tag: China

Alan Reynolds in 1997 on Exchange Rates and Trade

I stumbled on this 1997 talk abut NAFTA by my old friend Roberto Salinas-Leon, making a case for Hillary’s Wikileak dream of Hemispheric free trade (but not for her other dream of “open borders” if that really meant unhindered migration).  

I may be biased, but the following heretofore lost quote from me still seems relevant, but for the U.S. too, not just Mexico. Trump adviser Peter Navarro thinks the dollar is 45% too strong against the Chinese yuan, which supposedly excuses Trump’s threat of a 45% tariff.  (I’m more in the “strong dollar is good for America” camp, though strong doesn’t mean continually rising.) 

As Alan Reynolds has recently explained, “the explicit goal of devaluation is to worsen the terms of trade”-for instance, to make Mexico trade more exports for fewer imports. Reynolds continues: “…even if Mexico wanted to impoverish itself in this way, it does not work. When the peso was devalued at the end of 1994 that did not result in Mexican oil or beer being one cent cheaper in terms of U.S. dollars. After a devaluation, interest rates soar, real tax receipts collapse, and the foreign debt burden increases. This causes a squeeze on the government’s budget, and on the budgets of families, farms and firms. This is no way to make a country “competitive.” Economic growth depends on more and better labor and capital, neither of which are encouraged by a currency of unpredictable value. A weak currency has never produced a strong economy.”

To be sure, concerns surrounding currency revaluation are closely mixed with the fear of generating a substantial trade deficit. Reynolds again explains the misdiagnosis of increased imports as a sign of bad times: “current account deficits have nothing to do with ‘competitiveness.’ They are caused by a gap between investment and domestic savings that is filled by foreign investment (which is good) or loans (which are not so good). To the extent that a devaluation might “fix” such a gap, it does so by slashing investment, not raising savings.”

Bucking the Protectionist Trend

In September, the UK government gave the green light for the construction of the Hinkley Point power plant through a French-Chinese consortium. The project—which has received wide international attention after being very nearly relegated to the protectionist dustbin—has been agreed to after much hemming and hawing. It has been mired in controversy mainly over security concerns related to foreign ownership, viewed by some as smacking of protectionism.

It is no secret that there has been a worrying trend toward protectionism in the global markets. The appetite for international trade agreements and foreign investment has been consistently listless. In the United States, and globally, some politicians have been banking on this by flaunting protectionist rhetoric in an effort to garner support. But while protectionism may win votes in the short-term, domestic economic growth will lose out in the long-term. Ultimately, politicizing the global economic rut will only make matters worse.

“The China Shock” Implicates Domestic Policies, Not Trade

A National Bureau of Economic Research working paper by David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, titled “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade,” has created Piketty-like buzz in U.S. trade policy circles this year.  Among the paper’s findings is that the growth of imports from China between 1999 and 2011 caused a U.S. employment decline of 2.4 million workers, and that wages and employment prospects for those who lost jobs remained depressed for many years after the initial effect. 

While commentators on the left have trumpeted these findings as some long-awaited refutation of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the authors have distanced themselves from those conclusions, portraying their analysis as an indictment of a previously prevailing economic consensus that the costs of labor market adjustment to increased trade would be relatively subdued (although I’m skeptical that such a consensus ever existed). But in a year when trade has been scapegoated for nearly everything perceived to be wrong in society, the release of this paper no doubt reinforced fears – and fueled demagogic rants – about trade and globalization being scourges to contain, and even eradicate.

Last week, Alan Reynolds explained why we should take Autor, et. al.’s job-loss figures with a pinch of salt, but there is an even more fundamental point to make here. That is: Trade has one role to perform – to grow the economic pie. Trade fulfills that role by allowing us to specialize. By expanding the size of markets to enable more refined specialization and economies of scale, trade enables us to produce and, thus, consume more.  Nothing more is required of trade. Nothing!

Still, politicians, media, and other commentators blame trade for an allegedly unfair distribution of that pie and for the persistence of frictions in domestic labor markets. But reducing those frictions and managing distribution of the larger economic pie are not matters for trade policy.  They are matters for domestic policy. Trade does its job. Policymakers must do their jobs, too.


State-Owned Enterprises and the TPP

My Cato trade policy colleagues and I recently released a Working Paper analyzing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We find that the agreement is “net liberalizing,” and that despite its various flaws, the agreement will improve people’s lives and should be ratified. Some aspects of the agreement were obviously good (like lower tariffs) and others were easy to condemn (like labor regulations); but for many of the TPP’s 30 chapters, our opinion is more ambivalent. 

The TPP’s chapter on “state-owned enterprises” (SOEs) is one of those. The TPP’s SOE rules are good rules, but they’re not nearly as ambitious as we wish they’d be. We gave the chapter a minimally positive grade of 6 out of 10. Here’s some of what we had to say in our report:


On the Oil-Gold Ratio: Why Oil’s Going Higher

A big story to come out of the last G-20 summit was that the Russians and Saudis were talking oil (read: an oil cooperation agreement). With that, everyone asked, again, where are oil prices headed? To answer that question, one has to have a model – a way of thinking about the problem. In this case, my starting point is Roy W. Jastram’s classic study, The Golden Constant: The English and American Experience 1560-2007. In that work, Jastram finds that gold maintains its purchasing power over long periods of time, with the prices of other commodities adapting to the price of gold. 

Taking a lead from Jastram, let’s use the price of gold as a long-term benchmark for the price of oil. The idea being that, if the price of oil changes dramatically, the oil-gold price ratio will change and move away from its long-term value. Forces will then be set in motion to shift supply of and demand for oil.  In consequence, the price of oil will change and the long-term oil-gold price ratio will be reestablished. Via this process, the oil-gold ratio will revert, with changes in the price of oil doing most of the work.

For example, if the price of oil slumps, the oil-gold price ratio will collapse. In consequence, exploration for and development of oil reserves will become less attractive and marginal production will become uneconomic. In addition to the forces squeezing the supply side of the market, low prices will give the demand side a boost. These supply-demand dynamics will, over time, move oil prices and the oil-gold price ratio up. This is what’s behind the old adage, there is nothing like low prices to cure low prices.

The Global Poor, the Great Enrichment, and the American Working Class

Americans have lately been debating the tradeoffs we face as the global poor rise. Their gains have been enormous and unprecedented. And yet the American working class has struggled to better itself even as conditions have improved for most others:

Image source.

Percentiles 80-95 contain many from the relatively rich countries’ lower-income classes; there are a lot of Americans in there. Other factors may be at work, but let’s say for the sake of argument that the gains by the global poor have on balance harmed at least some of them.

So why is this happening? Is it part of some other nation’s malicious plan? Is it China, perhaps? Or India? Or did we inadvertently do it to ourselves, through bad trade agreements or “soft” foreign policy?

It’s natural to want to make the story about us, or our actions, or a villain who threatens us. Those sorts of explanations are politically useful; they suggest that the right leader can get us out of the mess we’re in.

But maybe the correct explanation isn’t about us at all. One way to see this is to ask a slightly different question: Why is the Great Global Enrichment happening right now? Why didn’t it happen in the 1960s? It happened in the 1960s in Japan, after all. It presumably could have happened elsewhere too. So why not?

Can the United States, China and Russia Cooperate on Trade?

The 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou is fast approaching and, similar to the pre-summit meetings hosted by China throughout the year, the focus will be the state of the global economy. Still contending with sluggish global economic growth, the summit’s theme of “Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy” is especially timely. Under the umbrella of global economic growth, cultivating opportunities for trade and investment will become a major priority for G20 states, and three global powers—the United States, China, and Russia—are each developing their own multinational trade route projects. These major trade projects could serve as opportunities for cross-country cooperation and growth, but they could also become sources for future conflict.

China’s management of domestic markets, currency, and commitment to structural reforms was a cause for global concern at the first meeting of G20 Finance and Central Bank Governors in February. At next week’s summit, China’s President Xi Jinping will undoubtedly point out China’s efforts towards realizing supply-side structural reforms in the face of China’s “new normal” of slower economic growth. As part of these reforms aimed at rebalancing China’s economy, Beijing plans to cut industrial overcapacity, tackle overhanging debt, reform state-owned enterprises, and seek out new consumer markets. On the last point, Beijing is championing its New Silk Road Initiative (also known as “One Belt, One Road”), a major state project focused on opening up new markets. To accomplish this, Beijing is building vast trade networks spanning several countries and continents, by land and by sea. However, many countries are wary. The project, billed as purely an economic one, may evolve to include a political and/or military dimension as well.