Tag: Center for Democracy and Technology

A No-Brainer: Bad for Privacy and Liberty

CNET journalist Declan McCullagh has lit up the Internets today with his reporting on a revamped Senate online privacy bill that would give an alphabet soup of federal agencies unprecedented access to email and other online communications.

Leahy’s rewritten bill would allow more than 22 agencies – including the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications Commission – to access Americans’ e-mail, Google Docs files, Facebook wall posts, and Twitter direct messages without a search warrant. It also would give the FBI and Homeland Security more authority, in some circumstances, to gain full access to Internet accounts without notifying either the owner or a judge.

This would be an astounding expansion of government authority to snoop. And it comes at a time when the public is getting wind through the Petraeus scandal of just how easy it already is to access our private communications.

Assuming McCullagh’s reading of the draft he obtained is remotely plausible, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) should reconsider his current course–if he wants to maintain the mantle of a privacy leader, at least.

The Washington, D.C., meta-story is almost as interesting. Who is where on the bill? And when? The ACLU’s Christopher Calabrese told McCullagh last night, “We believe a warrant is the appropriate standard for any contents.” Freedom Works came out of the gate this morning with a petition asking for oppositions to Senator Leahy’s revised bill.

The Center for Democracy did not have a comment when McCullagh asked, though spokesman Brock Meeks suggests via Twitter today that McCullagh didn’t try hard enough to reach him. The reason that’s important? CDT has a history of equivocation and compromise in the face of privacy-invasive legislation and policies. At this point, the group has said via Twitter that they “wouldn’t support the rewrite described in CNET.” That’s good news, and it’s consistent with people’s expectations for CDT both on the outside and within.

There will undoubtedly be more to this story. Emails should not only be statutorily protected, but Fourth Amendment protected, based on the framework for communications privacy I laid out for the Supreme Court in Cato’s Florida v. Jardines brief.

I Second That Skepticism

The ACLU’s Chris Calabrese notes that nominations to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board were forwarded from the Senate Judiciary Committee to the full Senate this morning. Congress created the Board in August 2007, and we have waited, and waited, and waited while the Bush and Obama administrations neglected to appoint anyone to it.

Calabrese is rightly skeptical that the “PCLOB” can make a difference:

[T]he national security establishment is huge, with tens of thousands of employees and a budget of more than $60 billion. The NSA alone has more than 30,000 employees. Contrast that with the PCLOB. It’s currently authorized (if it finally gets filled) to spend a whopping $900,000 and hire ten full-time employees for the 2012 fiscal year. With this level of staffing, it’s hard to imagine that the Board and its investigators can even begin to understand this vast national security infrastructure, never mind properly oversee it.

I have a fair amount of experience with privacy oversight in the U.S. government, having served on the Department of Homeland Security’s Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. That experience has fairly well validated my thinking in 2001, before there were “privacy officers”:

The appointment of a privacy czar or creation of a privacy office is a poor substitute for directly addressing the voraciousness of many government programs for citizens’ personal information. Political leaders themselves should incorporate privacy into their daily consideration of policy options, rather than farming out that responsibility to officials who may or may not have a say in government policy.

To see how the PCLOB fits into government thinking, we can look at a 2007 speech given by Donald Kerr, principal deputy director of National Intelligence. To him, “privacy” is giving the government access to all the data it wants, subject to oversight.

[P]rivacy, I would offer, is a system of laws, rules, and customs with an infrastructure of Inspectors General, oversight committees, and privacy boards on which our intelligence community commitment is based and measured. And it is that framework that we need to grow and nourish and adjust as our cultures change.

That’s not privacy.

So don’t think for a minute that privacy will be better protected with a PCLOB in place, except perhaps marginally in the few programs that the Board dips into.

The membership of the board is slated to be: Jim Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology, a sincere and knowledgeable privacy player, whose “player” role I find incompatible with producing good privacy outcomes; Elisebeth Collins Cook, a former Department of Justice lawyer who I had never heard of before her nomination; Rachel Brand, an attorney for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also unknown to me; Patricia Wald, a former federal judge for the D.C. Circuit whose privacy work is unknown to me; and David Medine, currently a WilmerHale partner who will chair the board. Medine is unquestionably government-friendly. He was a Federal Trade Commission bureaucrat who helped draft the Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial privacy and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) regulations.

On Breach of Decorum and Government Growth

Last week, the Center for Democracy and Technology changed its position on CISPA, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, two times in short succession, easing the way for House passage of a bill profoundly threatening to privacy.

Declan McCullagh of C|Net wrote a story about it called “Advocacy Group Flip-Flops Twice Over CISPA Surveillance Bill.” In it, he quoted me saying: “A lot of people in Washington, D.C. think that working with CDT means working for good values like privacy. But CDT’s number one goal is having a seat at the table. And CDT will negotiate away privacy toward that end.”

That comment netted some interesting reactions. Some were gleeful about this “emperor-has-no-clothes” moment for CDT. To others, I was inappropriately “insulting” to the good people at CDT. This makes the whole thing worthy of further exploration. How could I say something mean like that about an organization whose staff spend so much time working in good faith on improving privacy protections? Some folks there absolutely do. This does not overcome the institutional role CDT often plays, which I have not found so creditable. (More on that below. Far below…)

First, though, let me illustrate how CDT helped smooth the way for passage of the bill:

Congress is nothing if not ignorant about cybersecurity. It has no idea what to do about the myriad problems that exist in securing computers, networks, and data. So its leaders have fixed on “information sharing” as a panacea.

Because the nature and scope of the problems are unknown, the laws that stand in the way of relevant information sharing are unknown. The solution? Scythe down as much law as possible. (What’s actually needed, most likely, is a narrow amendment to ECPA. Nothing of the sort is yet in the offing.) But this creates a privacy problem: an “information sharing” bill could facilitate promiscuous sharing of personal information with government agencies, including the NSA.

On the House floor last week, the leading Republican sponsor of CISPA, Mike Rogers (R-MI), spoke endlessly about privacy and civil liberties, the negotiations, and the process he had undertaken to try to resolve problems in the privacy area. At the close of debate on the rule that would govern debate on the bill, he said:

The amendments that are following here are months of negotiation and work with many organizations—privacy groups. We have worked language with the Center for Democracy and Technology, and they just the other day said they applauded our progress on where we’re going with privacy and civil liberties. So we have included a lot of folks.

You see, just days before, CDT had issued a blog post saying that it would “not oppose the process moving forward in the House.” The full text of that sentence is actually quite precious because it shows how little CDT got in exchange for publicly withdrawing opposition to the bill. Along with citing “good progress,” CDT president and CEO Leslie Harris wrote:

Recognizing the importance of the cybersecurity issue, in deference to the good faith efforts made by Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, and on the understanding that amendments will be considered by the House to address our concerns, we will not oppose the process moving forward in the House.

Cybersecurity is an important issue—nevermind whether the bill would actually help with it. The leadership of the House Intelligence Committee have acted in good faith. And amendments will evidently be forthcoming in the House. So go ahead and pass a bill not ready to become law, in light of “good progress.”

Then CDT got spun.

As McCullagh tells it:

The bill’s authors seized on CDT’s statement to argue that the anti-CISPA coalition was fragmenting, with an aide to House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) sending reporters e-mail this morning, recalled a few minutes later, proclaiming: “CDT Drops Opposition to CISPA as Bill Moves to House Floor.” And the Information Technology Industry Council, which is unabashedly pro-CISPA, said it “applauds” the “agreement between CISPA sponsors and CDT.”

CDT quickly reversed itself, but the damage was done. Chairman Rogers could make an accurate but misleading floor statement omitting the fact that CDT had again reversed itself. This signaled to members of Congress and their staffs—who don’t pay close attention to subtle shifts in the views of organizations like CDT—that the privacy issues were under control. They could vote for CISPA without getting privacy blow-back. Despite furious efforts by groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the ACLU, the bill passed 248 to 168.

Defenders of CDT will point out—accurately—that it argued laboriously for improvements to the bill. And with the bill’s passage inevitable, that was an essential benefit to the privacy side.

Well, yes and no. To get at that question, let’s talk about how groups represent the public’s interests in Washington, D.C. We’ll design a simplified representation game with the following cast of characters:

  • one powerful legislator, antagonistic to privacy, whose name is “S.R. Veillance”;
  • twenty privacy advocacy groups (Groups A through T); and
  • 20,000 people who rely on these advocacy groups to protect their privacy interests.

At the outset, the 20,000 people divide their privacy “chits”—that is, their donations and their willingness to act politically—equally among the groups. Based on their perceptions of the groups’ actions and relevance, the people re-assign their chits each legislative session.

Mr. Veillance has an anti-privacy bill he would like to get passed, but he knows it will meet resistance if he doesn’t get 2,500 privacy chits to signal that his bill isn’t that bad. If none of the groups give him any privacy chits, his legislation will not pass, so Mr. Veillance goes from group to group bargaining in good faith and signaling that he intends to do all he can to pass his bill. He will reward the groups that work with him by including such groups in future negotiations on future bills. He will penalize the groups that do not by excluding them from future negotiations.

What we have is a game somewhat like the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Though it is in the best interest of the society overall for the groups to cooperate and hold the line against a bill, individual groups can advantage themselves by “defecting” from the interests of all. These defectors will be at the table the next time an anti-privacy bill is negotiated.

Three groups—let’s say Group C, Group D, and Group T—defect from the pack. They make deals with Mr. Veillance to improve his bill, and in exchange they give him their privacy chits. He uses their 3,000 chits to signal to his colleagues that they can vote for the bill without fear of privacy-based repercussions.

At the end of the first round, Mr. Veillance has passed his anti-privacy legislation (though weakened, from his perspective). Groups C, D, and T did improve the bill, making it less privacy-invasive than it otherwise would have been, and they have also positioned themselves to be more relevant to future privacy debates because they will have a seat at the table. Hindsight makes the passage of the bill look inevitable, and CDT looks all the wiser for working with Sir Veillance while others futilely opposed the bill.

Thus, having defected, CDT is now able to get more of people’s privacy chits during the next legislative session, so they have more bargaining power and money than other privacy groups. That bargaining power is relevant, though, only if Mr. Veillance moves more bills in the future. To maintain its bargaining power and income, it is in the interest of CDT to see that legislation passes regularly. If anti-privacy legislation never passes, CDT’s unique role as a negotiator will not be valued and its ability to gather chits will diminish over time.

CDT plays a role in “improving” individual pieces of legislation to make them less privacy-invasive and it helps to ensure that improved—yet still privacy-invasive—legislation passes. Over the long run, to keep its seat at the table, CDT bargains away privacy.

This highly simplified representation game repeats itself across many issue-dimensions in every bill, and it involves many more, highly varied actors using widely differing influence “chits.” The power exchanges and signaling among parties ends up looking like a kaleidoscope rather than the linear story of an organization subtly putting its own goals ahead of the public interest.

Most people working in Washington, D.C., and almost assuredly everyone at CDT, have no awareness that they live under the collective action problem illustrated by this game. This is why government grows and privacy recedes.

In his article, McCullagh cites CDT founder Jerry Berman’s role in the 1994 passage of CALEA, the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act. I took particular interest in CDT’s 2009 backing of the REAL ID revival bill, PASS ID. In 2006, CDT’s Jim Dempsey helped give privacy cover to the use of RFID in identification documents contrary to the principle that RFID is for products, not people. A comprehensive study of CDT’s institutional behavior to confirm or deny my theory of its behavior would be very complex and time-consuming.

But divide and conquer works well. My experience is that CDT is routinely the first defector from the privacy coalition despite the earnest good intentions of many individual CDTers. And it’s why I say, perhaps in breach of decorum, things like: “A lot of people in Washington, D.C. think that working with CDT means working for good values like privacy. But CDT’s number one goal is having a seat at the table. And CDT will negotiate away privacy toward that end.”

Is Government Transparency Headed for a Detour?

With a year in office, and perhaps under some pressure to deliver on promises of transparency and change, the White House went on a little PR offensive this week. It rolled out a blog post and a video claiming the transparency successes of the administration’s first year. A lot has gone on, and it’s worth a review. It’s also worth noting some signals that the government transparency project could be heading for a slight detour.

In the video — a little infomercial-y, but tolerable and interesting — federal chief technology officer Aneesh Chopra cites several examples of government use of technology. A system called ISDS Distribute helps the government monitor flu outbreaks, for example, akin to Google.org’s Flu Trends. Chopra touted the benefits of machine readability and the Agriculture Department’s release of data about a thousand most commonly eaten foods. (I’m not sure if this is it, but if not it’s probably something similar. Someone like Mike could use it to build a site that is further along than 1996’s state-of-the-art.) And Chopra discussed the platforms they are building at apps.gov to help agencies draw on the participation and engagement of the public. Putting aside how these illustrate the federal government’s distended role, these are all fine things.

White House ethics counsel Norm Eisen cited the release of visitor records as “one of the big innovations in the White House” over the past year. (Good, yes. But “big”?) Eisen dodged the question about why health care negotiations are not on C-SPAN.

In response to a question about putting federal advisory committees online, Chopra told of a recent meeting of the President’s Council of Advisers for Science and Technology, which was telecast live on the web and archived.

Finally, Chopra touted the planned January 22nd roll-out of data feeds from every federal agency under a recent open government memorandum — three “high-value data sets” per agency. In working toward this, Chopra said, “the conversation is all about what would help you do what you do better.  How can we advance our shared goals of reducing disparities in health care, improving our commitment  to renewable energies, advancing our collective educational results?”

This language and some of the examples cited in the video cause me to worry that the transparency effort may be heading for a detour. Rather than substantive insight into government management, deliberations, and results, we might get a lot of data-oriented play-toys.

According to the memorandum:

High-value information is information that can be used to increase agency accountability and responsiveness; improve public knowledge of the agency and its operations; further the core mission of the agency; create economic opportunity; or respond to need and demand as identified through public consultation.

That’s a very broad definition. Without more restraint than that, public choice economics predicts that the agencies will choose the data feeds with the greatest likelihood of increasing their discretionary budgets or the least likelihood of shrinking them. That’s data that “further[s] the core mission of the agency” and not data that “increase[s] agency accountability and responsiveness.” It’s the Ag Department’s calorie counts, not the Ag Department’s check register.

The kind of substance the transparency community expects is well represented in a  report issued jointly by the Center for Democracy and Technology and OpentheGovernment.org in March of last year. It’s called “Show Us the Data: Most Wanted Federal Documents,” and it asks for access to important research and governmental process information with the capacity to generate real insights into government and its operations.

Interesting data that the agency has collected or produced may be just that — interesting — but the heart of the government transparency effort is getting information about the functioning of government. Once we have these core elements of transparency captured, other data are absolutely good to have. But let the starting point be the workings of agencies themselves.

To help focus agencies on releasing the data that is high-value for genuine government transparency, I plan to examine the three data-streams each agency releases and grade the agencies on whether their releases provide insight into agency management, deliberations, or results.

As I examine the agency’s data feeds, I’ll use their proximity to true government transparency to assign them a letter grade, awarding them three points for each feed that has to do with management, deliberation, or results. These numerical scores — 9, 6, 3, or 0 — I’ll translate into grades: A, B, C, or D. (Nobody fails when the criteria only came out a week in advance.) F is reserved for agencies that don’t produce feeds.

This rubric for rating the data that agencies release seems reasonably objective, and a decent measure of which agencies are really responding to the demand for transparency and change, and which are pushing interesting data out as a smokescreen against deeper insights and reform. Hopefully, this effort at focusing agencies on true high-value data will see some uptake among my colleagues in the transparency community (if I haven’t alienated them with my endless harping on President Obama’s Sunlight Before Signing promise). Watch this space for agency grades shortly after the release of the feeds.

Assessing the Claim that CDT Opposes a National ID

It was good of Ari Schwartz to respond last week to my recent post querying whether the Center for Democracy and Technology outright opposes a national ID or simply “does not support” one.

Ari says CDT does oppose a national ID, and I believe that he honestly believes that. But it’s worth taking a look at whether the group’s actions are consistent with opposition to a national ID. I believe CDT’s actions – most recently its support of the PASS ID Act – support the creation of a national ID.

(The title of his post and some of his commentary suggest I have engaged in rhetorical excess and mischaracterized his views. Please do judge for yourself whether I’m being shrill or unfair, which is not my intention.)

First I want to address an unusual claim of Ari’s – that we already have a national ID system. If that is true, his support for PASS ID is more sensible because it is an opportunity to inject federal privacy protections into the existing system (putting aside whether it is a federal responsibility to manage a state system or systems).

Do We Already Have a National ID?

I have heard a few people suggest that we have a national ID in the form of the Social Security Number. I believe the SSN is a national identifier, but it fails the test of a national identification card or system because it is not used for identification. As we know well from the scourge of identity fraud, there is no definitive way to tie an SSN to a person. The SSN is not used for identification (at least not reliably and not alone), which is the third part of my national ID definition. (Senator Schumer might like the SSN to form the basis of a national ID system, of course.)

But Ari says something different. He does not claim any definition of “national ID” or “national ID system.” Instead, he appeals to the authority of a 2003 report from a National Academy of Sciences group entitled “Who Goes There?: Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy.” That report indeed says, “State-issued driver’s licenses are a de facto nationwide identity system” – on the second-to-last substantive page of its second-to-last substantive chapter

But this is a highly selective use of quotation. The year before, that same group issued a report called “IDs – Not That Easy: Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems.” From the beginning and throughout, that report discussed the many issues around proposals to create a “nationwide” identity system. If the NAS panel had already concluded that we have a national ID system, it would not have issued an entire report critiquing that prospect. It would have discussed the existing one as such. Ari’s one quote doesn’t do much to support the notion that we already have a national ID.

What’s more, CDT’s own public comments on the proposed REAL ID Act regulations in May 2007 said that its data-intensive “one person – one license/ID card – one record” policy would ”create a national identification system.”

If a national ID system already existed, the new policy wouldn’t create one. This is another authority at odds with the idea that we have a national ID system already.

Support of PASS ID might be forgiven if we had a national ID system and if PASS ID would improve it. But the claim we already have one is weak.

“Political Reality” and Its Manufacture

But the heart of Ari’s claim is that supporting PASS ID reflects good judgment in light of political reality.

Despite the fact that there are no federal politicians, no governors and no appointed officials from any party publicly supporting repeal of REAL ID today, CDT still says that repeal is an acceptable option. However, PASS ID would get to the same outcome, or better, in practice and has the added benefit of actually being a political possibility… . I realize that Harper has invested a lot of time fighting for the word “repeal,” but at some point we have to look at the political reality.

A “Dear Colleague” letter inviting support for a bill to repeal REAL ID circulated on the Hill last week. How many legislators will hesitate to sign on to the bill because they have heard that the PASS ID Act, and not repeal of REAL ID, is CDT’s preferred way forward?

The phrase “political reality” is more often used by advocates to craft the political reality they prefer than to describe anything truly real. Like the observer effect in experimental research, statements about “political reality” change political reality.  Convince enough people that a thing is “political reality” and the sought-after political reality becomes, simply, reality.

I wrote here before about how the National Governors Association, sensing profit, has worked diligently to make REAL ID a “political reality.” And it has certainly made some headway (though not enough). In the last Congress, the only legislation aimed at resolving the REAL ID impasse were bills to repeal REAL ID. Since then, the political reality is that Barack Obama was elected president and an administration far less friendly to a national ID took office. Democrats – who are on average less friendly to a national ID – made gains in both the House and Senate.

But how are political realities crafted? It has often been described as trying to get people on a bus. To pass a bill, you change it to get more people on the bus than get off.

The REAL ID bus was missing some important riders. It had security hawks, the Department of Homeland Security, anti-immigrant groups, DMV bureaucrats, public safety advocates, and the Bush Administration. But it didn’t have: state legislators and governors, privacy and civil liberties groups, and certain religious communities, among others.

PASS ID is for the most part an effort to bring on state legislators and governors. The NGA is hoping to broker the sale of state power to the federal government, locking in its own institutional role as a supplicant in Washington, D.C. for state political leaders.

But look who else was hanging around the bus station looking for rides! – CDT, the nominal civil liberties group. Alone it jumped on the bus, communicating to others less familiar with the issues that PASS ID represented a good way forward.

Happily, few have taken this signal. The authors of PASS ID were unable to escape the name “REAL ID,” which is a far more powerful beacon flashing national ID and all the ills that entails than CDT’s signal to the contrary.

This is not the first time that CDT’s penchant for compromise has assisted the national ID effort, though.

Compromising Toward National ID

The current push for a national ID has a short history that I summarized three years ago in a righteously titled post on the TechLiberationFront blog: “The Markle Foundation: Font of Evil II.”

Briefly, in December 2003, a group called the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age recommended “both near-term measures and a longer-term research agenda to increase the reliability of identification while protecting privacy.” (Never mind that false identification was not a modus operandi of the 9/11 attacks.)

The 9/11 Commission, citing Markle, found that “[t]he federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses.” In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, including national standards for drivers’ licenses and identification cards, the national ID system recommended by the Markle Task Force. And in May 2005, Congress passed a strengthened national ID system in the REAL ID Act.

An earlier post, “The Markle Foundation: Font of Evil,” has more – and the text of a PoliTech debate between myself and Stewart Baker. Security hawk Baker was a participant in the Markle Foundation group, as was national ID advocate Amitai Etzioni. So was the Center for Democracy and Technology’s Jim Dempsey.

I had many reservations about the Markle Foundation Task Force and its work product, and in an April 2005 meeting of the DHS Privacy Committee, I asked Dempsey about what qualified people to serve on that task force, whether people were invited, and what might exclude them. A month before REAL ID passed, he said:

I think the Markle Task Force at least sought balance. And people came to the table committed to dialogue. And those who came with a particular point of view, I think, were all committed to listening. And I think people’s minds were changed… . What we were committed to in the Markle Task Force was changing our minds and trying to find a common ground and to try to understand each other. And we spent the time at it. And that, I think, is reflected in the product of the task force.

There isn’t a nicer, more genuine person working in public policy than Jim Dempsey. He is the consummate honest broker, and this statement of his intentions for the Markle Foundation I believe to be characteristically truthful and earnest.

But consider the possibility that others participating on the Markle Foundation Task Force did not share Jim’s predilection for honest dialogue and compromise. It is even possible that they mouthed these ideals while working intently to advance their goals, including creation of a national ID.

Stewart Baker, who I personally like, is canny and wily, and he wants to win. I see no evidence that Amitai Etzioni changed his mind about having a national ID when he authored the recommendation in the Markle report that ultimately produced REAL ID.

Other Markle participants I have talked to were unaware of what the report said about identity-based security, national identity standards, or a national ID. They don’t even know (or didn’t at the time) that lending your name to a report also lends it your credibility. Whatever privacy or civil liberties advocates were involved with the Markle Task Force got rolled – big-time – by the pro-national-ID team.

CDT is a sophisticated Washington, D.C. operation. It is supposed to understand these dynamics. I can’t give it the pass that outsiders to Washington might get. By committing to compromise rather than any principle, and by lending its name to the Markle Foundation Task Force report, CDT gave credibility to a bad idea – the creation of a national ID.

CDT helped produce the REAL ID Act, which has taken years of struggle to beat back. And now they are at it again with “pragmatic” support for PASS ID.

CDT has been consistently compromising on national ID issues while proponents of a national ID have been doggedly and persistently pursuing their interests. This is not the behavior of a civil liberties organization. It’s why I asked in the post that precipitated this debate whether there is anything that would cause CDT to push back from the table and say No.

Despite words to the contrary, I don’t see evidence that CDT opposes having a national ID. It certainly works around the edges to improve privacy in the context of having a national ID – reducing the wetness of the water, as it were – but at key junctures, CDT’s actions have tended to support having a U.S. national ID. I remain open to seeing contrary evidence.

Lock It Down, Centralize It, Federalize It

Speaking of the Center for Democracy and Technology, Leslie Harris gave a terrific quote to Forbes.com for an article on cybersecurity:

The Rockefeller-Snowe Bill represents just the sort of heavy-handed regulation that could stifle innovation and hurt the economy, argues Leslie Harris, president and chief executive of the Center for Democracy and Technology. “If you lock things down too tight and try to centralize and federalize all kinds of standards, you’re on a collision course with the innovators who may be making the next great tech product in their backyard,” she says.

The question is why CDT doesn’t apply this thinking to the field of identification and credentialing.

EPIC on PASS ID: a National ID Card

The Electronic Privacy Information Center has produced a very thorough analysis of the PASS ID Act, which would revive the REAL ID national ID program.

The EPIC analysis states flatly, “The bill would establish a national ID card,” and, “The intent of this legislation is to facilitate a National ID system.”

That’s quite a contrast to Ari Schwartz at the Center for Democracy and Technology, who alone believes that PASS ID “prevents the creation of a National ID system.”