Tag: BCA

GOP Groups’ Ads on Sequestration, Defense Jobs Are Misleading

It is no surprise that the defense contractors want to protect their profits by getting taxpayers to pony up more money. Now they have secured the support of Crossroads GPS in a commercial against Senate candidate and former Virginia governor Tim Kaine. The Crossroads ad follows similar ones from Kaine’s challenger, George Allen, and the National Republican Senatorial Committee. All three ads claim that spending cuts under sequestration will result in devastating job losses to the defense industry and Virginia; the Crossroads ad claims 520,000 jobs will be lost. But these estimates are wildly inflated and represent the short-term interests of the defense industry, not the American taxpayer.

In actuality, the cuts, if they occur, will be evenly divided between the Pentagon and the rest of the discretionary budget. They are a very modest share of total federal spending over the next decade, and the assertion that the cuts will lead to massive job losses have been thoroughly refuted here, here, and here. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that such cuts will have beneficial effects over the medium- to long-term, if the savings are returned to taxpayers, and not merely plowed into other federal spending.

All of these pro-GOP ads get the lost jobs number from a study commissioned by the Aerospace Industries Association and authored by George Mason economist Stephen Fuller. Last Friday, the Cato Institute hosted a forum—which included Fuller—that considered the effects of military spending cuts on employment and the economy. We discussed the positive impact that cuts in Pentagon spending can have in the wider economy, and even in a state like Virginia that is more dependent than other states on federal spending. The Wall Street Journal’s Steve Moore argued we should just let sequestration happen (I agree). As the Washington Post reported, Economist Benjamin Zycher summed up the hypocrisy of conservatives claiming the defense budget produces jobs:

“Conservatives . . . are highly dubious about the purported [gross domestic product] and employment benefits of federal domestic spending, as illustrated by the meager effects of the Obama stimulus fiasco,” he said. “There’s no particular reason to believe that defense spending is different.”

I wish that organizations like Crossroads GPS were as committed to saving the taxpayers money as they are to electing Republicans. I’d also like it if they relied on objective facts, not statistics designed to protect the narrow interests of an industry that relies overwhelmingly on taxpayer dollars. We wouldn’t expect Republicans to accept the teachers unions’ claims about job losses from cuts in the Department of Education. Why, then, do they promote these phony numbers by the defense contractors?

On Thursday, Dan Mitchell and I will be discussing this issue—the effects of sequestration—on Capitol Hill. It is not too late to register, but space is limited, so act now.

The Truth about Sequestration

Cato has just released a new video, titled “The Truth about Sequestration,” that tells the real story about sequestration, the automatic budget cuts required by the Budget Control Act. Many in Congress claim to abhor their creation, including many of those who voted for it, yet the members and the president haven’t done much to prevent it. Perhaps they shouldn’t do anything and let the cuts happen. In our video, my colleagues Ben Friedman and Dan Mitchell join me in explaining that, whatever its shortcomings as legislation (and there are many, as discussed below) sequestration may be the only viable way to reduce the Pentagon’s budget.

However, there’s little likelihood that sequestration will significantly reduce the defense budget long term. That’s because sequestration cuts the defense budget only in the first year. Every year after that, defense spending will increase. Spending levels will indeed be lower than the Pentagon last year expected them to be. But only in Washington is that considered a cut. So, under sequestration, instead of spending $5.7 trillion on defense over the next decade, as the FY2013 budget suggests, the government will spend about $5.2 trillion.

That $500 billion difference may not actually materialize. Congress has a few options to mitigate the effects of the initial $55 billion slice off the budget. They could reprogram funds after the sequester, change the definition of “programs, projects and activities” (the budget level at which the cuts are implemented), or take advantage of the flexibility within operations and maintenance (O&M) funds. In fact, because the Office of Management and Budget has declared that war spending is eligible to be sequestered, the total cuts to O&M can be spread out across a bigger pot of money. Beyond all that, sequestration does not affect outlays or funds already obligated, which means it will not affect existing contracts. So, the real story is that should sequestration actually happen, Congress and the Pentagon will have much more flexibility than they’re willing to admit.

Our video also highlights the fact that we spend far more on the military than is necessary. Since the end of the Cold War, policymakers and pundits have coalesced around the idea that the United States is the “indispensable nation” responsible for protecting everyone from everything. Under the misapprehension that threats anywhere in the world are necessarily threatening to the United States, we have taken on the responsibility of policing the entire planet. This increases the chances that the United States will become involved in conflicts that do not engage vital U.S. interests, or that we do not fully understand, or can easily remedy. This strategic hypochondria (H/T Ted Galen Carpenter) also burden American taxpayers with additional costs that could and should be borne by others. The video includes a nifty graphic showing the expansion of NATO. We have added a host of weak or fragile countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia (including, still, Iraq and Afghanistan), and now we are doubling down with assurances to Asian nations that we will constrain China (and implying that they need not do so).

In short, a bloated defense budget has enabled these misguided policies, encourages free-riding by our “allies” and make us less safe abroad and less free at home. Though I would have much preferred a serious strategic debate before the current fiscal crisis, and indeed called for such a thing, sequestration should help us to refocus our national security priorities. In fact, the real story is that sequestration doesn’t restrict our choices, it enables us to make better ones.

Americans shouldn’t worry that sequestration will make our defense budget too small. We account for approximately 48 percent of the world’s military spending. We will retain a margin of superiority over any conceivable combination of rivals, including China, even if our share of military spending fell to 44 or 45 percent of the world’s total.

Sequestration was no one’s first choice, but keeping our reckless spending and strategic myopia on auto pilot is worse.

A Modest Victory for Transparency and Accountability in the DoD Budget

Earlier this week I wrote about the Obama administration’s proposal to shift $5.6 billion dollars out of the Pentagon’s base budget into the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account. Because the OCO budget was exempted from last year’s Budget Control Act (BCA), this gimmick was clearly intended to allow the Pentagon to evade the BCA limits, and had attracted the attention of House Budget chair Paul Ryan (R-WI), Republican Study Committee chair Jim Jordan (R-OH), and a handful of budget watchers. I anticipated that one or more members would call attention to it during floor debate over the defense bill.

Sure enough, on Wednesday afternoon, Rep. Mick Mulvaney (R-SC) offered an amendment to undo the shift. Unfortunately, Mulvaney’s amendment was ruled out of order, ignoring the fact that the entire defense bill exceeded the BCA spending limits and thus also should have been ruled out of order. I thought the proposal to fix the dubious OCO shift would die there.

Not so. Undaunted, Mulvaney returned with a new amendment co-sponsored with Reps. Jordan and Peter Welch (D-VT) that did not actually transfer any funds—thus conforming to House rules—but that expressed the same goals articulated in the earlier amendment. As Mulvaney, Jordan, and Welch explained in a “dear colleague” letter:

Our amendment, similar to a Sense of the House resolution, supports the policy of moving $5.6 billion in non-war costs back to the Base Budget. It fully supports the resources our troops on the battlefield will need, but it does not actually transfer any funding. It simply highlights a non-partisan issue—accountability and transparency—by demonstrating support to move these non-war costs back to the Base Budget in the FY13 CR and future budget requests. (Emphasis in original)

The gambit worked: the resolution passed 238-178, with strong bipartisan support. House Armed Services Committee chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-CA) voted no, as did Appropriations chair Harold “Hal” Rogers (R-KY) and the House Appropriations Committee-Defense Subcommittee chair C.W. Bill Young (R-FL). But 154 Republicans voted for the amendment, including Budget chairman Ryan, House whip Eric Cantor (R-VA), and Rules Committee chair David Dreier (R-CA).

It was a modest, and largely symbolic, victory for transparency and accountability. The next step is to end the war in Afghanistan and eliminate the OCO account entirely. That separate pot of money for the war(s) has served to obscure the enormous growth in the Pentagon’s base budget over the past decade.

What Sequestration Might Mean for San Diego (and Other Places)

A few days ago, I wrote about the fight looming between taxpayer advocates and defense contractors over whether Congress should scrap the Budget Control Act (BCA) and allow the Pentagon’s budget to grow. The contractors and their allies, led by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), contend that cuts in military spending will have a harmful (some say devastating) impact on the sluggish economy; taxpayers groups point out that the Pentagon’s budget has risen dramatically over the past decade and object to suggestions that we should raise taxes or incur more debt to pay for additional increases.

In my earlier post, I focused on the politics of this fight, here I focus on economics. I’m not convinced—and neither are a number of others—by the AIA’s claims that sequestration will wreck the economy.

For starters, we should keep an eye on the bottom line. If there is no deal to undo the BCA, the Pentagon’s base budget in 2013 will be about the same as in 2007. The budget, in short, is not being gutted, slashed, cut to the bone, etc. (pick your favorite metaphor). In real, inflation-adjusted terms, Pentagon spending will remain near historic highs and well above the spending levels of the 1990s. As for the economic effects of the spending cuts contemplated under sequestration, these are likely to be small because the cuts are tiny relative to the economy as a whole, less than three tenths of 1 percent of GDP per year over the next decade.

Those small cuts are likely, in the big picture, to generate overall benefits. It’s easy to focus exclusively on the companies and individuals hurt by the cuts and forget that the taxed wealth that funded them is being employed elsewhere. Provided that defense-spending cuts allow for lower taxes, people will have more disposable income to spend. If they spend it wisely (and even if they don’t), that will generate new economic activity that will offset the job losses elsewhere.

Of course, regions disproportionately dependent upon military spending are more likely to feel squeezed. Even in these defense-heavy localities, however, the effects of military-spending cuts are likely to be temporary, and the eventual transition of workers out of the defense industry into other fields should have beneficial effects. That goes for areas with sufficient economic activity—especially diversification—to help ease the transition.

That is what we hope will happen. But it is more than just hope; my attitudes toward the economic effects of military spending cuts are also shaped by personal experience, especially a trip that I took to San Diego in the summer of 1997.

I was there to do some research on the missile gap and the presidential election of 1960. John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon had both campaigned in Southern California, and both alleged that their opponent’s decisions with respect to military spending would drive thousands of people out of work. I located some interesting information at UC-San Diego and San Diego State. The most memorable moment, however, occurred during a visit to General Dynamics’s Convair facility, not far from the San Diego Airport (aka Lindbergh Field).

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) had been a major manufacturer of manned aircraft during World War II and then later moved into the design and manufacture of missiles and rockets. Operated as a division of General Dynamics after the two companies merged in 1954, Convair was one of the largest civilian employers in San Diego for several decades. Convair employment in San Diego peaked at more than fifty thousand in 1961, fell to less than six thousand by 1976 and then spiked again in the 1980s to more than twelve thousand employees. But orders for Convair products collapsed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. By June 1995, GD’s Convair Division counted a mere 1,432 workers in its San Diego facility. When I arrived at the Convair plant, two years later, in June 1997, I found a single construction trailer that served as the office for Convair’s final two employees. As I explained in the epilogue to my book, John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap, “I witnessed a dying company breathing its last.”

Although it was just one company, one might expect Convair’s demise to have had a devastating ripple effect, given its signal importance to the San Diego economy over the years. It didn’t. Likewise, the other Pentagon cuts of the early 1990s (holding constant for inflation, DoD outlays fell by 29 percent from the peak in 1987 to the trough in 1999) did not do irreparably harm. For example, San Diego’s unemployment rate was the same as the national average in 1996 (5.4 percent), and well below that of the rest of California (7.3 percent) at the time. By 1999, San Diego’s unemployment rate had fallen to just 3.1 percent, more than a full point below the national average (4.2 percent), and more than two points below California state-wide (5.3 percent).

Why did San Diego fare so well? As one study of the region observed in May 2001:

the defense engineers and managers diverted, by the loss of their jobs, into entrepreneurial pursuits … helped the region emerge from the severe economic challenge posed by defense cutbacks at the beginning of the 1990s. Today, San Diego’s economy is growing and contains a more diverse set of industries.

Of course, we will never know if San Diego might have experienced even stronger economic growth in the absence of defense cutbacks in the early 1990s. Nor can we be certain that it will respond to the looming defense drawdown under sequestration as well as it did to the far deeper cuts of the late 1980s and early 1990s. But this one case study shows that even defense-heavy localities can adapt to lower levels of defense spending. At a minimum, the story serves as an important counterpoint to the AIA’s claims of impending doom.

Cross-posted from the Skeptics at the National Interest.

More Skepticism on Romney’s Military Spending Promise

On Sunday, Defense News published a good article by Kate Brannen that looks into Mitt Romney’s plans for military spending. This is not the first examination of Romney’s lofty campaign promise to spend at least four percent of GDP on the Pentagon’s base budget. Since October 2011, when I first crunched the numbers on his plan, others have followed with their own estimates.

In my first analysis, his plan totaled $2.046 trillion above projected defense budgets based on CBO totals from FY 2012 to FY 2021. That total does not include war costs, nor does it take into account the possibility of military action toward Iran, which Romney has made clear is on the table, with or without Congressional approval. My number one question at the time—beyond the fact that GDP is not the proper guide for military spending—was: Where is this money going to come from?

In April, I recalculated Romney’s gimmick, adjusting my numbers with the help of my colleague Charles Zakaib, based on the Obama administration’s latest 10-year projections. We presented the data in the graph below:

The conclusion: Romney’s four percent gimmick would now necessitate $2.58 trillion in additional military spending above the new baseline. I tried to put this in context:

Romney’s Four Percent Gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise), and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney’s annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989).

Does Romney genuinely believe we have enemies that approach the Soviet Union’s might, let alone ones that are 42 percent more threatening? We would be wise to question his judgment if so.

Back in the realm of the reality, further cuts to military spending are fast approaching as sequestration looms. The debate in Washington is now largely focused on how much to cut from the defense budget and in what manner. This is consistent with what the majority of Americans favor and has sidelined those arguing for ever-greater military spending. And yet Mitt Romney remains committed to his Four Percent idea. In this instance, Romney should embrace his supposed conservatism and leave the spendthrift gimmicks to the opposition.

Much more in the podcast below: