Tag: antidumping

The Antidumping Lobby’s Power to Destroy Jobs

President Obama claims to support America’s exporting and so-called “green jobs” industries, but he also likes rules that restrict the importation of critical inputs to those industries. Austin Bragg and I produced a short video detailing how antidumping duties serve to nudge American manufacturers offshore or out of business. The examples we cite are American manufactured products that fall squarely into the category of “green.”

Facebook it. Tweet it. And read more of Dan Ikenson’s heavy lifting on the antidumping issue here, here and here.

President’s Fealty to Antidumping Lobby Kills Jobs and Depresses Growth

Rhetorically, President Obama is a champion of industry—as long as it’s green. To put our money where his mouth is, the president has already devoted over $100 billion in direct subsidies and tax credits to promote investment in solar panel, wind harnessing, lithium ion battery, and other industries he deems crucial to “winning the future.” (See Economic Report of the President, 2011, P. 129, Box 6-2 “Clean Energy Investments in the Recovery Act” for a list of some of those subsidies.) Concerning those industries, the president said in his 2010 SOTU address:

Countries like China are moving even faster… I’m not going to settle for a situation where the United States comes in second place or third place or fourth place in what will be the most important economic engine of the future.

To be sure, I am opposed to industrial policy, which presumes that one person or a cabal of self-anointed soothsayers knows how the future will unfold. But the story I am about to share is, I think, instructive in describing endemic policy dissonance within this administration and speaks to what even the president’s staunchest supporters describe as half-heartedness and an incapacity or unwillingness to follow through. Some chalk it up to indifference, but it’s really an aversion to making choices that could offend potential supporters.

While the president talks up the solar panel industry and commits our resources to its development, other policies of his administration undermine its success and encourage offshoring of production and the jobs that go with it. Dow Corning is one of the world’s largest producers of silicones, which are the most crucial components of solar panel production. The foremost ingredient in these silicones is silicon metal, which costs nearly twice the world market price in the United States because of antidumping restrictions on imports of the raw material from China and Russia (two of the world’s largest suppliers). Under U.S. antidumping law, Dow Corning and all other consumers of silicon metal were forbidden from participating formally in the proceedings that lead to the imposition of the duties.

As I described in a recent Cato policy paper, this is more than just tough luck for a few companies. This is economic self-flagellation on a grand scale. The antidumping statute prohibits consideration of the impact of prospective duties on downstream industries or on the economy as a whole, yet policymakers—having been steamrolled by the pro-antidumping lobby—have given scant consideration to the idea that this is plainly stupid policy, particularly in a globally integrated economy characterized by transnational supply chains and cross-border investment. In such an environment, if one hopes the best for the country’s value-added industries, there should be no restrictions on raw material inputs ever (a policy being embraced by other governments around the world).

Alas, the silicon metal restrictions constitute a big problem for Dow Corning and other industrial consumers of silicon metal, but a bigger problem for the economy. To compete with producers of silicones—the solar panel industries—in Europe, Japan, Canada, and China, Dow Corning is forced to consider moving production abroad so that it is not at such a large cost disadvantage from the outset. As Dow Corning officials put it in a very informative letter:

If Dow Corning were to move the production occurring within its Kentucky operations to any country outside the U.S., it would be more competitive by simply having access to the same global supply of raw materials as all other competitors.

Dow Corning could move offshore, a move it would prefer not to make, and probably recover the costs of the transition in short order. But doing so would reduce U.S. economic activity and destroy U.S. jobs, which would have a more lasting adverse impact. So, in an effort to avoid offshoring its operations—a move that one would think the administration would welcome—Dow Corning submitted an application to have some of its silicone production facilities in Kentucky designated as a Foreign Trade Subzone. The key policy objective of foreign trade zones, according to the former president of the National Association of Foreign Trade Zones is:

The optimization of economic development in the United States creating jobs, investment and value-added activity. The current regulations strike a balance that considers antidumping and countervailing duty petitioners, importers and U.S. manufacturers. Imported products that are made with components that may be dumped or subsidized are not subject to antidumping duty or countervailing duty. If these duties can be avoided by locating a factory in a foreign country, the Board should at least consider allowing it to happen here for export so that American workers can benefit. That is what the regulation achieves.

Basically, Dow Corning was proposing that to balance its need for access to world-priced silicon metal with the country’s need for economic activity and jobs, it would bring in silicon metal from foreign sources, including silicon metal from China and Russia, to be transformed into silicons in that subzone. Antidumping duties on silicon metals that were used to make silicones that were subsequently exported without first “entering the commerce of the United States” would be waived, while antidumping duties on silicon metals used to make silicones sold in the United States would be subject to the full payment of duties.

But during the period in which the FTZ application was pending, an army of professional antidumping law supporters—the Committee to Support U.S. Trade Laws (CSUSTL), the United Steelworkers Union, the Steel Manufacturers Association, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), and others—argued that granting the designation would serve only to circumvent the antidumping order, and that the well-being of the petitioner was all that mattered under the antidumping law.

After hearings, several comment periods, and deliberation the Foreign Trade Zones Board granted Dow Corning’s FTZ request, but “subject to a restriction prohibiting the admission of foreign status silicon metal subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty order,” thereby negating the entire purpose of the application and effectively daring Dow Corning to shut down its Kentucky operations and move abroad. That decision was signed by the acting assistant secretary for import administration—the same person charged with overseeing the Commerce Department’s notoriously pro-petitioner, antidumping regime, and, for the record, a person who answers to President Obama.

Did the president know what was at stake and look the other way? Or did he not even know? Neither answer reflects particularly well on a man claiming to have a plan for job creation and economic growth.

Antidumping Reform Crucial to U.S. Competitiveness

The Cato Institute today published its 13th policy paper on the topic of antidumping. “Economic Self-Flagellation: How U.S. Antidumping Policy Subverts the National Export Initiative” describes with compelling anecdotes and data how the outdated assumptions of a 90-year-old law—one purported to “level the playing field” and protect U.S. companies from “unfair” foreign competition—conspire with its overzealous application to erode the competitiveness of U.S. firms.

During the decade from January 2000 through December 2009, the U.S. government imposed 164 antidumping measures on a variety of products from dozens of countries. A total of 130 of those 164 measures restricted (and in most cases, still restrict) imports of intermediate goods and raw materials used by downstream U.S. producers in the production of their final products. Those restrictions raise the costs of production for the downstream firms, weakening their capacity to compete with foreign producers in the United States and abroad.

In all of those cases, trade-restricting antidumping measures were imposed without any of the downstream companies first having been afforded opportunities to demonstrate the likely adverse impact on their own business operations. This is by design. The antidumping statute forbids the administering authorities from considering the impact of prospective duties on consuming industries—or on the economy more broadly—when weighing whether or not to impose duties.

That asymmetry has always been insane, but given the emergence and proliferation of transnational production and supply chains and cross-border investment (i.e., globalization)—evidenced by the fact that 55% of all U.S. import value consists of raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital equipment (the purchases of U.S. producers)—it is now nothing short of self-flagellation.

Most of those import-consuming, downstream producers—those domestic victims of the U.S. antidumping law—are also struggling U.S. exporters. In fact those downstream companies are much more likely to export and create new jobs than are the firms that turn to the antidumping law to restrict trade. Antidumping duties on magnesium, polyvinyl chloride, and hot-rolled steel, for example, may please upstream, petitioning domestic producers, who can subsequently raise their prices and reap greater profits. But those same “protective” duties are extremely costly to U.S. producers of auto parts, paint, and appliances, who require those inputs for their own manufacturing processes.

President Obama acknowledges as much. On August 11, 2010, at a White House signing ceremony, the president offered the following rationale for a bill that he was about to sign into law:

The Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010 will create jobs, help American companies compete, and strengthen manufacturing as a key driver of our economic recovery. And here’s how it works. To make their products, manufacturers—some of whom are represented here today—often have to import certain materials from other countries and pay tariffs on those materials. This legislation will reduce or eliminate some of those tariffs, which will significantly lower costs for American companies across the manufacturing landscape—from cars to chemicals; medical devices to sporting goods. And that will boost output, support good jobs here at home, and lower prices for American consumers.

Higher input prices stemming from antidumping measures are only the first assault on these downstream firms. The next wave usually takes the form of stiffer competition from firms in countries where there are no antidumping duties on the critical input. As a result, the foreign competition often operates at a cost advantage in the United States and in other markets that enables it to sell profitably at lower prices than U.S. firms can charge.

Accordingly, the profits of downstream firms are squeezed by both higher costs, due to import restrictions, and lower revenues, due to lost sales. As a consequence, countless U.S. producers in downstream industries—including firms that were once thriving in the United States and foreign markets—have suffered severe losses, contraction, and bankruptcy.

Again, the administration is well aware of this connection. Indeed, the U.S. Trade Representative launched a formal complaint against China in the WTO for that country’s restrictions on exports of certain crucial raw materials, providing the following rationale:

China maintains a number of measures that restrain exports of raw material inputs for which it is the top, or near top, world producer. These measures skew the playing field against the United States and other countries by creating substantial competitive benefits for downstream Chinese producers that use the inputs in the production and export of numerous processed steel, aluminum and chemical products and a wide range of further processed products.

Moreover, the USTR demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that restrictions on upstream products generate downstream costs that compound at successive stages in the production supply chain:

These raw material inputs are used to make many processed products in a number of primary manufacturing industries, including steel, aluminum and various chemical industries. These products, in turn become essential components in even more numerous downstream products.

If you need more evidence that the antidumping status quo is weighted heavily against import-consuming U.S. industries, consider this gem: three of the nine mineral raw materials that are the subject of the U.S. case against China in the WTO (magnesium, silicon metal, and coke) are simultaneously subject to U.S antidumping restrictions. That’s right! With our own import restrictions firmly in place, the United States is suing China to remove its export restrictions on the same products. That sounds like an excellent use of resources.

As a final indignity, many U.S. exporters suffer the wrath of foreign antidumping restrictions and other forms of protectionism that are often the result of persistent U.S. opposition to antidumping reform, as well as outright retribution for specific U.S. antidumping actions. Among recent victims are U.S. exporters to China of automobiles, fiber optic cable, chicken, grain, and paper. In countless ways, the antidumping status quo subverts U.S. competitiveness and is an albatross around the neck of the U.S. economy.

To bestow real and enduring benefits upon the U.S. economy, the antidumping law should be reformed to—at a minimum—give legal standing to manufacturers and workers in consuming industries; require the administering authorities to conduct an analysis of the economic impact of prospective antidumping duties and to deny imposition if the costs exceed a certain threshold; and require that any antidumping duties imposed not be excessive.

Antidumping and Bedroom Furniture from China: The Real Story

The Washington Post ran a story in yesterday’s print edition about the U.S. antidumping order against Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China—a case I described seven years ago as the “Poster Child for [Antidumping] Reform” because its sordid details explode the myths upon which rest the rationalizations for the law’s existence.

Those details are nowhere to be found in the WP article, which was published, presumably, to make a few other points.  One such point—the only one with which I agree—is that antidumping duties aren’t very effective at restoring or preserving U.S. jobs.  As the article demonstrates, since the imposition of AD duties on Chinese furniture beginning in 2005, imports from Vietnam, Indonesia, and other countries not subject to the AD restrictions have emerged to fill the vacuum created by declining imports from China.  Not much news in that, though.  This kind of trade diversion is a typical consequence of antidumping restrictions. Likewise, furniture production and the jobs it used to support has not undergone a renaissance in the United States – despite that being the rallying cry of the domestic producers who brought the case in 2004. (More on that in a moment.)

But the article—beginning with its title (“Chinese Make a Run Around U.S. Tariffs”)—leads readers to the faulty conclusion that those cunning Chinese are at it again, looking for ways to prosper at the expense of innocent, upstanding U.S. producers and their workers.  A pretty good tip-off that an article about China and trade is going to miss the mark, mislead, and misinform is when the author describes trade as a contest between two countries with the trade account characterized as a scoreboard.

The United States and China have exchanged accusations of dumping for years and imposed tit-for-tat duties.  All along, though, China has generally come out on top: Its trade surplus with the United States rose to $273 billion in 2010…more than three times the level of a decade earlier.

Is the reader to conclude, then, that more antidumping measures against Chinese products are integral to reducing the trade deficit and, ultimately, “com[ing] out on top”?  That conclusion doesn’t really dovetail with the point about how antidumping does nothing to restore U.S. production.  But I digress.

The main problem with the article is that it escorts readers to the incorrect conclusion that it was Chinese furniture producers who initiated efforts to get around the U.S. antidumping duties.  Implied throughout the article is that a man named Lawrence Yen, president of a Chinese furniture company, was the architect of some crafty plan to avoid U.S. duties.  It reports that during a meeting of Chinese furniture makers in Dongguan: “[Yen] told them [he] would set up a factory in Vietnam,” which was presented in the article as though it were the idea’s genesis.  The caption to the inset chart of furniture imports in the article reads:

To avoid a 2005 U.S. tariff on Chinese-made wooden bedroom furniture, Chinese furniture companies moved operations to other Asian countries, thwarting U.S. efforts to curb “dumping,” the export of goods at unfairly low prices.

This presentation of events may serve the clichéd theme that Americans are in a pitched battle with the Chinese, who are willing to stretch and break the rules to “win,” but it fails to give readers critical parts of the story.  The fact is that this strategic tariff aversion plan, which is as legal and common as off-the-shelf tax minimization software at Best Buy, was the brainchild of the U.S. domestic furniture industry before it filed the case in 2004.

Here’s where my 2004 paper would be useful to readers interested in a fuller accounting of the details:

The case of Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China has nothing to do with unfair trade and is a perfect example of the need for antidumping reform. The filing of this case was a tactical maneuver by one group of domestic producers that seeks to exploit the gaping loopholes of the antidumping law to get a leg up on its domestic competition. Domestic producers realize that the only way to compete and offer their customers variety is to source at least some production from abroad. Instead of preserving or returning domestic jobs (which is the public justification for the petition) import restrictions will cause a shift in sourcing from China to places like the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, and Vietnam–places from which many of the petitioners have begun or are poised to begin importing themselves.

At the time this case was initiated, the same U.S. furniture producers who were petitioning for relief from imports from China were investing in furniture operations in other countries.  There’s nothing illegal or objectionable about investing in foreign production, but the assertions of the petitioning U.S. producers that their aim was to restore U.S. production and U.S. jobs were clearly false.  It is testament to the laughably modest standards for finding a domestic industry injured by reason of dumped imports that duties were ever imposed in the furniture case.  Consider this:

The petitioners’ argument that the U.S. furniture industry is being hurt by Chinese imports is similarly suspect. In the 1990s, U.S. producers began to supplement their domestic production with furniture made in China. The import surge from China did not begin until years after U.S. producers began to cultivate the Chinese industry.

Consider the experience of Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Company, one of the largest U.S. producers and a petitioner in this case. In the late 1990s Vaughan-Bassett invited one of the largest Chinese producers, Lacquer Craft, to its factory to videotape production of bedroom furniture so that it could produce bedroom furniture in China for Vaughan-Bassett to import and resell. According to testimony before the ITC, U.S. producers turned to China to “supplement their product line because they had ideas, they had designs, they were the professionals in our industry, and they knew after traveling to China and seeing the infrastructure there that they could make certain bedrooms in China, bring it here, mark it up 30 to 40 percent to a retailer and still sell it for less than they could have made it for.”

Some producers invested directly in Chinese manufacturing facilities, while others simply imported from unrelated Chinese producers. U.S. retailers soon caught on, recognizing the many benefits of purchasing from China. They could cut out the middlemen (U.S. producers) who were simply importing, marking up, and profiting; they could produce a greater variety of designs (including hand carvings and inlays) that are cost-prohibitive in the United States; they could respond to high levels of defects in U.S. production by switching to alternatives; and they could have custom designs mass-produced and labeled under their own brand names.

While imports of wooden bedroom furniture from China have increased considerably over the past few years, domestic producers (including many of the companies that brought or at least supported the antidumping petition) have played a major role in that increase. In 2000, 6 percent of domestic producers’ U.S. shipments were sourced from China. By 2002, that figure increased to 19.6 percent, and through the first half of 2003, that figure stood at 26.6 percent.

According to the ITC’s own preliminary report in this case:

As an initial matter, we note that the record indicates it has become common practice for members of the domestic industry to import the subject merchandise from China as a means of supplementing their domestic production in the market place. For example, the record shows that 20 of the 40 responding domestic producers imported Chinese merchandise during the period and that the 12 largest domestic producers of wooden bedroom furniture all imported reasonably substantial and increasing volumes of merchandise from China during the period of investigation. In fact, the *** companies within the petitioning group all have imported increasing volumes of subject merchandise from China during the period of investigation.

The essence of this case, then, is well summarized by representatives of Furniture Brands International, Inc., the largest U.S. producer and an opponent of the petition. This case boils down to “a request by domestic producers who are significant importers of the subject merchandise to impose duties on imports that they have voluntarily made on the ground that their very own actions have caused them injury.”

Are petitioners really calling on the federal government to stop them before they import again? The actual story looks more complicated. Evidence presented during the ITC proceeding indicates that certain petitioners have begun or are poised to begin importing from alternate sources should antidumping duties be imposed on Chinese furniture.

The ITC preliminary report confirms this trend is likely underway:

U.S. imports of wooden bedroom furniture from Indonesia, Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand, the fifth, sixth, eighth, and tenth respective largest foreign country suppliers of wooden bedroom furniture to the United States, increased by a total of $100.4 million during 2000-02 and by another $26.7 million in January-June 2003 from the same period in 2002. Although still a small supplier of wooden bedroom furniture to the U.S. market, U.S. imports of these products from Vietnam increased by a total of $8.5 million during 2000-02 and by another $11.6 million in January-June 2003 from the same period in 2002.

A brief submitted to the ITC by the Furniture Retailers Group indicated that petitioners “have been busy helping to set up operations in numerous third countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, where costs are lower than in China. In fact, this week representatives of Vaughan-Bassett are in Vietnam meeting with Vietnamese furniture companies.”

The brief went on to question why the petition named only China and not any of the other low-price third-countries since source-shifting is a common response to country-specific antidumping duties. The answer, of course, was implied.

Although  the antidumping law is hailed by its supporters as a tool to ensure “fair trade” and to “level the playing field” and to protect American firms and workers from “ill-intentioned foreigners,” the fact is that the law is frequently used by U.S. companies seeking advantage over other U.S. companies, with hapless consumers and consuming-industries the collateral damage.

But when media give scant and selective coverage to the topic, they are abetting the status quo, which depends on the continued inscrutibility of the operation of this costly canard.

Tony Soprano Meets the Antidumping Law

Forget all the high-minded rhetoric about “fair trade” and “level playing fields.” Discount the apple-pie claims that the antidumping law protects good American companies and their hard-working employees from unscrupulous, predatory, foreign cheaters. Those are just some of the myths that have sustained the costly antidumping status quo for decades.

If the American public were familiar with all of the sordid details of the antidumping case concerning wooden bedroom furniture from China (which I called a Poster Child for Reform back in 2004), they would be angry and ready to change the law.  Well, on Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal did its part by running a story about how U.S. producers of wooden bedroom furniture have been extorting cash from their Chinese competition in exchange for dropping pursuit of even higher antidumping duty rates at the Commerce Department.

The Journal reported that about $13 million was paid to a group of 20 U.S. furniture makers between 2006 through 2009, and that a much larger, but unspecified, amount of money went to pay the U.S. firms’ lawyers.

Surprisingly, this practice is not illegal. Charlotte Lane, one of six commissioners at the U.S. International Trade Commission, which presides over antidumping investigations and sunset reviews, said, “I cannot figure out for the life of me how they are legal.” And her colleague, Commissioner Dan Pearson added that these settlements create “additional costs and distortions” in furniture trade, “with little evidence that these distortions have yielded any benefits to the industry overall, the U.S. consumer, or the U.S. taxpayer.”

But this practice is nothing new. It’s been going on in the shadows for several years in other cases as well. Bill Silverman, a trade lawyer who represents furniture retailers and importers, offered: “Everybody in the industry in the U.S. and China understands that these payments are clever shakedowns.”  Back in 2006, I wrote about similar “shakedowns” with hundreds of exporters from several countries in the shrimp antidumping cases (toward the end of the paper under the subheading, “A Sign of Things to Come?”)

This pay-to-play scheme is made possible by the peculiarities of the U.S. antidumping system. The United States has the distinction of being the only major economy in the world that uses a “retrospective” system for collecting final antidumping duties on imports. That means that importers pay estimated antidumping duties on goods when they enter the United States, but the final liability is not known until much later—often 18 months to several years later. This system creates enormous uncertainty for importers and works effectively to supercharge the impact of U.S. antidumping measures.

Every year the Commerce Department invites parties involved in antidumping cases to request reviews of the most recent year’s imports to determine the actual amount of dumping for that year, and to set new deposit rates going forward. (More detailed description here.) Neither petitioners nor the respondent companies are required to request a review, and if no requests are made within a given time frame, the duty rates already in effect continue.

So, if a foreign exporter has a 10 percent antidumping duty rate on his products, but is managing to continue making sales in the United States, he might not want to request a review of the previous year’s sales, which could establish a higher final liability and a higher deposit rate going forward. But petitioners can request a review of those sales. In the furniture and shrimp cases, petitioners requested reviews of dozens of companies that “could live with” the rates they were paying, thereby introducing the specter of greater uncertainty, more legal and other expenses, and the risk of higher duties. That’s when petitioners offered to rescind those review requests in exchange for payments.

Now, if that doesn’t amount to extortion (link definition), I’m not sure what does.

As I wrote about the shrimp cases in 2006:

Most foreign companies accepted the deal, which arguably was the better option for both parties in each deal. But there is clearly something unseemly about the domestic industry extorting large sums of money from foreign shrimp producers under threat of burying them in heavy legal costs and the uncertainty associated with the Commerce Department’s calculating new antidumping rates. There is also something ominous about the relative ease with which the petitioners’ bar was able to effectively sell access to the U.S. market and split the proceeds with U.S. companies.

Although the Byrd Amendment was found in violation of the ADA [Antidumping Agreement] and will cease to operate next year, the petitioners’ lawyers seem to have concocted a model for effectively resurrecting Byrd. With this success under their belts, petitioners’ lawyers have a new way to market antidumping actions to their current and prospective clients.

These extortions are only the latest shenanigans in the wooden bedroom furniture case. Antidumping is portrayed as a tool to protect “our” producers from “their” producers. But the primary targets in the furniture case were other U.S. furniture producers.  As I wrote in 2004:

The case of Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China has nothing to do with unfair trade and is a perfect example of the need for antidumping reform. The filing of this case was a tactical maneuver by one group of domestic producers that seeks to exploit the gaping loopholes of the antidumping law to get a leg up on its domestic competition. Domestic producers realize that the only way to compete and offer their customers variety is to source at least some production from abroad. Instead of preserving or returning domestic jobs (which is the public justification for the petition) import restrictions will cause a shift in sourcing from China to places like the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, and Vietnam–places from which many of the petitioners have begun or are poised to begin importing themselves.

The antidumping law is nothing like what its supporters claim it to be.  Its operation works to the benefit of a few industries and crafty insiders at great cost to the rest of the economy.  Let’s hope the Journal article sparks the kind of outrage that will propel serious antidumping reform in the United States.

Getting Serious about Antidumping Reform in 2011

The U.S. antidumping law still enjoys broad bipartisan support in Congress and within pockets of the executive branch. Although some of that support can be chalked up to politicians representing the narrow interests of influential constituencies that have mastered the use of antidumping as a bludgeon to cripple the competition, much more support stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose, history, mechanics, and consequences of the law.

Too many policymakers passively accept the anachronistic rationalizations proffered by the steel industry, labor unions, other big antidumping users, and their hired guns in Washington. Too many buy into the idealized imagery of a patriotic, upstanding American producer working tirelessly to ensure the preservation of well-paying jobs for hard-working Americans, but is suffering the ravages of unscrupulous, predatory foreign traders intent on destroying U.S. firms and monopolizing the U.S. market. What politician could oppose a law presumed to protect that kind of a company against that kind of a scourge?

But when the curtain is peeled back, exposing the reality of the operation of the U.S. antidumping law, one discerns a very different reality.  Antidumping measures always raise the costs of firms in downstream industries that rely on the affected imports.  The law routinely claims domestic firms as victims.  The law is often used as a tool by domestic firms waging battle for supremacy over other domestic firms.  Sometimes foreign-owned firms are the petitioners and U.S-owned firms are the respondents.  Rarely does the law lead to job creation or job restoration in the domestic industry.  And never is the allegation of “unfair trade” substantiated, or even investigated.  Myth and misinformation explains the persistence of the U.S. antidumping regime.

Over the next few months, the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies will shine the spotlight on  U.S. antidumping policy and update its large body of research on the subject by publishing some new papers and hosting discussions about the prospects for meaningful antidumping reform. The new Congress should pay attention.  After all, if renewed talk about completing the Doha Round in 2011 is to become action, so must antidumping reform.

The first of those studies is now available on the Cato home page. That paper describes the evolution of U.S. antidumping policy from an obscure offshoot of competition law into the predominant instrument of contingent protection that it is today and provides an account of some of the crucial statutory and administrative changes that have occurred over the decades. Its purpose is to demonstrate that the increase in antidumping activity reflects several developments that have nothing to do with foreign behavior whatsoever, including a progressive expansion of the definition of dumping, relaxation of evidentiary standards, and a pro-domestic-industry bias in the law’s administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce. The arcane mix of statutory rules and discretionary whims that emerged as contemporary antidumping policy is a far cry from the first antidumping law—in practice and intent. Today, antidumping is little more than an elaborate excuse for run-of-the-mill protectionism. And overwhelmingly, U.S. businesses and consumers are its victims.