Tag: Anthony Kennedy

Libertarians and the Long Road to Gay Rights

Justice Anthony Kennedy has been called the most libertarian member of the Supreme Court (though Ilya Shapiro finds his libertarianism “faint-hearted”). So maybe it’s no surprise that in the Lawrence (2003), Windsor (2013), and Obergefell (today!) cases, Kennedy wrote a majority decision finding that gay people had rights to liberty and equal protection of the law.

As I note in The Libertarian Mind and in an article just posted at the venerable gay magazine The Advocate, libertarians and their classical liberal forebears have been ahead of the curve on gay rights for more than two centuries: 

As the Supreme Court prepares for a possibly historic ruling, most of the country now supports gay marriage. Libertarians were there first. Indeed John Podesta, a top adviser to Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton and founder of the Center for American Progress, noted in 2011 that you probably had to have been a libertarian to have supported gay marriage 15 years earlier.

Just seven years ago, in the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and Hillary Clinton all opposed gay marriage. The Libertarian Party endorsed gay rights with its first platform in 1972 — the same year the Democratic nominee for vice president referred to “queers” in a Chicago speech. In 1976 the Libertarian Party issued a pamphlet calling for an end to antigay laws and endorsing full marriage rights.

That’s no surprise, of course. Libertarians believe in individual rights for all people and equality before the law. Of course they recognized the rights of gay people before socialists, conservatives, or big-government liberals.

King v. Burwell Doesn’t Present a ‘Coercion’ Question

I have a post over at National Review Online’s Bench Memos blog that explains why, contrary to Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concerns, the King v. Burwell challengers’ interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a., PPACA, ACA, and ObamaCare) doesn’t coerce states. At least, not under the Court’s current tests for determining whether Congress is coercing states.

If you happen to be a busy Supreme Court justice, here’s a spoiler:

1. The ACA’s exchange provisions don’t penalize states. They let states make tradeoffs between taxes, jobs, and insurance coverage.

2. Roughly half of states appear to consider those costs tolerable. Prior to 2014, eight states voluntarily imposed this supposedly coercive penalty on themselves.

3. This “deal” is comparable to what the Court allowed in NFIB v. Sebelius. In NFIB, the Court allowed states collectively to turn down Medicaid subsidies for as many as 16 million poor people. The exchange provisions permit states to do the same for 16 million higher-income residents.

I have no objection to the Court lowering the bar for demonstrating that cooperative federalism programs coerce states. But the Court will have to lower the bar quite a bit to find the ACA’s exchange provisions coercive.

If you aren’t a busy Supreme Court justice, or even if you are, read the whole thing.

Actually, Justice Kennedy, IRS Did Tell Congress Section 36B Contains “Contradictory Language”

During oral arguments in King v. Burwell on Wednesday, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed skepticism about the government’s claim that the Supreme Court should defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as allowing certain taxes and subsidies in all states, when the statute authorizes those measures only in states that have an “Exchange established by the State.” Specifically, Kennedy expressed skepticism that the IRS interpretation was eligible for so-called Chevron deference, telling Solicitor General Donald Verrilli:

And it seems to me a little odd that the director of Internal Revenue didn’t identify this problem if it’s ambiguous and advise Congress it was.

Actually, the IRS commissioner did tell Congress the statute was ambiguous.

IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman

In August 2012, IRS commissioner Douglas Shulman testified before Congress. The hearing was largely devoted to the very IRS rule now before the Supreme Court. Rep. Scott DesJarlais (R-Tenn.) interrogated Shulman, in relevant part:

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Do you agree that when authorizing these premium assistance tax credits the Internal Revenue Code, Section 36B, explicitly refers to health insurance exchanges established by the States under Section 1311?

Mr. SHULMAN. I think 36B has some contradictory language in it.

[…]

Mr. SHULMAN. I very much agree with you that there is some contradictory language…

Dr. DESJARLAIS. You are not agreeing with me. I don’t think it is ambiguous, sir. I don’t think it is ambiguous. I think it is very clear.

This is notable for a few reasons:

First, the head of the IRS testified to Congress that there is in fact language in the act that contradicts the government’s argument before the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell that the statute unambiguously authorizes the disputed taxes and subsidies in states with federal exchanges.

Second, neither the IRS’s proposed rule nor its final rule claimed the statute was either clear or ambiguous on this question.

Third, the proposed and final rules identified no statutory support at all for the IRS’s interpretation.

Fourth, the IRS commissioner made this concession before the IRS rule had been challenged in court. The hearing was in August 2012 and the first challenge was filed in September 2012.

Fifth and consequent(ial)ly, this evidence further demonstrates the government’s arguments in King are post-hoc rationalizations for a rule promulgated without reasoned decisionmaking.

How Identification Is Overused and Misunderstood

Justice Anthony Kennedy seems to be carving out his place as the Supreme Court justice who doesn’t “get” identity. Maryland v. King was the case issued today that shows that.

His opener was the 2004 decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, which ratified laws requiring people to disclose their names to police officers on request.

In that case, Deputy Lee Dove of the Humboldt County (NV) Sheriff’s Department had received a report that a man had slugged a woman. He didn’t know the names of the alleged perpetrator or the victim, but Dove found Larry Hiibel standing next to his truck at the side of the road talking to his seventeen-year-old daughter seated inside. Dove didn’t check to see if they were having a dispute, or if anyone had hit anyone. He just started demanding Hiibel’s ID.

“Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder,” Justice Kennedy wrote, approving Hiibel’s arrest for refusing to show his papers:

On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in [certain cases, such as] where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.

Even if he had gotten Larry Hiibel’s ID, that wouldn’t have told Dove any of these things. Dove would have had to stop his battery investigation to investigate Hiibel’s background, which he didn’t do until after he had arrested Hiibel–and after his partner had thrown Hiibel’s distraught daughter to the ground. (There’s your battery.)

In Maryland v. King, Justice Kennedy did it again. He wrote the decision approving DNA identification of arrestees. Like demanding Hiibel’s ID, which had no relation to investigating battery, Maryland’s practice of collecting DNA has no relation to investigating or proving the crime for which King was arrested, and it does nothing to administer his confinement. This Justice Scalia made clear in a scathing dissent.

The Court alludes at several points to the fact that King was an arrestee, and arrestees may be validly searched incident to their arrest. But the Court does not really rest on this principle, and for good reason: The objects of a search incident to arrest must be either (1) weapons or evidence that might easily be destroyed, or (2) evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. Neither is the object of the search at issue here. (citations omitted)

Justice Kennedy appears to think there are certain behaviors around detention and arrest that law enforcement is allowed without regard to the detention or arrest. Here, he has sanctioned the gathering of DNA from arrested people, supposedly presumed innocent until proven guilty, to investigate the possibility of their connection to other, unknown crimes. His logic would allow searching the cell phone of a person arrested for public drunkenness to see if they have participated in an extortion plot.

There is plenty of time to run DNA identification data past cold case files after conviction, and all parties agree that’s what would have happened in King’s case. Given that, the Supreme Court has upheld DNA-based investigation of innocent people for their connections to cold cases because they happen to have been arrested. That’s the strange result of Maryland v. King.

Supreme Court Finally Resists Temptation to Cite Foreign Law When Interpreting the U.S. Eighth Amendment

The Supreme Court decided more than just the Arizona immigration and Montana campaign-finance cases yesterday; by a 5-4 margin, it struck down state laws that impose mandatory sentences of life-without-parole (LWOP) on juveniles who have committed murder.  The Court left open the possibility of discretionary juvenile LWOP sentences, provided that the sentencing judge takes into account the defendant’s youth and maturity.

I don’t have much to say about this ruling—Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is too hopelessly subject to national surveys, multi-factor balancing tests, and the whims of Justice Kennedy to begin to discuss here—other than to point out one glaring ray of light: unlike past such cases, the Court did not cite foreign law as support for its ruling.  I’ve pointed out the problems with doing that many times before, and Cato even joined a brief two years ago specifically on this issue in the case involving juvenile LWOP  for non-homicide crimes.  Suffice it to say, whatever you think about “cruel and unusual punishment,” the only society whose ”evolving standards of decency” are relevant to interpretations of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment is the United States.

More on this point from Hans Bader over at CEI’s blog.

More on Property Rights (Plus Privileges, Immunities, Due Process)

Yesterday I blogged about the Florida property rights case, which I now consider the best unanimous opinion against my position I could ever imagine.  Although the property owners lost, four justices stood for the idea that courts no less than legislatures or executive bodies are capable of violating the Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment), while two others endorsed remedying such violations via Substantive Due Process (Fourteenth Amendment), and the remaining two didn’t express an opinion one way or the other.  For more on the case, see the blogposts of Cato adjunct scholars Tim SandefurIlya Somin, and David Bernstein.

An interesting side note involves Justice Scalia’s excoriation of Substantive Due Process (and Justice Kennedy’s use of it):

Moreover, and more importantly, JUSTICE KENNEDY places no constraints whatever upon this Court. Not only does his concurrence only think about applying Substantive Due Process; but because Substantive Due Process is such a wonderfully malleable concept, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 562 (2003) (referring to “liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendentdimensions”), even a firm commitment to apply it would bea firm commitment to nothing in particular.

The great attraction of Substantive Due Process as a substitute for more specific constitutional guarantees is that it never means never—because it never means anything precise.

Scalia also calls Kennedy’s method “Orwellian”  – after having said that Justice Breyer uses a “Queen-of-Hearts” approach “reminiscent of the perplexing question how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?”  Really, this is classic Scalia, a delight to read (and you should, here).

The problem with what Scalia says, as Josh Blackman points out, is that the Court is about to release its opinion in the Chicago gun case, McDonald v. Chicago and, based on the oral argument, is about to incorporate the Second Amendment via Substantive Due Process.  If SDP is so bad, how can Scalia (endorsed by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito) use it to protect a “new” right? – particularly when the Privileges or Immunities Clause was created for just this purpose!  One answer is that, to Scalia, “babble” – his term for SDP – is still worth more than “flotsam” (his term for P or I), as I discuss here.  Another is that, to put it bluntly, Scalia is a results-oriented non-originalist, as Josh and I discuss here.

Speaking of Blackman-Shapiro collaborations, for the correct way to apply the right to keep and bear arms to the states, see our law review article called “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed.”  And Tim Sandefur, who authored Cato’s McDonald brief (read a summary here) just published a fascinating related article called “Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process.”  I haven’t read it yet but am very much looking forward to it. 

Tim also recently wrote a book defending economic liberties (which Justice Scalia also disparages in his Stop the Beach opinion), called The Right to Earn a Living: Economic Liberty and the Law.  I hear it makes for good beach reading.

Crocodile Tears? Liberals Lament Lack of Their Own on the Court

An interesting narrative has arisen among some on the left that the nomination of Elena Kagan shows what chumps Democratic presidents are.  That is, not only could President Obama have tapped a stronger “progressive” voice, but he – like President Clinton before him, and unlike Republican presidents – put avoiding political fights ahead of moving the Court left.  Since LBJ, Democrats have opted for a “moderate technocrat” like Stephen Breyer rather than a “lion” like William Brennan or Thurgood Marshall.  (Sonia Sotomayor was good and necessary for identity politics, the argument continues, but, let’s face it, she’s no liberal Scalia.)

Take this opening quote from a New York Times article that came out the day of the nominee’s announcement: “The selection of Solicitor General Elena Kagan to be the nation’s 112th justice extends a quarter-century pattern in which Republican presidents generally install strong conservatives on the Supreme Court while Democratic presidents pick candidates who often disappoint their liberal base.”  Or Dahlia Lithwick’s op-ed in Slate about how liberal law students are so many lost sheep because their ideological heroes are deemed unconfirmable and therefore not part of the nomination discussion.

Well.  A few things on this: First, even if the argument were true, it’s simply not statistically significant because we’re only talking four Democratic appointments (Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg by Clinton, Sotomayor and Kagan by Obama; poor Jimmy Carter had none, the same number George W. Bush would have had had he not been re-elected).  Second, if you line up the Republican and Democratic nominees in recent decades, it’s conservatives who are disappointed (need I even mention John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter, let alone Earl Warren and Brennan himself, all Republican nominees).  Third, to say that someone like Ginsburg – a push-the-envelope feminist and ACLU lawyer – is a moderate is to center the jurisprudential spectrum around the law faculty lounge.  And fourth, as David Bernstein details, it is people like Richard Epstein – and other Federalist Society regulars like Dan Troy, Miguel Estrada, John Eastman, Frank Easterbrook, Stephen Bainbridge, and Todd Zywicki (as well as Cato’s own Roger Pilon, Randy Barnett, and Ilya Somin) – who would be considered filibusteringly beyond the pale, much more than Lithwick’s vaunted American Constitution Society stalwarts.

In short, if anything it is Republicans who can rightfully be disappointed in their presidents’ nominees – though Kennedy’s seat was of course originally to have been filled by Robert Bork. More unfortunately, it is libertarian law students who can lament that their kind lacks representation on the High Court – though note that the second choice for Kennedy’s seat was Douglas Ginsburg (the last judicial martyr of the drug war).  And so, as the Court remains securely to the left of the American people, just today ratifying radical assertions of federal legislative and judicial power, Elena Kagan is poised to fit right into that jurisprudential “mainstream.”  Good for the left, bad for the Constitution.