Tag: amicus briefs

Should You Need a License to Help Someone Find an Apartment?

Kansas City Premier Apartments v. Missouri Real Estate Commission is quite similar to the occupational licensing case of Locke v. Shore, in which Cato also recently filed a brief, except that the speech-licensing regulation here concerns not artistic expression but rather the dissemination of consumer-demanded commercial information — specifically, rental property listings that are free to the public.

The Missouri Real Estate Commission, acting on a complaint by a licensed realtor, decided that Kansas City Premier Apartments, which provides local rental listings, was acting as an unlicensed real estate broker and was therefore subject to fine and even criminal prosecution. (Before KCPA began operations, it had asked the Commission whether it needed a license and did not receive a clear answer other than that it was a “grey area” of law.)

KCPA challenged the Commission’s decision on First Amendment grounds, but the trial court found it to be constitutional without giving a reason for its conclusion. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court after simply presuming the constitutionality of the speech restriction — contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. that “[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it” — and placing the burden of proving unconstitutionality on KCPA.

Cato has now joined the Pacific Legal Foundation on a brief supporting KCPA’s request that the U.S. Supreme Court hear the case. Our brief notes that “this case combines the nationally important commercial speech issue with the equally nationally important question of the extent to which the Constitution tolerates occupational licensing.” We explain the difficulties that the Court’s “commercial speech doctrine” has caused and argue for a movement toward greater protection for collective and commercial speech, and away from a confusing four-part test established in a 1980 case called Central Hudson.

As in Locke, this latest case raises the question of whether occupational licensing schemes that have an effect on speech are constitutional. Also as in Locke, an infinite array of professionals and ordinary people could get caught up in this regulation, including even a friend helping another friend find an apartment.

Beyond the technical legal points, the case implicates broader policy issues such as the right to earn a living and the impact that speech monopolies have on consumers. Indeed, the consumer impact may be even more apparent here than in other occupational licensing cases because so many people struggle to find affordable apartments and other rentals in this economy — not to mention over the course of their lives.

The Supreme Court will decide early in the new year whether to hear Kansas City Premier Apartments v. Missouri Real Estate Commission.

More on the Constitution’s Lack of a Drug-War Exception

Challenges to Florida’s unconstitutional drug laws continue to gain momentum. Following a successful federal district court challenge to the constitutionality of state statutes lacking a mens rea requirement (mental culpability, rather than, for example, incidental possession), people convicted under them have come forward en masse to ask Florida courts to reexamine their convictions.

As described in the background to a previous brief in the case of Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Shelton, the district court held that these sorts of laws offend the constitutional guarantee of due process. Florida’s Supreme Court has now consolidated over 40 appeals resulting from that federal court decision (which itself is now on appeal). Cato has once again joined the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, ACLU, Drug Policy Alliance, Calvert Institute for Policy Research, Libertarian Law Council, and 38 law professors on a brief supporting the rights of persons convicted under the “strict liability” statutes.

We urge the Florida Supreme Court to follow the federal district court’s lead and strike down laws prohibiting the sale, possession, or delivery of illicit substances without requiring mental culpability. That court now has the opportunity to reverse these unwarranted convictions and purge a nationally singular stain on civil liberties.

The name of the case is Florida v. Adkins.

Thanks to legal associate Paul Jossey for his assistance with this brief and blogpost.

Obamacare’s Footnote Four

This post was co-authored by Cato legal associate Chaim Gordon.

Freedom-loving lawyers everywhere recoil in horror at the mere mention of “footnote four.” In that infamous citation in the 1938 case of Carolene Products, the Supreme Court officially renounced judicial review of laws that infringe on economic liberty. This week, in his dissent from the D.C. Circuit opinion that upheld the individual mandate on Commerce Clause grounds, Judge Brett Kavanaugh added his own dubious “footnote four.”

Judge Kavanaugh’s 65-page dissent was devoted to his parsimonious reading of various provisions in the Internal Revenue Code, culminating in the conclusion that the Anti-Injunction Act robbed federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the case until the mandate penalty is actually enforced. As Judge Kavanaugh noted, “the Tax Code is never a walk in the park.” But the Tax Code is even more grueling when you are given lousy legal advice. And that is why footnote four – in which Judge Kavanaugh inexplicably decides to publicly thank former IRS commissioners Mortimer Caplin and Sheldon Cohen and their counsel for their amicus brief – is so troubling. Here is his footnote four:

Both sides before us want this case decided now and contend that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this suit. The amicus brief of former IRS Commissioners Mortimer Caplin and Sheldon Cohen, submitted by able counsel Alan Morrison, cogently argued the opposite position. The Court is grateful to amici and counsel for their assistance.

But it is entirely unclear why Commissioners Caplin and Cohen and Counsel Morrison deserve the court’s thanks. For starters, the Caplin and Cohen brief was not advocating either of Judge Kavanaugh’s nuanced readings – be they correct or not – of various provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. (It did, however, make one of Kavanaugh’s main arguments in response to one of the government’s arguments toards the end of the brief.) Rather, the Caplin and Cohen brief broadly asserts that the AIA “prevents courts from reviewing all claims involving payments under the Code, not just those labeled taxes.”

The problem is that, in support of this broad, sweeping assertion, the Caplin and Cohen brief misleadingly cites cases that do not support its claim. That is, almost all the cases cited by the Caplin and Cohen brief specifically relied upon the fact that the penalties at issue were found in chapter 68 of the IRC or were part of a larger taxing scheme (as in the Mobile Republican case). But you would not know that from reading the Caplin and Cohen brief.

Take, for example, the Caplin and Cohen brief’s citation to Shaw v. United States and Botta v. Scanlon as “perhaps the best illustration of the breadth of the applicability of” the AIA. What the Caplin and Cohen brief does not say is that both of these cases specifically rely upon provisions in the IRC that define the penalty at issue in those cases (under section 6672) as taxes for the purposes of the AIA. Those provisions, by their own terms, only apply to penalties under chapter 68 of the Code, and the penalty for violating the individual mandate is in chapter 48.

This is really green-eyshade stuff, we know, but that’s what this litigation has come to – and it’s why tax lawyers are not suffering the higher rates of unemployment of their peers in other specialties.

To make matters worse, Caplin and Cohen filed essentially the same amicus brief with the Supreme Court in one of the cases that the Court will take up at its cert petition conference this week. This is especially alarming because the government has urged the Court to appoint an amicus counsel to argue for the position that the AIA applies to the penalty for violating the individual mandate (even though the government now agrees with the mandate’s challengers that the AIA does not apply).

We think the justices’ clerks are fully capable of advising their bosses on the pro-AIA arguments, which in any event does not apply to the 26 state plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit case.  Plus the Court has the Fourth Circuit’s and now Judge Kavanaugh’s thorough “briefs.” If the Court does decide to appoint an amicus to argue that issue, however, let’s hope that it receives better legal advice than the D.C. Circuit got from Caplin and Cohen.

The Longhorn Mismatch: Too Much Racial Preference, Too Little Success

Last week the Supreme Court asked the University of Texas to respond to a cert petition raising an issue that in any non-Obamacare year would be the most explosive part of the Court’s docket: racial preferences in higher education.  (UT had for some inexplicable reason failed even to file a waiver, which is customary in cases where the respondent feels no need to file an actual brief.)

The case was brought by Abigail Fisher, a white Texan denied admission to UT-Austin even though her academic credentials exceeded those of admitted minority students.  The district court granted summary judgment to the university and the Fifth Circuit panel affirmed because a divided Supreme Court in the 2003 case of Grutter v. Bollinger (the University of Michigan case) found narrowly tailored racial preferences to be constitutionally justified for the sake of diversity.  Judge Emilio Garza wrote an electrifying concurrence – starting at page 58 here – agreeing that the ruling was correct under Grutter but that Grutter itself, and the regime of “soft” racial preferences (i.e., not quotas) it created, is incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause. 

The Fifth Circuit then denied en banc rehearing by a vote of 7-9, over a sharp dissent by Chief Judge Edith Jones.  (Full disclosure: The judge I clerked for lo those years ago, E. Grady Jolly, joined Chief Judge Jones’s dissent.)

Fisher’s cert petition objects to the wide discretion the Fifth Circuit would grant UT in administrating its racially preferential admissions paradigm, arguing that affording deference to the university extends Grutter and cannot be consistent with the “strict scrutiny” Grutter requires. Indeed, rather than working to phase out public university race preferences consistent with the expectations the Court articulated in Grutter – Justice O’Connor famously wrote that the diversity rationale would only suffice for about 25 years – the Fifth Circuit provides a veritable roadmap for discriminatory state action.

Now, it would be ideal if all nine justices were courageous enough to uphold constitutional protections for all citizens by refusing to legitimize racially discriminatory state action, regardless of the good-faith motives or other political atmospherics surrounding that action. Progressive legal theory being what it is, however, such a result, where people are judged on the content of their character/qualifications rather than the color of their skin, is unfortunately still a dream. There is, however, an argument that might sway even those members of the Court who support affirmative action as a policy matter: race preferences hurt those they are intended to help.

As highlighted in Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor’s amicus brief, a growing body of research suggests that when the capabilities of a student’s peers exceed their own, the student performs worse than when surrounded by peers with objectively similar capacities. Sander (a UCLA economist and law professor) and Taylor (a lawyer and journalist who has long covered civil rights issues) utilize this “mismatch theory” to discredit the assumption underlying race preference programs – that they benefit minorities – and demonstrate that the opposite is true. They further point out that racial preferences have failed to have their intended effects; namely, preventing racial balancing, fostering diversity, and making universities more attractive to minorities.

Three U.S. Civil Rights Commissioners also filed an amicus brief presenting evidence that racial preferences produce the opposite of their intended effect; they discourage rather than facilitate the entry of minorities into prestigious careers by incentivizing elite public universities to admit students they would not admit if admissions were race-blind. They argue that racial preferences place students in environments that do not optimize to their learning. Citing robust statistics, they conclude that this effect actually discourages minorities from entering science and engineering careers and becoming college professors, and decreases the number of minority students accepted to law schools who actually earn JDs and pass the bar exam.

The well-intentioned advocates of race-conscious public university admissions got it wrong under the Constitution. These briefs further illustrate the detriment everyone in society suffers when state action based on race rather than merit dictates the paths of young Americans.

Under the Court’s request for a response, the university has until the end of the month to file, unless it asks for and is granted an extension.  If the university’s response arrives by January, the case – if the Supreme Court takes it – should be on schedule for argument and decision this term.  For more on Fisher v. University of Texas, see the case’s SCOTUSblog page.

Thanks to Cato legal associate (and UT alumna) Anna Mackin for help with this blogpost.

D.C. Circuit Paves Way for Supreme Court Consideration of Obamacare

Today the D.C. Circuit ruled that the individual mandate is a constitutional exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause.  Senior Judge Laurence Silberman (Reagan appointee) wrote the opinion, which was joined by Senior Judge  Harry Edwards (Carter appointee).  Judge Brett Kavanaugh (George W. Bush appointee) dissented on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits, finding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the suit until the individual mandate/penalty/tax goes into effect.  (The case is Seven-Sky v. Holder; see Cato’s amicus brief and a quick breakdown by Tim Sandefur.)

Sure, this is a loss for our side but it’s not a big deal. Every development in the Obamacare litigation has been anticlimactic since the Eleventh Circuit split with the Sixth, guaranteeing that the Supreme Court would take the case.  Today’s ruling, therefore, is notable not so much for its result – upholding the individual mandate – as for the reluctance with which it reached it.  

After acknowledging the novelty of the power Congress is asserting, the court expressed concern at “the Government’s failure to advance any clear doctrinal principles limiting congressional mandates that any American purchase any product or service in interstate commerce.”  In other words, the majority saw itself bound by the Supreme Court’s broad reading of federal power under the Commerce Clause but felt “discomfort” at reaching a result that seemingly had no bounds.  

Indeed, the government has yet to tell any court in any of the cases what it cannot do under the guise of regulating interstate commerce.  But rest assured that the Supreme Court will ask again, and soon – it considers the myriad cert petitions later this week.  And if the high court is as unsatisfied with the government’s jurisprudential non-theory as the D.C. Circuit was, it will not hesitate to strike down this expansion of federal power. 

“Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity,” wrote Justice Kennedy for a unanimous Court last term (United States v. Bond).  “Federalism secures the freedom of the individual.” 

I am confident that the Supreme Court will not allow this unprecedented invasion of individual liberty.

There’s No Drug War Exception to the Constitution

Florida is so zealous in pursuing the war on drugs that its laws classify the possession, sale, and delivery of controlled substances as crimes not requiring the state to prove that the defendant knew he had possessed, sold, or delivered those substances.

In Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Shelton, state prosecutors convicted Mackie Shelton of transporting cocaine under one of these “strict liability” statutes, the trial judge having instructed the jury that the state only needed to prove that Shelton delivered a substance and that the substance was cocaine. Shelton successfully challenged the constitutionality of that state law in federal court, where the district judge overturned the conviction and noted that “Florida stands alone in its express elimination of mens rea as an element of a drug offense.”

Florida appealed that ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Cato has joined the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, ACLU, Drug Policy Alliance, Calvert Institute for Policy Research, and 38 law professors on an amicus brief supporting Shelton’s position.

The Supreme Court has recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that criminal culpability requires mens rea (a guilty mind). These “strict liability” crimes fall under the rubric of “public welfare offenses” and are typically what most people would not consider “serious,” such as traffic violations and selling alcohol to minors. Policymakers justify dispensing with mens rea requirements in such contexts by citing the need to deter businesses from imposing costs on society at large, or the burden that having to prove mens rea in these sorts of cases would overwhelm courts, or that the penalties are relatively small and carry little social stigma.

Florida’s legislature, however, went well beyond the normal boundaries of public welfare offenses in imposing strict liability for drug crimes that can carry significant prison terms — and thus violated the due process of law and traditional notions of fundamental fairness. As an alternative argument purporting to save its drug laws, Florida points to the availability of affirmative defenses, that these defenses (e.g., “I didn’t know it was cocaine”) to a presumption of guilty intent take the statute out of the (constitutionally dubious) strict liability category.

But a state may not simply presume the mens rea element of a crime: In Patterson v. New York (1977), for example, the Supreme Court held that prosecutors cannot reallocate the burden of proof by forcing a defendant to prove an affirmative defense. In requiring defendants to prove that they are “blameless” in these sorts of drug crimes, Florida’s statutes fail constitutional muster.

We urge the Eleventh Circuit to affirm the district court’s ruling that the offending state law unconstitutional.

Obamacare Litigation Update: All the Briefs the Supreme Court Needs to Take the Case Are In

In the last week, we’ve seen another slew of Supreme Court filings regarding the various Obamacare lawsuits.  Most notably, the private plaintiffs in the Florida/Eleventh Circuit case (the NFIB and two individuals)—represented by Mike Carvin and Randy Barnett, among others—filed their response to the government’s cert petition last Friday, two weeks before it was due! 

So, as with the cert petitions themselves at the end of September, the private plaintiffs initiated a “filing cascade” (my phrase, not a legal term of art) and forced the government’s hand.  The government then filed its consolidated response (to both the private and state plaintiff petitions) on Wednesday, and the (26) state plaintiffs—represented by former solicitor general Paul Clement—also filed their response to the government’s petition.

Got all that?  It basically means that all the necessary filings are in and the case is “ready for distribution” to the justices’ chambers for consideration of the cert petitions, which could happen as early as the Court’s November 10 conference. That means we could see an order about which case(s)/issue(s) the Court is taking as early as November 14.

So that’s the timing.  A brief note on substance: As you may recall, the Eleventh Circuit plaintiffs want the Court to review the following issues: whether the individual mandate exceeds federal power, the new Medicaid regulations/expansion as coercing the states, the mandate that states provide health insurance in their roles as employers, and severability.  The government, for its part, wants the Court to review the individual mandate, whether the Anti-Injunction Act makes the suits unripe (it argues that the AIA doesn’t apply but still, oddly, wants the Court to weigh in), and severability.  On this last point, the government has reiterated its position that if the individual mandate falls, the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions must fall with it—a position that garnered some media attention but is both consistent with its previous arguments and honest lawyering.  (It’s disingenuous as a matter of basic economics to argue that the overall reform can survive without the individual mandate, even if that’s the incongruous position that the Eleventh Circuit took rejecting the government’s “concession” on severability.)  Of course, the government is also hoping that the idea that striking the individual mandate also means striking the provision requiring coverage of pre-existing conditions will make the Court hesitant to do so.

Note that the government also filed its response to the Liberty University petition and still has time to file a response to Virginia’s cert petition (on the state standing issue), both out of the Fourth Circuit.  It argues, as do the Eleventh Circuit plaintiffs, that the Court should hold these petitions (as well as the Thomas More Legal Center’s out of the Sixth Circuit) pending resolution of the Eleventh Circuit case.   Finally, the D.C. Circuit has yet to issue its opinion in the Obamacare case argued there a month ago.

For more on both the timing and which issues the Court is likely to take, see Lyle Denniston’s excellent analysis at SCOTUSblog.