Tag: amicus briefs

Supreme Court Ducks Key Second Amendment Issue — For Now

Alas this morning the Supreme Court declined to review Kachalsky v. Cacace the challenge to New York City’s effective ban on carrying firearms (which I’ve previously discussed).  To correct some early media reports, this does not mean that the Court upheld the law or affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  It simply means that the scope of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms outside the home remains an open question, subject to divergent rulings in the lower courts.

But those lower-court rulings have indeed diverged greatly, creating what lawyers call a “circuit split.”  The Second Circuit in Kachalsky applied a nominal intermediate scrutiny that ultimately became perfunctory deference to the legislature, with the burden on the plaintiffs to justify the exercise of their rights. The Seventh Circuit, meanwhile, in an opinion by Judge Richard Posner in Moore v. Madigan, struck down Chicago’s complete prohibition on carrying firearms, finding that Illinois could not justify such extreme measures.  For “a severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense,” the same court ruled in an earlier case, the government must provide “an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close fit between the government’s means and its end.””  The D.C. and Fourth Circuits, meanwhile, have presumed the constitutionality of legislated restrictions, although D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote an important dissent suggesting that the scope of the right to carry should be determined by analogizing historical practice and precedent.

Those who follow firearms policy now recognize that this issue that was left open by District of Columbia v. Heller – the scope of the individual right that the Second Amendment protects – is crying out for resolution.  As Cato said in the brief we filed supporting the Kachalsky petition:

The Second Amendment’s scope and the means of assessing restrictions on that right thus remain largely undefined. No other constitutional right has been so left to fend for itself in the lower courts. This Court has not hesitated to seize opportunities to ensure the protection of other constitutional rights—recognizing historically based categorical rules, developing comprehensive methodologies, and announcing robust standards. The Second Amendment merits, and now needs, the same solicitude.

Whatever analytical approach the Court ultimately employs, the time has come to begin filling in the picture that the Court outlined in Heller, and to bring some harmony to the cacophony below.

We’ll now have to wait a bit longer for the Court to do that. As is always the case, the Court doesn’t give reasons for granting or denying review, but it’s possible that the Court didn’t want to take a gun case from the Second Circuit, which has jurisdiction over Connecticut, where the Newtown shootings occurred.  Or it may be waiting for Moore v. Madigan, because taking a petition brought by a state government would be seen as less discretionary – and would also allow the Court to focus on a complete ban on the right to carry rather than severe restrictions.  (D.C. and Illinois are the only jurisdictions that have flat bans, while 10 states, including New York, “may issue” such licenses in practice, but most rarely do in practice except to celebrities and former law enforcement officers.  The vast majority of states “shall issue” carry licenses unless the applicant has a felony conviction or mental illness, while a handful don’t require a license at all.)  

In any event, the issue isn’t going away and there’s only so long that the Court will be able to bear the legal incongruity and uncertainty. As former solicitor general Paul Clement – who represented the NRA in McDonald v. Chicago put it, “They’re eventually going to have to take it.”

Government Can’t Condition Federal Contracts on Giving Up Constitutional Rights

Under the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, the government requires groups receiving federal funding for overseas HIV/AIDS programs to adopt policies explicitly opposing prostitution. Several nonprofit organizations receiving federal funds claim that this “policy requirement” violates their First Amendment rights.

The groups don’t seek to advocate for prostitution (or its legalization), but would rather not speak on the issue at all. Successful efforts to fight AIDS often involve working cooperatively with marginalized groups, so adopting a policy statement that explicitly renounces prostitution could frustrate outreach efforts to disseminate public health information. The government, however, requires funding recipients to espouse such an anti-prostitution policy even when they spend private funds.

The district court ruled in the nonprofit groups’ favor, holding that the policy requirement violates the First Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the government may not condition the receipt of public funds on giving up First Amendment rights. Indeed, were the government’s position accepted, it would eviscerate the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, which the Court has long recognized to prevent the conditioning of generally available federal benefits on the waiver of fundamental rights.

This week, Cato filed an amicus brief arguing that the policy requirement significantly burdens political speech, the constitutional protection of which lies at the very heart of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress may not condition participation in federal programs on speech limitations that are outside the scope of the program being funded: the Court has never given Congress carte blanche to give federal contractors Hobson’s Choices, whether relating to the freedom of speech or other constitutional rights. It should thus continue to adhere to the principle that Congress’s power to condition funding is limited to ensuring that its funds are used to properly implement the program that Congress wishes to fund, not to compel private organizations to adopt express “policies” that don’t relate to the use of those federal funds.

The Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International on April 22.

U.S. Can’t Use Supreme Court’s Property Rights Ruling to Rewrite Takings Law

The Supreme Court ruled in December that a taking occurs when a government action gives rise to “a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of land,” thus allowing the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission to proceed with claims relating to the damage caused by government-induced flooding of a state wildlife management area. (The lower court had bizarrely held that while temporary physical invasions and permanent floods were subject to takings analysis, temporary flooding, even if repeated, was not.  For more background and links to Cato’s amicus briefs before the Supreme Court, see Roger Pilon’s commentary.)

On remand to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, the United States, relying on a single passage from the opinion, contends that the Supreme Court created a new multi-factor test applicable to all regulatory and temporary physical takings claims. Cato has now joined the Pacific Legal Foundation, National Federation of Independent Business, and National Association of Home Builders on a brief supporting the Commission and arguing that the passage upon which the government relies is both non-binding (“dicta” in legal terms) and in any event cannot be read to upset the distinction between regulatory and physical takings that the Court has consistently asserted.

It is well established in the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence that government intrusions on private property that permanently deprive the owner of a valuable property interest are to be subjected to the same test, regardless of whether the invasions are permanent or temporary. Under that test, courts are to consider the duration of the government intrusion, along with other information, to determine (1) whether the invasion is the direct cause of injury to the property and (2) whether the injury is substantial enough to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property and limit his exploitation thereof. If the injury to the property is substantial, it doesn’t matter whether the it was caused by an invasion of limited duration; once it is shown that the government invasion directly and substantially interfered with an owner’s property right, the government has a categorical duty to pay compensation.

In this case, the government’s intrusion permanently damaged significant property — valuable timber, from the destruction of trees — and is thus a compensable taking. The Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission didn’t modify or overturn the well-settled test for adjudicating physical takings claims, which remains distinct from the test that controls regulatory takings claims.

The Federal Circuit will hear argument in the case later this spring.

Supreme Court Should Clarify the Meaning of “One-Person, One-Vote”

As I wrote in January, the Supreme Court is currently considering – and will likely decide next week – whether to review a case, Lepak v. City of Irving, involving the constitutional principle of one-person, one-vote (OPOV). The specific issue is whether redistricting processes trying to comply with OPOV should equalize the total population in each electoral district or the number of citizens of voting age.  If the former, then a relatively small number of eligible voters in a heavily immigrant district can have their votes “over-weighted” compared to voters in other districts that are similarly populated but have far more eligible voters – as happened in Irving, Texas. Cato filed a brief supporting the challengers that highlighted the untenable conflict between OPOV and modern applications of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Over the last few days, several commentators have discussed this case and its implications -– including most recently Adam Liptak in the New York Times.  Most have presented the question facing the Court in Lepak as a choice between two competing theories of democracy: electoral equality (ensuring the equal weighting of voters’ votes) and representational equality (ensuring residents have equal access to representation).  For example, Liptak quotes University of Texas law professor Joseph Fishkin as describing the “enormous practical consequences” of a Court ruling that mandates electoral equality, which include “shift[ing] power markedly at every level, away from cities and neighborhoods with many immigrants and children and toward the older, white, more exclusive native-born areas.”  But this framing of the issue as a mutually exclusive “choice” rests on two crucial assumption, both of which are deeply flawed. 

First, most basically, it’s a false choice.  Electoral and representational equality aren’t mututally exclusive.  States and cities can –and almost always do, albeit unconsciously – create districts that meet both criteria.  That’s because equalizing population between districts will almost always equalize voting power too.  But even in the exceptional case where there are geographic concentrations of disproportionately non-citizen populations in a particular political subdivision, districts meeting both criteria can still easily be formed.   Legislators routinely draw districts that satisfy multiple goals – for instance, equal numbers of total population and certain partisan majorities.  If a state or city pursued both electoral and representational equality as apportionment goals, Fishkin’s parade of horribles would easily be avoided.

Second, Fishkin’s framing incorrectly assumes that OPOV can be met either by equalizing voting power or by equalizing representational access.  But OPOV isn’t some kind of constitutional either/or.  Indeed, as the name itself suggests, the constitutional requirement is one-person, one-vote, not one-person, one-equal-share-of-access-to-representation.  The Supreme Court has made clear that the person being protected by the doctrine is the voter and the thing being protected is the weight of that voter’s vote.  Thus the Court “simply stated” the OPOV doctrine as follows in the 1964 case of Reynolds v. Sims: “An individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living on other parts of the State.”  In other words, the right of a voter to an equally weighted vote stands on its own constitutional grounds.  This right doesn’t somehow evaporate when a city or state creates electoral districts containing equal populations.

This same flaw infects the reasoning in the three circuit court cases that have previously addressed this issue (whose divergent reasoning itself begs Supreme Court instruction).  As the lawyers representing the Lepak plaintiffs – one of whom I should mention is a former co-clerk of mine – put in a recent article in the Texas Review of Law and Politics:

Each [of the lower-court decisions] treats representational equality and electoral equality as morally and constitutionally equivalent. But this is putting the cart before the horse. Even assuming there is a constitutional right to equal representation, in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, electoral equality clearly reigns supreme. The Supreme Court has noted the right to vote is “preservative of all other rights,” and it is. Before there can be any meaningful representation, the right to vote must be protected and secured. In any “clash” between the right of a voter to an equally weighted vote and the right of a nonvoter to equal representation, the right of the voter trumps. 

By ignoring this reality and imposing literally no limits on how severely a city or state could dilute the weight of its voters’ votes, Garza, Daly, and Chen set a dangerous precedent. In those cases, vote dilution was as high as fifty percent. That result is pernicious enough. But it is just the tip of the iceberg. Under the holdings of these cases, so long as the total populations between the districts are equalized, a city could arbitrarily “choose” to make one voter’s vote worth two times, ten times, or even ten thousand times as much as another voter’s vote. Under these cases, any of these “political choices” would be acceptable. Yet how could any of these results be squared with the Supreme Court’s categorical holding that a voter has “a constitutional right to vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted”?

It’s a good question, and one the Supreme Court will hopefully soon answer.

Guns and the Commerce Clause: On the Way to the Supreme Court?

Nearly two years ago, I wrote about an intriguing Commerce Clause case involving the Montana Firearms Freedom Act.  To wit, Montana enacted a regulatory regime to cover guns manufactured and kept wholly within state lines that was less restrictive than federal law.  The Montana Shooting Sports Association filed a claim for declaratory judgment to ensure that Montanans could enjoy the benefits of this state legislation without threat of federal prosecution.  The federal district court ruled against the MSSA.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Cato joined the Goldwater Institute on an amicus brief, arguing that federal law doesn’t preempt Montana’s ability to exercise its sovereign police powers to facilitate the exercise of individual rights protected by the Second and Ninth Amendments. More specifically, for federal law to trump the MFFA, the government must claim that the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses give it the power to regulate wholly intrastate manufacture, sale, and possession of guns, which is a state-specific market distinct from any related national one.

The lawsuit’s importance is not limited to Montana; a majority of states have either passed or introduced such legislation. The goal here is to reinforce state regulatory authority over commerce that is by definition intrastate, to take back some of the ground occupied by modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

Well, after much delay – in part due to the Ninth Circuit’s waiting for Supreme Court instruction on the Commerce Clause in the Obamacare litigation – MSSA v. Holder finally saw oral argument two weeks ago.  The Goldwater Institute’s Nick Dranias, who was the principal author of our joint brief, was able to get 10 minutes of argument time and sent me this report afterwards, which I reprint with his permission:

Supreme Court Could Also Strike Down DOMA on Federalism Grounds

One of the more interesting and potentially influential amicus briefs in United States v. Windsor, the case challenging DOMA Section 3, is one filed by a group of federalism scholars, all of whom have some connection to Cato and/or are generally sympathetic to the positions we take at the Center for Constitutional Studies. As Dale Carpenter puts it on the Volokh Conspiracy blog:

Today I’m proud to join three of my co-Conspirators — Jonathan Adler, Randy Barnett, and Ilya Somin — as well as Ernie Young and Lynn Baker in filing an amicus brief in United States v. Windsor arguing that DOMA Section 3 is unconstitutional. While this conclusion is shared by 69% of constitutional law professors around the country, our route to that end is probably not as widely shared.

Our view is that Section 3 fails equal protection review for a reason quite distinct from the standard approaches relying on heightened-scrutiny analysis.  Whatever else may be its constitutional defects, Section 3 is not a constitutional exercise of any enumerated federal power.  It is also not a “necessary and proper” measure to carry into execution any of Congress’s enumerated powers.  Instead, it is an unprecedented expansion of federal authority into a domain traditionally controlled by the states.  The federal government claims a hitherto unknown and sweeping power to determine marital and family status.  While Congress has not (yet?) claimed a statutory authority to bar states from recognizing specific marriages, it has greatly complicated and burdened their police power to do so through the enforcement of DOMA. It may well be that Congress has authority to limit access to specific federal benefits otherwise available to validly married people.  But Section 3, as an across-the-board enactment untethered to any specific power, is not plainly adapted to serve any “legitimate” interest of the federal government.

This may be an appealing argument for those on the Court who take federalism seriously and have a problem with Section 3 but may not be ready to extend the constitutional right to marry to same-sex couples. Coincidentally, the justice most likely to fall into that category is Anthony Kennedy—who will almost certainly be the swing vote in these cases—but the four “conservative” justices could also sign on to something like this even as they vehemently reject the broader constitutional argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry (the Prop 8 case) or in future cases challenging state denials of marriage licenses.  The four “liberal” justices, meanwhile, don’t care about limiting federal power through constitutional structure, but will presumably vote to strike down Section 3 on equal protection grounds.

Indeed, as I wrote in December, “I could see an opinion stating that marriage is an issue that our federal system leaves to the states and the federal government has to respect each state’s definition of it in granting benefits based on that status. That would mean that federal benefits would operate differently in different states, but so be it; gay married couples would have an incentive to live in the growing number of states that recognize their relationships.”

This federalism argument may ultimately be too clever because the federal government certainly does have the power to define the terms in its statutes, which would collapse the issue in Windsor back to whether the restriction on DOMA’s definition of marriage survives equal protection analysis (on which see Cato’s brief). It would also probably be a mere way-station on the road to full marriage equality, becoming increasingly academic as more states allow same-sex marriage. But, as I said, it’s more likely to resonate with certain members of the Court—and could have the potentially more important benefit of strengthening federalism in other areas of policy.

It would also mean the striking down of arguably the most signficiant federal law on federalism grounds in the modern era. We shall see.

“Equality Under the Law” Requires State-Sanctioned Marriage to Be Available to Same-Sex Couples

The idea of equality under the law dates back to the foundations of democracy and the ancient Greek word “isonomia.” “Equal justice under law” remains so essential today that it is engraved in the cornice of the Supreme Court building.

In 1868, Congress and the states codified this important ideal into the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” As the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly show, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees to all persons — regardless of race, sex, or any other group characteristics — equality under the law, including the legal right to marry the person of one’s choosing.

In 2008, however, California voters passed Proposition 8, a ballot initiative reversing a California Supreme Court ruling that had authorized same-sex marriage and restricting the right to marry to opposite-sex couples only. Both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Prop. 8 was unconstitutional, for reasons ranging from the violation of a fundamental right to the impropriety of removing rights/benefits once granted.

With the case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, now before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Cato Institute has joined the Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) on an amicus brief that focuses on supporting marriage equality under the Equal Protection Clause. Our brief explains that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was not exclusively to address the disparaged rights of former slaves but, as the historical record shows, was intended to be universal in its protection of “any person” within U.S. jurisdiction.

The broad and sweeping guarantee of legal equality was understood at the time to secure and protect the equal rights of all individuals, so as to prohibit arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood marriage to be a personal, individual right that, when established by a state, must be made available on an equal basis to all.

Moreover, the Constitution also protects fundamental rights against state infringement under the substantive liberty provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Decades of Supreme Court cases protecting the equal right to marry — without regard to race, being behind on child support payments, or even imprisonment — have been rooted in both the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of equality under the law and the Fourteenth Amendment’s broader liberty protections, which converge in securing for all persons an equal right to marry.

Prop. 8 denies gays and lesbians the liberty to marry the person of their own choosing, places a badge of inferiority on same-sex couples’ loving relationships and family life (with the full authority of the state behind it), and perpetrates an impermissible injury to these individuals’ personal dignity. It thus directly subverts the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is an affront to the inalienable right to pursue one’s own happiness that has guided our nation since its founding.

We urge the Supreme Court, which will hear Perry on March 26, to invalidate Prop. 8 as a violation of the foundational guarantee that all persons shall have equality under the law.

See also my op-ed with CAC’s Doug Kendall, which further explains our reasoning – and stay tuned for another joint brief tomorrow in United States v. Windsor, the Defense of Marriage Act case also on the Court’s docket this term.