Archives: 11/2014

Krugman vs. Krugman on Statutory Interpretation

To follow-up on my colleague Walter Olson’s earlier post on the Paul Krugman piece on King v. Burwell, what struck me was Krugman’s flexible approach to statutory interpretation.

Here he is in today’s piece:

Last week the court shocked many observers by saying that it was willing to hear a case claiming that the wording of one clause in the Affordable Care Act sets drastic limits on subsidies to Americans who buy health insurance. It’s a ridiculous claim; not only is it clear from everything else in the act that there was no intention to set such limits, you can ask the people who drafted the law what they intended, and it wasn’t what the plaintiffs claim. …

 if you look at the specific language authorizing those subsidies, it could be taken — by an incredibly hostile reader — to say that they’re available only to Americans using state-run exchanges, not to those using the federal exchanges.

As I said, everything else in the act makes it clear that this was not the drafters’ intention, and in any case you can ask them directly, and they’ll tell you that this was nothing but sloppy language. …

So, don’t worry so much about the specific language; instead, look at the drafters’ intent and the surrounding context. Got it.

On the other hand, here’s Krugman from January of 2013, writing about the idea of a platinum coin:

Enter the platinum coin. There’s a legal loophole allowing the Treasury to mint platinum coins in any denomination the secretary chooses. Yes, it was intended to allow commemorative collector’s items — but that’s not what the letter of the law says. And by minting a $1 trillion coin, then depositing it at the Fed, the Treasury could acquire enough cash to sidestep the debt ceiling — while doing no economic harm at all.

So in this situation, you should stick to the “letter of the law,” and not worry so much about the drafters’ intent.

Hmm, how to reconcile those two Krugman assertions about the proper approach to statutory interpretation?  That’s a tough one.  Wait, I got it!  We’ll call this the Krugman canon of construction: “Interpret statutes in whatever way makes them consistent with your policy preferences.”

Congress Should Tell President Barack Obama No to War against the Islamic State

President Barack Obama finally is obeying the law. He wants Congress to authorize military action against the Islamic State. 

Congress should respond as it was prepared to do when the president requested permission last year to bomb Syria: Capitol Hill should say no.

Candidate Barack Obama stated: “The president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”  But three years ago, President Obama took America into war against Libya.  Three months ago, he initiated hostilities in Iraq against the Islamic State. Both without a congressional vote.

Most recently, administration officials claimed authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force against al-Qaeda adopted in the aftermath of September 11.  But the Islamic State is not al-Qaeda and ISIL’s leaders did not help organize the attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon. 

The president obviously changed his mind after his party was defeated in the off-year elections.  At least he now is following the Constitution. 

The Founders gave most military powers to Congress: raising and funding the military, writing the rules of war, issuing letters of marquee, and ratifying treaties. Moreover, Article I, Section 8 (11) states: “Congress shall have the power … to declare war.” 

The early Americans feared a president and war like today.  The Founders particularly opposed a system which subjected the nation’s peace to the whims of one man, accountable to no one.

Research Shows that Small Government Is Efficient Government

I’ve argued that we’ll get better government if we make it smaller.

And Mark Steyn humorously observed, “our government is more expensive than any government in history – and we have nothing to show for it.”

But can these assertions be quantified?

I had an email exchange last week with a gentleman from Texas who wanted to know if I had any research on the efficiency of government. He specifically wanted to know the “ratio of federal tax dollars collected to the actual delivery of the service.”

That was a challenge. If he simply wanted examples of government waste, I could have overloaded his inbox.

But he wanted an efficiency measure, which requires apples-to-apples comparisons to see which jurisdictions are delivering the most output (government services) compared to input (how much is spent on those services).

My one example was in the field of education, where I was ashamed to report that the United States spends more per student than any other nation, yet we get depressingly mediocre results (though that shouldn’t be a surprise for anyone who has looked at this jaw-dropping chart comparing spending and educational performance).

But his query motivated me to do some research and I found an excellent 2003 study from the European Central Bank. Authored by Antonio Afonso, Ludger Schuknecht, and Vito Tanzi, the study specifically examines the degree to which governments are providing value, and at what cost.

Krugman on King v. Burwell

Even by his standards, Paul Krugman uses remarkably ugly and truculent language in challenging the good faith of those who take a view opposed to his on the case of King v. Burwell, just granted certiorari by the Supreme Court following a split among lower courts. Krugman claims that federal judges who rule against his own position on the case are “corrupt, willing to pervert the law to serve political masters.” Yes, that’s really what he writes – you can read it here.

A round of commentary on legal blogs this morning sheds light on whether Krugman knows what he’s talking about. 

“Once upon a time,” Krugman claims, “this lawsuit would have been literally laughed out of court.” [Citation needed, as one commenter put it] The closest Krugman comes to acknowledging that a plain-language reading of the statute runs against him is in the following:

But if you look at the specific language authorizing those subsidies, it could be taken — by an incredibly hostile reader — to say that they’re available only to Americans using state-run exchanges, not to those using the federal exchanges.

New York City lawyer and legal blogger Scott Greenfield responds

If by “incredibly hostile reader,” Krugman means someone with a basic familiarity with the English language, then he’s right.  That’s what the law says. … There is such a thing as a “scrivener’s error,” that the guy who wrote it down made a mistake, left out a word or put in the wrong punctuation, and that the error was not substantive even though it has a disproportionate impact on meaning.  A typo is such an error.  I know typos. This was not a typo. This was not a word misspelled because the scribe erred.  This was a structural error in the law enacted. Should it be corrected? Of course, but that’s a matter for Congress.

While some ObamaCare proponents may now portray the provision as a mere slip in need of correction, as I noted at Overlawyered in July, “ObamaCare architect Jonathan Gruber had delivered remarks on multiple 2012 occasions suggesting that the lack of subsidies for federally sponsored exchanges served the function (as critics had contended it did) of politically punishing states that refuse to set up exchanges.”

Josh Blackman, meanwhile, points out something incidental yet revealing about Krugman’s column: its homespun introductory anecdote about how his parents discovered that they had been stuck with a mistaken deed to their property, fixed (“of course”) by the town clerk presumably with a few pen strokes and a smile, couldn’t possibly have happened the way Krugman said it did. Property law, much more so than statutory construction, is super-strict about these matters.

If your deed is incorrect, you cannot simply get the “town clerk” to “fix the language”. … Mistakes are enforced by courts. That’s why [everyone] should purchase title insurance. … 

So this is the exact opposite example of what Krugman would want to use to illustrate why King is “frivolous.” If courts applied property doctrine to the construction of statutes, this case would be over in 5 seconds. The government loses. 

To be sure, there may be better arguments with which to defend the Obama administration’s side of the King case. But do not look for them in Paul Krugman’s commentary, which instead seems almost designed to serve the function of pre-gaming a possible defeat in King by casting the federal judiciary itself as “corrupt” and illegitimate.  

 

 

You Ought to Have A Look: IPCC Deception, Poorly Performing Climate Models, Natural Disasters

You Ought to Have a Look is a feature from the Center for the Study of Science, posted by Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. (“Chip”) Knappenberger. While this section will feature all of the areas of interest that we are emphasizing, the prominence of the climate issue is driving a tremendous amount of web traffic. Here we post a few of the best in recent days, along with our color commentary.

Leaving the election results aside (noting that they were bad for the Obama administration’s ill-founded and executive-ordered climate policies), we highlight a couple (among the many) interesting climate change–related tidbits scattered among the intertubes.

The first is an analysis of what was left out of the latest (final?) report from the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), conducted by Marcel Crok, a Dutch journalist who covers climate change with a somewhat skeptical eye.

Crok recently partnered up with climate researcher Nic Lewis to produce a major analysis of climate sensitivity—one of the key parameters in helping to understand how much influence human activities will have on the future climate—for the United Kingdom’s Global Warming Policy Foundation  (another site that you’ll surely be hearing from in these pages from time to time). Lewis and Crok found that the IPCC greatly overestimated the climate sensitivity based on a critical review of the extant scientific literature on the topic.

In a post this week on his blog (which is sometimes written in Dutch), Crok compares how the IPCC treatment of climate sensitivity changed from being-front-and-center in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report to being nearly buried in its 2014 Fifth Assessment Report.  

Why the change? Because the more people look at climate sensitivity, the less it looks like the IPCC produced a very good “assessment” of it. Virtually the entirety of their reports are premised on a climate sensitivity of around 3.5°C. A much more realistic value is around  2.0°C—a difference so large as to consign most of the IPCC reports to the dustbin of climate history.

Will the Supreme Court Take Up Marriage Cases After All?

While the Supreme Court’s decision last month not to take up the same-sex marriage cases that had accumulate over the summer surprised some (but not all), that “decision not to decide” was easily explained by the absence of a conflict in the lower courts. All of the federal courts of appeal to have ruled had held traditional state definitions of marriage to be unconstitutional. As of this past Thursday, however, that’s no longer the case.

In case you’ve been overly focused on the last few days’ other big legal news, the Cincinnati-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled 2-1 in favor of the state marriage laws of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee (cases in which Cato filed several briefs). Judge Jeffrey Sutton – whose previous turn in the national spotlight came when he voted to uphold Obamacare’ individual mandate before the Supreme Court got that case – wrote a magisterial opinion rejecting the challengers arguments regarding the Fourteenth Amendment. While I disagree with it for reasons spelled out in Cato’s various briefs, it’s seriously the best possible legal articulation of why states should remain free to restrict marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples. Sutton’s elegant and well-crafted opinion, though ultimately wrong, puts to shame many of the opinions that nevertheless correctly struck down state marriage laws – most notably Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s, which reads like a stream-of-consciousness college-sophomore sociology paper.

And this development wasn’t surprising. The conventional wisdom was that Sutton would be the swing vote on the panel and that he would invoke Baker v Nelson – the Supreme Court’s 1972 dismissal of a gay-marriage lawsuit “for want of a substantial federal question” – as binding lower courts’ hands notwithstanding Windsor v. United States and other legal developments. Ilya Somin makes an astute observation comparing Sutton’s approach to what he did in the Obamacare case:

Some of the flaws in Sutton’s analysis in the same-sex marriage case bear a surprising resemblance to those of his most famous previous opinion: his concurrence upholding the Obamacare individual health insurance mandate. In that case, he relied on an idiosyncratic interpretation of the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges that went against Supreme Court precedent, and was not adopted by any of the other judges who considered the issue on either the Supreme Court or the lower courts (including the many who voted to uphold the mandate on other grounds). Both opinions combine strong rhetorical statements about the humility required of lower court judges – especially when it comes to deferring to the Supreme Court – with neglect or significant misunderstanding of relevant Supreme Court precedent.

The practical question now is whether the cert-petition process will be completed quickly enough for the Court to consider these cases this term or whether it’s pushed to next fall (meaning a ruling as late as June 2016). Dale Carpenter and Josh Blackman sketch out the twists and turns we can expect, ultimately concluding that it’ll be very close, given that generally only cases the Court takes by early January make it onto the argument calendar for the same term. The challengers will be filing their cert petition(s) this very week, which makes an argument in late April still theoretically possible. 

My bet is that Chief Justice Roberts maneuvers behind the scenes in such a way that argument won’t be until next term begins in October but the ruling will come by Christmas 2015. Of course, if Justice Ginsburg retires or is otherwise unable to perform her duties at any point in this process, the case/ruling will be held up, thus setting up a presidential election in which same-sex marriage figures much more prominently than any we’ve had.

New Attorney General Pick a Savvy Move

President Obama has finally managed to strike the proper political tone on something. His nomination of federal prosecutor Loretta Lynch is unlikely to ruffle the feathers of the lame duck Congress and should let the Justice Department operate with less political opposition. Like George W. Bush’s appointment of Michael Mukasey to replace the embattled Alberto Gonzalez, Lynch is likely to be a low-profile steady hand to replace the radioactive Eric Holder.

At the same time, picking the first black woman AG allows the president to further his diversity agenda without spending tremendous political capital (which he doesn’t now have) – in a way that wouldn’t have been possible with Tom Perez, the controversial labor secretary who was also thought to be a contender for the job. All in all, while I’m sure I’ll disagree with some of Lynch’s enforcement decisions, this nomination means that legal analysts’ focus will largely remain on those policy issues rather than the controversial personalities and politics behind them.