In his book, Tripwire: Korea
and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Cato senior fellow and
syndicated columnist Doug Bandow presents a comprehensive review
of the history of U.S. military involvement in South Korea and argues
that it is time to recognize that South Korea is capable of
defending itself and bring American troops home.
Bandow contends that military activism abroad may have been
justified at one time to contain the hegemonic threat posed by the
Soviet Union and its clients. However, with the Cold War behind us,
there is no longer any need for U.S. tripwires around the world.
Such a tripwire is especially inappropriate on the Korean
peninsula. "In 1953 the ROK was a wreck--impoverished, war ravaged,
and ruled by an unloved autocrat whose belligerence had helped
plunge his country into a disastrous war. Without an American
security guarantee, South Korea would not have long survived. But
four-plus decades later the South is prosperous and democratic
while its adversary is ruled by an autocrat who lacks both
charisma and international friends. North Korea talks of avoiding
absorption by Seoul, not of conquest."
Washington's military commitment to South Korea has outlived
its usefulness. While South Koreans undoubtedly appreciate the protection,
there is no compelling reason for the forward deployment of U.S.
troops and the corresponding risk to American lives. South
Koreans "will probably still want the United States to be
prepared to fight to the last American for them," Bandow writes,
"but their wishes should not matter. Washington should risk
the lives and wealth of its citizens only when something fundamental
is at stake for their own political community. U.S. soldiers'
lives are not gambit pawns to be sacrificed in some global chess
game."
Bandow builds his case by carefully examining the history of the
U.S. involvement in South Korea and its relation to America's changing
international role. He notes that the United States "emerged
from World War II as the leader of the 'free world' and the only
power strong enough to contain a seemingly aggressive and
threatening Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1953 America
essentially adopted as its responsibility the defense of the
entire globe." South Korea was merely one front in the rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
When the worldwide Soviet threat disintegrated, any need for a
strong U.S. presence in South Korea went with it. However, instead
of gradually disengaging itself, the United States has pursued a
strategy of expanded involvement under the pretext of maintaining
regional stability. Bandow examines the various justifications
for continued involvement and concludes that the "chimera of
stability is likely to lead Washington to risk thousands of lives
day in and day out, and to spend tens of billions of dollars year
after year, in hopes of preventing events that are not only
purely speculative but also tangential to U.S. security."
In the book's final chapter, "A New Foreign Policy for a
Changed World," Bandow eloquently makes the case that it is
time to return to the American tradition of individual liberty at
home and nonintervention abroad.
"Tripwire is a much-needed antidote to the obsolete Cold War thinking that continues to guide American policymaking in Korea. Boandow's solidly based, hard-hitting analysis deserves a wide audience."
-Selig S. Harrison
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1996/260pp./$19.95 cloth ISBN: 1-882577-29-9/$9.95 paper ISBN: 1-882577-30-2
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