Cato News Release - July 26, 2000

Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20001-5403
Phone (202) 842 0200
Fax (202) 842 3490
Contact Us

For Media

News Release

July 26, 2000

Limited Missile Defense Sufficient To Protect U.S., Study Says
More Expansive System Could Jeopardize Arms Control

WASHINGTON-Building a limited missile defense system could achieve U.S. defense goals without endangering arms control efforts, according to a Cato Institute study released today.

As the missile-defense debate intensifies, opponents are claiming that a robust national missile defense (NMD) would lead to a new arms race with Russia and China, while ardent supporters are lobbying to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- the foundation of the modern arms-control regime -- even at the risk of angering Russia. Charles Peña, an independent missile-defense consultant who authored the Cato study, says both factions are misguided.

In "Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive," Peña suggests that a limited NMD system could be built without endangering relations with Russia. He proposes that the United States negotiate new reductions in nuclear stockpiles, down to around 1,500 warheads, which "would be a clear signal that the United States was not attempting to achieve a strategic nuclear advantage over Russia -- thus making it easier for Russia to agree to the proposed NMD deployment."

Indeed, the limited NMD system Peña proposes would be aimed solely at countering missile threats from "rogue nations" and accidental launches. Limited NMD would consist of 100 or 200 interceptors designed to protect the 50 states from such attacks, which is the approach embraced by the Clinton administration. Building a comprehensive NMD system that protected other countries and defended against an all-out missile attack by Russia or China would be "costly, ineffective and provocative," Peña argues.

Although a limited system would require amending the ABM Treaty, Russia may be willing to accept such a change in exchange for deeper cuts in strategic offensive forces, Peña says. Such cuts would still leave the United States with a viable deterrent against missile-wielding nations.

Peña concludes with a warning: While it is possible to achieve a balance between arms control, the ABM Treaty and a defense against emerging threats, "such a balance will not be achieved without dispensing with the overheated political rhetoric on both sides of the issue."

"Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive"